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Abstract 
Psychotherapy and the Embodiment of the Neuronal Identity:  
A Hermeneutic Study of Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: 
Healing the Social Brain 
Ari Natinsky 
Antioch University Seattle 
Seattle, WA 
In recent years, there have been several ways in which researchers have attempted to 
integrate psychotherapy and neuroscience research. Neuroscience has been proposed as a 
method of addressing lingering questions about how best to integrate psychotherapy 
theories and explain their efficacy. For example, some psychotherapy outcome studies 
have included neuroimaging of participants in order to propose neurobiological bases of 
effective psychological interventions (e.g., Paquette et al., 2003). Other theorists have 
used cognitive neuroscience research to suggest neurobiological correlates of various 
psychotherapy theories and concepts (e.g., Schore, 2012). These efforts seem to embody 
broader historical trends, including the hope that neuroscience can resolve philosophical 
questions about the relationship between mind and body, as well as the popular appeal of 
contemporary brain research. In this hermeneutic dissertation I examined a popular 
neuropsychotherapy text in order to explore the historical fit between neuroscience and 
psychotherapy. The study identifies the possible understandings of the self (i.e., what it 
means to be human) that could arise from Western therapy discourses that are based on  
 
iv 
 
neuroscientific interpretations of psychotherapy theories. The methodology of this 
dissertation consisted of a critical textual analysis of Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The 
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain. The primary content, 
rhetorical strategies, and recurring themes in Cozolino’s book were outlined and 
interpreted from a hermeneutic perspective. This included a historical critique of 
Cozolino’s claims about the origins, purpose, and efficacy of psychotherapy, his 
assertions about the relationship between self and brain, and examples of his 
psychotherapy case vignettes. Rhetorical strategies in his writing included analogy, 
ambiguity, speculative language, and figures of speech such as metaphor and 
personification. A discussion of these findings addressed the implications of Cozolino’s 
efforts with regards to patient care, psychotherapy theory integration, and the possible 
effects that these efforts may have on the profession of psychology. The electronic 
version of this dissertation is at OhioLink ETD Center, www.ohiolink.edu/etd 
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Chapter I: Introduction and Background of the Problem  
Introduction 
 Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social 
Brain integrates neuroscience research with explanations for effective psychotherapy 
practices. This text appears alongside over 30 other books in the Norton Series on 
Interpersonal Neurobiology (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2013). The series of texts 
was inspired by the works of psychiatrist and author Daniel Siegel who, beginning with 
his foundational text The Developing Mind (1999) and through subsequent works such as 
The Mindful Brain (2007) and Mindsight (2010), has consolidated a vast collection of 
research from neuroscience disciplines into an integrative theory of human psychological 
and social development. Siegel’s theory, branded interpersonal neurobiology, has 
proposed an integrated connectivity between the human mind, the human brain from 
which the mind is assumed to emerge, and interpersonal relationships that continually 
influence and are influenced by mind-brain interactions within and between individuals 
(Siegel, 1999, 2001). Influenced by this theory, Cozolino encourages psychotherapists to 
adopt (and perhaps encourage potential psychotherapy patients to request) psychotherapy 
practices informed by recent advances in mind-brain research that have been facilitated 
by recent advances in neuroimaging.  
 According to Cozolino, as of October 2013, approximately 25,000 copies of his 
book have been sold since it was first published in 2002 (the second edition was 
published in 2010). Twelve Thousand of those 25,000 copies have been sold in the last 
three years. In other words, there has been a significant increase in recent sales (L. J. 
Cozolino, personal communication, October 30, 2013). Portland State University now 
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offers a certificate program in interpersonal neurobiology that students can use for 
college credit, and professionals can use as continuing education (CE) credits (Portland 
State University, 2013). 
 In a relatively short period of time, the idea of a brain-based psychotherapy has 
become popular among psychotherapists of many theoretical persuasions. Why? What is 
it about neuroscience research that has become so salient for many psychotherapists and 
psychotherapy theorists and researchers in such a short period of time? What are the 
hopes that it has stirred? What is it about the language that this body of literature uses, 
and the larger understandings about self and society that it draws from and appeals to, 
that has made its findings and interpretations so alluring? In other words, what is the 
cultural and historical fit between neuroscience and psychotherapy? In this study I follow 
the suggestions of several historians of brain science (e.g., Borck, 2001; Kay, 2001; Rose, 
2007; Vidal, 2009) who encourage researchers to address the above hermeneutic 
questions by historically situating and interpreting the primary content, rhetorical 
strategies, and themes in Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: 
Healing the Social Brain.  
 The Interpretive Turn in the human sciences during the 20th century led many 
theorists to suggest that scientific breakthroughs are often a matter of fit between the 
larger cultural frame and a specific theory or practice, rather than an isolated discovery 
removed from the history and politics of its time and place (Canguilhem, 1977/1988; 
Cushman, 1995; Foucault, 1966/1994; Gadamer, 1975; Kuhn, 1962). However, theorists 
to date have not adequately addressed the ways in which the integration between 
neuroscience and psychotherapy reflect the current American political and cultural 
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environment in which psychotherapists practice and in which this brain-based 
psychotherapy literature has appeared. As a result, theorists have not been able to address 
how the use of brain-based psychotherapy paradigms could contribute to a shift in the 
ways in which patients and society generally understand the purpose and process of 
psychotherapy, or in a larger view how the current way of being, that is, the self, is 
thought to be understood.  
Background 
 In this section I discuss the convergence of historical factors that I believe 
contributed to the emergence of neuroscience-informed psychotherapies. I provide 
historical perspectives on the understandings and social arrangements from which the self 
is produced, and how the interest in scientifically locating the self in the material brain 
emerged during the modern era. I describe how current neuroscientific research emerged 
along with the advent of mid-20th century biomedical research, and I discuss ways that 
neuroscientific understandings of mind or subjective experience contribute substantially 
to the current way of being in Western culture. I also present philosophical and scientific 
challenges to how neuroscience research often depicts a materialized mind. Finally, I 
describe the integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy.   
 The self in the modern era and the emergence of neuroscience during the 
20th century. An understanding of the relationship between mental and physical aspects 
of human beings has been a part of Western selfhood in each historical era from ancient 
Greece through today. Historians and philosophers (e.g., Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Vidal, 
2009) often note the transition from the ancient conceptualization of nonmaterial 
experiences as residing external to humans, to the modern era understanding of 
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nonmaterial experience as located inside each embodied individual. Plato located soul 
(that is, the power or purpose of a physical life form) as completely nonmaterial or 
separate from human physicality. Aristotelian philosophy that followed Plato was 
significant because it did not separate the body from the concept of soul. That is, the form 
of matter and matter itself were considered two distinct parts of one entity. Soul in the 
Aristotelian sense was not a religious concept but a concept referring to the essence of an 
object—that is, the defining, essential attributes or functions of that object. In the view of 
Aristotle, the understanding of human life was not compartmentalized; rather, his was a 
vision of persons as immersed within social or shared context rather than distinct from it. 
 The modern self and the Cartesian split. The relationship between the 
nonmaterial and the material (or personhood and physicality) in the modern 
understanding of self (beginning during the 17th century) is most often associated with 
the philosopher René Descartes. Descartes distinguished between mental experience and 
physical aspects of individuals by interiorizing private mental experience within each 
individual. This was the basis of a selfhood characterized by a dichotomy between 
individual experience as separate from the physical world. According to Bordo (1987), 
Cartesian or modern philosophy represents the culmination of the transition to modernity 
during the 17th century. A foundational premise of the modern world is that the human 
body resides in a material world that is considered void of intrinsic meaning. In this view 
meaning about the world is connected to its discoverable and understandable physical 
workings. Subjective experience resides in a mind considered to be internal and private 
for each individual.  
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 Bordo (1987) noted historical events that directly preceded Descartes’ seminal 
17th century writing, such as the advent of the telescope, the initial decline of church 
authority, and the erosion of eurocentrism by global trade, all of which threw into 
question many of the assumptions about the world and certainty about the purpose of 
humans within it. According to Bordo, it was within that general uncertainty that 
Descartes’ philosophy emerged. Central to Cartesian philosophy was a presupposition of 
doubt about material existence, and efforts to overcome that doubt with certainty about 
existence through replicable, controlled experimentation leading to mastery over the 
natural world and establishment of objective and verifiable truth about the order of that 
world. The scientism of the modern era was marked by the vision of human beings as 
capable of understanding, explaining, and exerting control over nature. According to 
Canguilhem (1977/1988), “Descartes contradicted Aristotle’s propositions point by point. 
For him, nature was identical with the laws of motion and conservation. Every art, 
including medicine, was a kind of machine-building” (p. 129). In his seminal historical 
account of personal identity or the concept of self in the modern era in the West, Charles 
Taylor (1989) outlined three primary aspects of the modern identity:  
 First, inwardness, the sense of ourselves as beings with inner depths, and the 
 connected notion that we are “selves”; second, the affirmation of ordinary life 
 which develops from the early modern period; third, the expressivist notion of 
 nature as an inner moral source. (p. x)  
  
 Taylor (1989) described the transition from the philosophy of Plato to the modern 
vision of a self as a private individual who exists in a dichotomy between the individual’s 
internal world and the external material world. Taylor wrote,  
 The modern epistemological tradition from Descartes, and all that has flowed 
 from it in modern culture, has made this standpoint fundamental—to the point of 
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 aberration, one might think. It has gone as far as generating the view that there is 
 a special domain of “inner” objects available only from this standpoint; or the 
 notion that the vantage point of the ‘I think’ is somehow outside the world of 
 things we experience. (p. 131) 
 
 The modern self is a vision of human being that valorizes scientific inquiry or 
acquiring objective evidence of the functioning of the outer material world in order to 
overcome doubt about material existence. Taylor (1989) explained that Descartes’ 
rejection of a close relationship between scientific inquiry and morality situated moral 
sources within humans rather than in an inherent cosmic order designed by a higher 
divinity. In Cartesian philosophy, understanding the workings of a divine power or 
cosmic order follows from understanding the material world (which includes the human 
body). Taylor described how the vision of rational or instrumental control over the world 
and the physical body is an entire way of being that defines life in the West. He wrote, 
 Rational mastery requires insight, of course. . . . But the insight is not into an 
 order of the good; rather it is into something which entails the emptiness of all 
 ancient conceptions of such order: the utter separation of mind from a mechanistic 
 universe of matter which is most emphatically not a medium of thought or 
 meaning, which is expressively dead. Insight is essential to the move we can call, 
 following Weber, “disenchanting” the world. We could also call it neutralizing 
 the cosmos, because the cosmos is no longer seen as the embodiment of 
 meaningful order which can define the good for us. And this move is brought 
 about by our coming to grasp this world as mechanism. . . .We demystify the 
 cosmos as a setter of ends by grasping it mechanistically and functionally as a 
 domain of possible means. Gaining insight into the world as mechanism is 
 inseparable from seeing it as a domain of potential instrumental control. (p. 149)  
 
 For Descartes, the rule of reason over passion was an essential part of the 
instrumental or technical control over the external or natural world because such 
rationality allows for an accurate understanding and manipulation of the mechanical 
functioning or order of the natural world. These were the foundations of dualism (a 
believed separation between mind and body) because the body is part of the external 
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material world and must therefore be studied and explained by objective scientific 
investigation separate from individual perspective or experience. Bordo (1987) explained 
that in Cartesian philosophy, subject and object are ideally without any continuity 
because, “the scientific mind must be cleansed of all its ‘sympathies’ toward the objects it 
tries to understand. It must cultivate absolute detachment” (pp. 103-104). Bennett and 
Hacker (2003) discussed how the Cartesian move of mind as separate from body 
suggested a personification of mind as a distinct entity that acts with the body through its 
connection in the pineal gland of the brain. The Aristotelian soul therefore became 
separate from person and reconfigured as a nonmaterial, interiorized unit that gathers 
information from the external world for the interiorized individual to accumulate. This 
rejects the assumption of a shared external world and views a compartmentalized rather 
than unitary mental and physical existence (as had been esteemed since Aristotelian 
philosophy), thereby configuring a human being who is inherently detached rather than 
connected to the world and other people.  
 Vidal (2009) argued that the brain has been one of the most important symbols of 
human beings to emerge from the modern era because the brain has been intricately tied 
to the modern concept of the self, and the study of neural processes has become strongly 
connected to questions that have traditionally been raised by Western philosophy. He 
used the term “brainhood” (p. 6) to denote the recent position that holds an individual to 
be defined by “being, rather than simply having, a brain” (p. 6). Vidal argued that the 
principles underlying the idea of the “cerebral subject” (p. 6) or the idea that self is a 
brain replicate the principles of private individualism that are at the core of modern 
Western selfhood. He wrote,  
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 To the extent that Locke himself, in a revolutionary move, redefined “person” as a 
 continuity of memory and consciousness, each individual’s absolutely inalienable 
 self-ownership could in principle be attached to any substance. In practice, 
 however, it was necessarily located in the brain as organ responsible for the 
 functions with which the self was identified. By an intellectual mechanism 
 involving both transitivity and metonymy—from self-functions to brain, from the 
 part to the whole—the self and the brain became consubstantial. The 
 individualism characteristic of western and westernized societies, the supreme 
 value given to the individual as autonomous agent of choice and initiative, and the 
 corresponding emphasis on interiority at the expense of social bonds and contexts, 
 are sustained by the brainhood ideology and reproduced by neurocultural 
 discourses. (Ehrenberg, 2008, as cited in Vidal, 2009, p. 7) 
 
 In other words, the link between body and self has had longstanding prominence 
in Western philosophy, yet the brain was a fitting physical symbol for the modern 
concept of individual selfhood. The idea that an individual is (rather than simply has) a 
brain represents an ontological premise, that is, a way of understanding and confirming 
existence. In Vidal’s view, neuroscience research therefore does not simply or 
unexpectedly discover connections between mind or self and brain, but instead serves as 
a way to validate the engrained Western belief that individual existence is inseparable 
from individual brain functioning. Vidal (2009) argued that ”whether ontological or 
methodological, the belief in brain-self consubstantiality seems to have impelled brain 
research. The idea that ‘we are our brains’ is not a corollary of neuroscientific advances, 
but a prerequisite of neuroscientific investigation” (p. 7). By suggesting that neuroscience 
investigates an already-assumed connection between self and brain (rather than having 
unexpectedly discovered evidence that supports that claim), Vidal suggested that the 
history of how the brain became such a prominent symbol of the self in the West cannot 
be understood through the findings of neuroscience research. Instead, the goals, 
principles, and discoveries of brain science can only be understood by situating the rise of 
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this research in the broader time and place in which these efforts emerged. Similarly, 
Vrecko (2010) argued that, “the facts, theories and practices that emerge from brain 
research are always cultural and historical products, with particular political and 
economic trajectories—and should be analyzed as such” (p. 4).  
 Early 20th century brain science in Western societies. Historians have examined 
the interplay between neuroscientific research and various cultural and political trends in 
Western societies during the 20th century. These cultural histories illustrate ways in 
which the interest in the relationship between mind and brain, the science used to study 
that relationship, and the discourses in which that science is enveloped, are all reflective 
of wider social, political, and economic issues of their time and place. For example, in his 
history of cortical localization (that is, locating mental capacities within the cortex or 
outermost region of the brain) by brain scientists in Germany during the late 19th century 
and early 20th century, Hagner (2001) situated widespread discourses about the brain 
within broader political and cultural shifts during that time. Scientists portrayed the brain 
as the location between competing needs and drives. This partly served as a way to gain 
funding and raise public interest in this new science. However, the Western cultural 
issues that became metaphors to be physically mapped onto the brain are especially 
noteworthy.  
 Borck’s (2001) history of the emergence of electroencephalography in Germany 
during the early 1900s described how the electroencephalogram or EEG (an instrument 
that records electrical waves in the human brain) became established as a method of 
revealing individual personality in material form by understanding the underlying brain 
activity that corresponds to mental faculties. Although initially controversial among 
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many scientists, the EEG gained popular acclaim as a method for achieving a 
materialized understanding of nonmaterial aspects of human experience. Borck’s account 
describes how measures of electricity in the brain used to reveal individual psychological 
experiences appealed to both modern and pre-modern understandings of human beings. 
According to Hayward (2001), the emergence of the EEG in Britain during the 1930s can 
be understood through newspaper articles during that time that suggested the machine’s 
relevance had evolved into “a kind of truth machine or electric confessional that would 
reveal the occult workings of the human mind. It was a technology that materialized 
conscious life, transforming private mental states into public images” (p. 620). According 
to Hayward, through the promotion of this technology by scientists such as William Grey 
Walter, “the brain was pictured as a kind of hopeful, if sentimental, radar searching for 
comfort and stability among the random patterns of the world” (p. 626). Similar to 
Borck’s history of the EEG in Germany, Hayward suggested that the EEG represented an 
ability to transcend or overcome the boundaries between private individual experience 
and the external world by translating inner nonmaterial experience into accessible 
material images.  
 Post-World War II cognitive science in the United States. Cognitive sciences 
gained prestige and academic influence in the United States after World War II. Historian 
Lily Kay (2001) argued that the interest in the concept of mind had waned for the first 
half of the 20th century. During the 1940s and 1950s, studies conducted by Warren 
McCulloch and Walter Pitts brought the study of mind to a laboratory brain research 
setting. Kay noted that from the 1940s through the 1960s, the concept of mind gained 
legitimacy and valor as an object to be studied, “an object of quantitative representations 
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that bore novel implications for the age-old queries about the relations between mind and 
body, the natural vs. the artificial, and for automated military technologies of the postwar 
era” (p. 592). She argued,  
 It is not “the mind” as an eternal and immutable object which McCulloch and 
 Pitts brought into experimental quantitative research in the 1940s. It was not the 
 same mind that, as the epitome of human consciousness and identity, had been an 
 object of scientific intrigue since antiquity. Though some features and images 
 have indeed persisted through the ages, the soul, psyche, anima, and mind have 
 always been suffused with historically-situated spiritual symbolisms and cultural 
 meanings. . . . The McCulloch-Pitts notion of mind as neural nets was 
 reconstituted within a new space of representation—the information discourse—
 which emerged in the 1940s in the United States and Europe. That discourse . . . 
 would reconfigure representations of life and society as systems of decisions and 
 signals; it was a technoepistemic transformation across disciplinary landscape and 
 the culture at large. (pp. 592-593) 
 
 Kay (2001) showed how the use of brain research to study the mind gained 
relevance in the United States and represented a convergence of a variety of historical 
and cultural phenomena around a belief that mind resulted of the logical patterns of 
neuronal activity. The mind as neural patterns represented a convergence of 
neurophysiology, psychiatry, philosophy, formal logic, algebra, theology, and military 
imagery, and it was wrapped in a new social discourse that mirrored postindustrial 
communication technology. As with the emergence of early brain scan technologies in 
Europe, the mind as logical neurons or neural nets also bridged the Cartesian divide 
between form and matter—that is, physical and nonmaterial aspects of human existence.  
 All of the cultural histories discussed above challenge mainstream histories of 
science that depict scientific discoveries as linear, inevitable, and able to be removed 
from their time and place. Traditional histories depict science as a series of ahistorical 
truths that explain the natural world and are automatically applicable across cultures and 
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eras (see Canguilham, 1977/1988; Foucault, 1966/1994; Kuhn, 1962). Critical histories of 
20th century brain science suggest that the neural investigation of mental experience has 
been wrapped in popular scientific and technological discourses. From these historical 
accounts, popular interest in brain science and technologies suggests widespread interest 
in an inner material sourcing of wider political, economic, and social trends. These 
discourses suggest a fascination with being able to observe and thereby understand 
individualized mental life, which had been considered private and unknowable in the 
modern era whose hallmark philosophical origins rested on the separation between mind 
and body or private and public realms. In the next section I discuss the emergence of 
contemporary neuroscience with molecular and genetic sciences, and the role of this 
brain research in the late 20th century understanding of self.  
 Late-20th century neuroscience as a biomedical institution. Abi-Rached and 
Rose (2010) discussed the emergence in the United States during the mid-1950s and early 
1960s of what is now called neuroscience, and disciplinary integration between 
psychological theories and physical sciences, particularly molecular science. They wrote, 
“while there is a long history of research on the brain,”  
 The neurosciences formed in the 1960s, in a socio-historical context characterized 
 by political change, faith in scientific and technological progress, and the rise of a 
 molecular gaze in the life sciences. They flourished in part because these 
 epistemological and technological developments were accompanied by multiple 
 projects of institution-building. An array of stakeholders was mobilized around 
 the belief that breakthroughs in understanding the brain were not only crucial, 
 they were possible by means of collaborative efforts, cross-disciplinary 
 approaches and the use of a predominantly reductionist neuromolecular method. 
 (Abi-Rached & Rose, 2010, p. 11) 
 
 Abi-Rached and Rose (2010) argued that the emergence of the neurosciences 
represented a use of the brain as a new epistemology or way of understanding the 
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confluence of biology and psychology. Because neuroscience in its current form emerged 
alongside biomedical sciences during the mid-20th century, the aims of neuroscience 
research and intervention function at the molecular and genetic levels. Rose (2007) 
observed that medical research and treatment today focuses on “our growing capacities to 
control, manage, engineer, shape, and modulate the very vital capacities of human beings 
as living creatures” (p. 3). He proposed five tenets that distinguish 20th century 
biomedicine from the 18th and 19th century medical sciences that preceded it: A vision 
of life as existing at the molecular level where it becomes malleable and unconstrained by 
a previously assumed natural order; a focus on optimizing life rather than simply curing 
disease; an understanding of human being as somatic or bodily and therefore concerned 
with conducting life in accordance with material concerns such as preventing illness and 
actively participating in health care rather than passively receiving it; seeking services 
from biomedical experts such as genetic counselors in order to navigate medical 
interventions and bioethical issues; and participation in a biomedical economy by citizens 
who actively anticipate, hope for, and directly advocate for biomedical advances that hold 
promises of preventing or curing disease, or enhancing physical and mental functioning. 
In other words, biomedicine began to make claims that replicated Watson’s (1913) 
pronouncement that psychology’s job was the prediction and control of behavior. 
 The novelty of contemporary biopolitics arises from the perception that we have 
 experienced a . . . qualitative increase in our capacities to engineer our vitality, 
 our development, our metabolism, our organs, and our brains. . . . It is now at the 
 molecular level that human life is understood, at the molecular level that its 
 processes can be anatomized, and at the molecular level that life can now be 
 engineered. At this level, it seems, there is nothing mystical or incomprehensible 
 about our vitality—anything and everything appears, in principle, to be 
 intelligible, and hence to be open to calculated interventions in the service of our 
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 desires about the kinds of people we want ourselves and our children to be. (Rose, 
 2007, p. 4) 
 
 An interest in biomedical sciences has created a trend of commonplace efforts of 
individuals to manipulate the somatic self in accordance in whatever ways are desired. 
This includes our minds. Rose (2007) continued,  
 While our desires, moods, and discontents might previously have been mapped 
 onto a psychological space, they are now mapped upon the body itself, or one 
 particular organ of the body—the brain. And this brain is itself understood in a 
 particular register. In significant ways, I suggest, we have become 
 “neurochemical selves.” (p. 188)  
 
 In Rose’s (2007) account, neuroscience represents the historical movement of a 
variety of human qualities, which were previously understood as existing within 
psychological space, onto the body. Moreira and Palladino (2005) described the idea of a 
neurochemical self as a primary indicator of Westerners’ fascination with “the endless 
possibilities of humanity as it finally comes to terms with its embodiment” (p. 69). 
Further, neuroscience positions individuals as “deeply enmeshed in a world where the 
staid, historical boundaries between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ are everywhere shattered”  
(pp. 69-70). In other words, the vision of the self as connected to alterable neurochemical 
processes appears alongside the cultural preoccupation with an interest in biomedical 
discoveries aimed at altering, enhancing, or remedying the human body, in ways that 
have not previously been possible, through molecular or genomic intervention. The 
shattering of the boundaries between nature and culture reflects a desire for humans to be 
unrestricted in the pursuit of physical modification in accordance with shifting cultural 
norms and trends. In the next section I discuss the work of theorists who have examined 
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various ways that these beliefs show up in routine behaviors, self-care practices, and 
social arrangements in Western cultures today.  
 Health improvement, hopefulness, and biosocial groupings. Scholars (e.g., 
Moreira & Palladino, 2005; Novas, 2006; Rajan, 2006; Rose, 2007; Sulik, 2009) have 
discussed how the understanding of self as a somatic, biomedical individual entails an 
ethical regime of disease prevention, health improvement, hope for biomedical 
advancements, and biosocial groupings. In biosocial groupings, social participation 
involves activities such as advocacy on behalf of patients for advances in disease 
detection, prevention, or treatment. The role of biomedicine in the understanding of 
selfhood has also been tied to themes of hopefulness and futurity among the initiatives or 
research promoted by molecular and genomic advances. For example, Rajan (2006) 
argued that genomic research aimed at calculating disease risk fosters a public discourse 
that “allows us to grammatically conceive of life in certain ways. . . . This shifting 
grammar of life, toward a future tense, is consequential not just to our understanding of 
what ‘life’ now means, but contains within it a deep ethical valence” (p. 14). According 
to Rajan, the individual interest in using genomic science to calculate personal disease 
risk suggests that a significant aspect of subjectivity among many Westerners now 
involves an individual’s expected participation—as both a patient and a consumer—in  
markets for biomedical procedures and products.  
 Moreira and Palladino (2005) argued that a “regime of hope” (p. 55) is central to 
social groupings focused on patient advocacy and disease awareness through 
campaigning for biomedical research and advancements, including those promoting 
medical research for diseases in which brain functioning is implicated. To illustrate the 
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concept of a regime of hope, they analyzed patient advocacy organizations’ support for 
continuing an experimental neurosurgical procedure for Parkinson’s disease patients 
following highly publicized experiments during 2001 that resulted in serious physical 
harm for some of the American research volunteers. Similarly, Novas (2006) posited that 
large organizations that advocate on behalf of patients and families for biomedical 
research in areas such as disease screening comprise a “political economy of hope”  
(p. 290) in which group members engage in political participation based on a shared 
advocacy for biomedical advances, and a sense of hope that is not confined “to an act of 
the imagination, but that is…materialized through a range of social practices” (p. 290).  
 Novas (2006) discussed practices that are characteristic of these groups’ purposes 
such as assisting patients and families in learning about diseases, and directly attempting 
to influence health policy, and noted how these types of activities brandish influence over 
the flow of public knowledge about medical issues, thereby linking social engagement to 
changes in market value of biological entities such as human tissue and blood. Rajan 
(2006) argued that this interplay between personalized biomedical knowledge and 
anticipated participation in a biomedical economy creates a particular configuration of 
personhood that exists at the crossroads of personal risk and market risk. In the next 
section I discuss how widespread images of the brain in popular media have perpetuated 
the understanding that self is observable through brain functioning, and neuroscience is 
as an authority about the self. 
 The influence of brain imaging on the understandings of self and personal 
identity in Western culture. The advancement of imaging or visualization technologies, 
including significant advances in brain imaging during the late 20th century, has been an 
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essential bridge between biomedicine and a biomedical (especially neuroscientific) 
understanding of self. Joyce (2008) argued that MRI (magnetic resonance imaging), 
which is one type of imaging used to observe the inner workings of the body or brain, has 
itself become a “cultural icon” (p. 2).  
 The technology and its benefits are often referred to in popular culture, science 
 exhibits, news stories, and policy debates to the point that MRI can be considered 
 a cultural icon—a sacred object on which revolve questions about personal 
 health, identity, and life’s many dilemmas. (p. 2) 
 
 Joyce (2008) highlighted how MRI has become a “technology of truth” (p. 2) in 
contemporary culture where it is granted a position of authority even though its findings 
in medical settings might not be as clear or unambiguous as those findings are portrayed 
in popular television or movies. She argued that “the development of MRI technology 
and our desire to use it must be understood in relation to the broader sociotechnical turn 
toward visualization” (p. 6).  
 In a symbolic economy that equates photographic pictures with the person or 
 object represented, medical images appear to offer the possibility of accessing the 
 inner body without mediation to discover truth. . . . The claim of truth is staked 
 partially on the terrain of the visual: For something to be true, it must be seen. 
 This point is illustrated when patients with mental illness and their families 
 support brain imaging as a way to prove to skeptical scientists and policy makers 
 that disease exists and research funding is needed (Dumit, 2000). Culture, interest 
 groups, and power determine whether knowledge is perceived as trustworthy, and 
 what counts as evidence varies across time and place. (Joyce, 2008, pp. 10-11) 
 
 Joseph Dumit’s (2004) ethnographical study of positron emission tomography or 
PET scans (one type of imaging technology that is used in brain imaging) provides an 
important cultural and historical analysis of the widespread use of brain imaging and the 
effects of how brain images contribute to the widespread depiction of selfhood as 
straightforward and observable through images of the brain. 
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 The brain scans that we encounter in magazines and newspapers, on television, in 
 a doctor’s office, or in a scientific journal make claims on us. These colorful 
 images with captions describe brains that are certifiably smart or depressed or 
 obsessed. . . . These brain images make claims on us because they portray kinds of 
 brains. As people with, obviously, one or another kind of brain, we are placed 
 among the categories that the set of images offers. To which category do I 
 belong? What brain type do I have? Or more nervously: Am I normal? (Dumit, 
 2004, p. 5) 
 
 Dumit (2004) further argued that “alongside the social and institutional 
components of brain-fact production, we must face this question of how cultural 
identification and intuition coincide with these representations of reality so that we are 
persuaded to take them as true” (pp. 6-7).  He proposed the concept of the “objective-
self” (p. 7) that “consists of our taken-for-granted notions, theories, and tendencies 
regarding human bodies, brains, and kinds considered as objective, referential, extrinsic, 
and objects of science and medicine” (p. 7). The objective self entails an understanding of 
personhood that is greatly influenced by images of the brain and the claims attached to 
those images, necessarily involving a constant interplay between the claims of scientific 
research, the way that research is disseminated by certain media outlets, and the way that 
readers or consumers of that information come to embody certain understandings of 
human beings that are taken for granted or assumed to be true. The effects of associating 
brain images with expert claims about the self, and the contests between competing 
understandings of self that brain images replicate, “are socially embedded across spheres 
of activity: mass-media science journalism, mental-illness activism, courtroom 
admissibility, and widespread readership of published speculations, as well as 
neuroscientific research” (p. 13). In the next section I discuss evidence for the popular 
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influence of widespread brain images, and the implications of this influence on everyday 
activities that are part of the current way of being. 
 Brain improvement as self-improvement: Biomedical selfhood, lifestyle choices, 
and personal healthcare practices. Above I discussed Rose’s (2007) interpretation of the 
emergence of a biomedical understanding of the self that shows up as a somatic or bodily 
person that exists at a molecular level where it is explainable, and receptive to disease 
prevention, medical intervention, and personal enhancement. For Rose the biomedical 
self entails a neurochemical self where mind is understandable and manipulated at the 
level of the brain. Other theorists (see Brenninkmeijer, 2010; Garza & Smith, 2009; 
Ortega & Vidal, 2007) have described the emergence and relevance of self-improvement 
practices that are tied to brain-improvement or cognitive enhancement. Brenninkmeijer 
(2010) succinctly observed that an interest in neuroscience research, “combined with the 
unremitting quest for a better life, has resulted in a successful self-help industry for brain 
enhancement” (p. 108).  
 Ortega and Vidal (2007) argued that neuroscientific understandings of self-
improvement and health lead to lifestyle choices that are manifested in a demand for 
goods and services that claim to promote brain vitality, for example, “help-self manuals, 
brain-fitness software and computer programs” (p. 257), as well as “vitamins and all 
kinds of dietary support purported to enhance brain performance” (p. 257). Consumerism 
that is driven by the promise of brain improvement is evidence of the appeal and the 
authority of claims about brain health driven by an understanding of neuroimaging as 
expert or authority on selfhood. As an effect of neuroimaging’s widespread influence, 
Ortega and Vidal also described the emergence of a “biosocial criterion of social 
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grouping” (p. 257) with regards to brain enhancement as a form of self-enhancement, 
evidenced by the emergence of social groups or events where membership is based on 
common goals such as maximizing cognitive performance or mental abilities. In one 
example of a biosocial grouping that places value on brain enhancement as a source of 
personal performance, they described the phenomenon of competitions based on mental 
agility such as memory championships. They also argued that biosocial groupings in 
general tend to be based on an understanding of self that is rooted in certain physical 
practices that are “structured according to criteria of health, bodily performances, specific 
illnesses or longevity, and they function according to criteria of merit and recognition that 
express values embodied in hygienic rules, activity schedules, and ideal models of the 
self” (p. 257). Ortega and Vidal argued that these goals represent individual or private 
interests, and therefore suggested that biosocial groupings are apolitical and not civically 
engaged. Further, the authority of brain images on selfhood is reflected not only in the 
self-improvement activities of individuals but also in the recent trend toward a significant 
role of neuroscience in humanities disciplines that were previously separate from 
reductionist scientific inquiry. Ortega and Vidal noted that this is a significant trend 
because it contributes to a view of social practices as beneficial for individual health and 
wellbeing.  
 According to Brenninkmeijer (2010), the idea that self-improvement is brain 
improvement involves an unusual paradox, since it requires at once a vision of self as 
brain, and also a vision of self and brain as separate because the self is tasked with 
gaining control over the brain. Brenninkmeijer argued that neither Cartesian dualism (the 
idea that a material brain is ontologically distinct from a nonmaterial mind) nor monism 
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(the view that mind emerges from the workings of the brain) accurately captures the 
relationship between the self and the brain that is promoted when individuals engage in 
activities to improve the self on the basis of improving the brain. In order to examine the 
understanding of self or the relationship between brain and self that is promoted by brain-
improvement technologies, Brenninkmeijer analyzed interviews with practitioners and 
patients of neurofeedback. In neurofeedback, clinicians use electroencephalogram (EEG) 
to identify mental states that are associated with a reduction of psychological symptoms 
(or an enhancement of physical and mental performance), and then train patients to 
maintain those states. From these interviews she attempted to ascertain participants’ 
expectations about neurofeedback, their understandings of proper participation in this 
treatment, and their understandings about the relationship between self and brain. Her 
results were inconclusive: 
 New technologies of the self give rise to new selves, stated Foucault, and in the 
 case of the brain devices this is clearly the case. The act of manipulating the brain 
 with a device makes people very aware of their biological constitution. First they 
 learn that their problems are brain problems, then they see these problems 
 visualized in their brain map, and next they interfere directly with their brains to 
 fix these problems. In this process the brain is clearly separated from the self. But 
 more than that, users of brain devices need more and more entities to explain their 
 selves and their healing process. (p. 121) 
 
 From the analysis of interviews with neurofeedback patients and participants, 
Brenninkmeijer (2010) found that none of the broad categories of mind-brain 
relationship—monistic (the position that mind emerges from the material body), dualistic 
(the position mind and body are distinct), or triadic (a neo-Cartesian view of mind-brain-
body integration) entirely capture the understanding of self or the understanding of the 
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relationship between self and brain that users of this brain-based treatment reportedly 
experienced.  
 Pitts-Taylor (2010) noted that although many scholars have argued that the 
mapping of moral and psychological questions onto brain functioning is suggestive of 
biological determinism, other scholars have used the concept of plasticity (the ability of 
the brain to change in response to its environment) as material evidence that humans are 
situated within a historical and social context in order to validate progressive political 
ideas such as agency, creativity, and non-determinism, rather than a rigidly centered 
modern selfhood. She rejected the optimistic use of brain plasticity as justification for 
progressive political views. She wrote, 
 The use of neuroscience does not inherently lead to determinism and can promote 
 its opposite. But…brain plasticity positions neurological ontology not only as 
 ever open to change, but also open to being changed. Plasticity is deployed to 
 encourage us to see ourselves as neuronal subjects, and is linked to the continued 
 enhancement of learning, intelligence, and mental performance, and to the 
 avoidance of various risks associated with the brain, including mental 
 underperformance, memory loss, and aging. While endorsing a view of the 
 body/self which resists biological determinism, I find that the popular discourse 
 on plasticity firmly situates the subject in a normative, neoliberal ethic of personal 
 self-care and responsibility linked to modifying the body. (p. 639) 
 
 According to Pitts-Taylor (2010), the strategy of advocating for social and 
cultural understandings of behavior by appealing to the idea of neuroplasticity instead 
reinforces a biomedical understanding of self wherein morality is tied to preventive 
health practices, and standards of citizenship or social inclusion are tied to ideals of self-
improvement and work-related productivity. She suggested that the brain as a symbol of 
the self is rooted in a vision of the good as modern individualism that valorizes personal 
gain above shared civic engagement. Her argument that the brain represents a neoliberal 
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self is similar to the critical interpretations of neuroscience posited by Ortega and Vidal 
(2007) and Vidal (2009) I discussed above. Later I examine whether neuroscience-
informed psychotherapies might also reinforce an individualized somatic selfhood.  
 Studies examining uses of neuroscience in popular media and the psychological 
impact of neuroscience’s appeal. Studies suggest that claims about the brain are often 
appealing to general audiences. Results of one noteworthy psychological study found 
evidence that decision-making by research participants was influenced by the presence of 
neuroscientific explanations of human behavior. In that study, Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, 
Rawson, and Gray (2008) found that a sample of research participants who had been 
presented with a series of psychological explanations for common human behaviors 
tended to rate explanations that contained neuroscientific information most favorably 
even when the extra information about the human brain was irrelevant to the 
explanations.  
 In a separate study, Gurley and Marcus (2008) found that research participants 
serving as mock jurors were significantly more likely to vote in favor of not guilty by 
reason of insanity (NGRI) verdicts when they had been presented with expert testimony 
and neuroimaging evidence showing that a defendant’s psychosis had occurred as a result 
of a head injury. Both of these studies provided evidence of the authority that 
neuroscientific claims hold over common understandings of truth and the location of the 
self. In Gurley and Marcus’ study, the idea that the brain is the location of self also 
entails a vision of the brain as the location of self-control, and participants’ responses 
suggested that this understanding of the brain mitigated notions of individual culpability. 
There is no question that in some cases brain injury or disease impacts behaviors in ways 
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that are relevant for legal and other purposes. However, these studies indicated that 
participants acted on the belief that there is a close relationship between brain functioning 
and the self, and therefore that neuroscience is an authority on the self.  
 The ways in which neuroscience is presented to popular audiences also has 
important implications for how people view neuroscience as an authority on the self, the 
relationship between mind and brain, and consumer demand. In a qualitative analysis of 
the reporting on neuroscience in popular news sources, Racine, Bar-Ilan, and Illes (2005) 
collected over 1200 news articles between 1995 and 2004 that featured reporting on brain 
science technologies. The researchers found three broad categories of techniques that 
journalists used in their reporting on neuroscience: Neuro-essentialism, or the conflating 
of self with brain; neuro-realism, or portraying brain imaging as conclusive proof of the 
existence of a mental phenomenon; and neuro-policy, or using neuroscience to promote a 
certain public policy or social practice (for other discussions of these categories of 
neuroscience in popular media see Racine, Bar-Ilan, & Iles, 2006; Racine, Waldman, 
Rosenberg, & Iles, 2010). These findings suggest that neuroscience is commonly 
portrayed as an authority on the self and often portrayed in popular media as the source of 
the self and confirmation that psychological experiences actually exist because 
neuroscience can observe their physiological correlates.  
 In this section I presented historical perspectives on the emergence of 
neuroscience, evidence of its popular appeal, and ways that it influences individual 
activities and interests. In the next section I discuss philosophical challenges to the use of 
neuroscience in the study of human psychology.  
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 Philosophical challenges to mind-brain reductionism in cognitive 
neuroscience. Thus far I have discussed the modern era configuration of self, cultural 
histories of 20th century brain science, the emergence of neuroscience in the United 
States with biomedicine and its subsequent effects on the self or the Western way of life, 
and evidence of neuroscience’s current authority and societal influence. In this section I 
discuss how contemporary mind-brain research is embedded within the disciplinary 
integration between psychology and neuroscience (titled cognitive neuroscience). I 
review critical perspectives on how certain uses of terminology or rhetorical strategies 
depict close relationships (or total interchangeability) between brain functioning and 
human psychological experience in ways that obfuscate the distinct and possibly 
incompatible concepts and methods of psychology and neuroscience. In my textual 
analysis of Cozolino’s (2010) book I examine his use of rhetorical strategies and how his 
grammar conceals and unknowingly perpetuates certain understandings of self. 
 Tallis (2004) argued that the idea that mind is reducible to the brain came about 
through the merger between analytic philosophy and cognitive science during the middle 
of the 20th century. He described the historical “capitulation” (p. 12) of philosophy of 
mind to cognitive science, arguing that the movement toward holding science in higher 
esteem than philosophy represented a backlash against the linguistic turn in philosophy. 
The linguistic or Interpretive Turn saw the ascent of theories positing truth as something 
that depends on how discourses are constructed rather than on an objective reality that 
philosophy is capable of understanding. He argued that the integration between analytic 
philosophy and the philosophy of science was premised on the hope that combining the 
views of various academic disciplines would result in better answers to the philosophical 
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dilemmas (including mind-brain dualism) that had been the subject of controversy and 
debate for much of the modern era.  
 According to Tallis (2004), “eventually, admiration for science and its methods 
modulated into something more subservient. Some thinkers began to agree with their 
more scornful scientific colleagues that in many areas of investigation philosophy was an 
anachronism” (p. 10). With the advancements of neuroscientific methods during the mid-
20th century, the philosophy of mind strayed even further from philosophy and toward 
cognitive sciences. Rather than trying to understand human thought through 
philosophical discourse or epistemology, the study and understanding of human thought 
or knowledge became favored by many philosophers as an inquiry into cognitive 
processes and their material correlates. Rather than simply integrating epistemology (the 
study of knowledge) with natural science, natural science became increasingly thought of 
as the source of epistemological inquiry. According to Tallis, the influence of analytic 
philosophy was significant because this branch of philosophy dismissed the importance 
of the concept of consciousness or individual subjective awareness.  
 Tallis (2004) also situated the rise of a mind-brain lexicon during that time within 
emerging philosophical challenges to psychologism (i.e., the 19th century attempt to 
reduce logical entities such as propositions to mental states, thereby subsuming 
philosophy under empirical psychology). He wrote that antipsychologism “led…to a 
wide-ranging suspicion of talk about memories, sensations, thoughts, beliefs, and so on as 
if they were distinct, non-material, inner entities with an existence of their own” (p. 13). 
The combination of neuroscience with a philosophy of mind that disregarded 
consciousness and subjective experience led to the following grammatical problem:  
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 The most striking . . . evidence of the continuing influence of the hostility in 
 analytical philosophy to mental contents, is the vogue for theories of mind that 
 evacuate the latter of contents of consciousness and/or equate them with linguistic 
 or quasi-linguistic entities construed in an abstract, grammatical way. “Syntactic 
 theories of mind” that reduce the mind to sets of rules linking inputs and outputs 
 in a functionally effective way—offered as a “scientific” alternative to the “folk 
 psychology” which invokes entities such as beliefs—are only the most literal 
 expressions of this ubiquitous influence. The prominence in this Lexicon of terms 
 such as “calculation,” “grammar,” “logic,” “rule” testifies to the after-life of 
 Fregean ways of thought in the philosophy of mind. Only after the “linguistic 
 turn” could philosophers be inclined to think of the mind as an ensemble of 
 “symbol processing devices,” a “syntactic engine operating on mental sentences” 
 and the like. (pp. 15-16) 
 
 I. Gold and Stoljar (1999) provided an overview of two different versions of what 
they identified as the neuron doctrine, and the implications of these two doctrines for 
psychology. The first version they titled the trivial neuron doctrine, noting that it is 
already the basis of cognitive neuroscience. It states that, “a successful theory of mind 
will be a theory of the brain” (p. 814). The second version, titled the radical neuron 
doctrine, states that, “a successful theory of mind will be a solely biological 
neuroscientific theory” (p. 814). In other words, theory of mind will be expressed in 
terms of the brain instead of merely being explained in terms of the relationship with it. 
The result of this would be what scholars have identified as eliminativism or eliminative 
materialism. Proponents of this position predict that many concepts in psychology will 
not be found to correspond to neural functioning, and therefore will eventually be 
disregarded as nonexistent. This view suggests that notions of human subjectivity will be 
dismissed in favor of direct brain-behavior explanations.  
 I. Gold and Stoljar (1999) noted that the two neuron doctrines tend to become 
conflated because of how authors and theorists write about brain research. That is, the 
neuron doctrine has two interpretations appealing to audiences simultaneously, and this 
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explains how the theory that mind is reducible to brain can be both widespread and 
controversial. According to the authors, the trivial neuron doctrine is plausible but 
inconsequential since psychology and its related fields of study would still exist if it were 
ever proven correct; however, they noted that the radical version is very consequential 
because it would signal an epochal defeat for psychology, even though, according to I. 
Gold and Stoljar, eliminative materialism is not scientifically supported. The authors 
posited that because of this confusion, many people often believe in the eliminativist 
principles of the radical neuron doctrine because they read mind-brain claims or 
predictions and they see elements of both doctrines at the same time. This is how 
audiences understand cognitive neuroscience literature as both radical and scientifically 
sound.	  Theorists (e.g., Noë, 2009) who have criticized attempts to radically reduce 
personhood to the human brain, have argued that the portrayal of recent neuroscientific 
advances as revolutionary is itself a rhetorical strategy, since it has been known for at 
least thousands of years that brain functioning and conscious experience are somehow 
related. I. Gold and Stoljar (1999) articulated how the portrayal of neuroscience as a 
revolutionary endeavor may unknowingly lead audiences to support eliminativism when 
they think they are simply showing interest in research that seeks to find the neural 
correlates of mental events. 
 Scholars such as Bennett and Hacker (2003), Brothers (2001), and Tallis (2004) 
have argued that in many ways the scientific study of the brain is logically incompatible 
with the study of psychological concepts. These scholars criticize cognitive neuroscience, 
which is the subfield of neuroscience that studies psychological concepts by identifying 
their corresponding neural structures and functions (other branches of neuroscience 
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emphasize the study of the material brain for disease treatment and other scientific 
reasons). Bennett and Hacker rejected the methodological premise of cognitive 
neuroscience on the basis that combining psychology and neuroscience confuses 
conceptual and empirical questions. They explained that conceptual questions are 
concerned with “forms of representation” (p. 2), that is, what does and does not make 
sense, and these questions precede empirical questions addressed by scientific study, 
which seeks to answer a question that is empirically true or false based on the conceptual 
issues that were already assumed. Thus, a scientific investigation hoping to yield an 
answer to a question that was unknowingly based on a conceptual error is a flawed 
experimental design that produces meaningless results. They argued that cognitive 
neuroscience, which attempts to answer psychological questions in terms of their 
underlying neurophysiology, is based on a conceptual confusion. In their view, while 
neuroscience can answer questions about the correlations between psychological 
functioning or impairment and neurophysiological functioning or impairment, 
neuroscience cannot replace psychological concepts or explanations with neurological 
concepts or explanations, and it cannot explain psychological abilities as abilities of the 
brain.  
 An important part of Bennett and Hacker’s (2003) expansive survey of the history 
and philosophical bases of mind-brain research is their discussion of what they call the 
mereological fallacy, or ascribing qualities to a part of an entity that can only apply to the 
entity as a whole. According to the authors, this becomes the mereological principle of 
neuroscience when psychological predicates are ascribed to brains, since psychological 
predicates were intended to describe people. According to Bennett and Hacker, early-
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20th century brain researchers were largely Cartesian dualists because they attributed 
certain human qualities or abilities to the mind rather than to humans, thereby using 
language that kept mind or nonmaterial mental experience separate from brain or 
neurophysiological functioning. More recently, they argue, neuroscientists have claimed 
to reject mind-body dualism by using language that ascribes human qualities to the brain 
instead of ascribing them to the nonmaterial mind. According to Bennett and Hacker, it is 
not simply that it is inaccurate to attribute abilities such as thinking or remembering to an 
entity such as the brain rather than to humans; rather, it actually makes no sense to do 
this. To say that it is inaccurate implies that it is testable or disprovable, whereas the idea 
that the brain rather than humans perform uniquely human tasks, or possess uniquely 
human attributes, is unable to be confirmed or disconfirmed through scientific inquiry. 
They noted that psychological concepts are difficult to define, but they are attributes of 
whole beings, they represent common understandings of persons (and some animals), and 
psychological concepts are not theoretical concepts. Therefore, believing that it is still 
unknown how mental and physical aspects of life are related (the premise of much 
neuroscientific study) is an “illusion” (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, p. 119). Psychological 
concepts do not necessarily separate mental from physical in their descriptions of people, 
and therefore they are already adequate descriptions of how humans and animals “have 
the kinds of capacities that characterize them” (p. 119). 
 Brothers’ (2001) rejection of cognitive neuroscience is based on the same logical 
argument. She noted that although neither psychology nor hard sciences can be extracted 
from the social practices within each area of study, psychology studies concepts that have 
ancient roots and involve ideas about personhood which exist because those ideas are 
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agreed upon by the community studying them. Hard or natural sciences, on the other 
hand, use the relatively recent scientific method to test theories about a physical external 
world by rejecting false hypotheses. Concepts related to mental experience exist in the 
realm of the social, and whether or not a statement about something involving human 
psychology is true is largely determined by whether a group of people agrees that the 
statement is true in the circumstance in which it is made. In other words, it can be argued 
that psychology does not study the workings of the external or natural world.  
 According to Brothers (2001), even empirical or scientific psychological 
experiments depend on operationalizing concepts in a way that ultimately rest on 
however a certain community agrees upon the definition of the concept being measured, 
rather than resting on the observation itself. Conversely, natural science is based on a 
belief in the existence of a physical world that is external to the people making 
observations about it. Therefore, psychology is not a science according to the traditional 
definition of a science because the truth of a psychological statement does not ultimately 
rest on observations of an external material world (even though psychology presents itself 
in a way that combines mental concepts and objective material discourse). Psychological 
studies require attributing motivations to the subjects being studied and therefore 
psychological statements depend upon other psychological statements, not upon 
observations of a material object (in psychology, the object of study is a person). For 
example, the study of a concept such as depression requires a community of people 
agreeing upon what that concept means and ways to interpret whether a person is 
exhibiting it. But logically it is not the person or subject who is being studied; what is 
being studied is a quality or attribute of that person, even though psychological concepts 
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are embedded in everyday language, and in everyday language psychological concepts 
typically describe whole persons, not just their mind or mental state.   
 According to Brothers (2001), it is easy to forget that simply because the general, 
everyday understanding of a person is that a person is an entity who is both mental and 
physical, this does not mean that it is easy to combine the two distinct fields (psychology 
and neuroscience) that each study one of those parts of humans. This is why cognitive 
neuroscience is able to exist. As humans we go about our daily life and think or talk 
about people, but we do not think or talk about them as a mind or as a brain. The word 
person assumes that a set of mental and a set of physical qualities are present. So in order 
to accept cognitive neuroscience claims about the relationship between mind and brain, 
one must assume that the study of the mental and the study of the physical can go 
together as easily as the mental and physical go together when we think or talk about 
people in normal everyday grammar.  
 Since psychology and neuroscience have separate histories, vocabularies, 
concepts, and research methods, rhetoric or grammar has to fill in the gaps. Brothers 
(2001) identified rhetorical strategies that are often used in cognitive neuroscience 
literature to do that (she also noted that at times authors acknowledge uncertainty about 
the mind-brain relationship and suggest that these questions will be answered with more 
neuroscience research; or, some neuroscientists solve the mind-brain problem with 
eliminativist claims that psychological concepts are fictions and the concept of mind is a 
placeholder for neuroscientific explanations of behavior).  
 For example, Brothers (2001) noted the strategy of using everyday words to 
describe both psychological concepts and brain activity, which ignores the separate 
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contexts of each of those fields. She observed, “ignoring the contexts makes it look as 
though there is no hard work involved in equating the brain and the mind” (p. 15). A 
common example is the use of Freud’s concept of the unconscious by neuroscientists to 
imply a relationship between psychoanalytic theory and neuroscientific research even 
though the idea of the unconscious mind had nothing to do with the fact that brains and 
body typically function outside of awareness. Another strategy is the use of analogy to 
portray brain structures as mirroring the way psychological experiences are 
conceptualized. In other words, “the complex everyday grammar of a mental term is 
discovered in the brain itself. The discovery, of course, depends on constructing 
appropriate narratives of brain architecture” (p. 19). For example, 
 The widespread idea that socialization and rationality constrain our primitive 
 natures is often recast as the dominance of the cortex over subcortical brain 
 structures. This oversimplified, ideologically based idea about brain structure is 
 then used, circularly, to prove the cultural idea. (p. 19) 
 
 Because brain functioning (in this case the cortex) is not entirely understood by 
scientists, this type of argument is able to depict brain functioning and cultural values as 
fitting perfectly together as if the brain causes those cultural values to exist through its 
functioning. These narratives therefore function to naturalize social values and mores. 
Another strategy is to present a new narrative as a neuroscientific discovery—in other 
words, to portray brain functioning as having proved something previously unconsidered 
in psychology such a relationship between some mental or affective concepts that had not 
previously been recognized. The problem is that the psychological narrative preceded the 
interpretation of brain structures acting in a certain way, which then proved the narrative 
that an author is trying to construct (see also Bennett & Hacker, 2003). 
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 Brothers (2001) argued that the reason cultural narratives can be easily mapped 
onto the brain is because, although neuroscience uses natural science methodology to 
study a physical object, neuroscience lacks a central organizing theory against which to 
test hypotheses, even though a central theory is a standard in other sciences. Scholars 
(e.g., Atmanspacher, 2007; Uttal, 2007) have noted that psychology also lacks a central 
organizing principle unifying its numerous and often unrelated sub-disciplines. 
According to Uttal (2007), psychology will always be questioned as a legitimate science 
as long as its terminology (e.g., concepts such as mind or consciousness) are too 
numerous in quantity and often ambiguous in meaning. Uttal reminded readers that some 
theorists do not consider these issues to be problematic, and some theorists do not 
consider these issues to entirely negate the argument that psychology is a science. 
Regardless, he argued that in order to compensate for the perceived problem of 
psychology not being a science, psychologists often take abstract concepts regarding 
mind or mental life and describe them as physical in order to make them seem observable 
or quantifiable entities. In fact these mental-physical associations are actually figurative 
or metaphorical ways of talking.  
 Brothers (2001) concluded by cautioning against two potentially harmful effects 
of the attempt to use cognitive neuroscience to overcome the mind-body split of 
Cartesian or modernist philosophy. First, describing problems in terms of the brain makes 
it more difficult to attribute those problems to unfair social and economic arrangements. 
Second, brain-based understandings of self are transferred from an expert class to society 
more generally, and therefore the authority of neuroscience suggests a process of turning 
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control of human nature (and beliefs about how people change) over to the opinions of a 
few high-status scientific experts. 
 Uttal (2007) argued that evidence of psychology’s reliance on the material 
concepts of other scientific fields can be found in noticing that over the last century, 
psychology has periodically adopted anew whatever latest technologies or machines are 
popular to use as a metaphor for the mind, leading to the computer metaphor for mind in 
cognitive psychology. Even more problematic is how psychology’s borrowing of material 
understandings of other sciences to serve as accessible metaphors for mental processes 
has caused a reification or seemingly literal understanding of concepts that are actually 
nonmaterial. He suggested that the fusion between neuroscience and psychology is itself 
a good example of this because the functions of the neuroscience technologies have often 
become adopted as actual psychological theories rather than methods for answering 
specific psychological questions under investigation. For example, in psychology’s mind-
brain research the use of EEG recordings led to electromagnetic or field theories of mind 
whereas the use of fMRI images reinforces a view of mind as localized in the brain. 
 What was a well-defined problem in physics, information processing, or medical 
 pathology often becomes an entrenched paradigm of psychological research with 
 all of the accoutrements of a scientific endeavor but without adequate 
 consideration of the seductive call of what might well have been an ill-connected 
 metaphor. (Uttal, 2007, p. 64) 
 
 Tallis (2004) called this problem “thinking by transferred epithet” (p. 34), and he 
used that issue to deconstruct common terminology that is used to portray the mind as 
analogous to the functioning of various technologies, yet which have come to be 
incorrectly understood as literal descriptions and explanations of the mind. He suggested 
that this association between mind and machine is based on (and constantly reinforces) 
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the view that neuroscience has already explained or will explain the phenomenon of 
consciousness. In other words, Tallis argued that technological terms reinforce the 
premise that mind is brain by reinforcing the idea that mind functions like machines. This 
happens to be a largely unquestioned part of typical parlance since machines are 
generally anthropomorphized in a variety of ways that unknowingly (and incorrectly) 
attribute to them qualities of being conscious, free-willed, human-like entities that think 
and perform tasks. Like Uttal (2007), Tallis (2004) noted that the ambiguity of 
psychological concepts is one reason for the persistence of material misrepresentations of 
mind. For example, concepts such as calculation, complexity, goals, and instructions are 
concepts that are often used to describe the functioning of machines such as computers, 
yet are also applied by cognitive psychologists to describe mind (or to describe how the 
brain works to produce the mind).  
 Like Brothers (2001), Tallis (2004) is also a physician who has conducted 
neuroscience research yet is vocal in his criticism of the neuroscientific study of 
psychological concepts. He is primarily concerned with the disregard for the concepts of 
consciousness and subjectivity that a reductionist neuroscientific understanding of human 
psychology frequently depicts. His concern is that attributing all human experience to the 
brain tends to overlook many of the important philosophical and social issues that those 
questions have traditionally been thought to raise. In his view, the neuroscientific vision 
of self is ultimately a scientistic, Darwinian understanding of humans that is 
uncomplicated and boring. Further, the understanding of a mechanistic, material self, 
when described in ways that neglect concepts such as consciousness or subjectivity, 
ultimately portrays humans without agency or self-directedness.  
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 In sum, critics of cognitive neuroscience have argued that using neuroscience to 
locate psychological concepts within neurobiological processes is illogical and therefore 
requires using rhetoric or grammar in ways that make nonmaterial concepts seem either 
interchangeable with, or able to be easily mapped onto observable physical correlates. 
Critics also suggest that cognitive neuroscience, despite its popularity, and despite 
promising an explanation of how humans experience life in both physical and 
nonphysical ways, often naturalizes and individualizes social and philosophical issues. 
This has significant consequences for what people understand to be the location of human 
experience, difficulties, and change. In the next section I discuss the integration between 
neuroscience and psychotherapy.   
 A brief history of arguments supporting the integration of psychotherapy 
and neuroscience. In this section I discuss ways in which authors have portrayed 
neuroscience as having the potential to help therapists discern among the multitude of 
psychotherapy theories, select appropriate treatments, and measure the effectiveness of 
these treatments for third-party payers who often hold significant control over the 
delivery of mental health care. These issues have been identified in psychotherapy 
literature as explanations for why various psychotherapy-neuroscience integration efforts 
are necessary.  
 Integration of psychotherapy theories. In light of the expansive number of 
psychotherapy theories, the question of which psychotherapy treatment should be 
provided to which psychotherapy patient has not been easy to answer. The integration or 
combination of separate therapy theories has been driven in part by research findings 
suggesting that most psychotherapies seem to confer equally helpful results for patients, 
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and, in general, most patients seem to respond well to psychotherapy for reasons that are 
similar regardless of the specific therapy modality (Norcross & Newman, 2003). A 
second attempt to resolve this dilemma was the creation of evidence-based treatments 
specifically tailored for psychological disorders, and with the purpose of maintaining 
verifiable and replicable psychological treatments.  
 The history of psychotherapy integration includes the initial decline of 
psychoanalysis’ prominence during the mid-20th century, which had significant 
implications for professional psychology. Cushman (1995) noted a split even within 
psychoanalytic theories during the 1940s following the death of Sigmund Freud. 
Although now widely regarded as a flawed study, Hans Eysenck’s seminal study during 
the 1950s, which claimed to find psychoanalysis ineffective as a mental health treatment, 
was thought to have catalyzed the drive to implement alternative psychological 
approaches (Goodwin, 2008). Lazarus (2005) argued that in professional psychology 
journals, disagreements between various schools of practice within professional 
psychology were evidenced at least as early as the 1960s, and were initially pronounced 
in expert debates between psychoanalysis and behavioral models of treatment for 
psychological conditions. During the mid-to-late-20th century psychotherapy experienced 
a proliferation of psychotherapy theories, at times accompanied by noticeable 
disagreements between the experts affiliated with them, and competition for professional 
legitimacy among advocates of separate paradigms (J. Gold & Stricker, 2006; Miller, 
Duncan, & Hubble, 1997; Norcross, 2005). Today psychotherapists continue to confront 
the challenge of understanding and selecting appropriately from among a multitude of 
psychotherapy modalities. According to Barker (2001), 
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 For over 30 years society has been drowning in psychotherapies. Where 
 psychoanalysis once strode confidently, alone, now the path to the client’s door is 
 beaten by a Technicolor assortment of approaches, models and interventions, 
 some with only the most tenuous attachments to the five main forces of 
 psychological thought. (p. 11) 
 
 Miller, Duncan, and Hubble (1997) suggested that contentious disagreements 
among advocates of specific psychotherapy theories and modalities might be attributable 
in part to financial interests of authors who have sought to differentiate new products 
from already-existing yet similar treatments. They also noted the pressing need among 
psychotherapy providers to prove to third-party payers that the reliability and verifiable 
effectiveness of treatments administered with psychotherapy patients. Formal integration 
between psychotherapy theories has been a prominent late-20th century psychotherapy 
trend. According to Goldfried, Pachankis, & Bell (2005), the origins of psychotherapy 
integration could be seen as early as the 1930s when some theorists proposed a 
convergence between certain principles of psychoanalysis and the emergent behavioral 
models of treatment for psychological conditions. Psychotherapy integration offers an 
alternative to psychotherapists promising allegiance to any one psychotherapy approach. 
One of the goals of psychotherapy integration has been the discovery of areas of 
convergence among various effective psychotherapy models in order to “create theories 
and practices that are superior to the existing pure-form models” (Lampropoulos, 
Spengler, Dixon, & Nicholas, 2002, p. 1228). With the hopes of improving 
psychotherapy overall, some authors have suggested that psychotherapy integration might 
curtail the disputes among competing schools of psychotherapy with regards to best 
practices in therapy (Alford & Beck, 1997).  
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 The finding that many treatment approaches have the potential to confer similar 
benefits upon therapy clients is now commonly understood among professional 
psychotherapists to be a driving factor behind the movement for multi-theoretical or 
integrative approaches to psychotherapy treatment (O’Brien & Houston, 2007; Prochaska 
& Norcross, 2003). As theoretical integrationists seek to determine the most efficacious 
psychotherapy modality for each patients’ presenting problems (Norcross, 2005; Stricker 
& Gold, 2006), integrative modalities have, by some survey measures, constituted a 
significant portion of professional psychotherapists’ identified psychotherapy approach 
(Norcross, Karpiak, & Lister, 2005; Prochaska & Norcross, 2003). According to Nuttall 
(2002), psychotherapy integration represents a convergence of historical factors in 
professional psychology, including the influence of a postmodern worldview that 
questions the idea of singular or objective truth; the need to prove cost-effectiveness of 
psychotherapy treatments to third-party payers; and the need to efficiently train providers 
to be able to identify the needs of individual clients and maintain flexible treatment 
approaches. As a primer to his multitheoretical adult psychotherapy guide, Brooks-Harris 
(2008) similarly argued that the movement toward theoretical integration has probably 
been a result, in part, of emerging postmodern approaches driven by constructionist, 
systemic, and cognitive theories. Evidence of this argument can be seen in humanistic 
psychotherapists’ adopting experiential techniques, as with the emotional-focused 
therapy recommended by Leslie S. Greenberg (Elliott, Watson, Goldman, & Greenberg, 
2004); psychodynamic theorists adopting interpersonal techniques, such as the cyclical 
psychodynamic paradigm by Paul Wachtel (1993); and the well-known merger of 
numerous cognitive and behavioral psychotherapies which have included dialectical 
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behavioral therapy created by Marsha Linehan (Robins, Schmitt, & Linehan, 2004) and 
acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) devised by Steven Hayes (2004).  
 The effects of managed care organizations (MCOs) on professional psychology 
and psychotherapy. The emergence of managed care organizations (MCOs) and their 
strict oversight of patient care has also factored prominently among the difficulties that 
psychologists and psychotherapy have faced in the delivery of services over the last 
several decades. Managed care organizations, which are private health insurance 
agencies, emerged during the 1980s and placed barriers to financial compensation for 
mental health services such as restrictions on reimbursable psychotherapy methodologies, 
and limitations on the number of psychotherapy sessions for which patients might receive 
coverage (Cohen, 2003; Panzarino, 2000). The emergence of short-term psychotherapy 
approaches and the efforts to devise methods of measuring psychotherapy progress has 
since been ubiquitous (Cushman & Gilford, 2000; L. M. Richardson & Austad, 1991). 
Authors have suggested that long-term psychotherapies, which seem more likely to 
address clients’ longstanding behaviors or personality characteristics within the context 
of the therapeutic relationship, have often been discouraged by managed care guidelines 
(Cushman & Gilford, 2000; Ragan, 2006; Sperling & Sack, 2002).  
 Authors have also noted the social, ethical, and practical difficulties cause by 
managed care oversight for mental health services. For example, Braun and Cox (2005) 
noted the ethical and legal challenges that have arisen as clinicians, confronted with 
managed care restrictions on clients’ coverage, might have intentionally or 
unintentionally misrepresented a client’s diagnosis or treatment in order to provide 
reimbursable treatment. Discrepancies in therapists’ diagnoses of patients based on 
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payment method has been studied and reported elsewhere (see Kielbasa, Pomerantz, 
Krohn, & Sullivan, 2004). Cushman and Gilford (2000) described the social implications 
of managed care organizations’ regulatory control over psychotherapy approaches and 
preferred diagnostic categories, and the surveillance by MCOs over the relationship 
between psychotherapist and patient. They argued that the mandates of managed care 
companies promote an uncomplicated understanding of complex human problems, and 
therefore has the potential to result in psychotherapy practices that indirectly promote 
political values consistent with conformity or compliance to authority. Wilcoxon, 
Magnuson, and Norem (2008) further proposed potential implications of these types of 
inflexible psychotherapy practices during the mental health treatment of minority clients. 
Managed care limitations on reimbursements for psychotherapy providers also coincided 
with the increased use of psychiatric medications, against which psychotherapists have 
frequently found themselves competing as treatment providers (Linford & Arden, 2009). 
Linford and Arden also argued that psychotherapists have often struggled to define or 
explain succinctly the factors that comprise the quality of the psychotherapy experience, 
whereas advocates for psychiatric medications have been able to explain the efficacy of 
their treatments as an assumed correction to chemical imbalances.  
 Applying neuroscience to psychotherapy integration and validating 
psychotherapy efficacy. In psychotherapy articles and books, authors have advocated 
strongly for a continued and growing relationship between psychotherapy and 
neuroscience. One argument suggests that psychotherapy research that uses brain 
imaging has the potential to identify effective psychotherapy practices and allow 
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psychologists and psychotherapists to have confirmed scientific explanations of the 
purpose of therapy. According to Beitman and Manring (2009), 
 Psychotherapy may be leaving its prescientific state as neuroimaging and 
 specialized electroencephalograms of brain function help to define the 
 neurophysiological bases of psychotherapeutic change. As therapists theorize, 
 their theories will be increasingly testable by concrete brain mapping. Such work 
 will challenge therapists to learn that mind and brain are not separate but are 
 different aspects of the same thing. (p. 713) 
 
 Similarly, Linden (2006) argued that “psychotherapy needs to be based on a 
sound understanding of the biological processes involved. There is no reason why this 
general standard of contemporary medicine . . . should not apply here as well” (p. 528). 
According to Fonagy (2004), “non-biased, non-subjective measures of outcome are 
urgently required. Neuroscience (particularly brain imaging) will deliver this sooner 
rather than later” (p. 357). These statements seem unwavering in both the convictions 
about the importance of integrating neuroscience with psychotherapy, as well as the 
attitude of certainty that neuroscientific methods will indeed become increasingly 
intertwined with the specific practice of psychotherapy and the general understanding of 
its purpose and efficacy.  
  Authors (e.g., Beitman & Manring, 2009; Beitman & Viamontes, 2006; Porto et 
al., 2009; Toomey & Ecker, 2007; Walter, Berger, & Schnell, 2009) have argued that the 
use of neuroimaging technologies in psychotherapy research could prove which 
psychotherapy theories (and which common factors amongst various psychotherapy 
theories) are most efficacious for brain change and therefore worthy of being 
recommended as psychological treatments. The assertion is that such neuroscientific 
research would provide conclusive evidence as to which therapies are least effective, 
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consolidating the myriad of psychotherapy theories into sets of precise interventions for 
specific clinical problems. For example, Linden (2006) proposed that neuroscience might 
contribute to these professional goals because “a better understanding of . . . biological 
mechanisms might aid in the improvement of therapeutic interventions or even in the 
utilization of these very mechanisms, as in the case of neurofeedback” (p. 528). In their 
neuroscience-informed understanding of the purpose of psychotherapy, Beitman and 
Viamontes (2006) argued that “a pragmatic look at the psychotherapeutic interaction 
suggests that it is a relationship between two brains and their bodies” (p. 214). Beitman 
and Viamontes predicted that by utilizing neuroscience in psychotherapy research, 
“psychotherapists will be able to visualize the brain processes that underlie both 
psychopathology and psychotherapeutic change” (p. 214). These statements materialize 
psychotherapy by reducing psychotherapy theory and practices to the brain.  
 Broadening the scope of established psychotherapy theories. Psychotherapy 
theorists have used neuroscience research in an effort to either verify the accuracy of 
already-existing psychotherapy theories’ models of behavior and change, or to overcome 
limitations to well-known psychotherapy paradigms by broadening the scope or utility of 
those theories. In other words, the appeal to neuroscience is very wide. For example, with 
regards to remedying the purported decline in prominence of psychoanalytic theory, 
seminal neuroscience researcher and psychiatrist Eric Kandel (1999) has encouraged 
psychoanalytic therapists to embrace neuroscience research as proof of psychoanalytic 
interpretations of memory, consciousness, and mind, and to portray the aims of 
psychoanalysis as convergent with the aims of neuroscientific research in those areas. 
Kandel argued that such a merger between psychoanalysis and neuroscience could 
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potentially reverse what he described as the declining influence of psychoanalytic ideas 
within professional psychological practice. Boag (2007) similarly declared, “the 
significance of this direction for psychoanalysis cannot be overstated. . . . The venture 
into neuroscience makes possible the further evaluation of some of the fundamental 
concepts within psychoanalytic theory” (p. 376). In one article, Ragan (2006), a physician 
and psychoanalytic practitioner, bemoaned his experiences of being instructed by 
managed care agents to avoid discussing transference issues with therapy patients in 
order to avoid issues that might lead to patients’ regression and possibly lengthier courses 
of therapy. He argued that by appealing to neurobiological evidence for its theories, 
“psychoanalysis can join the ranks of those fields claiming a modicum of ‘objective’ and 
‘subjective,’ ‘rational,’ and ‘hierarchical’ understanding of the essential workings of what 
it is to be human” (p. 643).  
 In a different application of neuroscience to psychotherapy, Ilardi and Feldman 
(2001) proposed that the study of the neural correlates of mental activities could serve to 
widen behavioral psychology’s limited disciplinary boundaries. Noting that behaviorists 
traditionally have assumed that behavior is largely determined by an individual’s 
environment and that behavior is measured with observable individual actions, Ilardi and 
Feldman argued that advances in neuroimaging may allow for observations of mental 
states, thereby broadening what is considered to be observable phenomena. In another 
unique application of neuroscience to an effort to expand the scope of psychotherapy 
theories, Cromby (2004) argued that psychotherapies based on social constructionism 
should incorporate brain-based explanations of subjectivity in order to incorporate the 
idea of physical embodiment into their understanding of human beings. He argued that 
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some contemporary psychotherapy theories have become extreme in their view that 
reality is ambiguous, in effect perpetuating an understanding of mind and body as 
separate even though constructionist theories had been incorporated into psychotherapy 
to challenge mind-body dualism. Cromby argued that incorporating supposed 
physiological correlates of mind into social constructionist approaches could therefore 
enable these psychotherapies to “more profoundly challenge the cognitivism and 
individualism of mainstream approaches” (Cromby, 2004, p. 817). These theorists’ 
efforts all suggest a materialization of mind and other psychological concepts. The 
variety of ways in which these theorists appeal to neuroscience to resolve an array of 
challenges in psychotherapy theory is also noteworthy. 
 Authors have suggested that neuroscience research might eventually contribute to 
an overhaul of dichotomous classifications between physiological processes and mental 
disorders, anticipating that the relationships between molecular and cognitive levels of 
functioning will be identified (see Linden & Fallgatter, 2009; Mizen, 2005; Peres & 
Nasello, 2008). For example, Linden and Fallgatter (2009) suggested that, “classical 
concepts of mental disorders such as schizophrenia have been variously attacked as being 
too broad or too narrow. Here, the hope is that neuroimaging may contribute diagnostic 
markers to support or refute existing categories” (p. 1). Similarly, according to Peres and 
Nasello (2008), “functional neuroimaging technologies are perhaps the most important of 
several recent developments that promise to correct, or even eliminate, the rigid 
classification of disorders as neurological, psychiatric, or psychological” (p. 944). These 
goals seem ambitious and assume theoretical integration among various understandings 
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of psychopathology in order to facilitate broadly agreed-upon understandings of 
psychology distress or discernible mental illness.  
Statement of the Problem 
 Despite the significant role of neuroscience and mind-brain research in the 
contemporary understanding of self, there has been a relative absence of studies that 
critically examine the integration between psychotherapy and neuroscience. There has 
been a convergence of historical and political developments in Western culture that has 
led to the formation of contemporary neuroscience. Several philosophical and scientific 
controversies have emerged about cognitive neuroscience’s efforts to study psychological 
concepts by identifying their neural correlates, and yet there has been a relative absence 
of critical analyses of the integration between psychotherapy and neuroscience in the 
literature. Therefore, there is a need for a cultural and historical interpretation of a 
neuroscience-informed psychotherapy text based on a careful analysis of the claims and 
rhetorical strategies used to integrate mind and brain or psychotherapy and neuroscience.  
Description of the Study 
 Specifically, in this hermeneutic study I historically situate a brain-based 
psychotherapy text. I first conduct a textual analysis of Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The 
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain. In that analysis I discuss 
examples of the primary content, rhetorical strategies, and recurring themes in the book. I 
then examine the implicit cultural and historical assumptions in Cozolino’s claims and 
recommendations, and I discuss ways in which he used linguistic devices to identify 
psychotherapy with neuroscience. Finally, in Chapter V I discuss the implications of the 
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text for professional psychology and psychotherapy, and the broader economic, political, 
and social arrangements that the text at once embodies and replicates.  
Rationale for the Study 
 This project could bring greater attention among psychotherapists and general 
audiences to understandings about the self that are unknowingly perpetuated in a brain-
based psychotherapy discourse. As a hermeneutic study of a psychotherapy text, it is 
assumed that certain understandings about the self or what it means to be human are 
present in the text’s claims about psychological health, illness, and approaches for 
facilitating healing. Hermeneutic philosophy is an interpretive framework for 
understanding how healing practices embody and then replicate certain sociocultural 
trends and moral understandings of a historical time and place. Revealing the 
understanding of the self in a brain-based therapy theory is necessary for understanding 
the political, economic, and social arrangements that are promoted in a brain-based 
therapy discourse.  
Importance of the Study 
 This study is important because it could contribute to a substantive dialogue 
within professional psychology and psychotherapy about some of the possible 
implications of a brain-based psychotherapy discourse for patients and for the larger 
societal understandings of issues such as psychological health and illness, as well as the 
purpose of psychotherapy. Because of the relative absence of critical interpretations about 
brain-based psychotherapy theories despite well known but separate critical historical 
examinations of both psychotherapy and neuroscience, this study attempted to bring 
attention to some of the underlying values, assumptions, and lifestyle choices that brain-
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based psychotherapy discourses reinforce, and that authors of brain-based psychotherapy 
texts (and psychotherapists employing their recommendations) might have overlooked. 
 It is clear from a review of the literature that authors who support the integration 
between neuroscience and psychotherapy have many hopes that neuroscience will resolve 
some longstanding yet unresolved issues such as how best to explain psychotherapy’s 
effectiveness, and how to select or combine psychotherapies for the treatment of a 
specific patient or for the treatment of a specific psychological problem. However, some 
of the possible implications of using neuroscience to answer these psychological and 
treatment-related questions (and to devising psychotherapy interventions from brain 
research) have gone largely unexamined. By identifying many of the recurring rhetorical 
strategies or devices in a brain-based psychotherapy book, I intended for my hermeneutic 
study to build on the work of scholars (e.g., Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Brothers, 2001; 
Tallis, 2004) who have critiqued the logic underlying cognitive neuroscience’s 
integration of psychology and neuroscience, and voiced concerns about the societal 
implications of viewing human psychology in neurobiological terms. I am particularly 
interested in how the understandings about self that have been associated with mind-brain 
research might come to be replicated in psychotherapy, and the implications of that 
possible trend for the profession of psychology. I believe that psychotherapists, patients, 
and general audiences could benefit from greater awareness of the possible implications 
of literature that uses mind-brain research to justify established psychotherapy therapies 
(or possibly to create new therapy discourses based on interpretations of brain 
functioning or discussions about the brain).  
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Summary 
 In this chapter I introduced the modern era concept of the self, some of the 
historical and cultural trends from which neuroscience research emerged during the 20th 
century, and critical perspectives on the neuroscientific study of psychology or mental 
experience. I identified the problem of a relative absence of literature critically examining 
the integration between psychotherapy and neuroscience, and I described the study of 
Cozolino’s (2010) book that I conduct in Chapters IV and V. In the next chapter I review 
the justifications and uses of neuroscience in psychotherapy research, and ways in which 
neuroscience has been applied to psychotherapy theory.  
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
 In Chapter I, I discussed the configuration of the self in Western culture beginning 
around the 17th century with what is considered to be the start of the modern era. I 
showed that although humans have recognized for thousands of years that brain and 
conscious experience are somehow related, contemporary neuroscience has created a 
unique and powerful place in the understanding of the self. In this chapter I broadly 
survey the literature pertaining to the uses of neuroscience in psychotherapy research and 
the integration of neuroscience with psychotherapy theories.  
Neuroscientific Explanations for Psychotherapy Efficacy  
 In this section I briefly describe several neuroimaging technologies and I review 
some of the proposed neurobiological explanations for psychotherapy’s effectiveness in 
reducing psychological symptoms or improving psychological functioning.  
 A brief overview of common neuroimaging technologies. A brief overview of 
neuroimaging technologies is necessary to understand the foundation of the research 
methods and conclusions that authors have drawn from psychotherapy-neuroimaging 
studies. Lee, Kannan, and Hillis (2006) categorized brain imaging technologies according 
to whether the technologies have been used to identify abnormalities in brain structure 
(such as computerized tomography or CT and magnetic resonance imaging or MRI), or 
changes in brain function (such as positron emission tomography or PET and single 
photon emission computerized tomography or SPECT), or both structural and functional 
issues (functional magnetic resonance imaging or fMRI). Kolb and Whishaw (2009) 
categorized neuroimaging technologies based on whether the technology has been used to 
detect and record the electrical activity of neurons (such as electroencephalogram or 
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EEG), or whether the technology uses x-rays to display densities of brain regions and 
anatomy (such as computerized tomography or CT), or as dynamic imaging methods 
(PET, MRI, and fMRI). The dynamic imaging methods, all spawned from the principles 
of CT, utilize computers during scanning sessions which sequentially capture a number 
of images of an individual’s brain, then combine the multitude of images in order to 
display areas of brain activation (Kolb & Whishaw, 2009).  
 Single photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT) and positron 
emission tomography (PET) technologies both display regional cerebral blood flow 
(rCBF) in an individual’s brain, which is strongly suggestive of glucose metabolism or 
energy use and therefore is used to indicate increases in activity in various regions of the 
brain. Each of these technologies tracks the activity of a radioactive tracer that is 
typically injected into participants’ bloodstreams prior to brain scanning (Linden, 2008; 
Peres & Nasello, 2008). FDG-PET, for example, is named for F 18 fluorodeoxyglucose, 
the radioactive isotope injected into participants or patients prior to scanning that emits 
positrons as it decays. A computer detects the decay of the tracer as a measure of 
metabolic activity in human tissue (Peres & Nasello, 2008).  
 Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technology captures images of an 
individual’s brain that display the responses of brain tissues when tissues are exposed to a 
powerful magnet. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is used in 
neuroimaging to display images of an individual’s brain that can discern between 
different responses of oxygenated and deoxygenated blood when exposed to the fMRI’s 
magnet. In fMRI, increases in the neural activity in specific areas of an individual’s brain 
are indicated through detecting increases in flow of oxygenated blood flow to those areas 
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(Beutel, Stern, & Silbersweig, 2003; Lee et al., 2006). FMRI technologies display both 
anatomical structures and blood-flow processes (Peres & Nasello, 2008). In the next 
section I discuss how these technologies have been used to explain material correlates of 
psychotherapy treatments.  
 Neuroplasticity, learning, and memory. Stress or trauma during early 
development is believed to impact neurobiological functioning in ways that result in 
psychological symptoms (Fonagy, 2004; Watts-English, Fortson, Gibler, Hooper, & De 
Bellis, 2006). Therefore, certain experiences such as psychotherapy are believed to 
produce changes in individuals’ brains that correspond to a reduction of symptoms of 
psychopathology (Dumont, 2009; Peres & Nasello, 2008). Central to this argument is the 
broader concept of neuroplasticity, that is, the ability of the brain’s structures and 
functioning to be amenable to changes in response to certain environmental or 
experiential factors (Brenner, Roder, & Tschacher, 2006; Fuchs, 2004; Grawe, 2007; 
Liggan & Kay, 1999; Peres & Nasello, 2008). According to Fuchs (2004),  
 There is a life-long re-mapping of cortical networks according to the individual 
 experience, including the de novo generation of neurons in the adult 
 hippocampus, as proven recently. Neuroplasticity is a prerequisite for any 
 enduring change in behavior, cognition, and emotion. . . . In order to produce 
 lasting effects, psychotherapy should arrive at restructuring neural networks, 
 particularly in the subcortical-limbic system which is responsible for unconscious 
 emotional motivations and dispositions. (p. 479) 
 
 Etkin, Pittenger, Polan, and Kandel (2005) emphatically remarked, “there is no 
longer any doubt that psychotherapy can result in detectable changes in the brain”  
(p. 155). According to Dumont (2009), “successful psychotherapy entails neuronal 
restructuring, which in turn enables more functional behavior” (p. 33). Liggan and Kay 
(1999) outlined several specific physiological mechanisms which have been proposed as 
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explanations for psychotherapy’s ability to effect changes in patients’ brains and 
subsequently behavior. These include altering metabolism in brain regions (and altering 
serotonin metabolism specifically), impacting thyroid functioning, and creating new 
synapses (electrical signals between neurons) similar to those that are expected to emerge 
during new learning experiences.  
 Brenner et al. (2006) argued that an individual’s brain develops largely in 
accordance with a genetic foundation, yet they noted that  
 Learning processes control the construction of cognitive-emotional schemata, 
 which is correlated in particular to dendritic cross-linking. . . . If psychotherapy is 
 understood to be a form of learning, then the unfolding learning process can also 
 effect changes in gene expression and thus influence the strength of synaptic 
 connections. (p. S11) 
 
 That learning processes are suspected to occur during certain experiences is one 
of the primary explanations for psychotherapy enabling changes in patients’ brain 
functioning (Centonze, Siracusano, Calabresi, & Bernardi, 2005; Etkin et al., 2005).  
 Centonze et al. (2005) explained that psychotherapy alleviates psychological 
distress because processes such as the inhibition of memory consolidation and 
reconsolidation disrupt patients’ emotional reactivity to distressing memories (see also 
De Raedt, 2006). Researchers suspect that neuroplasticity underlies lasting psychological 
and emotional reactivity in response to early experiences (forming the basis of implicit or 
emotional memory, the effects of which are often out of patients’ awareness), or allowing 
for lasting psychological or behavioral change, as new memory alters patients’ 
expectations and perceptions of themselves and others (see Fuchs, 2004; Liggan & Kay, 
1999). 
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 According to Centonze et al. (2005), “an effective psychotherapy must be directed 
to erase maladaptive implicit memories and aberrant synaptic plasticity” (p. 124). Liggan 
and Kay (1999) noted, “once learned implicitly, rules may exert a self-perpetuating bias 
for interpreting later experience in a manner consistent with past experience, regardless 
of the appropriateness of such an interpretation” (p. 105). Liggan and Kay further 
explained that  
 In psychotherapy, these patterns of implicit rules are revealed and reflected upon, 
 and change occurs through the learning of new patterns explicitly repeated until 
 the new habit-based manner is engrained in the implicit memory system. Within 
 this proposition, psychotherapeutic change may be attributed to a process of 
 insight or to the provision of abstract explanations regarding underlying 
 relationship patterns. (p. 105)  
 
 Some theorists have posited that psychotherapy causes neurobiological changes 
because the therapeutic relationship itself acts as a reparative attachment relationship that 
decreases the psychological impact of implicit memories formed during early childhood 
social interactions (see Duquette, 2010; Fuchs, 2004; Liggan & Kay, 1999). At the end of 
this chapter I discuss the use of attachment theory in brain-based psychotherapies such as 
interpersonal neurobiology. 
Neuroimaging Methods in Psychotherapy Outcome Studies 
 In this section I review and discuss the use of neuroscientific research in studies 
of psychotherapy treatments. According to Linden and Fallgatter (2009),  
 Treatment monitoring with functional neuroimaging has had particularly 
 fascinating applications in the field of psychological interventions. We can now 
 safely say that there has been a paradigm shift over the past 10 years to an 
 integrated view of psychological and neurobiological models of mental illness and 
 its treatment. (p. 5)  
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 Beutel et al. (2003) argued that, “neuroimaging procedures are based on the fact 
that mental activity is accompanied by a change of neural activity associated with a 
change (increase or decrease) of metabolic activity in these areas” (p. 777). Many studies 
have investigated the neurobiological correlates and impairments of various mental 
disorders through neuroimaging of research participants who have been diagnosed with 
specific disorders (see Melcher, Falkai, & Gruber, 2008). For example, researchers have 
used neuroimaging to display underlying neurobiological processes that are suspected to 
be involved in a variety of mental disorders including schizophrenia (Carter, Mintun, 
Nichols, & Cohen, 1997) and bipolar disorder (Blumberg et al., 2003). 
 In Baxter et al.’s (1992) study, researchers used positron emission tomography 
(PET) to compare possible neurobiological changes in members of a healthy control 
group to neurobiological changes in patients who had been treated for obsessive 
compulsive disorder with either antidepressant medication or a course of behavioral 
therapy. Since that study, neuroimaging technologies have been used to measure changes 
in the brain activity of psychotherapy patients following participation in various 
psychotherapy treatments for various psychological disorders. A sufficient number of 
these psychotherapy-neuroimaging studies have been conducted such that recent review 
articles have organized and compared these studies’ methods, results, and psychotherapy 
treatment implications (Frewen, Dozois, & Lanius, 2008; Peres & Nasello, 2008; Porto et 
al., 2009; Roffman, Marci, Glick, Dougherty, & Rauch, 2005). Peres and Nasello (2008) 
examined 21 of these studies and concluded, “the results in general show that the 
psychotherapeutic approaches used had the potential to modify dysfunctional neural 
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circuits associated with the disorder in question” (p. 950). Peres and Nasello further noted 
that 
 Psychotherapy influenced neuropsychological normalization with a corresponding 
 development of the patient’s psychological equilibrium. In fact, changes occurring 
 at the mental level through psychotherapy are accompanied by changes in brain 
 blood flow and normalization of patients’ neural dynamics. (p. 950) 
 
 A review of studies in which research participants attended a structured 
psychotherapy modality for treatment of a specific psychological disorder, followed by 
neuroimaging procedures to measure possible neurobiological changes attributable to the 
psychotherapy, indicate that these psychotherapy-neuroimaging studies can be broadly 
categorized in several ways. For example, the most frequent disorders for which 
participants in these studies have been treated with psychotherapy and then administered 
brain scans have been post-traumatic stress disorder (Farrow et al., 2005; Peres et al., 
2007), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Baxter et al., 1992; Brody et al., 1998; Nakao et 
al., 2005; Nakatani et al., 2003; Schwartz, Stoessel, Baxter, Martin, & Phelps, 1996), 
panic disorder (Prasko et al., 2004; Sakai et al., 2006) major depressive disorder (Brody 
et al., 2001; Goldapple et al., 2004; Martin, Martin, Rai, Richardson, & Royall, 2001) and 
social or specific phobias (Furmark et al., 2002; Johanson, Risberg, Tucker, & Gustafson, 
2006; Paquette et al., 2003). The psychotherapy modalities provided to treatment-group 
participants in these studies have generally been short-term courses (typically comprised 
of 2 to 24 sessions) of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), interpersonal therapy (IPT), 
behavioral therapy (BT), or exposure therapy. The most commonly used neuroimaging 
technologies in these psychotherapy-neuroimaging studies have been positron emission 
tomography (PET), single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), magnetic 
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resonance imaging (MRI), and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 
Participants during neuroimaging have undergone brain scanning while in a resting state, 
or during symptom provocation, or during some neuropsychological test such as a 
measure of attention, in order to examine possible neurobiological correlates of the 
effects of the psychotherapy on psychological symptoms.  
 These studies have also varied based on the specific research design used in each 
study. That is, in order to determine the effects of psychotherapy participation on an 
individual’s brain activity, studies have compared psychotherapy participants’ 
neuroimaging results to neuroimaging results of participants in control groups comprised 
of individuals who had not been diagnosed with the psychological condition under 
investigation (see Nakatani et al., 2003; Paquette et al., 2003), or individuals who had 
been diagnosed with the same psychological condition as the treatment group members 
but who did not receive psychotherapy (see Furmark et al., 2002), or individuals who had 
been diagnosed with the same clinical condition but received treatment with psychiatric 
medications in place of psychotherapy (see Brody et al., 1998; Martin et al., 2001).  
 Examples of neuroimaging in psychotherapy outcome studies. I discuss the 
following examples of psychotherapy studies in order to illustrate the use of 
neuroimaging technologies within varying research designs that were used to investigate 
neurobiological changes in participants who had each undergone specific psychotherapy 
treatments for treatment of psychological conditions shared by members of their 
treatment group.  
 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and cognitive behavioral 
therapy (CBT). Paquette et al. (2003) investigated neurobiological changes in 
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participants’ brains using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) following 
cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for treatment of spider phobia. In this study design, 
12 female participants were screened for inclusion based on two self-report symptom 
questionnaires, a review of DSM-IV criteria for specific phobia, and observations of the 
participants’ reactions to viewing images of spiders while placed in an inactive MRI 
scanner in order to determine whether reactions to this situation were sufficiently 
tolerable to allow participation in similar procedures during the actual experimental 
conditions. For treatment comparison, a control group was comprised of 13 female 
participants who demonstrated no phobic responses to images of spiders and who 
presented with no histories of psychiatric or neurological illnesses. The participants in 
both groups underwent fMRI scanning prior to the psychological intervention that was 
administered to participants in the treatment group. Treatment group participants who 
received the CBT intervention were re-administered fMRI scanning following treatment 
in order to assess for neurological changes following therapy, while the control group 
members did not participate in any further fMRI procedure and received no psychological 
intervention.  
 The course of psychotherapy for treatment group members consisted of weekly 
three-hour group cognitive behavioral therapy sessions, with 6 members in each therapy 
group, for four weeks. The therapy sessions consisted of gradual exposure therapy (from 
viewing pictures, to viewing films, to viewing real spiders, to touching spiders) with 
accompanying exposure-based homework that was completed by participants between 
sessions. In this experiment, participants were determined to be responsive to therapy 
after demonstrating the ability to touch the pictures of spiders, the video screen 
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displaying films of spiders, and then the actual living spiders. Participants also rated their 
subjective fear responses after viewing the film sequences.  
 While undergoing the fMRI scan following the course of therapy, participants 
were shown video images of spiders alternating with images of butterflies for a statistical 
comparison of patients’ brain activity during each of these conditions. The fMRI results 
that had been captured during both exposure to the butterfly images and exposure to the 
spider images were compared within treatment-group members and between treatment- 
and control-group members in order to measure possible neurobiological changes in 
treatment-group participants accompanying symptom reductions following cognitive 
behavioral therapy. fMRI images of participants’ brains were acquired and then analyzed 
using “Statistical Parametric Mapping software” (Paquette et al., 2003, p. 403). Each 
voxel or pixel of the brain images from participants in the treatment-group (before and 
after psychotherapy) and control group-members was compared in its activity using a 
computer program that measured the amount of blood oxygenation response in various 
regions of the brain. A t-test was then used to compare the average level of activity at 
each voxel within and between groups.  
 Paquette et al. (2003) reported that the comparison between brain images of 
control subjects and pre-treatment phobic subjects demonstrated that “the dorsolateral 
prefrontal and the parahippocampal gyrus were significantly activated in phobic subjects, 
before CBT, but not in the control group” (p. 406). A comparison of brain images of 
treatment subjects demonstrated, prior to the CBT treatment, “significant loci of 
activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus and the parahippocampal gyrus, bilaterally” 
(p. 406), and increases in blood oxygen “were also noted in the left inferior occipital 
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gyrus, left fusiform gyrus, and right middle occipital gyrus” (p. 406). After undergoing 
CBT, neuroimaging results of treatment-group members reportedly showed activation 
that had not been observed prior to the intervention, “bilaterally, in the middle occipital 
gyrus and the superior parietal lobule. Significant peaks of activation were also seen in 
the left inferior occipital gyrus, left fusiform gyrus, and right inferior frontal gyrus”  
(p. 406). Paquette et al. noted among their conclusions, “the brain activation pattern 
found in phobic subjects, after effective CBT, displayed some similarity with that noted 
in normal control subjects; that is, in controls, no frontal or hippocampal activity was 
detected during the viewing of the spider film excerpts” (p. 407). They also claimed that, 
in support of the efficacy of CBT that had been suggested by earlier findings, “the 
absence of activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and parahippocampal gyrus . . . 
provides strong support to the view that CBT reduces phobic avoidance by 
deconditioning contextual fear learned at the level of the hippocampal/parahippocampal 
region” and also “by decreasing cognitive misattributions and catastrophic thinking at the 
level of the prefrontal cortex” (p. 407). That statement explained psychotherapeutic 
efficacy through a neurobiological mechanism of change. 
 The methods and conclusions of this study warrant further discussion. In Chapter 
I, I discussed the concerns of scholars (e.g., Uttal, 2007) who have questioned whether it 
is logical to reify or attempt to materialize psychological concepts by associating those 
concepts with related brain regions and neural activity. Faux (2002) outlined several 
conceptual and methodological critiques of experiments that use neuroimaging to study 
cognitive psychology constructs. The specific methodological issues that Faux raised 
about validity and reliability of mind-brain research is applicable to Paquette et al.’s 
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(2003) use of neuroimaging to study neural correlates of cognitive behavioral therapy that 
was shown to have been effective for decreasing symptoms of specific phobia.  
 Paquette et al. (2003) used what Faux (2002) identified as a common 
experimental design in cognitive neuroscience, which consists of subtracting the brain 
activity recorded during one cognitive task from the brain activity recorded during 
another cognitive task in order to identify whether changes in brain activity occurred and 
if so, the brain regions that were involved. In the Paquette et al. study, this process 
entailed measuring neural activity during a treatment task (e.g., viewing spiders), and 
measuring neural activity during a baseline task (e.g., viewing butterflies), and then 
computing an average brain scan for each participant under each condition. Researchers 
subtract average baseline scans from average treatment scans to determine whether the 
averages across all individuals in all scans suggest the presence of any “brain regions 
with averages that are statistically different from zero” (Faux, 2002, p. 166). In cognitive 
neuroscience studies that use the subtraction method, the brain regions with statistical 
significance are thought to explain the cognitive process being investigated.  
 According to Faux, there are several problems that may arise with conclusions 
drawn from this method. In these studies, baseline and treatment tasks are said to differ 
based on a cognitive process, yet Faux argued that it is unlikely that a single task or 
concept could be devised that elicits a single brain operation, as many brain processes are 
required even for simple cognitive tasks. Legrenzi and Umilta (2011), who also critiqued 
the subtraction method, noted that if the baseline task is for any reason wrongly selected, 
the conclusions about the experiment are meaningless.  
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 Faux (2002) also argued that, whereas brain activity can be directly observed, 
cognitive concepts (e.g., attention) are broad and imprecise, and therefore at times there 
is not general agreement on their exact meanings. In the Paquette et al. (2003) study, this 
issue may arise with the researchers’ use of concepts such as “volitionally” (p. 404) and 
“vigilance” (p. 407) to describe participants’ mental states. “If relevant variables are not 
under proper experimental control, then the results are likely to be uninformative or 
misleading” (Faux, 2002, p. 167). With varying interpretations of important constructs, 
an experiment’s validity (that is, the accuracy with which an experiment identifies and 
measures a concept under investigation) may be questionable. Poorly quantified concepts 
also limit the reliability of an experiment (that is, the ability to replicate its findings). 
 Paquette et al. (2003) used a t-test to compare averages of brain region activation 
within treatment-group participants before and after CBT, and between phobic subjects 
and subjects in the normal control group. t-tests were conducted on each voxel. Faux 
(2002) cautioned against the use of univariate statistics to compare the activity of 
thousands of voxels. Faux wrote, “not only does Type I error inflate due to multiple 
correlated tests, but statistical significance, accurate or not, may have little relation to 
neurological significance” (p. 171). In other words, there is an increased chance of 
incorrectly concluding that there is a statistically significant difference between two 
samples of voxels or pixels representing brain activity. In the Paquette et al. study, Type I 
error may have arisen from analyzing the multitude of brain images produced from only 
12 participants in the treatment group and 13 participants in the control group. Further, all 
participants in both groups were female, which also suggests limited generalizability of 
this study for wider populations. In sum, the concerns that Faux raised about the use of 
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neuroimaging to study cognitive concepts are relevant in light of the neuroimaging 
methodology and conclusions of Paquette et al.’s study of neuroimaging and 
psychotherapy. 
 Single photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT) and exposure 
therapy. Peres et al. (2007) recruited 37 participants who had been diagnosed with 
subthreshold posttraumatic stress disorder, of which 16 were administered a manual-
guided exposure-based therapy for 15 weeks while the remaining 11 participants 
remained on a waiting list to receive psychotherapy and were therefore used as a 
comparison group. Participants in both groups each underwent two SPECT scans. The 
neuroimaging procedure for both groups consisted of having each participant listen to a 
script read aloud describing their traumatic experience, then voluntarily recalling the 
memory in order to re-experience the episode. A radioactive tracer was injected into 
participants 30 seconds into the reading of the trauma narrative. 50 minutes were 
provided for rest before participants were taken to receive their SPECT scan.  
 The psychotherapy treatment group members underwent one scan following 
retrieval of the traumatic memory prior to beginning psychotherapy, and then received 
the second scan (also following retrieval of the traumatic memory) after completing 8 
weekly sessions of the psychotherapy treatment. Members of the control group received 
initial SPECT scans prior to treatment group members beginning therapy, and again after 
60 days, with the same symptom provocation method (although the control group had not 
been receiving treatment). Participants in both groups were administered the same two 
structured diagnostic interview assessments before the first scan and after the second 
scan. Three self-report symptom measures (one each pertaining to depression, anxiety, 
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and posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms) were administered after each scan. Further, 
an inventory measuring the intensity of traumatic memories was administered prior to 
treatment and after treatment as a pre- and post-treatment measure (control group 
members were administered this instrument twice in 60 days). 
 Peres et al. (2007) found decreases on nearly all psychological symptom measures 
for treatment group participants, and no change on nearly all measures for control group 
participants. The authors correlated these psychological findings with changes in brain 
activity that SPECT scan results indicated. They selected seven brain regions for their 
statistical analysis, as prior research suggested that those regions are active during 
traumatic memory retrieval. Among the findings, participants showed decreased activity 
in the left amygdala, and increased activation of the left anterior cingulate, left prefrontal 
cortex, left and right thamalus, left parietal lobe, left hippocampus and left Broca’s area. 
 Peres et al. (2007) discussed a variety of observed correlations between the 
reduction of posttraumatic symptoms and changes in regional brain activity. For example, 
they noted that “integrating sensorial traces of memories into structured therapeutic 
narratives is one of the main challenges for psychotherapies applied to trauma victims” 
(p. 1488). They then concluded, 
 The circuitry involved in the post-psychotherapy SPECT scans probably indicates 
 better codification and processing of the sensory information, which was not 
 processed in the baseline scans. The relative decrease in activation of the 
 amygdala during the psychotherapy follow-up scan may also be related to a less 
 intense subjective experience of unpleasant emotions, accompanied by activity in 
 the neural network associated with conscious interpretation, synthesis, and 
 integration of those sensory and emotional stimuli. (p. 1488) 
 
 As with Paquette et al.’s (2003) neuroimaging study of cognitive-behavioral 
therapy for specific phobia that I discussed above, Peres et al.’s (2007) study warrants 
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further discussion. This study did not use the subtraction method as in the Paquette et al. 
study in order to identify differences in brain activity before and after a psychotherapy 
treatment. Instead, Peres et al. recorded participants’ brain activity before and during the 
course of treatment, each time following a task that induced traumatic memories (and the 
psychological experiences of re-experiencing those memories consistent with 
posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms). This means that Peres et al. might have guarded 
against problems that arise in the subtraction method if a baseline task is poorly selected 
for treatment comparison (see Legrenzi & Umilta, 2011). In other words, this study may 
have greater validity because there is less chance that factors other than psychotherapy 
accounted for the neural differences between treatment and control group members. 
Further, the treatment and control group members were more diverse in this study (at 
least with regards to gender) than those in the Paquette et al. study, and therefore the 
results of this study could offer greater reliability than that study.  
 It is noteworthy that after Peres et al. (2007) read trauma narratives to participants 
prior to administering the brain scans, participants were asked to voluntarily re-
experience their traumatic events, and it was unclear how the researchers could verify or 
quantify that participants were complying with those instructions. Because brain activity 
is measured by averaging neural changes across participants, individual differences in 
brain activity could still be vast.  
 As with the study by Paquette et al. (2003), Peres et al.’s (2007) use of univariate 
statistics to test for statistical significance between psychological symptoms and brain 
activity suggests a heightened risk of incorrectly concluding that a statistically significant 
relationship exists between those variables (i.e., Type I error). Peres et al. used several 
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psychological assessment instruments to determine psychotherapy treatment efficacy, to 
measure psychological symptoms pre- and post-treatment, and to compare changes in 
control group members and treatment group members over two months. Although 
psychological assessment and treatment are well paired, the conceptual problems with 
mapping psychological concepts onto brain regions that scholars (e.g., Bennett & Hacker, 
2003; Faux, 2002) have raised also deserve attention here. In sum, although there are still 
conceptual and methodological concerns associated with using neuroimaging to study 
psychotherapy concepts, Peres et al. took steps to increase the validity and reliability of 
their experiment that seemed to be missing in Paquette et al.’s neuroimaging study 
discussed above. 
Brain-Based Psychotherapy Theories 
 Whereas neuroimaging technologies have been applied to psychotherapy outcome 
studies in order to assess changes in the brains of therapy patients that occur with the 
reduction of psychological symptoms following certain psychotherapy treatments, some 
authors have proposed new psychotherapy paradigms based on the integration of 
neuroscience research and psychotherapy theories. Examples of these include coherence 
therapy (Toomey & Ecker, 2007) and interpersonal neurobiology (Siegel, 1999). A brain-
based interpretation of psychoanalysis called neuropsychoanalysis (Schore, 2012) 
integrates neuroscientific research with psychoanalytic concepts and theories. 
 Coherence therapy. Toomey and Ecker’s (2007) coherence therapy is a 
psychotherapy modality derived from a neurobiology-informed relationship between 
memory and psychological distress. The goal of the therapy is to reduce the strength 
(depotentiation) of certain neurons thought to be responsible for the implicit (emotional) 
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memories associated with distressing psychological symptoms (Ecker & Toomey, 2008; 
Toomey & Ecker, 2007, 2009). Toomey and Ecker (2007) described their goal of 
devising a psychotherapy modality that would unite reductionist sciences with the 
experiential process of psychotherapy, and would also surpass the shared rate of 
effectiveness among various psychotherapy modalities. They proposed that coherence 
therapy interventions achieve those goals by maximizing the plasticity of patients’ brains, 
indicated by targeting brain regions in which symptoms originate, doing so as quickly as 
possible, and targeting the most powerful types neural connections (Ecker & Toomey, 
2008).  
 Toomey and Ecker (2007) based the coherence therapy model on the premise that 
neurobiological explanations for effective psychotherapy practices are best understood 
through constructivist theory. As a constructivist psychotherapy, they favored a 
philosophy of human psychology in which each individual is assumed to create and exist 
in his or her world in a way that is consistent with certain personal constructs or 
individual interpretations rather than a single true or objective reality. They further noted 
that each individual is believed to actively assemble knowledge rather than passively 
receiving it, and then adapting to the world through personal experiences rather than 
through any single true human nature. Within this theory, personal constructs or 
knowings enable individuals to experience and adapt to the world, are created through a 
variety of perceptual and physical processes, are synonymous with memory (some are 
implicit or unconscious and others are explicit or conscious), and are able to be revised. 
According to Toomey and Ecker (2007), “psychological constructivism’s central 
insistence on the active role of the individual in shaping experiential reality receives 
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extensive corroboration from findings on how the brain functions” (p. 205). They cited 
Quartz & Sejnowsky (1997) as having identified this phenomenon as neural 
constructivism, and portrayed a fit between this phenomenon and the tenets of 
constructivist theory as applied to psychotherapies positing a highly subjectivist view of 
reality.  
 According to Toomey and Ecker (2007, 2009), most psychotherapy patients’ 
symptoms are caused by implicit memories, which are emotional reactions that are 
triggered in situations that are in some way reminiscent of earlier formative experiences. 
As certain psychotherapy interventions encourage a patient to change his or her 
constructs or personal beliefs, these interventions enable a reduction in psychological 
symptoms through a corresponding reduction in emotional reactivity. In coherence 
therapy, psychotherapy techniques that reduce psychological symptoms consist of 
identifying the early experiences that first produced certain constructs or views of reality 
that continue to maintain unwanted emotional reactivity. The authors stated that the 
purpose of all psychotherapies informed by neuroscience research appears to be the 
integration between areas of the brain that are involved in this longstanding out-of-
awareness reactivity, and areas of the brain that allow a person’s current attention to 
identify and focus on the underlying beliefs that maintain those longstanding reactions 
(Ecker & Toomey, 2008). 
 Interpersonal neurobiology. Some authors who have advocated for the creation 
of a theoretically integrative psychotherapy in which interventions target neurobiological 
change have also cited brain-based explanations for the healing effects of the therapeutic 
relationship, that is, the purported ability of the human brain to respond positively to the 
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empathic qualities of some interpersonal relationships. For example, authors Linford and 
Arden (2009) argued that, “beyond the surface differences of various therapeutic 
methods, at heart we help clients change by enhancing the neuroplasticity of their brains” 
(p. 22). Those authors further noted,  
 Our brains are exquisitely adapted to change in response to the attuned and 
 compassionate interest of another human being. Attunement helps our clients face 
 what has been hidden and experience what has been denied, and as that happens 
 both their brains and ours are changed. We also help by educating clients about 
 how their behavior affects their brains and how that in turn changes how they feel. 
 (p. 22)  
 
 One paradigm that explores the interplay between the quality of human 
relationships and the effects on individuals’ brains (with a particular but not exclusive 
interest in parent-child relationships) is titled interpersonal neurobiology. Psychiatrist and 
author Daniel Siegel (1999) presented the phrase interpersonal neurobiology in his book 
The Developing Mind: How Relationships and the Brain Interact to Shape Who We Are. 
In that book Siegel provided a theoretically integrative model of human social 
development for the stated purpose of building “a foundation for a neurobiology of 
interpersonal experience” (Siegel, 1999, p. 1). According to Siegel (2001), “the brain is 
structured with an innate capacity to transcend the boundaries of the skin of its own body 
in integrating itself with the world, especially the world of other brains” (p. 87). Authors 
have described interpersonal neurobiology as a general paradigm of human 
psychological, neurobiological, and social development, the tenets of which represent 
convergent views and findings from various disciplines across sciences and humanities 
(Badenoch, 2008; Codrington, 2010; Siegel, 2001). Siegel was the founding series editor 
in Norton Books’ Series on Interpersonal Neurobiology, which displays over 30 books 
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for sale on its Internet webpage, and one large physical model of the human brain with 
moveable parts, which the website has marketed to mental health clinicians as “an ideal 
tool for helping your clients to visualize the complexities of the brain and mental health 
disorders—and a useful refresher for practitioners who find brain anatomy 
overwhelming” (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2013, para. 2). The topics of the books 
in Norton’s interpersonal neurobiology series are varied and include general 
psychotherapy texts for practitioners (Badenoch, 2008; Cozolino, 2010), and 
psychotherapy texts specifically purposed for the treatment of trauma (Wilkinson, 2010), 
infant mental health and child-parent interventions (Lillas & Turnbull, 2009), and 
neuroscience-informed approaches to social work (Applegate & Shapiro, 2005). 
 In general, the interpersonal neurobiology paradigm is based on neuroscience 
research suggesting that the structures of individuals’ brains are “constantly being formed 
and re-formed through interactions with other brains” (Hollingsworth, 2008, p. 841). 
Specifically, interpersonal neurobiology draws heavily from developmental neuroscience 
as described by authors such as Allan Schore (1994), who has proposed that an 
individual’s capacity for emotional regulation and a stable sense of self has its origins in 
early attachment relationships, which are internalized and stored in the right hemisphere 
of an infant’s brain. These attachment experiences therefore impact brain development, 
influence the quality of later personal relationships, and confer either protection against, 
or increase individual risk for developing symptoms of psychopathology (Schore, 2001, 
2002, 2005). According to Schore (2005), early attachment experiences occur during 
preverbal stages of development and form the basis of implicit memories that arise as 
nonverbal or emotional reactions to later social experiences. According to interpersonal 
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neurobiology as a psychotherapy paradigm, the relationship in psychotherapy between 
therapist and client is potentially analogous, in terms of its neurobiological effects, to 
healthy attachments during childhood. Therefore, influenced by the ideas of Schore 
(2005), interpersonal neurobiology interventions attempt to effect psychological change 
in patients in part through influencing right-brain (and other neurobiological) activity of 
therapy patients through an empathic and supportive therapy relationship (Siegel, 1999). 
 Neuropsychoanalysis. Schore (2012) founded neuropsychoanalysis or the 
disciplinary integration dedicated to combining psychoanalytic concepts and theories 
with an understanding of their neural correlates. Neborsky (2006) advocated for a short-
term psychodynamic therapy approach that he based on Schore’s (1996) interpretation of 
right-brain processes as the seat of unconscious relational processes. In attributing 
psychopathology to inadequate attachment experiences that prevent right-brain 
development of typical emotional regulation, Neborsky (2006) wrote, “some of us now 
think of infants from birth to about 16 months as right brain creatures” (p. 524). He 
argued that an adult psychotherapy patient’s defensiveness could represent unresolved 
separation anxiety caused by the inability of an early caregiver to help the patient 
internalize a sense of emotional regulation. He also posited that traditional long-term 
psychodynamic psychotherapy, with a dialogue centered on therapists’ interpretations or 
explanations of patients’ behaviors, has often neglected the patients’ emotional or 
nonverbal experiences and therefore failed to correct patients’ attachment-oriented, right-
hemisphere neurobiological processes. Neborsky (2006) explained that during 
psychotherapy, after a patient’s superego (that is, anxiety-producing fears of abandoning 
his or her defensiveness) is sufficiently lowered, “the therapist can become a new 
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attachment figure and rapidly improve attachment status” (p. 527). Neuropsychoanalysis 
contends that therapy is a process of communication between the right hemisphere of a 
therapist’s brain and the right hemisphere of a patient’s brain. These statements illustrate 
a relocating of psychological concepts to the individual brain. 
 In sum, within psychotherapy literature, rationales for neuroscience-
psychotherapy integration include identifying the efficacy of psychotherapy approaches, 
integrating psychotherapy theories based on those findings, and in general providing a 
putatively more coherent and scientific explanation of the purpose and process of 
psychotherapy. A review of psychotherapy literature involving the integration of 
neuroscience and psychotherapy suggests that neuroscience research methods have been 
used to study the neurobiological effects on patients undergoing primarily short-term, 
evidence-based psychological treatments for specific psychological disorders, and 
neuroscience has also been used to combine aspects from various psychotherapy theories 
into integrative paradigms such as interpersonal neurobiology.  
 I provided this review of literature to highlight ways in which psychotherapy 
research has included neuroimaging, as well as ways in which psychotherapy theories 
have incorporated cognitive neuroscience into psychological and psychotherapy theories. 
Cozolino’s (2010) neuroscience-informed psychotherapy text, which I examine and 
critique in Chapters IV and V, emerged amidst these applications of neuroscience to 
psychotherapy. This chapter was therefore intended to provide a more immediate 
historical and professional context for the emergence of his book than the longstanding 
Western philosophical and social issues I presented in Chapter I.  
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Summary 
 In this chapter I provided a sample of psychotherapy literature integrating 
neuroscience and psychotherapy. In the next chapter I outline the methodology of my 
research project. I discuss the textual analysis I used to interpret the content, rhetoric, and 
themes in Cozolino’s (2010) book.  
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Chapter III: Methods 
 In this chapter I discuss the research approach and theoretical framework of this 
hermeneutic study of Cozolino’s (2010) brain-based psychotherapy text The 
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain. 
Research Approach  
 In Chapter I, I reviewed several recent cultural histories of brain research during 
the late-19th and early-20th century in Western Europe and the United States that showed 
how discourses about the brain and brain research reflected political, social, and 
economic trends and changes of their time and place. Those critical historical accounts 
illustrated how the origins of those historical and cultural phenomena became assigned to 
the structures of the individual material brain. Those histories included accounts of how 
early brain scanning technologies such as the EEG sparked widespread excitement about 
translating mental experiences that had been considered private, and contained within 
each individual, into observable depictions of individual psyches or personalities. In other 
words, the use of technology to transcend the material-nonmaterial or inner-outer divide 
suggested an interest in resolving mind-body dualism or revealing in public and material 
form the interiorized private individual self. I recognized that a textual analysis was 
particularly relevant for interpreting the understandings of self that might be perpetuated 
by a brain-based therapy discourse, in part because scholars have examined the way 
language is used in cognitive neuroscience literature to portray psychological concepts as 
easily studied by neuroscience when in fact there are philosophical and scientific 
controversies with that position. Scholars have also commented on the societal effects of 
a vision of the self as reducible to the brain. Philosophical hermeneutics is relevant for 
 76 
interpreting the ways in which a brain-based psychotherapy text and its subsequent 
therapy discourses emerge from this sociocultural situation and use language in a way 
that then replicates contemporary social practices and understandings of self. 
Theoretical Framework  
 Philosophical hermeneutics and the self in psychotherapy. In this section I 
discuss the tenets of philosophical hermeneutics as a sociocultural paradigm that emerged 
during the Interpretive Turn in the humanities during the mid-20th century, and the use of 
hermeneutics to understand psychotherapy practices as reflections of the historical and 
cultural situations in which they emerged. By understanding psychological concepts as 
contextual phenomena—that is, the understanding that experience is situated between 
people rather than within each individual, and emerges uniquely from a convergence of 
cultural and historical trends—theories such as hermeneutics provide alternatives to 
empirical, scientific research methods in psychology and psychotherapy. Hermeneutics 
challenges the understanding that individuals exist a priori over the context into which 
they are born. This rejects the assumption of an inner-outer or a mental-material 
dichotomy born of modern era philosophy and scientism. It also stands contrary to the 
claim that scientific discoveries necessarily represent inevitable, ahistorical truths about 
the world, thereby rejecting the primacy of empirical research methods in psychology and 
psychotherapy. Especially applied to critical analyses of psychotherapy theories, 
hermeneutics has been influential for the understanding that these theories embody and 
therefore replicate certain understandings of the good and therefore make claims about 
morality or a vision of the best way of life that emerges uniquely within a historical era. 
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 The term hermeneutic has longstanding meaning in Western civilization involving 
the concept of interpretation, notably the interpretation of texts. Kirschner and Martin 
(2010) placed philosophical hermeneutics as one among several primary sociocultural 
theories that have been influential to late-20th century psychotherapy theories that have 
challenged empirical or statistical research as the preeminent research paradigm for 
understanding human psychology. They noted that philosophical hermeneutics shares 
with other prominent sociocultural perspectives (such as discursive, constructionist, and 
dialogical theory) an interest in how “self and mind can be studied in terms of how an 
individual’s sense of identity, and related phenomena such as memory and emotion, are 
patterned in terms of cultural narratives, symbols, and practices” (p. 9). In these 
approaches, self is constituted by multiple discourses and relationships, human agency is 
valued over determinism, and the Cartesian split between mental and physical experience 
is refuted without appealing to any one emphasis on physiology, emotions, or personality 
traits to explain human psychology. Rather, “the primary object of psychological study is 
the person acting within the biophysical and sociocultural world” (Kirschner & Martin, 
2010, p. 11).  
 Although hermeneutics challenges the core assumptions of modern era 
philosophy and most mainstream psychological theories and research, Kirschner and 
Martin (2010) noted that some elements of this contextual and relational thinking were 
present in the early founding of the discipline of psychology, and were present in some 
form throughout Enlightenment, Romantic, and even modern era thought. According to 
Frie (2011), despite the late-20th century turn toward critical social theories of selfhood 
in psychotherapy that challenge the inherent valuing of embodied individualism typical in 
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20th century psychotherapy discourse, those individualist Western values remain 
embedded in much of psychotherapy practice. In other words, hermeneutic and other 
interpretive theories respect the fluidity between historical eras and how traditions 
emerge uniquely in a certain time and place yet are also continuous between successive 
eras.  
 According to Woolfolk, Sass, and Messer (1988), hermeneutics has provided an 
alternative to empirical research (that is, sensory or observation-based research) that has 
typically been most valued in professional psychology (see also F. C. Richardson, 2009). 
Spence (1988) argued that, rather than opposing the interests of physical or empirical 
scientific methodology, hermeneutics as an interpretive research approach is interested in 
meaning, and is critical of the assumption among empirical sciences that individual 
behaviors can be understood apart from the context within which those behaviors occur. 
Some scholars have argued that although hermeneutic research has served as a primary 
alternative to the empirical research that is most prominent in psychology, interpretive 
and critical research can also inform and improve empirical research, and interpretive and 
critical theorists and researchers often share with empirical scientists a mission to find 
meaning (Meichenbaum, 1988; Spence, 1988). For example, these authors argue that 
hermeneutics improves upon empirical research by encouraging researchers to consider 
that interpretations have an impact on scientific inquiry, and therefore it is misguided to 
believe that scientific efforts represent objective or neutral inquiry that is removed from 
persons conducting the research. Further, hermeneutics challenges empiricist researchers 
to consider how context impacts behavior (thereby challenging the assumed of validity of 
behavioral research conducted in laboratory settings separate from daily life). 
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Hermeneutics encourages empirical investigators to recognize not only that people and 
their contexts are dynamic and change over time, but also that psychological or 
behavioral constructs being measured change over time (Meichenbaum, 1988). 
 Philosophical hermeneutics as an interpretive research paradigm in contemporary 
psychotherapy (Bernstein, 1988; Cushman, 1995; Meichenbaum, 1988) is most 
associated with the writings of the 20th century German philosopher Hans-Georg 
Gadamer (1966/2004, 1975, 1986/1994a, 1986/1994b). Gadamer (1966/2004), borrowing 
the term hermeneutical from Martin Heidegger, attributed the reemergence of 
hermeneutic interpretation in the 20th century to philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey. Critical 
psychotherapy researchers have noted this as well, and have also noted that philosophical 
hermeneutics emerged in part as an effort to challenge the interpretive efforts of Dilthey 
and to focus on how a shared reality emerges through language, as opposed to the 
modern-era notion of an inner private self that most 20th century psychotherapy practices 
seem to have encouraged (see Sass, 1988).  
 Sass (1988) summarized H.-G. Gadamer’s position that self is inseparable from 
the historical and cultural context in which the self exists. Therefore, attempts at self-
reflection or understanding subjective experiences necessitate a consideration of those 
contextual factors. Sass further discussed the hermeneuticists’ argument that scientific 
theories also reflect the historical and cultural contexts in which those theories have 
emerged and are disseminated. Psychotherapy theories have been described by many 
interpretive theorists as privileging or valuing certain ways of living and experiencing the 
world even though the theories at times ignore the underlying values or virtues that they 
promote (Meichenbaum, 1988; Sass, 1988; Woolfolk et al., 1988). Historically situating 
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scientific efforts—in this case, psychotherapy theories, research, and practices—allows 
researchers in the humanities to engage in dialogues about the cultural values and virtues 
that inspired those theories, research, and practices, and which therefore unknowingly 
promote certain aspects of the wider cultural context. 
 H.-G. Gadamer (1966/2004) observed the mid-20th century turn in philosophy 
toward an emphasis on language or semantics as a way of interpreting how individuals 
come to embody or live certain social practices rather than merely contemplate or reflect 
upon these practices. For psychotherapy practices, this interpretive emphasis on language 
and discourse creates certain implications for the effects that psychotherapy practices 
might have on therapy patients, as psychotherapy patients come to embody or replicate 
whatever wider cultural values or beliefs that might be encouraged through therapeutic 
discourse (Cushman, 1995, 2002; Orange, 2009; F. C. Richardson, 2002; F. C. 
Richardson & Christopher, 1993; Stigliano, 1989). “By saying that the world is linguistic, 
hermeneutics is saying that we can understand action by its reference to a larger common 
discourse, a community’s conversation which pervades and gives context for that action” 
(Stigliano, 1989, p. 48).  
 Hermeneuticists have suggested that meaning results from active experiencing 
rather than passive contemplation (Woolfolk et al., 1988). Philosophical hermeneutics 
considers that language or discourse, rather than simply describing social practices, 
actually constitutes the self (Wachterhauser, 1994). In critical psychotherapy research this 
enables researchers to interpret psychotherapy theories as appealing or acceptable for 
patients and clinicians because of the ways that therapy theories implicitly contain 
beliefs, customs, and traditions shared by members of a society within a certain time and 
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place. This provides psychotherapy researchers with the means by which to reflect 
critically about the broader configuration of self that is reinforced through the resulting 
therapy practices (Cushman, 1995; F. C. Richardson & Bishop, 2004).  
 In the tradition of Heidegger’s ontological premise, hermeneuticists argue that 
individuals experience the world by actively interpreting the world through the lens of 
culture and social order; language, or speech, allows for understanding that social order. 
Individuals are therefore assumed to not simply understand the world through language; 
instead, individuals are thought of as actively living the discourses of their historical era. 
The goal of hermeneutics is “to reconstruct these ontologies or distinctions embodied in 
our practices” (Stigliano, 1989, p. 49). Further, hermeneutics “does not attempt to find 
out necessarily the truth of these interpretations, but only how these interpretations shape 
and determine the way we live in the world” (p. 49). The hermeneutic circle—the 
metaphor for this interpretive research—describes a cultural practice or artifact such as a 
text as simultaneously constructed by, and actively constructing the larger historical 
framework from which it emerged, in an ongoing and mutually dependent relationship 
(Cushman, 1995).  
 Cushman (1995) applied philosophical hermeneutics in his cultural history of 
psychotherapy in the United States. In the modern era, the idea of human being as a self-
contained individual was a cornerstone of philosophical and scientific inquiry. The 
conceptualization of psychological symptoms and psychological treatment that began 
during the early-20th century occurred amidst a sudden urbanization and 
industrialization, yet within the backdrop of racism and violence that had been part of 
American culture since the nation’s inception. Within this context psychoanalysis gained 
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popularity within that cultural and historical frame as a “local” cure for a “local” self 
(Cushman, 1995, p. 25). A cultural history of psychotherapy suggests that understanding 
why Americans were ready to embrace psychoanalysis as a cure for psychological 
symptoms requires an understanding of the convergence of sweeping economic and 
social changes amidst shared historical traditions. Cushman discussed how psychotherapy 
expanded in power and influence as an American institution, aligning itself with the 
scientific methodology of psychological research. Psychotherapy theories throughout the 
20th century can be understood as reflections of wider cultural trends and social 
practices. Periodic changes in psychological theory are believed to mirror broader shifts 
in how people live and communicate with each other. Following this tradition, I based my 
critical historical interpretation of Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy 
on philosophical hermeneutics. 
 Late-20th century changes in selfhood reflected in psychotherapy theories. 
During the 20th century an epochal historical shift occurred in Western science and 
philosophy after three centuries of modernity. In understanding the transition between 
modernity and what has been broadly termed postmodernism, Huston Smith (2003) 
wrote,  
 The modern outlook can be summarized by identifying its three controlling 
 presuppositions. First, that reality may be personal is less certain and less 
 important than that it is ordered. Second, man’s reason is capable of discerning 
 this order as it manifests itself in the laws of nature. Third, the path to human 
 fulfillment consists primarily in discovering these laws, harnessing them where 
 this is possible, and complying with them where it is not. The reason for 
 suspecting that this modern outlook has had its day and is yielding to a third great 
 wave in Western thought is that reflective men are no longer confident of any of 
 these three postulates. . . . Frontier thinkers are no longer sure that reality is 
 ordered and orderly. If it is, they are not sure that man’s mind is capable of 
 grasping its order. Combining these two doubts, we can define the Postmodern 
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 Mind as one which, having lost the conviction that reality is personal, has come to 
 question whether it is ordered in a way that man’s reason can lay bare. (pp. 6-7) 
 
 Smith (2003) identified significant changes in science, philosophy, theology, and 
art during the 20th century. He noted that 20th century advances in physics have led some 
theorists to question whether humans are capable of visualizing or imagining the possible 
behavior of matter and energy. Philosophy has seen a collapse of objective metaphysics 
and the emergence of a general uncertainty about whether humans are capable of 
explaining how reality emerges and becomes ordered. In theology, most Judeo-Christian 
religions seem to have moved past the integration between belief in God and rationality 
that dominated the modern era; most Western religions today question in some way 
whether reason is suited to understand the existence of God, and instead embrace a faith 
in God rather than delineated reasons for believing in God. Further, religious beliefs now 
often stem from personal histories or subjective experiences rather than arguments or 
practices espoused by religious institutions. With art and literature, Smith recalled the 
prominence during the 20th century of authors questioning concepts of objectivity and 
morality, and often lacking a shared artistic framework entirely. Protagonists such as 
those in the seminal existential novels find themselves in a world devoid of meaning and 
struggling to find purpose—even punished for attempting to do so. In visual arts the 
questioning of objectivity and meaning shows up, for example, in bold depictions of 
trivial and common aspects of human life such as commonplace objects, thereby 
illustrating how the seemingly trivial is as worthy a way of understanding human beings 
as depictions of religious experiences or historical events.  
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 According to Smith (2003), recent changes within science, philosophy, theology, 
and art share an “acceptance of reality as unordered in any objective way that man’s mind 
can discern.” (p. 15). Further, “this acceptance separates the Postmodern Mind from both 
the Modern Mind, which assumed that reality is objectively ordered, and the Christian 
Mind, which assumed it to be regulated by an inscrutable but beneficent will” (p. 15). 
Neimeyer (1993) noted that the influence on psychotherapies of constructivism (the 
rejection of objective reality or truth in favor of an interpretive framework that views 
individuals as active creators of meaning and experience) has fit broadly within a 
postmodern understanding of social and cultural influences on human behavior. Hoyt and 
Combs (1996) described the impact of the Interpretive Turn in the humanities on  
late-20th century psychotherapy approaches such as Michael White’s narrative therapy 
and solution-focused therapy. 
 Theorists have noted that some psychotherapy theories during the 20th century 
increasingly turned away from the idea that individuals are comprised of a unitary 
individual with a deep interiority, and began to embrace sociocultural theories that posit a 
shift in the configuration of self toward a shallow, relational, decentered person described 
by the quality of multiplicity or being a multiple self (Cushman, 2002; Cushman & 
Gilford, 1999; Frie, 2009a, 2009b; Frie & Coburn, 2011; Salgado & Hermans, 2005). The 
broad cultural shift from a strongly entrenched modern or Cartesian self to a fragmented, 
multiple self has been significant for late-20th century shifts in psychotherapy theories. 
As Cushman & Gilford (1999) noted, "multiplicity, in other words, has begun to appear 
as the embodiment of the good" (p. 18). According to Salgado and Hermans (2005), two 
broad antecedents can be ascribed to the paradigm shift toward a multiple or non-unitary 
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self amongst psychotherapy models: The social-cognitive perspective (which views self 
through the computer metaphor of an information-processing device) and the social 
constructionist framework (which views self as a construct that is constituted through 
language).  
 Frie and Coburn (2011) noted that gestalt psychotherapy theorists were the first 
major school of therapy to embrace a relational rather than an individualistic conception 
of selfhood. Late-20th century psychoanalytic theorists have followed in the 
understanding of self as relational (Bromberg, 1993). Psychoanalytic theorists have noted 
a return to the seminal work of psychiatrist and author Harry Stack Sullivan who has 
become highly influential for psychotherapists, particularly interpersonal or relational 
psychotherapists. In his cultural history of psychotherapy in the United States, Cushman 
(1995), whose hermeneutic or critical historical framework for interpreting 
psychotherapy theories is the basis of this textual analysis and historical interpretation of 
brain-based psychotherapies, described the eschewing and ignoring by psychiatrists and 
psychologists of Sullivan’s highly critical and progressive understanding of self that 
would have radically altered the history of psychotherapy had it been embraced during its 
time.  
 The adopting of late-20th century sociocultural perspectives has led some of the 
primary psychotherapy theories to view therapy as a fundamentally relational endeavor 
shared between therapist and patient, rather than an effort at individual improvement 
through predictable, empirically-based, or pre-determined and replicable therapy 
interventions. A hermeneutic perspective understands this relational shift as mirroring the 
historical time and place in which therapists now practice. Relational practices emerge 
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from a broader cultural embrace of late-20th century shifts toward a self characterized by 
multiple, flexible, and changing identities. Cushman and Gilford (1999) cautioned against 
a misuse of those interpretive theories by some psychotherapy approaches that seem to 
inadvertently reinforce or encourage for patients some of the problematic aspects of the 
shallow, decentered self. For example, the privileging of a self that is capable of quick 
lifestyle and personality changes may contribute to fleeting relationships and 
psychological instability.  
 Within psychotherapy, authors such as Orange (2003), Hoffman (2009), and 
Vivona (2009) have come out against efforts to integrate neuroscience and psychotherapy 
that use neuroscience to explain and validate psychotherapy theories. For example, 
Hoffman (2009) situated the appeal of neuroscience within the broader movement in 
psychoanalysis to validate itself as a legitimate science through empirical or positivist 
research methods. Orange (2003) criticized the reductionism of mind to brain that is 
involved in neuroscientific interpretations of psychoanalytic theory and practice. She also 
rejected the frequent claim in psychotherapy literature that integrating neuroscience with 
psychoanalysis constitutes a return to Freud’s early speculation that mind or ego would 
ultimately be discovered as neural processes. Orange proposed a perspectival realism 
paradigm as an alternative to the reduction of psychoanalytic theory to cognitive 
neuroscience models. She also argued that perspectival realism is an alternative to 
problematic incarnations of postmodern or constructivist theories that implicitly dismiss 
the importance of agency and subjective experience for therapy patients. In 
psychotherapy literature there has been a relative absence of critical interpretations of the 
integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy. 
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 Application of hermeneutics to textual analyses. Above I discussed how 
philosophical hermeneutics emerged during the 20th century as an alternative to 
positivism or quantitative research methods in the social sciences. Hermeneutics is 
applied to interpret the cultural and historical traditions, meanings, beliefs, and values 
that are implicit in psychological and psychotherapy theories and practices. As an 
interpretive paradigm critical of modern era scientism, hermeneutics challenges the 
privilege of rigidly structured, procedural research approaches. Scholars have debated 
how hermeneutics can be applied to research in psychology without replicating the 
scientific objectification that hermeneutic theorists historically situate and interpret 
(Woolfolk et al., 1988).  
 Stigliano (1989) addressed this issue in his discussion of how hermeneutics can be 
applied to the cultural and historical interpretation of a certain narrative or discourse such 
as a text. He argued that although hermeneutic theory challenges the primacy of rigid, 
technical approaches for collecting and analyzing data, there is a sequence of identifiable 
“moments” (p. 67) that researchers commonly experience when selecting and interpreting 
a text that is characteristic of valued practices within a certain time and place. A textual 
analysis can use a book, an interview or series of interviews with research participants, or 
other cultural artifacts that are representative of implicit assumptions and meanings that 
are shared amongst readers and between authors and audiences.  
 The first moment, titled text generation, entails either composing a new text (such 
as a series of interviews), or selecting a text that already exists and is exemplary of a 
certain historically distinct practice. I selected Cozolino’s (2010) book as a popular text 
that is exemplary of brain-based psychotherapy discourses because of its broad scope and 
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the variety of therapy theories and practices that it contains. I generated questions about 
how Cozolino (2010) integrated neuroscience into his understanding of the history, 
purpose, and best practices of psychotherapy, and specific ways in which he used 
language to do this throughout his book. I addressed these questions by identifying 
exemplary passages in which he directly or indirectly discussed these issues. In the 
remaining sections in this chapter I explain further the selection of Cozolino’s text, the 
categories of primary content I devised for collecting passages from his text, the 
rhetorical strategies I identified, and my approach to identifying recurring themes in his 
book.  
 The second moment, called distanciation, involves recognizing that the text 
emerges within a certain historical era, and therefore its discourse refers to social 
practices, values, concerns, and norms of its time and place. In Chapter IV I provide the 
findings of my textual analysis and interpret the exemplary passages in light of the 
contemporary trends, practices, and beliefs about the self that scholars have identified as 
implicit within contemporary neuroscience. I identified ways in which Cozolino used 
language that was noteworthy because it combined psychology and brain functioning. For 
example, I noticed the use of phrases and statements that were unclear, speculative, 
figurative, and repetitive. As I studied his text I considered reasons why therapists might 
find his claims and rhetoric to be appealing, and I thought about whether the rhetorical 
strategies could cause readers to be confused or misled about the relationship between 
human experience and neurobiological functioning.  
 In the third moment, called appropriation, the researcher engages in personal 
reflection about his or her worldview and perspective. This facilitates a contextual 
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understanding of a text and its implicit meanings and ideologies. As I interpreted 
Cozolino’s (2010) text in light of the convergence of historical factors from which the 
integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy emerged, I considered my 
experiences as a therapist and psychology student. I reflected on why Cozolino’s 
psychotherapy recommendations might assuage readers’ anxieties about validating 
psychotherapy practices and verifying the efficacy of psychological treatments.  
 For the fourth moment in a hermeneutic study, Stigliano (1989) used the term 
reconstruction to describe the effects of having contextualized and historically situated 
the practice under investigation. In this phase the practice is reframed and possibly 
altered after recognizing that it exists within a historical context and therefore replicates 
or embodies certain aspects or assumptions of that broader context. I considered how a 
brain-based therapy is at once a recent and historically distinct phenomenon, yet it is also 
a practice that understandably follows from the history of psychology and psychotherapy. 
My interpretation rejects the claim that late-20th century neuroscience naturally or 
automatically provides a better explanation for the emergence of psychotherapy theories 
and practices that were devised prior to recent advances in neuroimaging. However, my 
interpretation also recognizes that the understanding of the self as a brain is appealing to 
therapists and other readers because this vision follows certain beliefs about human 
experience, illness, and healing that have longstanding philosophical roots in psychology 
and psychotherapy. The reduction of psychological illness and healing to the brain 
appears as a materialized version of psychology’s reduction of social and philosophical 
issues to psychological concepts explaining individual experience. These interpretations 
of psychotherapy practices differ from the interpretation of neuroscience-psychotherapy 
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integration as inevitable, universally applicable across eras and cultures, and objective or 
unbiased in its observations of human being.  
 In accordance with the fourth moment that Stigliano (1989) described, the 
hermeneutic interpretation of Cozolino’s (2010) text is intended to change the way 
therapists read and implement brain-based psychotherapies. I hope to broaden therapists’ 
understanding of the possible implications of neuroscience-informed psychotherapy 
discourses. Stigliano argued that a successful hermeneutic study would not consist of 
results claiming to confirm an independent reality. Instead, hermeneutic interpretation 
challenges unquestioned empiricism by revealing the social arrangements concealed by 
everyday, taken-for-granted discourse. This provides alternative understandings of the 
world. Stigliano noted that, rather than simply rejecting scientific inquiry entirely, 
hermeneutic studies often contribute to improvements within social institutions such as 
the delivery of healthcare services, “not only by increasing effectiveness, but also by 
loosening the grip of ideology” (p. 63). I intended for the interpretation of Cozolino’s text 
to improve psychological treatments by encouraging therapists to consider the history of 
neuroscience-psychotherapy integration, and to question the cultural assumptions 
embedded in this growing therapy discourse. 
Hermeneutic’s Critiques of Intrapsychic Theory 
 Above I discussed the emergence of hermeneutics during the 20th century as a 
post-Cartesian philosophy that challenges the separateness between individual life and 
social context that had typically been assumed in modern era philosophy (see Cushman, 
1995; Taylor, 1989). Scholars have applied hermeneutics as a critical interpretive 
paradigm in order to historically situate psychotherapy theories and discuss how these 
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theories embody moral discourses that unknowingly support certain cultural values and 
make claims about the best way of life (i.e., the good). The ideals of Western 
individualism have been reinforced in most psychotherapy theories, beginning with early 
psychoanalytic theory. F. C. Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon (1999) argued that 
psychotherapy and counseling valorize the emancipatory outlook of the modern era 
through promoting individual self-sufficiency, personal freedom, and autonomy over 
shared, voluntary social practices that comprise civil society. By doing so they may 
promote 
 A “preoccupation with the inner self” that by itself does little to restore a sense of 
 purpose within some community of shared values, without which the conditions 
 for personal insecurity and directionlessness may only be reinforced, promoting 
 yet more preoccupation with inner distress. (p. 7)  
 
 Therapies that uncritically emphasize concepts such as an inner life or an inner 
world of each person, and describe psychological health as an inner wellbeing, may serve 
to reinforce a rigid divide between individual experience and social context, and therefore 
perpetuate a notion of the good as the isolated individual concern with personal gain. 
Scholars argue that encouraging this worldview ultimately leads therapists and patients to 
reinforce the problematic attitudes that have often caused the psychological difficulties 
for which patients seek therapy. For example, F. C. Richardson et al. (1999) noted that 
the modern era expectation of self-directed individualism leads many people to 
experience emotional distress and shame when their sense of autonomy fails even 
slightly. The authors argued that the result is a culture in which narcissism and confusion 
reigns among individuals as they long for meaning and purpose in a culture that discredits 
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shared historical traditions and common moral standards as authoritarian and therefore 
restrictive of individual success (see also Cushman, 1995).  
 Hermeneuticists argue that agency comes from recognizing that individuals are 
embedded in, rather than removed from their world. F. C. Richardson et al. (1999) 
applied the hermeneutic philosophy of H.-G. Gadamer in their argument for considering 
the psychotherapy relationship as a civic arrangement between therapist and patient, who 
exist within a shared historical context even though both have developed from a 
subjective personal history. Hermeneuticists have also described how the emergence of 
relational and interpersonal psychotherapy theories reflects broader late-20th century 
shifts in the configuration of the self (Cushman & Gilford, 1999). Late-20th century 
psychotherapy theories such as relational psychoanalysis, some humanistic-existential 
psychotherapies, and feminist therapy (e.g., Layton, 2009) have challenged intrapsychic, 
decontextualized accounts of human behavior, psychopathology, and change (Frie, 2011). 
Relational and interpersonal theories share an understanding that individuals cannot be 
understood apart from the social interactions that individual personality and behaviors 
emerge within, or apart from a broader cultural context in which individuals develop and 
live.  
 In my analysis of Cozolino’s (2010) text I will identify whether there are ways in 
which he appeals to both intrapsychic, individualized understandings of the self as well as 
theories that challenge those understandings. This may be contradictory. However, in my 
textual analysis and discussion of his brain-based theory and treatment recommendations 
I will also identify and challenge ways in which intrapsychic, individualistic 
conceptualizations of self might be reinforced through a therapy discourse that 
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materializes psychological experience through neuroscientific interpretations of 
psychology and psychotherapy. In other words, in my review of his text I maintain a 
critical post-Cartesian position such as those supported among contemporary 
psychotherapy theories such as intersubjective systems theory (e.g., Stolorow & Atwood, 
1994) and relational psychoanalysis (e.g., Mitchell, 1988).  
 In following scholars such as Cushman and Gilford (1999) and Walls (2004), 
relational and interpersonal understandings of selfhood, in addition to avoiding 
discourses that uncritically replicate the modern ideals of personhood that lead to a lack 
of meaning and purpose, also broaden the relevance of psychology and psychotherapy 
across minority groups. A White majority ideal of selfhood has traditionally consisted of 
an individual who achieves freedom and autonomy by overcoming rather than adhering 
to moral standards and historical traditions. In a pluralistic society, traditional 
psychotherapy theories that unknowingly embrace this vision are irrelevant for many 
patients. According to Walls (2004), by considering how therapist-patient interactions are 
reflections of the cultural beliefs and sociopolitical experiences of each participant 
(especially with regards to race, gender, and class), therapists consider factors beyond the 
traditional limited vision of therapy as a resolution of a patient’s intrapsychic conflict 
(see also Layton 2009). This extends psychoanalytic and psychotherapy theories to 
populations beyond those for whom individualist accounts of psychological experience, 
pathology, and change have historical and cultural appeal. 
 A balance between an understanding of the personal and an understanding of the 
social is necessary to avoid perpetuating a disregard for the roles of both meaningful 
social engagement and shared moral standards in psychological wellbeing. Such a 
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balance is also necessary in order to avoid a radical postmodern position that, according 
to some scholars, negates the concepts of agency and subjectivity and is therefore no less 
problematic than classical intrapsychic theories (Cushman, 2005; Frie, 2009b; Orange, 
2003). Although hermeneuticists critically examine psychology and psychotherapy by 
historically situating the concepts and assumptions of these fields, hermeneutics avoids a 
historical determinism by embracing agency and emphasizing an encounter with 
difference (see Cushman, 2005). Hermeneutics therefore provides a balance between 
intrapsychic and extreme postmodern positions that advocate for a relativism that, 
according to some scholars, unknowingly removes agency or a sense of freedom and 
choice from therapy patients (Orange, 2003) or promotes a radical individualism that is 
completely removed from what postmodern philosophers intended with their challenges 
to modernity (Cushman, 2005; Cushman & Gilford, 1999).  
 In sum, my critique of Cozolino’s (2010) text is premised in large part on 
relational and interpersonal theories that challenge the modern era notion that a rigid 
individualism is the necessary condition for freedom and agency. I favor theories that 
endorse a vision of human psychology as at once individual, interpersonal, and cultural 
because these approaches promote more inclusive and philosophically sound mental 
health practices that in turn hold the possibility for a more equitable and participatory 
society (Layton, 2009; F. C. Richardson et al., 1999). For these reasons I will critique 
instances in Cozolino’s (2010) text in which his brain-based therapy theory, by 
materializing psychological concepts and experiences, may unknowingly uphold rigid 
individualist or intrapsychic accounts of human psychology even when appealing to late-
20th century relational theories. 
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Selection of the Text 
 I selected as my primary text Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of 
Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain (2nd ed.). A major publishing company, Norton 
Books, published this text in a series of books titled the Norton Series on Interpersonal 
Neurobiology. These books integrate neuroscience with topics encompassing lifespan 
development, trauma, social work, parenting, psychotherapy, and other areas of human 
psychology. Daniel Siegel, who served as the series editor, has been credited with 
creating the phrase interpersonal neurobiology to describe his paradigm of human 
development that is based on a triad of psychological, neurobiological, and social 
development. I selected Cozolino’s book because, as its title indicates, it is marketed as a 
psychotherapy text, and it is broad in its scope, with chapters integrating neuroscience 
with topics such as attachment theory, trauma and other psychopathology, and a variety 
of psychotherapy theories and practices. Cozolino (2010) provided brain-based 
explanations of the mechanisms by which psychotherapy can effectively alleviate 
psychological symptoms, and he described psychotherapy interventions through the lens 
of research in the neurosciences, thereby making claims about the relationship between 
mind and brain, the origins of psychopathology, and the purpose of psychotherapy. 
Cozolino’s book provides a comprehensive overview of psychotherapy and its integration 
with neuroscience. 
 Cozolino (2010) is identified as a psychotherapist in his book. He holds the title 
of Professor of Psychology in the Graduate School of Education and Psychology at 
Pepperdine University in Malibu, California. According to his biography on Pepperdine’s 
 96 
website, Cozolino earned his doctorate in clinical psychology, and he also holds degrees 
in philosophy and theology. According to that website,  
 He has conducted empirical research in schizophrenia, child abuse and the long-
 term impact of stress. His areas of interest include neuroscience and 
 neuropsychology, which is the integration of psychological observation on 
 behavior and the mind with neurological observation on the brain and nervous 
 system. In addition, he has conducted research on the biobehavioral sciences and 
 psychotherapy. (Pepperdine University, 2013, para. 1) 
 
 The website also notes that in addition to The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy and 
various articles and book chapters about psychological issues, Cozolino also authored 
books titled The Neuroscience of Human Relationships: Attachment and the Developing 
Social Brain and The Making of a Therapist: A Practical Guide for the Inner Journey. 
The website notes, “in addition to his teaching and writing, Cozolino maintains a clinical 
and consulting practice in Los Angeles” (Pepperdine University, 2013, para. 1). 
Cozolino’s publication history and professorship, combined with his experience as a 
psychotherapist, suggests that he is likely to be considered an authority in the fields of 
psychology and psychotherapy. This also substantiates the relevance of a textual analysis 
of The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain for a historical 
interpretation of the integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy.  
Research Questions 
 The following research questions guided my hermeneutic interpretation of the 
primary content, rhetorical strategies, and themes in Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience 
of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain.  
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 1. According to Cozolino (2010), what is the historical fit between neuroscience 
and psychotherapy, and what are the implications of his claims for the purpose of 
psychotherapy and the identity of psychotherapists? 
 2. What are some of the primary functions that Cozolino’s (2010) use of rhetoric 
served in his neuroscience-psychotherapy integration? 
 3. What is the understanding of self or what it means to be human that is 
perpetuated by Cozolino’s brain-based psychotherapy theory and recommendations? 
 4. What are the political, economic, and social arrangements that might be 
unknowingly replicated by psychotherapy conducted in accordance with Cozolino’s 
(2010) theory and recommendations? 
Structure for Gathering and Categorizing Primary Content, Rhetorical Strategies, 
and Recurring Themes  
 I devised the following rubric and then I used it as a guide while reading 
Cozolino’s (2010) text and collecting passages that were exemplary of the primary 
content, rhetorical strategies, and recurring themes in the text.  
 Primary content in Cozolino’s (2010) text. For primary content I was interested 
in reviewing passages in which Cozolino addressed an array of topics related to the 
history, theory, and practice of psychotherapy, which I explicate below. 
 Outline and background. I first provide a brief summary of the sections or parts 
of Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain. 
Then I present a summary of passages in which Cozolino depicted or discussed the 
following topics related to the history of psychotherapy, the history of his theory, 
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descriptions of established therapy theories, and differences between his therapy theory 
and other therapies. 
  Tenets of Cozolino’s psychotherapy theory. In this portion of my interpretation I 
discuss Cozolino’s broadest understandings or descriptions of the purpose of 
psychotherapy, the general populations of psychotherapy patients or common reasons 
why people seek talk therapy (as well as types of abnormal behavior or psychopathology 
that psychotherapists treat), Cozolino’s understanding of self, mind, and brain (and the 
relationships between those aspects of human experience), the neurobiological 
mechanisms of psychotherapy, the psychological mechanisms that activate those 
corresponding brain processes, ways in which therapists should provide therapy so that 
those mechanisms are utilized, and indicators of successful psychotherapy outcomes. 
 Case vignettes from Cozolino’s psychotherapy practice. I discuss two examples 
of psychotherapy case vignettes from Cozolino’s own treatments of patients that seemed 
to encapsulate some of the recurring themes or recommendations for psychotherapy 
practice and illustrate how he applied the tenets of his theory to psychological treatment.  
 Rhetorical strategies and elements of writing style in Cozolino’s (2010) text. 
After summarizing the primary content following the outline above, I list examples of 
recurring rhetorical strategies or devices that Cozolino used throughout his book. I 
primarily referenced the Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, 3rd edition (Baldick, 
2008) for my definitions of these strategies.  
 Analogy: A logical argument comparing two relationships between two entities or 
objects.  
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 Ambiguity: Passages or statements in which an author’s intended meaning was 
unclear because the arrangement of the statement could imply two or more distinct 
meanings. 
 Aporia: A statement by an author (or in literary works a character) that 
intentionally casts doubt on a main premise or purpose of his entire book that he had 
previously identified.  
 Diction: Recurring style of writing or choice of words that seemed rhetorically 
useful and significant.  
 Epigraph: Quotes preceding a book or any part of a book (such as a chapter or 
subsection).  
 Figures of Speech: I focus on the following four types of figures of speech in 
Cozolino’s (2010) text. 
 Apposition: Phrases in which two nouns are placed next to each other with the 
intention of using one of the nouns to describe or portray some quality of the second 
noun.    
 Metaphor: A comparison between two unlike objects or entities on the basis of 
some shared quality, without using the words like or as. 
 Personification: Attributing human qualities or actions to nonhuman material 
objects.  
 Prosopopoeia: Personification of a nonmaterial concept such as memory or 
emotion. 
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 Themes. For primary themes I highlight some of the broadest categories of 
recurring issues or arguments, and as subthemes I provide examples of Cozolino’s 
specific applications of those arguments and issues.  
 In Chapter IV I outline the primary content, rhetorical strategies, and themes, and 
I provide passages that exemplify those topics. I also provide my initial interpretations or 
commentary about those passages. I used the four research questions above as guidelines 
for Chapter V. In that chapter I then summarize and discuss my Results chapter, 
Cozolino’s central thesis, the historical claims he used to support the thesis, the rhetorical 
strategies he used to support the thesis, the understanding of self perpetuated by the 
thesis, the potential effects of the thesis and its understanding of self on the practice of 
psychotherapy and the profession of psychology, and finally, my interpretation of the 
political, economic, and social arrangements perpetuated by the thesis. 
Definitions 
 For the purpose of this research study I used the following definitions of relevant 
terms and concepts. 
 Biological determinism: The ideology that favors biological or genetic 
explanations for all aspects of human life and behavior.  
 Brain-based or neuroscience-informed psychotherapy: I use these phrases 
interchangeably to refer to psychotherapy theories premised on the integration between 
neuroscience and psychotherapy. Although neuroimaging has been included in research 
studies of specific psychotherapy modalities (such as behavioral therapy and exposure 
therapy), I used these phrases to describe paradigms such as interpersonal neurobiology, 
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or Cozolino’s (2010) psychotherapy text, which combine a variety of psychological 
concepts and psychotherapy theories with cognitive neuroscience findings.  
 Dualism: The theory that mind and body are separate. That is, nonmaterial, 
subjective experience is believed to exist as altogether separate from body, which belongs 
to the natural or physical world. Mental and physical aspects of individual experience are 
therefore considered separate ways of being or experiencing the world. 
 Eliminative materialism or eliminativism: The position that psychological 
concepts exist only insofar as they are found to be products of underlying physical 
processes. However, eliminativists predict that neural correlates will not be found for 
psychological concepts. Therefore in this view those concepts will be considered 
fictitious and should be replaced by neurobiological terminology once neuroscience 
research identifies the physical processes that generate behavior. This is a radical 
reductionism that does not view mental qualities as having corresponding physical 
correlates, but instead challenges the existence of human subjectivity.  
 Emergentism: The philosophical position that the component parts of a whole 
phenomenon are necessary but not sufficient for its existence. Emergentism has been 
used as a counter to reductionism, especially the efforts to reduce mind to the workings of 
the brain.   
 Materialism or reductive materialism: The position that mental phenomena are 
reducible to physical or material existence. Materialism specifically involves the mapping 
of mental processes to neurobiological processes.  
 Naturalism: The position that only the physical world is real. Naturalism is 
frequently aligned with the belief that the scientific method (rather than fields such as 
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religion or philosophy) will explain how and why the world appears and functions as it 
does (see scientism, below). 
 Rhetorical strategies or devices: Recurring uses of language and figures of speech 
in a text. I primarily referenced the Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, 3rd edition 
(Baldick, 2008) to define the rhetorical strategies I identified in Cozolino’s (2010) text.  
 Neuroscience and neurosciences: An integrative academic discipline that emerged 
in the United States during the mid-20th century. One goal of neuroscience has been the 
use of brain research to investigate neural origins of sociological, psychological, and 
other phenomena. 
 Professional psychology and psychotherapy: Any talk therapy conducted by a 
licensed mental health professional, either a doctoral level psychologist or master’s level 
mental health clinician (e.g., therapists who hold a master’s degree in psychology, or 
marriage and family therapy, or social work but practice as licensed clinical therapists). 
These professionals provide psychotherapy for individuals, couples, families, and groups 
in a way that is consistent with state licensure and health care laws. These clinicians also 
follow generally accepted practices and professional psychotherapy ethics provided by 
national professional organizations. Ethical practices vary among organizations such as 
the American Psychological Association and the American Association for Marriage and 
Family Therapy. 
 Psychological or subjective experience: I use these terms interchangeably to 
describe conscious awareness. In my interpretations of Cozolino’s (2010) text, for 
example, I use these terms when I discuss his views on how human psychology is related 
to brain functioning. With that grammar I am not intentionally recreating a dichotomy 
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between mental and physical experiences; instead I am distinguishing between 
psychological concepts that are shared understandings of human experience, and 
descriptions of brain functioning. I use the terms interchangeably in order to foster a flow 
to my writing. 
 Scientism: A rigid adherence to the position that natural or physical sciences will 
explain everything about the world and life. Proponents of scientism maintain an 
epistemological stance that valorizes naturalism or materialism to such a degree that non-
material aspects of human experience (such as culture, subjectivity, the humanities, and 
religion) are either dismissed entirely or reduced to quantitative data points, or a physical 
location or processes within the human body.   
 Reductionism: The position that a whole entity or system can be understood in 
terms of its smaller parts. Reductionism is also used to position the concepts of one 
discipline or academic area as constituent parts of the concepts of a broader area of study. 
For example, some scientists and philosophers claim that mind is solely a product of 
brain functioning. This claim reduces the field of psychology to the field of neuroscience 
because it asserts that mind or conscious experience is better explained by brain 
functioning which is one constituent part of human experience.  
Summary 
 In this chapter I described the rationale and methodology of my research project, 
including a description of philosophical hermeneutics and the use of 20th century 
interpretive theory to situate scientific efforts and achievements within the time and place 
in which they emerged. In the next chapter I provide the results of my textual analysis of 
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Cozolino’s (2010) book using the outline for primary content, rhetorical strategies or 
elements of writing style, and recurring themes, as I described above.  
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Chapter IV: Results of the Textual Analysis of Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The 
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain 
 In this chapter I lay out the primary content, rhetorical strategies, and recurring 
themes throughout Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy according to 
the format I discussed in Chapter III.  
Primary Content  
 Outline and background. In this section I interpret the six parts of The 
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain and describe Cozolino’s 
statements about the history of psychotherapy, the history of his theory, his descriptions 
of established psychotherapy theories, and his understandings of the differences between 
his theory and established psychotherapy theories.  
 The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain is divided into 18 
chapters spread evenly across six parts. Part I includes chapters on the relationship 
between the professions of neurology and psychology, ways in which psychological 
phenomena and mechanisms of well-known psychotherapy treatments relate to 
neurobiology.  
 Part II contains chapters on the workings of the human nervous system, ways in 
which the brain stores memories, the differences between left and right hemispheres of 
the human brain, and ways in which these issues are relevant for the practice of 
psychotherapy. 
 Part III includes chapters on higher-level cognitive processes or executive 
functioning and the human brain, the relationship between the workings of the human 
brain and the ways in which the workings of the human brain impact the perception of 
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reality, and how the human capacity for language or narrative facilitates integration 
amongst brain regions.  
 Part IV includes chapters on the relationship between the nervous system and 
attachment, linking the evolution and functioning of the human brain to the social 
qualities of human beings.   
 Part V includes chapters on psychopathology, focusing on trauma and anxiety 
disorders, and the ways in which the quality of a child’s early relationships with 
caregivers comes to shape personality.  
 Part VI includes chapters that review how psychotherapy emerged historically 
because of the evolution of the brain, the ways in which psychotherapy serves the 
purpose of altering the functioning of a patient’s brain, and predictions for how 
psychotherapy will become closely tied to neuroscience, for example, including 
neurobiology terms in case conceptualizations, and using neuroimaging to plan treatment 
and assess psychotherapy progress.  
 General history of psychotherapy according to Cozolino. In this section I focus 
on Cozolino’s understanding of the historical origins of psychotherapy.  
 Psychotherapy as an inevitable necessity due to the evolution of the human brain. 
According to Cozolino, psychotherapy emerged because it is a corrective intervention for 
problems created by how the human brain evolved.  
 Many of our most important socioemotional learning experiences are organized 
 and controlled by reflexes, behaviors, and emotions outside of our awareness and 
 distorted by our immature brains. To a great extent, psychotherapy owes its 
 existence to these artifacts of evolution and development. (p. 9) 
 
 Evolution’s legacy is a complex brain, vulnerable to a variety of factors that can 
 disrupt the growth and integration of important neural networks. The field of 
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 psychotherapy has emerged because of the brain’s vulnerability to these 
 developmental and environmental risks. (p. 11) 
 
 The human brain is an amazing organ, capable of continual growth and lifelong 
 adaptation to an ever-changing array of challenges. Our understanding of how the 
 brain accomplishes this mandate increases with each new theoretical development 
 and technological advance. At the same time, we are uncovering some of natural 
 selection’s more problematic choices. If necessity is the mother of invention, then 
 evolution itself has created the necessity for psychotherapy by shaping a brain that 
 is vulnerable to a wide array of difficulties. (p. 306) 
 
 These statements suggested that the emergence of psychotherapy was inevitable 
because it serves as a cure for problems that are a result of the functioning of the human 
brain. According to Cozolino, the human brain evolved to have a tremendous influence 
over individual behaviors and experiences, which at times leads to the personal 
difficulties for which therapy happens to be able to remedy. His ahistorical understanding 
of psychotherapy depicted in these passages naturalized psychological treatments as 
corrective interventions for a brain that develops and learns outside of conscious control, 
thereby at times resulting in maladaptive behaviors and emotions. Interpretive theories 
and critical historians of science have challenged the common portrayal of scientific 
advancements as inevitable because this removes those efforts from their broader time 
and place. The passages above established evolution as a central organizing principle of 
Cozolino’s theory of psychotherapy and psychopathology (see Themes, pp. 213-220). 
 Freud’s rebellion against the medical establishment. According to Cozolino, 
Freud’s early professional interest in the relationship between mind and brain was at odds 
with the medical establishment of his time. Cozolino implied that Freud was a maverick 
for having an interest in the relationship between brain and behavior, and that soon he 
chose to ignore this interest because it was ahead of its time. As a result he was forced to 
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focus instead on devising a language of psychology or mind rather than neurobiology as a 
way to describe human experience.  
 “Freud started out as a rebel, a neurologist curious about the mind. I suspect he 
 was frustrated with the mind-brain partisanship of medical school, and longed to 
 work with others who shared his interests” (p. 1).  
 
 It is noteworthy that Cozolino speculated about Freud’s intentions (“I suspect he 
was frustrated”; see also Speculation language, pp. 195-203) and by doing so attempted 
to justify the history of psychotherapy he depicted.  
 Despite his enthusiasm, Freud realized that his dream for psychology to be based 
 in an understanding of the nervous system was far ahead of its time, and at odds 
 with prevailing religious beliefs and medical dogma. For these and other reasons, 
 he suppressed the publication of The Project until his death. Perhaps Freud kept 
 the Project to himself because he feared that it would be relegated to the same 
 sort of obscurity as the case of Phineas Gage. (p. 4) 
 
 Freud, the neurologist, became all but forgotten as his psychological theories 
 moved further and further from their biological roots. He chose instead to utilize 
 the more palatable and accessible metaphors of literature and anthropology to 
 provide the primary vocabulary for psychoanalysis. Unfortunately, Freud’s shift 
 from the brain to metaphors of mind opened psychoanalysis up to all sorts of 
 criticism throughout the 20th century. Metaphors such as the Oedipal and Electra 
 complexes were seen as contrived fictions, shielding them from scientific 
 evaluation. Perhaps Freud anticipated that in the future, psychoanalysis would 
 eventually be integrated with its neurobiological substrates. (pp. 4-5) 
 
 Cozolino suggested that Freud happened to be correct in understanding the human 
mind because his theory is now validated by recent neuroimaging research. The claim 
that mind is an antiquated placeholder for brain ignores the controversies associated with 
that type of reductionism while overlooking the differences between psychological and 
neurobiological understandings of self and the problems that arise when assuming that 
the founding principles and vocabularies of two separate fields of study are so easily 
intertwined. Cozolino later established the purpose of his book as purportedly revisiting 
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and continuing Freud’s intended mapping of psychological concepts such as mind onto 
underlying neurobiological structures. 
 Cozolino’s strategy seemed to be an illustration of what historians of psychology 
such as Danziger (1979), Furumoto (1989), and Samelson (1974) have called an “origin 
myth,” complete with its attendant inaccuracies. Cozolino’s origin myth makes an appeal 
on behalf of psychology to the higher-status medical specialty of neurology, claiming that 
psychology was initially rooted in neurology and therefore has a legitimate right to 
reunite with that branch of medicine now that scientific methods such as neuroimaging 
are providing proof of psychology’s theories. Cozolino implied that psychological 
theories would be antiquated and unverifiable without the evidence of their relevance and 
timelessness provided from brain research. Cozolino’s assertion is problematic in several 
ways. He argued that Freud’s use of literature and anthropology, important elements of 
psychoanalytic theory, were the equivalent of historical placeholders for a theory that was 
actually describing the workings of the human brain. In other words, Cozolino extracted 
psychoanalysis (and subsequent psychological theories that emerged to either expand or 
supplant early psychoanalytic theory) from their connections with various humanities 
disciplines by arguing that such an interdisciplinary theory was not Freud’s original 
intention or preferred path. Cozolino also asserted that psychoanalysis has been criticized 
because the language of literature and anthropology could not be subjected to the 
empirical or observable methods of scientific study, thereby implying that neuroscience 
provides ways of measuring human psychology that could verify psychoanalytic 
accuracy. This assertion is problematic because it uses a certain depiction of the history 
of psychoanalysis to discredit the significant and longstanding connection between 
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psychoanalysis and the humanities, and to argue for a correction to the generally 
understood purpose and rationale for psychoanalytic or psychotherapy treatment. His 
interpretation of the history of psychoanalytic theory was used as a rationale for 
combining brain research and human psychology into a single endeavor, yet he 
overlooked ways in which psychology and neurology might have distinct goals or 
represent distinct understandings of self. 
 The history of psychotherapy was similar to the history of other scientific 
discoveries. In the following passage Cozolino asserted that psychotherapy was devised 
through a process similar to the methodology of scientific experiments. He illustrated this 
assertion with an example of how a psychoanalytic explanation for the effectiveness of 
electroshock therapy has been deemed obsolete.  
 Like other scientific discoveries, psychotherapy developed from a combination of 
 trial-and-error learning, the intuition of its founder, and plain luck. Each school of 
 psychotherapy offers an explanation of mental health and illnesses as well as why 
 its strategies and techniques are effective. Fortunately, the effectiveness of an 
 intervention does not depend on the accuracy of the theory used to support it. For 
 example, there was a time when psychoanalysts attributed the success of 
 electroshock therapy to the need of a depressed person to be punished. The 
 treatment worked and still works despite the lack of a solid understanding of its 
 mechanisms of action. (p. 32) 
 
 Here Cozolino argued that scientific discoveries or advancements are products of 
the individual genius of the researchers associated with those discoveries, thereby 
implying that psychotherapy was inevitable or waiting to be uncovered based on 
improving upon whatever scientific research or findings preceded it. He claimed that 
effective therapy practices arose through “plain luck,” and he portrayed them as a set of 
experiments or interventions that have been refined for efficacy over time rather than 
discourses that embody cultural definitions of illness and health. His argument took for 
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granted a modern era, progressive theory of truth (see Leahey, 1992). This view of 
psychology as a progressive science is disputed by the interpretive turn in philosophy and 
should not simply be taken for granted as an unquestioned truth (see Gadamer, 1975).  
 Also noteworthy was Cozolino’s statement describing how psychological 
treatments have at times been recognized as efficacious or successful despite the 
inaccuracies of psychotherapy theories used to explain successful treatment results. His 
argument and subsequent example of electroshock treatment warrants discussion. Given 
his understanding of self, his interpretation of the functioning of the human brain, and his 
recommended therapy interventions drawing from psychoanalytic theory, it was 
surprising that he criticized a psychoanalytic interpretation of a mental health treatment 
without providing any alternative hypothesis about electroshock therapy’s success. He 
seemed to subtly discredit the value of traditional psychoanalytic theory by implying that 
a nonmaterial view of mood or personality has no value as one possible explanation for a 
mental health treatment with an apparent physiological component. His statements also 
imply that accurate explanations for psychological phenomena and treatments must be 
provided by neuroscience research even if psychologists must continue to wait for that 
research to be conducted. Further, since electroshock therapy is obviously a physiological 
intervention that produces a reduction of symptoms of disorders typically classified as 
psychological, the passage might convey that psychological theories have no relevant 
place in the scientific quest for physiological explanations for apparently physiological 
interventions. This is a noteworthy implication for a book that is branded as a 
psychotherapy text. 
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 Psychotherapy has been a neurobiological intervention without therapists 
knowing it. Throughout his book, Cozolino described psychotherapy interventions as 
successful to the extent to which they change the functioning of the human brain. He 
suggested that this has always been true yet recently has been proven through 
advancements in neuroimaging technologies. 
 “It is my belief that the development of psychotherapy has always been implicitly 
guided  by the principles of neuroscience” (p. 31). 
 Over the last century, psychotherapists have demonstrated that many of the 
 brain’s shortcomings can be counterbalanced by the application of skillfully 
 applied techniques in the context of a caring relationship. Thus, in our ability to 
 link, attune, and regulate each other’s brains, evolution has also provided us a way 
 to heal one another. Because we know that relationships are capable of building 
 and rebuilding neural structures, psychotherapy can now be understood as a 
 neurobiological intervention, with a deep cultural history. In psychotherapy, we 
 are tapping the same principles available in every relationship to connect to and 
 heal another brain. (p. 306) 
 
 Cozolino argued that psychotherapy has always been a method of intervening on 
the human brain in order to achieve whatever outcomes had been deemed desirable for a 
mental health treatment. The rationale for his rhetoric was dependent on his 
understanding of brain science as transcending the unique cultural and historical 
circumstances from which psychotherapy emerged and developed over the 20th century. 
It was unclear whether Cozolino intended to reappropriate the phrase “cultural history” to 
mean that psychotherapy (now explained as a “neurobiological intervention,” a purported 
correction to earlier understandings of human psychology and the purpose of 
psychotherapy) has a history within a certain culture, since the phrase “cultural history” 
also refers to the type of alternative history that situates phenomena within a specific 
cultural context (e.g., the hermeneutic interpretation of brain-based psychotherapy texts 
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presented here). If in fact he meant to align his work with a hermeneutic approach, he 
failed. His use of neuroscience to explain the purpose and efficacy of psychological 
treatments overlooked the important cultural and historical understandings of health and 
illness from which psychotherapy theories emerged.  
 Overall, Cozolino’s depiction of the general history of psychotherapy suggested 
an attempt to portray psychotherapy as a scientific endeavor through his use of the 
common elements of standard science histories that rely on inevitability, linear progress, 
and the attributing of advances to the individual genius of their creators or founding 
theorists. These explanations stand in direct opposition to interpretive or cultural histories 
of science that challenge the assumption that scientific advancements may be extracted 
from the time and place in which they gained popularity and relevance. He achieved this 
argument by appealing to the use of neuroscience as the higher-order field that validates 
psychotherapy theory and practice, and he portrayed therapy as originally having 
emerged from neurology before it strayed from its physical science origins. In this way 
he simplistically portrayed theories of mind or psychological processes as descriptions 
for human experience that could easily be mapped onto their rightful material substrates, 
rather than as theories for understanding human experience that have a longstanding and 
unique history which has contributed in important ways to the understanding of self in 
Western cultures. 
 History of Cozolino’s psychotherapy theory. In this section I review Cozolino’s 
statements about how and why he devised his theory, that is, his understanding of the 
specific historical antecedents of his psychotherapy text.  
 114 
 Revisiting the overlap between neurology and psychology now that the 
relationship between mind and brain has been established as a unified process. Most 
broadly Cozolino described his efforts as a reintegration between psychology and 
neurology now that neuroscience research has highlighted changes in the human brain 
that occur in response to psychological experiences and treatments. 
 How does the brain give rise to the mind? Where do the brain and mind meet, and 
 by what means do they interact with one another? These are difficult questions—
 so difficult, in fact, that the common reaction is to focus on either the mind or the 
 brain and act as if the other is irrelevant (Blass & Carmeli, 2007; Pulver, 2003). 
 The problem with this approach is the barrier it creates to understanding that the 
 human experience of brain and mind is essentially a unified process (Cobb, 1944). 
 Neurology and psychology are simultaneously pushed apart by academic and 
 intellectual politics while being drawn together by their common 
 psychobiological foundation. (Cozolino, 2010, p. 1) 
 
 This was the opening statement of Cozolino’s book. He asserted that brain and 
mind “is essentially a unified process,” citing a 1944 reference rather than recent 
neuroscience research. As a reason for why people focus dichotomously on either mind 
or brain, rather than noting the differences in the understanding of self or the 
longstanding unique purposes between various professions or academic areas, he 
provided the explanation that questions involving the relationship between mind or 
psychological experience, and brain or physical matter, are complex and difficult. That 
statement disregarded the possibility that people study one or the other because they 
reject an assumed unity between mind and brain, or they question the rhetoric or methods 
used to combine the separate areas of study, or simply that differentiating between mental 
and physical aspects of human beings provides a broader scope of research and 
understanding of human beings than attempting to unite those interests into a single field. 
Cozolino did not clarify whose “common reaction” he was referring to with this 
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statement. He noted “politics” as the reason why neurology and psychology remain 
distinct professions but it was unclear why neurologists would benefit from focusing on 
psychological issues amidst medical treatment of neurological disorders, and it was also 
unclear why psychologists would benefit from redefining themselves through a kinship 
with neurologists. With these opening statements Cozolino juxtaposed two separate 
issues—the areas of overlap between neurology and psychology, and the correlations 
between mental (mind) and physical (brain) processes. 
 Cozolino’s hope for an integration between the professions of neurology and 
psychology seemed to be justified in part because of Freud’s initial training as a 
neurologist. However, neurology is a branch of medicine that researches and treats 
physical disorders of the brain and nervous system, whereas psychology is a broad 
multidisciplinary field that draws from the humanities and is comprised of philosophical, 
cognitive, behavioral, and mental health research and practice. Therefore, it is unclear 
from these statements why the two fields should merge simply on the basis of Freud 
having transitioned in his career from a physician treating neurological disorders to a 
physician treating psychological symptoms or conditions through psychoanalytic or talk 
therapy treatment. In fact, there are scholars who have argued that Freud’s shift from 
neurology to psychology was well documented to be a conscious intellectual choice, not a 
disguise or strategy (see Brothers, 2001; Orange, 2003).   
 Cozolino claimed that his book was a return to Freud’s initial intention to 
understand human psychology through the workings of the brain. According to Cozolino, 
Freud’s hope for a neurobiological study of human psychology is possible now that 
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neuroimaging methods are available, and also because both psychology and brain 
research are each widely respected. 
 Perhaps Freud anticipated that in the future, psychoanalysis would eventually be 
 integrated with its neurobiological substrates. . . . The time for such an integration 
 has arrived, and respect for psychological processes have taken a strong enough 
 hold within both the scientific community and general culture that we can avoid a 
 reduction of the mind to basic biochemical processes. On the contrary, an 
 appreciation for the structures and functioning of the brain by nonneurologists has 
 become the norm. It is in this spirit that we turn our attention to ways of thinking 
 about the brain that enhance our understanding of human experience. (p. 5) 
 
 “As we approached the 21st century, neuroscience began providing us with tools 
 to explore what happens in the brain during early development, and later in 
 psychotherapy. A return to Freud’s Project is finally at hand” (p. 12). 
 
 As noted above, Cozolino argued that psychoanalytic theory emerged when 
historical circumstances dictated that Freud needed to devise descriptions and 
explanations for human experiences that only appear to be nonmaterial, despite his initial 
hypothesis that the mental or psychological experiences he was describing were actually 
products of their neural underpinnings in the human brain. In this passage it was unclear 
whether Cozolino’s statement “we can avoid a reduction of the mind to basic biochemical 
processes” was intended to refer to readers of his book specifically, or to individuals in 
contemporary culture generally when interpreting literature examining the relationship 
between psychological phenomena and neurobiological processes. His understanding of 
the historical antecedents of his book were also confusing because the phrase “on the 
contrary” seems misplaced, since the subsequent statement, “an appreciation for the 
structures and functioning of the brain by nonneurologists,” seemed more likely, not less 
likely, to cause readers to interpret his text as evidence supporting a reduction of mind to 
brain. Literature from a variety of fields including philosophy, history, and even 
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neuroscience has studied the influence of neuroscience research on popular culture and 
cautioned against the assumption that human psychology or mind can be easily 
understood as a product of neurochemical processes. Given that Cozolino’s theory might 
well be interpreted to be such a reduction, it is surprising that he dismissed so abruptly 
the possibility that efforts to integrate neurology and psychology through mapping mind 
or psychological theories onto brain might be interpreted as reductionism.  
 In sum, Cozolino described his efforts as picking up where Freud left off when he 
realized that his initial goal of mapping psychopathology and the talking cure onto the 
functioning of the brain was not feasible without the technological advances and a wider 
appreciation for the brain that emerged later in the 20th century and which Cozolino is 
now in the position to access. In this way Cozolino portrayed a great deal of psychology 
and psychotherapy as a placeholder for brain-based theories of psychotherapy for which 
his book was intended to serve as a foundation given its broad and theoretically 
integrative scope. This justification was based on his origin myth. Although it is true that 
an interest in brain science is popular, the implications of defining therapy in this way 
warrant closer scrutiny.  
 Examples of established psychotherapies described by Cozolino. In this section I 
provide examples of how Cozolino described psychotherapy theories that he identified as 
either well known or otherwise already established.  
 Psychoanalytic and psychodynamic therapies. In following passage Cozolino 
explained how psychoanalytic theory actually describes the structures and functions of 
the brain. 
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 Despite a conscious awareness that something may be wrong, the hidden layers of 
 neural processing continue to organize the world based on the prior experiences 
 that shaped them. As we will see in later chapters, the neural circuitry involved 
 with fear has a tenacious memory and can invisibly influence conscious 
 awareness for a lifetime. Part of psychodynamic therapy is an exploration and 
 uncovering of this unconscious organization of experience. Freud’s projective 
 hypothesis described the process by which our brains create and organize the 
 world around us. As the clarity of a situation decreases, the brain naturally 
 generates structure and projects it onto the world. (p. 34) 
 
 In this description of psychoanalytic and psychodynamic therapies Cozolino 
focused on a material explanation, localized in the brain, of what theorists refer to as the 
unconscious, or aspects of experience for which a person is unaware yet may be 
observable to therapists by the way patients respond to ambiguity or try to make sense of 
the world. Cozolino argued that these unconscious elements of experience are indications 
of how the brain works to project itself onto the world. In other words, Cozolino posited 
the brain rather than the patient as the single, true object of analysis, thereby interiorizing 
and reducing self to a physical organ.  
 Rogerian or client-centered therapy. In the following passage Cozolino described 
the theory of pioneering humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers. 
 Over the last century, the therapist attributes suggested by Rogers and what we 
 have come to think of as the best possible attitudes for optimal parenting have 
 become essentially identical. Rogerian principles lead to a minimized need for 
 defensiveness and shame while maximizing expressiveness, exploration, and risk 
 taking. Rogers was likely describing the best interpersonal environment for brain 
 growth during development and neural plasticity in psychotherapy when he stated 
 that client-centered therapy “aims directly toward the greater independence and 
 integration of the individual rather than hoping that such results will accrue if the 
 counselor assists in solving the problem. The individual and not the problem is the 
 focus.” (Rogers, 1942, p. 28, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 37) 
 
 Cozolino argued that Rogers’ description of his client-centered psychotherapy 
paradigm was unknowingly a description of the best relationship qualities to promote 
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optimal brain development and change. Cozolino then cited Rogers’ explanation of 
client-centered therapy as focused on the individual rather than focused on problems. In 
other words, Cozolino subtly redefined individual as brain. In this passage Cozolino also 
compared parenting and psychotherapy by arguing that the most favorable qualities for 
child development are analogous to the qualities of the psychotherapeutic environment. 
The connection between parenting and psychotherapy then became a primary issue in his 
book (see also Analogy, pp. 175-178). 
 Cognitive therapies. In the following passage Cozolino explained how cognitive 
therapy alters patients’ brains, and he also discussed how these modalities have been well 
represented amongst psychotherapy studies that have used neuroimaging to evaluate 
treatment efficacy. 
 “Cognitive therapies highlight the centrality of a person’s thoughts, appraisals, 
 and beliefs in guiding his or her feelings and actions” (p. 39).  
 
 Of all the different types of therapy, specific links have been found between 
 successful cognitive-behavioral therapy and changes in brain functioning. . . . 
 These findings strongly suggest that therapists can utilize cognition to alter the 
 relationship among neural networks in a way that impacts their balance of 
 activation and inhibition. In striving to activate cortical processing through 
 conscious control of thoughts and feelings, these therapies enhance left cortical 
 processing, inhibiting and regulating right hemispheric balance and subcortical 
 activation. The reestablishment of hemispheric and top-down regulation allows 
 for increases in positive attitudes and a sense of safety that counteract the 
 depressing and frightening effects of right hemisphere and subcortical (amygdala) 
 dominance. (Ochsner & Gross, 2008, as cited in Cozolino, p. 40) 
 
 “The inherent wisdom of this approach with depressed and anxious patients lies in 
 the fact that disorders of affect need activation of cortical executive structures”  
 (p. 41). 
 
 Cozolino identified cognitive therapy as the approach that has been most 
validated by neuroscience research, and he noted the suspected neurobiological 
 120 
mechanism or process by which psychological interventions are purportedly effective. 
This suggested that neurobiological changes spurred by other therapy paradigms have 
been at least partly inferred from neuroimaging studies of cognitive therapy patients. His 
claim that “the inherent wisdom” of cognitive therapy for depression and anxiety is the 
need for “activation of cortical executive structures” implied that neuroimaging confirms 
that therapists have unknowingly been impacting the structures and functioning of the 
brain during treatment.  
 Systemic family therapy. In the following passage Cozolino argued that systems 
theories actually describe how patterns in human relationships become embedded in brain 
functioning of each individual in the system. 
 “Dysfunctional family patterns . . . sacrifice the growth and well-being of one or 
 more members (often the children) to reduce the overall level of anxiety in the 
 family” (p. 42). 
 
 Over time, the dysfunction becomes embedded in the personality and neural 
 architecture of everyone in the family and they collude to maintain the system, 
 because they now all require the status quo in order to feel safe. These 
 experiences become embedded into the their neural architecture and are carried 
 forward into adult relationships. (p. 42) 
 
 As in other forms of psychotherapy, the goal of systems therapy is to integrate 
 and balance the various cortical and subcortical, left and right hemisphere 
 processing networks. . . . In essence, Bowen is highlighting that the simultaneous 
 activation of cognition and emotion leads to neural integration. (pp. 42-43) 
 
 The first step in systems therapy is to educate the family about these concepts and 
 to explore the history of both sides of the family through the past few generations. 
 . . . Uncovering family secrets and reality testing around the myths and 
 projections of each family member allow for cortical processing of primitive and 
 unconscious defenses. (p. 43) 
 
 In his description of systems therapy Cozolino asserted that relationship dynamics 
or patterns between family members become imprinted as neural patterns of each 
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member’s brain, causing people to strive to maintain homeostasis to avoid the anxiety 
caused by the threat of change. Cozolino’s fusion between systems dynamics and 
individual brain patterns seemed contradictory and antithetical to systems theories’ 
challenge to mainstream psychology’s focus on the individual as the primary unit of 
analysis or location of psychological symptoms.  
 Cozolino’s descriptions of these traditional therapy theories portrayed a 
materialized intrapsychic self, persons as individual brains, physical locations of the 
mechanisms of therapeutic efficacy, and individualized accounts of human relationships. 
All of these brain-based descriptions of psychotherapy theories overlooked how the claim 
of having discovered the material origins of longstanding psychological treatments is a 
reinterpretation of theories in accordance with a neuroscientific understanding of self 
rather than an uncovering of a true understanding of development, illness, and healing. 
Cozolino’s brain-based depiction of family systems theory was especially striking given 
that family therapy theories have viewed psychological problems and solutions as 
residing between members rather than intrapsychically in the interior of any one person. 
The use of a brain-based interpretation of systems theory illustrated how a brain-based 
interpretation of social or relational theories might be contradictory.  
 Differences between Cozolino’s theory and established psychotherapy theories. 
In this section I identify passages in which Cozolino described his psychotherapy theory 
as a unique psychotherapy theory or practice, or as an original interpretation of already-
established psychotherapy theories and practices.  
 Understanding the underlying neurobiology of effective psychotherapies rather 
than creating a new one. Cozolino did not create a new psychotherapy theory or specific 
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psychological treatment. Instead, he focused on a theoretical integration between already-
existing psychotherapy theories on the basis of a brain-based interpretation of several 
well-known psychotherapies and common factors of effective psychotherapies. 
 From my perspective, the value of neuroscience for psychotherapists is not to 
 explain away the mind or generate new forms of therapy, but to help us grasp the 
 neurobiological substrates of the talking cure in an optimistic and enthusiastic 
 continuation of Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology. (p. 358) 
 
 In this statement on the last page of his book Cozolino denied that he intended to 
promote a reduction of mind to brain, and he also denied that his book had been an 
attempt to create a new therapy theory. Although he denied attempting to use 
neuroscience to reduce mind to brain, he then described neuroscience as valuable for a 
“continuation” of Freud’s initial intention for a brain-based paradigm explaining human 
behavior or experience as neurobiological processes. This attempt to depict Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory as simply a placeholder for a psychotherapy-neuroscience 
integration overlooked the substantial effects of psychological and psychotherapy 
theories and practices on Western cultures, and Western cultural trends embodied by 
psychotherapy theories during the intervening decades of the 20th century. The claim that 
he was attempting to link his theory to Freud’s original intentions was part of Cozolino’s 
origin myth strategy (see above). 
 Using neuroscience in support of, or as a means for psychotherapy integration. 
Cozolino’s use of neuroscience as a means for psychotherapy integration was an 
important premise of his book.  
 “Whether it is called symptom relief, differentiation, ego strength, or awareness, 
 all forms of therapy are targeting dissociated neural networks for integration”  
 (p. 46).  
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 Cozolino’s statement suggested that various understandings of ideal therapy 
outcomes are all descriptions or interpretations of neural network integration, and 
therefore should be combined under the overarching field of neuroscience, rather than 
combined according to psychological common factors or differentiated according to the 
unique understandings of self that psychotherapy theories embody. In my review of 
literature relevant to the integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy (see 
Chapter II) I discussed similar arguments put forward by other theorists and 
psychotherapy authors. This proposal appears to offer hope for establishing with certainty 
a set of best practices in psychotherapy that would transcend the contentious debates 
among advocates of disparate psychological research methodologies about what 
constitutes psychological change and successful treatment. However, forfeiting the 
debate entirely in an effort to simply subsume the entire enterprise of psychotherapy 
integration and psychotherapy outcome research under the higher-status domain of 
neuroscience research is a rewriting of the purpose of psychotherapy treatment, and it is 
reductionist. In the following passage, Cozolino described psychotherapy in exclusively 
neuroscientific terms.  
 When theories of neuroscience and psychotherapy are considered side by side, a 
 number of working hypotheses emerge. First, given that the human brain is a 
 social organ, safe and supportive relationships are the optimal environment for 
 social and emotional learning. . . . Second, we appear to experience optimal 
 development and integration in the context of a mild to moderate level of arousal 
 or what we might call optimal stress. . . . A third hypothesis is that the 
 involvement of affect and cognition appears necessary in the therapeutic process 
 in order to create the context for integration of neural circuits with a high 
 vulnerability to dissociation. . . . Fourth, the co-construction of narratives between 
 parent and child or therapist and client provides a broad matrix supporting the 
 integration of multiple neural networks. (pp. 46-47) 
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 Cozolino argued that these four factors are common to effective psychotherapies 
because they appeal to some core traits or characteristics of the human brain, thereby 
activating networks in the brain in a certain way that makes therapy an effective 
psychological treatment through promoting the optimal functioning of the brain. By 
attributing neural integration to the combination of “safe and supportive relationships,” 
“optimal stress,” “the involvement of affect and cognition” and “the co-construction of 
narratives,” he described these important aspects of human psychology and development 
as central to patient health and wellbeing because of the effects of these conditions on the 
brain. This was one significant example of how he conflated personhood with the 
individual brain, repurposing psychotherapy in addition to his stated focus of validating 
already-existing practices. In other words, although Cozolino did not advocate for a 
therapy process or series of psychological interventions that might outwardly appear new, 
his re-visioning of therapy as effective for a brain rather than for an individual has 
important implications for how therapists think about their role as clinicians, the purpose 
of treating patients, and the proper area of study for psychological research methods.  
 In the following passage, Cozolino’s description of psychotherapy theories and 
neuroscience as both “heuristics” was noteworthy because he used that concept to 
describe both fields, and then he ascribed different qualities to each one.  
 Although each approach to psychotherapy is experienced as a fundamental truth 
 by its disciples, all modes of therapy are actually heuristics. Heuristics are 
 interpretations of experience or ways of understanding phenomena. The value of a 
 heuristic lies in its ability to organize, explain, and predict what we observe. 
 Neuroscience is another heuristic, one that we are using in the present discussion 
 to explain the mechanisms of action of psychotherapy; in other words how and 
 why it works. It is my belief that neuroscience is a helpful heuristic that will lead  
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 us to a fuller understanding of the process of psychotherapy and may also serve as 
 a rational means of selecting, combining, and evaluating treatment modalities.  
 (p. 33) 
 
 In this passage Cozolino seemed at first to claim that neuroscience, similar to 
“each approach to psychotherapy,” might simply appear to be another paradigm 
masquerading as a “truth.” However, a closer reading suggests that by describing the 
heuristic of neuroscience as serving “to explain the mechanisms of action of 
psychotherapy,” Cozolino implied some primacy or transcending quality of neuroscience 
as an explanation of efficacy currently missing from psychotherapy theories. The way the 
passage was worded implied that the value of neuroscience for all psychotherapies is 
greater than the value of any particular psychotherapy since therapies are experienced as 
“a fundamental truth” by the “disciples” or followers of that therapy. In other words, he 
used the word heuristic to relegate all specific psychotherapy approaches to the status of 
“interpretations” that are merely experienced as truth for the fans of that theory. Cozolino 
claimed that neuroscience is a proper means of psychotherapy integration because of its 
ability to explain contentious issues across modalities, rather than as a way to interpret 
phenomena myopically as he accused discreet therapy theories (or at least their followers) 
of doing. This seemed to be a roundabout way of advocating for psychotherapy 
integration through reductionism.  
 My hope is that including neural network activity in our case conceptualization 
 may help to establish a common language for us to select, combine, and evaluate 
 the treatments we provide. It will, one hopes, help us to move past debates 
 between competing schools of thought to a more inclusive approach to 
 psychotherapy. (p. 353) 
 
 This was another statement advocating for neuroscience as a means of 
establishing best practices from among a vast array of varying talk therapy theories. In 
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this passage there was a general sense that neuroscience could offer the hope for 
improving psychotherapy as a profession. The prediction that neuroscience will be used 
as a uniting paradigm overlooked the absence of much agreement among therapists or 
theorists about fundamental issues related to the meaning and nature of mental ills and 
their treatment. It would also require a rather uncritical approach to the meaning and 
nature of neuroscience. His claims in these passages were highly suggestive of a 
reduction of psychology to neurobiology. 
 Predicting future involvement of neuroscience in psychotherapy practice. 
Although he denied that his psychotherapy recommendations were meant to serve as a 
new and unique psychotherapy practice, and instead argued that his efforts represented a 
brain-based understanding of current psychotherapies and psychotherapy integration, 
Cozolino’s predictions for the future involvement of neuroscience in psychotherapy were 
bold. 
 As part of an initial assessment, [neuroimaging] could help therapists pinpoint 
 areas of neural activation and inhibition. Treatment planning will eventually come 
 to include specific psychotherapeutic and pharmacological interventions to 
 enhance the growth and integration of affected networks. Regular scans during the 
 course of therapy may someday be a useful adjunct to psychological tests, as ways 
 of fine-tuning the therapeutic process and measuring treatment success. (p. 345) 
 
 These predictions of a close relationship between psychotherapy and neuroscience 
in Cozolino’s final chapter (titled “The Psychotherapist as Neuroscientist,” pp. 341-358) 
were striking. Writing case conceptualizations in a neurobiology vernacular, or using 
neuroimaging to monitor psychotherapy patients’ progress in treatment might sound 
exciting to readers and appeal to an ideal of a more exacting, scientized future that is 
drawing near. However, Cozolino neglected to describe further any specific details for 
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how those plans would be widely implemented or why they might be helpful for patients, 
or what would be the consequences of linking psychotherapy with neuroscience in such a 
sweeping way.  
 In sum, Cozolino identified his theory as an attempt at psychotherapy theory 
integration and he predicted a future in which the practice of psychotherapy will be 
closely aligned with neuroscience. These were dramatic predictions and reductionist 
interpretations that warrant examination in light of the criticisms that some scholars have 
raised against the claims and rhetoric used to depict the relationship between mind and 
brain. With all of these predictions Cozolino took for granted the significance of 
neuroscience in popular culture and in the understanding of self in contemporary Western 
cultures. Although techniques similar to those that he predicted are already practiced by 
some specialized psychologists, his casual prediction for these practices to become 
widespread assumed that these changes to typical psychotherapy practice could be 
feasible or at least without reason for concern about the implications of turning talk 
therapy practice into a technicized neuroscientific intervention as the standard for patient 
care.  
 The tenets of Cozolino’s psychotherapy theory. In this section I focus on 
Cozolino’s broadest understandings or descriptions of the purpose of psychotherapy, the 
general populations of psychotherapy patients or common reasons why people seek talk 
therapy (as well as types of abnormal behavior or psychopathology that psychotherapists 
treat), Cozolino’s understanding of self, mind, and brain (and the relationships between 
those aspects of human experience), the neurobiological mechanisms of psychotherapy, 
the psychological mechanisms that activate those corresponding brain processes, ways in 
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which therapists should provide therapy so that those mechanisms are utilized, and 
indicators of successful psychotherapy outcomes. (For quotes from Cozolino’s text for all 
of the following subsections, see Appendix A, pp. 298-324). 
 The definition or general purpose of psychotherapy. In this section I examine 
Cozolino’s broadest descriptions of psychotherapy.  
 Psychotherapy as a venue for neural integration. Cozolino defined psychotherapy 
by its potential to restore neural integration or proper connectivity between brain regions. 
He asserted that therapies are able to be distinguished on the basis of which neural 
networks are involved, rather than on the basis of the tenets of the treatment, or the 
underlying assumptions about human behavior, change, health, or the best way of life—
that is, aspects of self—constructed by an array of shared social and cultural values. He 
instead reduced those broadly shared values to neural networks within an individual’s 
brain that he believed to be specifically influenced or activated in response to the 
“enriched environment” (p. 20) of therapy. In other words, he defined psychotherapy by 
the neurobiological mechanisms of change suspected to be involved with treatment.  
 According to Cozolino, the neurobiology that confers upon humans the potential 
to experience psychological problems is the same neurobiology that confers upon humans 
the capacity to reverse or remedy those problems in psychotherapy. In that way, human 
problems and their cures are highly individualized and the same process that explains the 
existence or continuance of individual difficulties (lack of neural integration) is related to 
the process that corrects those difficulties (establishing neural integration). This 
explanation was accomplished through a highly reductive understanding of problems and 
cures as physically localized and therefore able to be physically manipulated through the 
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qualities of the nonmaterial relationship and discourse of talk therapy acting in a material 
or physiological way on the human brain.  
 Psychotherapy as a relationship that is similar to other relationships that 
facilitate neural integration. Cozolino equated therapy with other human relationships 
that result in healing and corresponding brain change. His argument suggested that there 
is nothing inherently special or unique about the psychotherapy relationship, since its 
potential for healing exists in other relationships insofar as those other relationships 
produce similar changes in an individual’s brain. This was a significant claim that could 
contradict the unique philosophies and history embedded within the practice of 
psychotherapy. 
 By viewing therapy as a venue for neural integration that is similar to other 
relationships that facilitate healing through identical neurobiological change, Cozolino at 
once reduced psychotherapy to technical interventions that alter the brain while subtly 
implying that there is nothing inherently unique to the institution of psychotherapy or to 
the outcomes it may confer upon patients.  
 General reasons why people seek psychotherapy. In this section I address the 
broadest reasons that Cozolino provided for why people seek or attend psychotherapy, 
such as general descriptions or typical populations of psychotherapy patients. 
 A lack of “optimal” neural functioning is implicated in the problems for which 
people seek treatment with psychotherapy regardless of the severity or types of problems. 
Cozolino asserted that all psychotherapy patients receive treatment for problems that are 
manifestations of their underlying neurobiological correlates, regardless of the degree of 
severity or symptomatology. In other words, he argued that whether a patient seeks 
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therapy for treatment of mental illness or general life issues that do not warrant a 
psychological diagnosis, there is some aspect of the functioning of the patient’s brain that 
is relevant to the presenting problem and implicated when psychotherapy is successful. 
He speculated that neuroimaging might confirm this if neuroimaging studies of 
psychotherapy patients did not focus exclusively on treatment studies of specific mental 
illnesses, but instead broadened to include patients whose general personal issues or 
problems have not resulted in serious functional impairments. This materializing of all 
psychological difficulties and stressors was a significant claim in its assertion that even a 
lack of mental illness still implies that psychotherapy is a brain-based treatment. 
 Psychotherapy remedies problems that result because the human brain initially 
develops in accordance with early childhood experiences. According to Cozolino, early 
development influences later physiological and psychological wellbeing because brain 
development is sensitive to early negative interpersonal experiences (as well as later 
psychological traumas). He implied that individual functioning is determined early in the 
lifespan because the brain is especially adaptable to its surroundings during that phase of 
development. The brain was therefore portrayed as the source of individual personhood, 
and parenting was portrayed as significant for its effects on neurobiological development. 
 Patients are often being held back in their potential to enact desired changes 
because of the way in which their brains have constructed reality. Cozolino’s brain-based 
psychotherapy integration was based on the premise that the human brain constructs 
reality, guides an individual’s perceptions of reality, shapes personal identities, and in 
many ways exerts a vast amount of control over human behaviors and experiences. By 
redefining the unconscious mind as “hidden layers of neural processing” (p. 133), 
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Cozolino provided a materialized or brain-based explanation for patients’ hindered 
personal growth or inability to change in the way that they think they need or desire. This 
reiterated the idea that changing oneself entails changing one’s brain, and that the task of 
helping patients understand what is dissociated or outside of their awareness is a process 
of revealing the workings of hidden parts of the brain whose distortions are knowable 
only through patients’ perceptions, thoughts, or interpretations of reality. Because the 
pertinent brain layers are allegedly hidden there seems to be faith required to believe that 
these brain structures exist, or faith that neuroscience will eventually discover them 
through continued advances in imaging technology. The hope that neuroscience will 
provide explanations for human propensities, values, and behaviors is deeply tied to the 
biomedical self described by scholars such as Vidal (2009) and Moreira and Palladino 
(2005). 
 Psychological defenses (also described as the adaptations of neural networks) are 
no longer effective for coping. Cozolino explained that patients seek treatment when the 
usefulness of typical coping strategies have been exhausted. He mapped the 
psychoanalytic concept of defense mechanisms onto “neural networks” (p. 34), noting 
that people often seek treatment when their usual ways of dealing with their symptoms 
have been rendered ineffective, and as a result they can no longer ignore or deny their 
psychological distress or symptoms. Although people were described as the entity that 
seeks treatment, neural networks were described as the entity that “adapts to cope with 
emotional stress” (p. 34). In other words, Cozolino ascribed the flexibility or adaptability 
of human beings to the neural networks in the human brain, thereby materializing an 
intrapsychic view of self (see also Personification, pp. 209-211).  
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 All of these explanations for why patients attend therapy reduced the immense 
array of psychological conditions and general life problems typically treated in talk 
therapy to malfunctioning neural correlates. In general, even though Cozolino noted that 
social factors such as early relationships with caregivers may contribute to later mental 
problems, problems were typically depicted as individualized rather than systemic and 
interiorized rather than relational.  
 The definition and etiology of psychopathology. In this section I highlight 
Cozolino’s definition and descriptions of psychopathology or established mental 
disorders, categories of abnormal psychology, or diagnosable psychological conditions. 
 Mental disorders are types of inadequate neural integration. Cozolino broadly 
defined psychopathology as a lack of optimal neural network integration, and he provided 
specific examples of mental disorders or conditions that neuroscience research has 
confirmed as being “linked to deficits in the integration and balance among the cerebral 
hemispheres” (p. 106). At times it was unclear whether he attributed the origins of an 
individual’s psychopathology to the functioning of the human brain, or whether 
psychopathology has simply been observed to have neural correlates in the human brain 
(see also Ambiguity, pp. 171-178). Regardless, Cozolino paired the concept of mental 
disorder with the concept of inadequate or imbalanced integration between brain 
structures and functions. Through this understanding of psychopathology, mental or 
psychological conditions were portrayed as internalized by mapping an array of 
psychological symptoms onto individual neuroanatomy. This was significant because it 
implied an understanding of human difficulties as intrapsychic rather than interpersonal.  
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 Humans have the potential to experience psychopathology because of how the 
brain evolved. Cozolino’s understanding of psychopathology illustrated the centrality of 
evolutionary theory in his book (see Themes, pp. 213-220). According to Cozolino, 
psychopathology results from neurological processes that date back to the earliest human 
history, yet in modern life those processes are now often understood to be inappropriate 
or unreasonable psychological responses for the contemporary contexts or situations in 
which individuals might experience them. He suggested that because of the advancing 
complexity of the human brain over the course of human history, the experience of 
anxiety, for example, is the same fundamental process regardless of the psychological 
issue that is causing feelings of fear or worry, or the context in which those feelings are 
experienced. For example, he illustrated this argument by equating a physiological reflex 
resulting from an unexpected physical sensation with an “existential crisis” (p. 239) about 
issues that are not immediately inflicting physical harm upon a person. In other words, 
his understanding of all psychological distress as products of natural physiological 
processes regardless of the circumstances in which they occur was a reductionist 
understanding of problems of self, and exemplified his attitude of inevitability with 
respect to psychological problems and treatments that he described as timeless and 
natural occurrences. 
 The continuum of normality to abnormality represents a continuum of stress 
responses. Cozolino described stress as essential for healthy childhood development and 
later for effective psychotherapy when experienced in the correct amounts, yet quite 
harmful psychologically when individuals become overloaded with it, asserting that 
lasting anxiety and symptoms of psychological trauma often result from an 
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overabundance of stress. Cozolino explained the severity of both psychological and 
neurobiological indicators of trauma as correlating with the phase of individual 
development in which the trauma occurs, and the duration of the trauma. He identified 
neglectful, abusive, or otherwise harmful parenting as resulting in later psychological 
difficulties while asserting that ideal parenting leads to a proper balance of stress 
hormones in a child’s body and a proper integration of experience by a child’s brain. In 
these passages Cozolino implied that on a continuum from normality to abnormality, 
coherence among various aspects of human functioning (“sensation, perception, and 
emotion”; p. 151) are made possible by neural integration while symptoms of severe 
posttraumatic stress disorder indicate the most serious disruptions of neural integration 
and the “experience of self” (p. 151). In other words, he used his focus on trauma and 
dissociation to interpret psychopathology as a disruption in both neural integration and 
coherency of self, thereby portraying a close association between brain functioning and 
self.  
  Psychopathology resulting from nonsecure attachment experiences. Cozolino 
equated secure attachment with psychological wellbeing, and he associated insecure 
attachment with psychopathology. He claimed that a child forms a secure attachment 
with attuned and caring parents, which influences the development of the brain in a way 
that is likely to promote later mental and physical health. Cozolino reduced the parent-
child relationship to the effects of that relationship on the child’s brain, thereby 
technicizing and individualizing the parent-child relationship. Cozolino wrote that 
attachment schemas are stored “within networks of the social brain,” (p. 198) thereby 
attributing social aspects of humans to a hypothesized innate drive in the brain for 
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attachment and the formation of relationships. The psychological concept of repeating 
relationship patterns in accordance with early experiences was materialized onto the brain 
and rewritten as “implicit” (p. 198) products of brain functioning that occur outside of 
individual awareness. One passage in this section was especially noteworthy for 
Cozolino’s assertion that aggressive and violent behaviors including acts of domestic 
violence may result from how early nonsecure attachment impacts the developing brain 
(p. 234). His simple and abrupt explanation overlooked the culpability of perpetrators of 
these crimes, as well as broader cultural understandings that may contribute to violence 
within relationships that is disproportionately committed against women and children.  
 Overall, these understandings of psychopathology mapped psychological 
symptoms onto the human brain, naturalizing and reducing them in order to portray them 
as disruptions in the coherent experience of self that results from inadequate neural 
integration. Cozolino described trauma and dissociation by their intrapsychic effects that 
he mapped onto the brain, thereby using that understanding to conflate the concepts of 
neural integration and psychological integration. The focus on attachment and the brain 
seemed to be an attempt at social or relational theory but was at best	  an understanding of 
self as emerging in a dyad or triad with parents, validated by a materialized interpretation 
of intrapsychic processes rather than expanded with a broader understanding of the 
fluidity between a broader cultural context and the private family unit. 
 The existence and definition of self. In this section I examine how Cozolino 
defined or described the concept of self (aside from the relationship between self and 
mind or self and brain).  
 136 
 Influenced by D.W. Winnicott, Cozolino described self as developing during 
periods in childhood marked by calmness and being alone. Cozolino linked Winnicott’s 
true self—false self dichotomy with secure and insecure attachment styles and general 
psychological wellbeing. This was the primary psychological theory of self that Cozolino 
used to link his interpretation of brain research with human psychological development. 
Cozolino applied the Winnicottian theory to describe self in a way that emphasized the 
need for children to develop a sense of independence from parents. He associated true 
self with optimal emotional wellbeing and false self with maladaptive dependency on the 
needs of others resulting from parents having failed to provide adequate personal space 
for the development of individual identity and the ability to understand and care for 
oneself. He implied that “self-reflective capacity” (p. 192) or the ability to be alone and 
contemplative is a central gauge of proper child development and psychological health or 
stability. Later in this section I discuss how Cozolino used Winnicottian theory as an 
interpretation of ideal brain development.  
 Self formed through narrative. Cozolino argued that self is closely linked to 
narrative, that is, the language or story that a person uses to describe oneself, especially in 
regards to personal history. According to Cozolino, since language can be used in a 
flexible or creative way, the flexibility or adaptability of human beings stems from the 
vastness of possible narratives that individuals can construct. Cozolino suggested a 
transcendent quality that narrative confers upon humans by describing it as the tool by 
which a person can imagine alternate ways of being before attempting to implement 
changes that are consciously desired. Cozolino also asserted that shared narratives link 
individuals within a society. His statement that narratives link “feelings, actions, and 
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others to the self” (p. 207) implied that feelings, actions, and other people are not inherent 
to or inseparable from selfhood, but instead are detachable from the autonomous 
individual. Cozolino’s ambitious use of narrative to depict humans as capable of grand 
and imaginative changes seemed to be an example of what Cushman and Gilford (1999) 
described as a misuse of interpretive or postmodern concepts by some recent 
psychotherapy theories that inadvertently promote the idea of imagining quick and 
unproblematic personal changes, consistent with consumer culture rather than the critical 
philosophies that such rhetoric might at first appear to suggest. Later in this section I 
discuss how Cozolino emphasized how narrative activates neuroplasticity and creates 
lasting neural change. 
 Narrative or “stories of the self” enables affect regulation. In one statement 
Cozolino argued that the consistency of memory about personal history is essential for 
emotional regulation. He suggested that individuals regulate their affect through the use 
of narrative because narratives engender a sense of stability and predictability.  
 Self and imagination. Cozolino linked the flexibility of self to the capacity for a 
flexible and creative use of language and to the human imagination that this use of 
language supports. He also emphasized how the capacity for imagination is facilitated by 
the highly evolved human brain (see The relationship between self and brain,  
pp. 143-151). As I discussed above with Cozolino’s description of the close association 
between self and narrative, the assertion that subjectivity may so radically and 
whimsically shift has been identified as a misuse of postmodern theories of self that often 
encourages a decontextualized understanding of identity, moral relativism, and logical 
contradictions (see Cushman & Gilford, 1999).   
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 Overall, these various understandings and depictions of self suggested a 
combination of early-20th century psychoanalytic theory (which held a vision of self was 
rooted in an interiorized and individualized personhood) with highly relativistic 
portrayals of selfhood as easily and quickly changed based on imagination and narrative. 
Of note, his uses of the concept of self implied a unitary rather than multiplistic vision of 
self, as his understanding of integration and dissociation focused on various aspects of 
individual human functioning (e.g., psychological and physiological) rather than 
integration of multiple self states. 
 The existence and definition of mind. I this section I examine ways in which 
Cozolino defined or described the concept of mind. 
 Mind is how Freud chose to describe the brain. Cozolino did not explicitly define 
mind, although he intermittently described certain qualities or processes of the human 
mind and the relationship between mind and brain (see below). Cozolino used his 
simplified and ahistorical depiction of psychoanalysis as originating from neurology to 
imply that the psychoanalytic theory of mind was used as a placeholder until recent 
neuroimaging could establish the brain-behavior relationships that Freud initially and 
correctly hypothesized. In other words, he used his origin myth of psychotherapy to argue 
that human psychology and subjective experience appears nonmaterial but are now 
objectively verifiable by brain science as products of physiological correlates.  
 The brain is what therapists have unknowingly been working with or describing 
while calling it mind. As I discussed above (see General history of psychotherapy 
according to Cozolino, pp. 112-117), Cozolino argued that in conducting psychotherapy 
therapists have always been performing an intervention on the human brain. His 
 139 
statements exemplified how he combined the psychoanalytic concepts of conscious and 
unconscious mind with the unique functions of the hemispheres of the brain. This implied 
that the tenets of psychoanalytic theory (there are both conscious and unconscious aspects 
of human experience and volition) and the interplay between the left and right 
hemispheres of the human brain are two ways of describing the same phenomena of 
human experience. Cozolino’s rhetorical strategy overlooked the unique histories of brain 
research and psychoanalytic theory and therefore overlooked the unique goals, uses, and 
purposes of those areas of study. This dismissed the important cultural and political fit 
between psychological theories or treatments and the Western philosophical traditions 
from which they have drawn, as well as the specific cultural circumstances embodied by 
psychological theories. However, Cozolino also needed to insert a great deal of 
speculative and ambiguous language when drawing conclusions about the relationship 
between mind and brain (see Ambiguity, pp. 171-178; see Speculation language,  
pp. 195-203), and at times he acknowledged that such arguments are not without 
controversy and are potentially incapable of being considered objective findings rather 
than interpretive claims (see Aporia, pp. 178-182).  
 In sum, Cozolino’s descriptions of mind depicted the study of human conscious 
experience as an antiquated concept aside from its relationship to the brain and the 
interpretation of mind or consciousness as the experience produced by neurobiology. He 
used his origin myth strategy to assert that human experience is the result of material or 
physical processes in the brain. This is a controversial position rejected by many experts 
even within the field of neuroscience (see Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Brothers, 2001; Noë, 
2009). 
 140 
 The relationship between mind and brain. In this section I examine ways in 
which Cozolino explicated or implied a relationship between mind and brain.  
 Mind and brain are “a unified process.” Although Cozolino claimed to reject the 
reduction of mind to brain, in the opening statement of his book he posited a unity 
between the workings of the physical brain and the concept of mind. In that passage he 
argued that mind-brain research has been stifled by interdisciplinary politics, and that the 
complexity of these issues have turned many people away from trying to understand 
them. These claims were surprising in light of research documenting the popular appeal 
and academic prevalence of neuroscience research. Regardless, he responded by asserting 
that mind and brain are “essentially a unified process,” (p. 1) quickly simplifying the 
issue as if to assuage concerns that the mind-brain integration in his book might be 
complicated. The meaning of that statement was unclear, and portraying the issue as a 
matter of whether therapists can understand neuroscience seemed is a distraction from 
broader issues such as the accuracy of his mind-brain synthesis, and more importantly, 
the relevance of that theory for psychotherapy practice.  
 Mind is “embedded” within processes of the brain. Cozolino posited that 
psychoanalytic theories have unknowingly described brain functioning and how mind is 
“embedded” (p. 196) in brain processes. It was unclear what he actually intended to assert 
with that statement. However, by suggesting that psychoanalytic theories are necessary 
for understanding the relationship between mind and brain, or that those theories 
correctly describe how human experience results from neural functioning, Cozolino 
seemed to employ a fallacy described by Bennett and Hacker (2003) that states that one 
cannot ascribe such psychological theories to the brain unless one was already seeking to 
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find them, as there is no way to elicit from the brain a verification of whether the 
psychological theory or principle correctly fits with its functioning. The use of 
psychoanalytic theory in this way also seems to exemplify Brothers’ (2001) argument 
that the field of neuroscience needs the field of psychology a great deal more than the 
field of psychology needs the field of neuroscience since neuroscience requires the use of 
established theories of mind to use as a vehicle for inserting its language into common 
parlance.  
 Mind might emerge from the brain. In one statement Cozolino speculated that 
mind might emerge from the brain (p. 132) but it was unclear whether he attempted to 
imply that current research supports that claim, or that future research will likely provide 
evidence in support of this finding. The use of the concept of mind and the intended 
claim about it were both vague.  
 Certain states of mind might influence brain functioning. In one passage Cozolino 
seemed to describe mind as conscious volition and he implied that it activates the brain in 
ways that result in greater control over thoughts and behaviors. Although Cozolino 
primarily used the concept of self and descriptions of brain functioning (rather than 
descriptions of mind), here he implied that human intentionality or deliberately 
cultivating a certain “state of mind” (p. 169) may influence brain functioning in a way 
that fosters the type of self-control over emotions that is consciously desired. If Cozolino 
intended to imply that mind and brain are not synonymous because states of mind impact 
the functioning of the brain, then the reader may conclude from that passage whatever is 
typically described as mind exists at least partially outside of the workings of the material 
brain. However, since Cozolino also explicitly argued that the human brain creates and 
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exerts tremendous influence over the perception of reality, it was not clear whether he 
would contend that human intentionality as depicted in this passage is merely part of the 
illusion of freedom or control produced by the brain (see also Aporia, pp. 178-182). 
Cozolino did not discuss the possible contradictions, or the important implications, that 
necessary follow from his phrasing.   
 Phrases that suggested mind and brain are not synonymous. In addition to the 
passage described above that could imply that mind and brain are not synonymous or 
identical, other passages contained descriptions of mind that implied a separation 
between mind and brain. However, Cozolino did not provide sufficient clarification about 
these phrases or elaborate on the implications of these statements. Although these 
passages implied possible distinctions between mind and brain, this type of rhetoric was 
infrequent in Cozolino’s book, and in the absence of any explicit definition of mind it 
was not clear whether these passages were intended to refer to mind as human cognition 
and intentionality broadly, or to some possibly nonmaterial entity with which individuals 
are endowed. For example, in one passage he stated that over the course of human 
history, some executive functions “were assumed by the mind” (p. 115), suggesting that 
mind as at least partially separate from the brain. In another passage, the use of the phrase 
“group mind” (p. 164) implied that some process or entity is shared amongst people and 
related somehow to human social interactions. In another passage, his assertion that 
“brain and mind have evolved” (p. 316) to allow for the physical and emotional 
experiences of threatening situations also suggested a distinction between the two 
concepts or entities. However, he did not elaborate upon the intended meanings of these 
phrases.  
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 Cozolino’s failure to provide a clear definition of mind caused his occasional use 
of the concept to seem colloquial, and his intended assertions in these passages were 
vague. Because his use of the concept of mind alongside descriptions of the brain resulted 
in confusing statements, the intended relationship between mind and brain would 
seemingly have to be inferred by the reader. This might unknowingly reduce the concept 
of mind to brain functioning. In so doing, readers might unintentionally dismiss the 
relevance of psychological concepts and experiences apart from their verifiable neural 
correlates. Rather than simply overcoming a mental-physical dichotomy, this use of 
grammar could negate the importance of subjectivity and agency associated with 
psychological descriptions that inherently assume mental-physical holism and are thought 
to mediate brain-behavior relations (see Brothers, 2001). 
 The relationship between self and brain. In this section I discuss ways in which 
Cozolino explicated and/or implied a relationship between self and brain.  
 The extent of neural integration corresponds to the extent of psychological 
integration or coherence of self. Cozolino described how neural integration enables a 
seamless assimilation or coordination amongst various physical and mental aspects of 
human functioning. He seemed to associate that seamless coordination of human 
functions with the concept of selfhood or coherent psychological experience. In other 
words, he equated neural integration with a coherent experience of self in order to imply 
that self emerges from neurobiology. In one passage he first asserted that neural 
integration leads to what has been described by psychoanalytic theory as ego, and then he 
defined ego as the amalgamation of the psychological qualities associated with self 
(“personality, affect regulation, coping styles, and self image”; p. 27). In another passage, 
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based on his understanding of psychopathology as a lack of neural integration, Cozolino 
stated that it is a “fact that the self is a fragile construction of the brain” (p. 286). In that 
same passage he stated that the experience and location of self is flexible “within our 
imagination” (p. 286), a claim I discussed earlier when examining Cozolino’s 
understanding of self. These passages all demonstrated how Cozolino’s understanding of 
the relationship between self and brain at times had to be inferred based on the recurring 
ways in which it was used. Regardless, his uses of the concept of self alongside 
descriptions of the brain implied a decontextualized, material, and individual selfhood 
localized in the brain, and by happenstance or intuition had been described correctly by 
psychoanalytic and other psychological theories. His individualized vision of self was at 
once a physicalized self that can also utilize the properties of the brain to imagine 
boundlessness and freedom from apparent limitations, in order to facilitate desired 
personal changes. 
 Left and right hemispheres of the brain correspond to distinct aspects of self. 
Cozolino emphasized how two remarkably specialized hemispheres of the brain are each 
responsible for different aspects of human perception and experience, and that the 
integration or coordination between the two regions is essential for a coherent experience 
of self. In the passages I identified, Cozolino mapped aspects of the psychoanalytic 
theory of mind onto the left and right hemispheres of the human brain. He asserted that 
the right hemisphere of the brain operates in a way that is similar to how psychoanalytic 
theorists describe the unconscious mind, while describing “the left hemisphere 
interpreter” (p. 103) as the process by which a person’s brain knowingly and decidedly 
chooses how he or she will form coherent perceptions, and then directs or portrays that 
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person to other people. Cozolino then speculated that this function of the left hemisphere 
is a possible explanation for psychological defense mechanisms as described by 
psychoanalytic theory. The use of left and right brain hemispheres to describe the 
localization (and ideally a balance) of distinct aspects of human beings highlighted 
Cozolino’s use of the brain to support a veiled moral discourse whose origins were 
attributed (and reduced) to brain structures rather than shared culture and historical 
traditions that hold certain values and lifestyles in high esteem. For instance, by 
attributing rational self-control to the left hemisphere and unbridled mental processes to 
the right hemisphere, Cozolino naturalized a modern Western view of personhood that 
results in what it typically understood to be an indicator of adequate social functioning 
and general wellbeing. In other words, there are moral consequences to recommendations 
that are disguised as objective or neutral scientific findings.  
 The parietal lobes of the brain contribute significantly to the experience of self. 
Cozolino argued that the parietal lobes have been overlooked as a likely significant 
contributor to the experience of self. The passages in this section exemplified the 
underlying logic that Cozolino used throughout his book to link human psychology or 
conscious experience with processes in the brain. Cozolino first described certain human 
characteristics or abilities that he identified as most defining of self (and accurately 
intuited by early psychoanalytic theorists) and then he localized those defining capacities 
of self in the brain (especially the parietal lobes). He thereby implied that self emerges 
from the brain and that early psychoanalytic theories happened to be correct in describing 
the experience of self that the brain enables. As I discussed above, the circular logic used 
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to attribute a theory of self or mind to the functioning of the brain warrants exploration in 
light of challenges to this logic by scientists and other theorists. 
 Winnicott’s concept of true self describes neural integration and healthy 
psychological development. As I discussed above (see The existence and definition of 
self, pp. 135-138), Cozolino endorsed a Winnicottian vision of the emergence and 
development of self. He then used this theory to describe the results of brain development 
by speculating that the way in which an individual develops a self mirrors the way in 
which his or her brain develops, and that this brain development reflects the “neural 
organization” (p. 146) transmitted from parents to their children. With an attitude of 
certainty Cozolino described the true self as “obviously” (p. 191) a description of self that 
emerges from optimal development of neural networks. He described the concept of a 
true self as one that is psychologically integrated or conscious of and able to cope with 
negative feelings, and that the true self reflects proper mind-body integration. This is a 
depiction of self as an individual material being whose specific neurobiology (and 
therefore his or her mental or nonmaterial life) is formed primarily within the dyad or 
triad of parent-child relationships and is identical to a Winnicottian developmental 
scheme. This claim relied on the use of a psychological theory in a way that extracted it 
from the cultural circumstance in which that theory emerged and gained favor, and 
portrayed it as originally based on the intuition of the theorist who devised it, in order to 
re-appropriate it for use in the current era as verification of how brain science correctly 
explains the material origins of self. 
 Self and contemporary problems of the self both result from how the brain 
evolved to allow for imagination. Cozolino argued that the cerebral cortex of the brain 
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allows for the remarkable mental abilities that are unique to humans, such as the ability to 
imagine oneself in alternative circumstances, or to care about one’s place in a complex 
social order. He argued that the human imagination is also the cause of psychological 
problems that stem from unrealistic fears and expectations. According to Cozolino, 
because the human brain has advanced with the evolution of the human species, feelings 
such as fear and worry, which originally were useful to ensure physical survival, are now 
experienced as a result of concerns about psychological integrity that are often unfounded 
or irrational. For example, he identified the human brain as implicated even in symptoms 
such as malaise or worry resulting from a consideration of issues such as the finitude of 
human existence, negative social standing, or catastrophes that are unlikely to happen. 
Above I discussed some of the problems with reducing and naturalizing all psychological 
experiences to material processes (see General reasons why people seek psychotherapy, 
pp. 129-132).  
 The ways in which the brain interprets social interactions contributes to a sense 
of self. Cozolino described how the human brain recognizes and interprets nuances during 
interpersonal communication. He suggested that social aspects of selfhood result from 
“automatic” (p. 189) brain processes. He implied that social reciprocity and shared 
customs or ways of living are possible to the extent that the human brain receives input 
from other people through circuits that synthesize this input and infer what other people 
might be experiencing. This brain-to-brain explanation for human society is a highly 
individualized and scientized depiction of human beings as inherently removed from 
ideas about a shared world based on a moral tradition, that is, a shared understanding of 
the good. In other words, his strategy for challenging modern isolated individualism 
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exemplified a technical understanding of selfhood that could ultimately reinforce 
individualism rather than adequately support social or relational visions of human being.  
 Neural integration enables self to be experienced as embodied. In at least two 
statements Cozolino used neural integration to explain the human experience of 
physicality. Cozolino depicted the connection between mind and body as occurring 
through an integration of networks in the brain. This seemed to be an attempt to use 
neuroscience to resolve the problems raised by the presupposition of doubt about physical 
existence underlying the mind-body dualism central to modern era philosophy. This use 
of brain research to link mind and body is problematic because it relies on materializing 
rather than contextualizing human psychology, thereby replicating the interiorized 
modern era vision of self it sought to rectify. Some psychotherapy theorists have applied 
late-20th century sociocultural theories such as philosophical hermeneutics to 
psychotherapy theories and practices that have addressed Cartesian dualism by rejecting 
as a central concern the efforts to prove the existence of a material self, thereby 
contextualizing therapy practice as a social and relational endeavor rather than 
inadvertently reinforcing the interiorized and intrapsychic modern view of self (Kirschner 
& Martin, 2010). Naturalizing the material view of self as a product of brain functioning 
dismisses interpretations of embodied selfhood as a cultural and historical viewpoint 
rather than a timeless truth regardless of the extent to which the idea of a physicalized 
individual self currently appears to be intrinsic.  
 Language and narrative foster neural integration, thereby enabling a coherent 
experience of self. As I noted above (see The existence and definition of self,  
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pp. 135-138), Cozolino identified narrative or language as essential for the formation and 
ongoing flexibility of self. He also posited that narrative facilitates neural network 
integration that corresponds to the experience of self and emotional regulation. In doing 
so he implied a correlation but not any specific directionality between psychological and 
neurobiological processes. In other words, it was unclear whether neural integration 
results from or produces the psychological experiences of emotional regulation and a 
sense of self. His emphasis on the role of language and narrative or discourse in the 
construction of self or the understanding of human beings seems to incorporate late-20th 
century social and interpretive theory (such as hermeneutics) that have been influential to 
contemporary psychotherapy theories. However, the idea that language joins people by 
connecting brains seems to be an attempt to use relational thinking in the service of 
reinforcing a materialized intrapsychic view of self.  
 Self-reflection facilitates neural integration. As I discussed above, Cozolino 
argued that deep and calm personal reflection is essential for the emergence and 
development of a coherent experience of self (see The existence and definition of self,  
pp. 135-138). Cozolino also suggested a fit between this kind of reflection or 
contemplation and neural integration. He argued that the development of an integrated 
brain and an integrated self are dependent upon self-reflection, which facilitates 
coordination between emotions, thoughts, and other aspects of human functioning. This 
was an example of assigning qualities to the brain that he had also assigned to the self, 
thereby linking self and brain using a rhetorical device rather than verifiable 
neuroscientific findings. This argument illustrated how Cozolino’s view of self-contained 
individualism as both emerging from and facilitating healthy brain development was a 
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vision of acquiring self-control through a process of regaining power from the influence 
of the brain that seemed more akin to early modern era philosophy than contemporary 
interpretive understandings of human selfhood.  
 Narratives foster neural integration which enables affect regulation. Cozolino 
asserted that the way in which a person reflects upon his or her life can facilitate affect 
regulation or conscious control over mood and emotion. He also speculated that 
narratives about personal history serve to “maximize” (p. 47) neural integration because 
this fusion of memory and narrative supports affect regulation and predictable 
psychological functioning. This use of memory as a link between psychotherapy and the 
brain was an example of how Cozolino selected psychological theories and then 
explained them as the products of brain functioning, effectively naturalizing a 
philosophical discourse that has been seminal to the modern understanding of self in the 
west.  
 The array of uses of the concept of self alongside interpretations of brain 
functioning showed Cozolino’s emphasis on the relationship between self and brain. His 
statements implied that the concept of self was intended to describe the coherence of 
conscious experience through the integration of physical and psychological aspects of 
functioning. He mapped that understanding of self onto the brain by describing a 
relationship between neural integration and coherent or healthy psychological 
functioning. This served to individualize and naturalize the concept of self, portraying 
human beings as defined by the consistency of individual experience as allotted by and 
processed through the brain. This inner view of self seemed contrary to contextual or 
relational understandings of selfhood. Therefore the mapping of self onto brain seems to 
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perpetuate a view of human beings that is reminiscent of Cartesian dualism and early 
modern philosophy yet does little to foster an understanding of why these arguments 
might seem appealing or even necessary for psychotherapy theory and practice. 
 The relationship between self, mind, and brain. In this section I examine how 
Cozolino explained the relationship between self, mind, and brain by analyzing passages 
in which all three of those concepts or entities were discussed. 
 Exemplary of his self-mind-brain integration was Cozolino’s depiction of the 
relationship between the right hemisphere of the brain, the “unconscious” mind, and 
physical and emotional aspects of self. Cozolino did not define mind and he seemed to 
focus primarily on the relationship between self and brain rather than the relationship 
between all three concepts. In one exemplary passage (see Appendix A, p. 311) he 
included direct reference to mind, self, and brain. It was a good illustration of how 
Cozolino depicted the human brain as the interpreter of context and the source of self, 
while using the concept of mind primarily to illustrate how certain aspects of human 
experience that have typically been discussed in psychological theories (such as the 
unconscious in psychoanalytic theory) are actually localized in the brain. In that passage 
mind was portrayed as an antiquated term, as Cozolino used the phrase “the unconscious 
mind” (p. 97) to refer to how one region of the human brain exerts control over 
perception and judgment and connects emotions and physicality to the experience of self. 
This passage fit with Cozolino’s general strategy of focusing on the brain alongside 
descriptions of human experience while requiring that readers infer arguments about the 
relationship between mind and self through his portrayals of those concepts. This 
ultimately seemed to perpetuate a reductionist view of human being that not only failed to 
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account for the historical and philosophical differences between the study of mind and 
the study of brain, but served to promote a discourse about humans based on fusing 
neurobiological terms with human experiences and dismissing the use of mind as a 
concept that is central to valuing subjective conscious experience. In other words, this 
passage exemplifies the type of cognitive neuroscience discourse that Tallis (2004) 
cautioned could be challenge to the existence of psychology. 
 Neurobiological mechanisms of effective psychotherapy. In this section I 
identify some of the neurobiological mechanisms of effective psychotherapy that 
Cozolino discussed throughout his book.  
 The ability to alter gene expression. According to Cozolino, experience-
dependent gene expression explains neural plasticity or how the structures and functions 
of the human brain develop based on the qualities of the early childhood environment and 
retain malleability which enables neurobiological and psychological change during later 
interpersonal relationships or experiences such as psychotherapy (see also Neural 
plasticity, below). Cozolino explained that the adaptability of the human brain in 
response to context is possible because the way in which certain genes are expressed is 
not predetermined, but instead emerge based on context and experience. According to 
Cozolino psychotherapy can “reprogram” (p. 65) or alter certain brain structures in order 
to create or restore health because the brain adapts to social and physical environments. 
This underlying argument for human selfhood and change showed a genomic 
understanding of human beings while offering hope for proving the existence of human 
agency and self-directness through confirmatory neuroscience research. This fits with a 
biomedicalized understanding of self I discussed in Chapter I.  
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 Neural plasticity. The adaptability or plasticity of the human brain was central to 
Cozolino’s explanation for the effectiveness of psychotherapy. According to Cozolino, 
human change is a process of learning and adaptation enabled by neural plasticity or the 
capacity of neurons to connect, expand, and form in accordance with human experience. 
This premise connected individuals to their broader contexts through brain functioning, 
thereby naturalizing the moral discourse of change, improvement, adaptability, and 
psychological healing. 
 Neural integration. According to Cozolino, successful psychotherapy or 
psychological healing corresponds with neural integration or newly formed connectivity 
within the brain. He provided examples of neural integration including integration 
between left and right hemispheres, enhancing executive functions, and inhibiting the 
activity of the amygdala. These passages (see Appendix A, pp. 312-313) highlighted 
Cozolino’s use of neuroscience as evidence for a common factors approach to 
psychotherapy integration, that is, an understanding of the curative elements shared 
across various psychotherapies that are well established as effective psychological 
treatments. In these passages he described all successful psychotherapies as facilitating 
neural integration in the brains of therapy patients. Elsewhere he described how neural 
integration is fostered by each of the established common factors central to his 
psychotherapy integration (see Psychological mechanisms that enable neurobiological 
mechanisms of effective therapy to occur, pp. 155-157). He furthermore listed 
psychological symptoms and broad categories of abnormal behavior that have been 
“linked to deficits” (p. 106) in integration between the left and right hemispheres of the 
brain. With that claim, Cozolino did not specify whether deficits in neural integration are 
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believed to cause, result from, or simply co-occur with these psychological symptoms. In 
one passage he explained that a formerly narrow localized understanding of executive 
functions has been replaced by an understanding that brain functioning is best understood 
as integration between its many processes and regions. As an example of this he 
described how brain research validates an understanding of emotions and rational 
decision-making as not entirely separable from each other. This seemed to be a slightly 
updated localization theory that is only slightly less decontextualized.  
 New learning alters the effects of memories on psychological functioning or 
subjective experience. Cozolino suggested that memories are “encoded” (p. 16) or stored 
in the brain, and psychotherapy often alleviates symptoms or distress by reducing the 
impact of distressing or traumatic memories on later subjective experience. Cozolino 
used this link between memory and psychotherapy as evidence for why psychotherapy is 
a brain-based intervention. His statements were noteworthy because he specified a direct 
relationship between the brain and conscious experience. He identified neural firing 
patterns as first “sculpted by experience” (p. 16) before they are able to produce 
“organized patterns of behavior and experience” (p. 16), thereby positing directionality 
between mind and brain instead of simply providing a nonspecific description of 
correlation. With these passages Cozolino described the process of modifying patients’ 
reactions to memories as an essential psychological mechanism by which psychotherapy 
may be effective in reducing distress and changing the functioning of a patient’s brain. In 
one noteworthy passage, after stating that the flexibility of memory is “an observable 
manifestation” (p. 89) of neural plasticity because memory is encoded within or between 
neurons, he used this as evidence that psychotherapy is a direct intervention on the 
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human brain. These passages suggested an effort to depict individuals and personal 
history as tangible and manifested in an observable form, thereby verifying nonmaterial 
existence and explaining how it is physically alterable. These passages promulgated a 
view of human beings as configured through a neurobiological selfhood and connected to 
their broader environments and other people through the organ of the brain that functions 
outside of conscious control yet may respond to human volition in a way that enables 
human agency.  
 Psychological mechanisms that enable neurobiological mechanisms of effective 
therapy to occur. In this section I survey the broadest aspects of psychological 
experience that Cozolino claimed directly activate the neurobiological mechanisms I 
discussed in the previous section. Specific therapy interventions and other 
recommendations seemed to emerge from these broad psychological mechanisms, and I 
discuss those in the next section. 
 Four general conditions common to successful psychotherapies. Cozolino argued 
that four common factors—safety and trust in the therapy relationship, appropriate 
amounts of stress, the use of both emotion and cognition, and creating new narratives—
are required for psychotherapy to be effective. He stated that neural change and 
integration is the marker of success for every psychotherapy, and he then asserted that 
neural integration is “enhanced” (p. 25) by these four psychological mechanisms. The 
purpose of therapy was therefore depicted through descriptions of processes that alter 
neurobiological mechanisms.  
 Language and narrative. Above I discussed how Cozolino identified language 
and narrative as defining features of self, and he described how these human abilities 
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provide a link between the experience of self and the functioning of the brain. Cozolino 
also identified narrative and specific types of narrative or uses of language as significant 
for psychotherapy and neural integration. He portrayed narrative as a primary means by 
which therapists collaborate with patients in order to assist them with developing new 
thoughts and behaviors, and he depicted narrative as a primary psychological mechanism 
by which neural integration is activated. These statements were significant because he 
described narrative as the means by which whatever was previously unconscious or 
outside of a patient’s awareness becomes conscious and leads to changes in self. 
According to Cozolino, narrative leads to increases in self-reflection and self-awareness. 
He argued that this process may allow patients to appraise thoughts in ways that expand 
choice and separate themselves from social expectations or expectations of other people 
that might previously have appeared inflexible and prevented greater self-directedness. 
According to Cozolino, self-reflective language integrates thoughts and emotions in a 
way that may eventually foster a depth of understanding that facilitates a meditative state, 
that is, a higher level of consciousness wherein a patient can “move beyond words”  
(p. 171). It was unclear what that phrase meant but it seemed to imply some feeling or 
experience of transcendence. In this way narrative was portrayed as a mechanized tool 
that alters the brain and makes changes to psychological functioning that are potentially 
permanent. This was a technicized and reductionist use of the concept of narrative.  
 Create a nurturing and supportive therapeutic relationship that facilitates secure 
attachment. Cozolino argued that the therapy relationship itself guides gene expression in 
a healthful way that confers psychological change, thereby positioning this relationship as 
an instrument capable of activating the neurophysiological processes he identified as 
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necessary for psychological change. This focus on the therapy relationship might appear 
to challenge technicized ways of conducting therapy. However, it may instead perpetuate 
instrumentalism or a technicized understanding of therapy practices by appealing to the 
possible effects of human interconnectedness on the brain. This seems contrary to an 
understanding that the relationship itself is a way of understanding human psychology 
beyond the internalized physical effects to which interpersonal experiences are allegedly 
reducible.  
 An appropriate amount of stress helps patients learn to regulate their own affect. 
Cozolino described successful psychotherapy as requiring a balance between challenging 
and supporting patients in order to establish an ideal setting for new learning and affect 
regulation. Cozolino mapped the combination of supportive and challenging conditions in 
therapy onto the human brain. He described this process as activating neural processing 
and allowing a patient to internalize the stability of a therapist, sharing the therapist’s 
capacity for self-regulation while the patient works to develop those abilities in order to 
use them independent of the assistance of others. This was an example of a brain-to-brain 
depiction of affect regulation and social selfhood.  
 Overall, these psychological principles were technicized as conditions that 
activate desired brain changes believed to be the underlying mechanisms of 
psychological change rather than unique or important experiences or ways of knowing 
that are separate from the physical correlates of the psychological and interpersonal 
processes.  
 How therapists should provide psychotherapy. In this section I highlight some of 
the specific psychotherapy interventions that Cozolino recommended. 
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 Common interventions across established psychotherapy models that stimulate 
neuroplasticity. In two exemplary passages (see Appendix A, pp. 316-317) Cozolino 
listed examples of psychotherapy interventions. These lists present very brief and general 
descriptions of a variety of typical therapy interventions. He argued that these therapy 
strategies or techniques all stimulate patients’ brains in ways that lead to neural 
integration. This was an example of a casual appeal to neuroscience as validation for 
therapy integration and the understanding amongst many therapists that over the course 
of therapy with any one patient, a therapist might incorporate a variety of strategies that 
at one point were traceable to specific paradigms yet now may be identified as part of a 
generalist psychotherapy approach. This reduced a psychotherapy trend that developed 
over many years (and which also has cultural, historical, and economic factors) to a 
simple explanation for the convergence of therapy interventions as an inevitable result of 
the functioning or needs of the brain.  
 Consider how the brain distorts thinking and listen for what is not being talked 
about. Cozolino argued that the brain generates and distorts each patient’s perception of 
reality, and he recommended that therapists remember this and even inform patients 
about this in order to provide evidence that their difficulties may stem from beliefs that 
are inaccurate. He argued that conscious thoughts or mental processes are products of the 
“left hemisphere interpreter” (p. 111), that is, the function of the left hemisphere of the 
brain he described as actively choosing for an individual how he or she presents himself 
or herself to other people. Cozolino used this understanding of brain functioning to 
suggest that the process of identifying a patient’s dissociated experiences leads to an 
integration of those experiences into consciousness, while also facilitating integration 
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between brain hemispheres. In other words, pairing psychotherapy concepts with brain 
regions allowed Cozolino to portray neural and psychological integration as simultaneous 
processes.  
 Attribute psychological symptoms to the brain or body in order to depathologize 
them and to engender a sense of control for patients. Cozolino suggested that therapists 
might build rapport and engender a sense of egalitarianism in the therapy relationship by 
discussing how they share with patients the same potential for imperfections or 
difficulties because they are also endowed, as all humans are, with a brain that distorts 
reality. In this way patients might see difficulties and challenges as common occurrences 
and feel relief after recognizing that their troubling experiences are not unique. Although 
this recommendation was mentioned infrequently, it is significant to note because it 
showed how Cozolino recommended directly incorporating a discussion of brain research 
into the psychotherapy discourse, therefore illustrating the claims about self perpetuated 
by a therapy discussion about the brain in accordance with his recommendation.  
 Identify the congruence between a patient’s cognition and affect. Cozolino 
suggested that recognizing the fit between a patient’s thoughts and feelings is a way to 
identify the extent of that patient’s neural integration. He attributed the capacity for 
conscious narrative to the left hemisphere of the brain and he attributed nonverbal 
communication or affect to the right hemisphere, thereby portraying the effort to facilitate 
congruence between thought and affect as an exercise in brain hemisphere integration. 
This is an example of mapping onto the brain a cultural narrative or moral discourse that 
describes a balanced or self-controlled manner in which a person should interact with 
other people and live and work effectively. In other words, Cozolino appealed to a 
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fascination with the brain to naturalize an understanding of modern social norms and the 
good.  
 Using narratives in a way that puts feelings into words and engenders emotional 
regulation and a sense of control. Cozolino argued that accurately identifying feelings 
and consciously rewriting stories about personal history builds self-efficacy, and enables 
desired changes and healing in psychotherapy. He suggested helping patients as they 
create narratives that contain a more “objective” (p. 161) understanding of whatever 
issues are being discussed. These passages were noteworthy for how Cozolino depicted 
the brain as creating a flexible self and the ability to change in accordance with personal 
goals or aspirations (suggesting a subjective interpretation of reality), while paradoxically 
also providing an objectively verifiable neural location of those attributes. This appeal to 
a belief in the objectivity of science to validate human subjectivity in a highly reductive 
and technicized way seemed to fit with the dichotomy between inner subjectivity and 
external material reality that was central to early modern philosophy. 
 Make interpretations, analyze projection, and discuss whatever is dissociated or 
not being talked about. Some of Cozolino’s therapy recommendations drew from a 
psychoanalytic approach re-envisioned as a brain intervention. In one passage Cozolino 
asserted that patients reorganize their brains through becoming aware of unconscious 
experiences that result from the functioning of “hidden layers” (p. 138) in the brain that 
distort the perception of reality and lead to biases and irrational ways of thinking. 
Cozolino described typical changes in affect when a patient is confronted with 
unconscious or dissociated aspects of his or her experience, thus beginning “to fully 
experience the emotions against which he or she was defending” (p. 295). In other words, 
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Cozolino highlighted interventions intended to expose thoughts that patients are 
defending against or avoiding, and he incorporated these therapeutic strategies into his 
brain-based therapy theory.  
 In general, with all of the passages advising therapist how to practice 
psychotherapy, broad and longstanding psychotherapy theories were first reduced to 
obvious technical interventions and then repurposed according to their brain-changing 
capabilities. 
 Indicators of successful psychotherapy outcomes. In this section I identify 
psychotherapy outcomes that Cozolino considered to be desirable and therefore indicative 
of therapy efficacy or success. 
 Neural integration. Although neural change is not observable without 
neuroimaging, the argument that neural plasticity allows therapy to activate the brain in 
ways that support neural integration was ubiquitous throughout Cozolino’s book. As I 
noted earlier, Cozolino predicted that psychotherapy will begin to routinely include 
neuroimaging as a part of treatment planning, case conceptualization, and outcome 
assessment (see Differences between Cozolino’s theory and established psychotherapy 
theories, pp. 121-127). He also acknowledged that neuroimaging studies of 
psychotherapy patients had not been conducted with patients seeking therapy for general 
life problems rather than diagnosable mental illness (see also General reasons why 
people seek psychotherapy, pp. 129-132). Cozolino therefore portrayed neuroscience as a 
source of objective proof of psychotherapy’s efficacy and of the mechanisms through 
which therapy is beneficial, but he noted that for some patient populations this remains 
speculative.  
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 Less dissociation or greater integration. Cozolino used the concepts of 
dissociation and integration in descriptions of both psychological and neurobiological 
processes. At times he seemed to depict psychological and neurobiological integration as 
concurrent processes, and at other times Cozolino implied a direct or causal relationship 
between neural integration and psychological integration or coherent human experience. 
For example, in one passage (see Appendix A, p. 322), Cozolino described the 
integration of psychological aspects of human functioning such as thoughts and behaviors 
as “an active neurobiological process" (Cozolino, p. 21). However, there he provided no 
direct evidence supporting that assertion or its implication that psychological experience 
emerges from human neurobiological processes. Cozolino’s use of the concept of 
integration across psychological and neuroscientific descriptions of functioning and 
wellbeing ultimately confused and conflated separate epistemologies or ways of 
understanding human beings. 
 Symptom reduction. Cozolino recognized that some theories identify the purpose 
of psychotherapy as an effort to reduce or alleviate specific psychological symptoms. He 
implied that this description of a successful therapy outcome is equal to other theories’ 
descriptions of the purpose of psychotherapy (such as differentiation or ego strength) 
because all of those are interpretations of the same neural change. In other words, he used 
this indicator of successful therapy to argue that therapy theories offer quite different 
interpretations of the same objective truth that brain research best articulates.    
 Affect regulation. According to Cozolino, affect regulation is closely tied to 
secure attachment and a cohesive sense of self (see Secure attachment below). In one 
statement he proposed that affect regulation is “the most important result” (p. 47) of 
 163 
therapy because psychological integration (coherence amongst various mental and 
physical processes essential for mental health) is impossible without it.  
 Secure attachment. Cozolino described the psychotherapy relationship as 
activating the brain’s innate drive for communication and social interaction in a way that 
helps patients develop a secure attachment style. Cozolino described secure attachment as 
synonymous with the ability to appropriately engage with other people in ways that help 
regulate emotions and exert conscious control over psychological and physiological 
reactivity.  
 Ego strength and higher-order defenses. Tenets of psychoanalytic or 
psychodynamic therapies were prominent in Cozolino’s book, and in some passages 
Cozolino used psychoanalytic concepts to describe successful psychotherapy. For 
example, he described the quality and characteristics of an individual’s functioning as 
dependent upon, or indicated by which defenses are used, rather than whether defenses 
are used, thereby implying that psychological defenses are indispensible in human life. In 
another passage, secure attachment and ego strength were combined as measures of 
psychological wellbeing that he described as coinciding with more adaptive 
psychological defenses (for passages, see Appendix A, p. 323).  
 Self-reflective language. According to Cozolino, self-reflective language is 
indicative of an increased capacity for self-awareness and understanding, and suggestive 
of positive changes in psychological functioning. Elsewhere in his book he described 
self-reflective language as an important indicator of healthy psychological development 
and the emergence of self, and he implied that therapy may serve as a corrective 
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intervention for patients whose parents or caregivers did not facilitate the development of 
this type of language during early childhood. 
 Earned autonomy and avoiding pathological caretaking of others. According to 
Cozolino, appropriate psychological separateness and boundaries with other people 
(especially family members) are indicative of psychological health. Further, these 
qualities would ideally have developed during childhood through parenting that 
adequately respected this developmental need. He described a lack of autonomy between 
a child and his or her parents as a cause of the tendency to form relationships later in life 
in which the emotional needs of others is placed above one’s own emotional needs. The 
values of independence and self-directedness were essential to Cozolino’s understanding 
of self or ideal development and functioning.  
 In sum, Cozolino supported a variety of ways to identify therapy success that 
represented the tenets of several psychotherapy theories and a variety of interpretations of 
mental health and wellbeing. This probably served to maintain a broad appeal for his text, 
and incorporating a variety of indicators of psychological functioning seemed to further 
repurpose a multitude of therapy theories as unknowingly describing the same underlying 
neuroscientific phenomena or material truth. This is also an explanation for the popularity 
of his work.  
 Case vignettes from Cozolino’s psychotherapy practice. I located 13 case 
vignettes throughout Cozolino’s book, nine of which described his outpatient 
psychotherapy treatment of individual adult patients (of note, one of those nine cases 
involved a patient whom Cozolino had treated for one month in a hospital setting with 
individual and group therapy, and it was unclear whether the patient attended more than 
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one outpatient therapy session because that case vignette was brief and it was used to 
explain symptoms of Capgras syndrome (a serious mental disorder) rather than a course 
of treatment). With the remaining four vignettes, one described psychotherapy with a 
child patient, one described psychological assessment and treatment recommendations 
with a child rather than psychotherapy, one depicted family therapy with an adult brain 
injury survivor that involved cognitive rehabilitation strategies such as education about 
head injuries and support during a transition to appropriate community services (such as 
vocational rehabilitation), and one described a single consultation session with a patient 
experiencing severe flashbacks of childhood trauma in which Cozolino unexpectedly 
performed a crisis intervention. The vignettes were dispersed throughout the book and 
ranged from approximately two to six pages in length, with almost all of them being less 
than three pages long. In this section I examine two of Cozolino’s psychotherapy case 
vignettes. I provide the demographics of each patient and I outline the presenting problem 
and course of treatment that Cozolino described. The purpose of this section is to 
examine the ways in which these case vignettes illustrate some of his broader 
understandings about human psychology and recommendations for conceptualizing and 
treating psychological problems. I selected these vignettes because they were 
representative of some of his general understandings about self, illness, and change. 
 Sandy. Sandy, a patient in her mid-40s, sought treatment for “the usual concerns 
about relationships, family, and career” (p. 148). After some initial therapy sessions 
Cozolino realized that Sandy experienced intermittent depressive episodes characterized 
by irritability and feelings of hopelessness. He spent time trying to discover a possible 
genetic, medical, lifestyle, or developmental origin of these episodes, but he eventually 
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recognized a behavior cycle wherein Sandy’s mood swings tended to precede recurring 
sinus infections. In an attempt to relieve Sandy’s anxiety and feelings of self-doubt, and 
to help her create a narrative about the origins of her mood swings and practice 
behavioral changes to avert them, Cozolino attributed the mood swings to her pattern of 
physical symptoms.  
 We decided to anticipate her next dip in mood with a new plan. We agreed that 
 she would stop evaluating her life on days that she lost her will to live. She was 
 not allowed to think about leaving her husband or her job, or assess her worth as a 
 person. Instead, the mood dip would be a cue for her to go to the health food 
 store, buy vitamin C and zinc tablets, and rearrange her schedule to reduce stress. 
 . . . Sandy had to remain mindful of the possibility that what she experienced as 
 negative emotions was really a result of biological changes related to a physical 
 illness and not a collapse of character or impending global catastrophe. We 
 worked on developing a safe internal place for her to retreat to at these times, 
 where she could soothe and comfort herself and focus on healing. Over time, the 
 association between sinus infections and mood changes held up—we had created 
 a new narrative with far more explanatory power than the one it replaced. For 
 some unknown reason, Sandy’s biochemistry reacted to infection with a sharp 
 drop in mood, most likely related to drops in serotonin and dopamine. The 
 psychological depression experienced as a result of these changes led her to 
 reinterpret, in a negative way, the value of all aspects of her existence. By being 
 mindful of this process and using her frontal and parietal executive functions to 
 associate experiences with new meanings, she was able to engage in different 
 behaviors and create a better outcome. We had converted what usually led to an 
 existential crisis into a trigger for enhanced self-awareness, self-care, and medical 
 management. Sandy needed to learn how to pay attention to her feelings, reflect 
 on them with past experiences in mind, and follow a new plan of action contrary 
 to old reflective patterns. (pp. 149-150) 
 
 Cozolino speculated that Sandy’s depressive episodes were caused by 
neurochemical changes that accompanied sinus infections, and he also stated that this 
physiological explanation might not have been supported by established medical theory. 
With his case formulation he disregarded any psychological or psychosocial origin for his 
patient’s depression, favoring instead whatever physiological explanation was plausible. 
He incorporated his preferred psychoanalytic theory of the emergence of self 
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(encouraging Sandy to develop “a safe internal place for her to retreat”) into a behavioral 
approach that focused on improvements in practical coping skills to reduce the 
occurrence of mood swings rather than helping Sandy understand the possible 
significance of her thoughts and emotions during depressive episodes. It was noteworthy 
that Cozolino discounted the possibility that Sandy’s thoughts and impulses during her 
depressive episodes might in fact be related to unmet needs, legitimate concerns, or 
difficulties with her family or other aspects of her life. Cozolino replaced psychological 
insight with information about how the interactions between neurobiological and other 
physical processes might cause symptoms of depression. His preferred explanation 
suggested that if physical processes can be identified as the cause of psychological 
symptoms, then the symptoms should be explained as such and treatment should proceed 
accordingly. His justification for this approach was that the narrative he created was 
helpful for explaining symptoms and providing implementable solutions.  
 Sheldon. Sheldon, a Holocaust survivor in his late 60s, sought treatment for “his 
many anxieties and fears” (p. 89). His family members perished during the genocide 
while he survived in hiding.  
 As a child, his parents had hidden him from the Nazis in a storage room behind 
 the home of family friends. . . . Describing these days, Sheldon recalled 
 alternating states of terror and boredom, during which he would either sit and rock 
 or ride his tricycle around in slow tight circles. . . . 60 years later, he still found 
 himself reflexively rocking or walking in small slow circles when he became 
 frightened. His life felt like one long, fear-filled day. (pp. 89-90) 
 
 Cozolino intervened by asking Sheldon to imagine that as a child he had been able 
to escape from his confinement on his tricycle rather than having ridden it in circles in the 
storage room where he was forced to hide during the war. 
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 One day, I asked him for permission to change his memories just a bit. . . . I asked 
 him, “What would you do if this was a magic tricycle and it could take you 
 through walls without getting hurt?”. . . . Sheldon said, “I would ride right 
 through the house and out onto the sidewalk”. . . . I felt that an imaginative task 
 like this was not only accessible to him but would also serve the purpose of 
 bridging the positive affect from his grandchildren to his lonely and frightened 
 experiences as a child. Imagining he was making up the story for his 
 grandchildren might also help him cope with the embarrassment of doing this 
 with another adult. (p. 90) 
 
 Over the next few months, whenever Sheldon experienced his childhood fears and 
 anxieties, we would revisit his story and modify different details. These changes 
 seemed to grow more detailed and more vivid in his mind. His imagination gave 
 him the power to master many of his past fears. . . . Sheldon was a very special 
 man who was able to take advantage of the malleability of memory to make his 
 inner world a safer place. Nothing had changed about his childhood except that 
 now, when he remembered his hiding place, he also remembered his magic 
 tricycle. (p. 91) 
 
 With his creative exercise Cozolino helped Sheldon practice coping with 
symptoms of trauma-related anxiety by pairing elements of the traumatic memories with 
an imagined escape from his forced hiding during childhood. Cozolino used this 
imaginative activity in order to illustrate how psychological reactions to anxiety-
provoking memories are alterable because of the plasticity of the brain in which the 
memories are stored. This vignette was striking. In the description of his treatment of 
Sheldon’s psychological trauma Cozolino never discussed Sheldon’s experience as a 
member of a major religious group that was targeted for total eradication. Sheldon’s 
experience of trauma was described as a curable set of materialized symptoms rather than 
a part of his cultural heritage that may have been exacerbated by acculturation stressors 
during resettlement in the United States. Culturally sensitive and relevant psychotherapy 
for psychological trauma following ethnic persecution might have included a discussion 
of whether Sheldon sought sanctuary amidst his religious community in the United 
 169 
States, and why he might or might not have experienced such religious and community 
involvement as helpful. 
 The two case vignettes discussed above were exemplary of some of the recurring 
therapy recommendations and general themes in Cozolino’s book. In the first vignette, 
Cozolino alluded to his preferred psychoanalytic theory of the development of the self 
when suggesting that his patient, Sandy, needed to learn to cope with depression by 
spending time alone to develop a safe, “internal” place to turn to during stress. He placed 
that recommendation alongside behavioral changes that seemed to dismiss the importance 
of the patient using her difficulties with mood to learn about herself or to evaluate the 
context in which those symptoms emerged. His case conceptualization relied on a 
possible behavior cycle that Cozolino admitted might be tenuous, and his subsequent 
treatment approach dismissed any relational or depth-oriented course of therapy. With 
Cozolino’s treatment of Sheldon, his creative role-play intervention decontextualized that 
patient’s history of surviving genocide, reducing it from an experience shared by millions 
of people with the same religious history to isolated symptoms portrayed as curable by 
imagining a different personal history. His approach with both cases rested on a brain-
based explanation for why creating a new way of thinking and talking about a situation 
can lead to a reduction in presenting symptoms.  
 Summary of primary content. In The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing 
the Social Brain, Cozolino (2010) used the origin myth that psychotherapy originated 
from neurology to portray his text as an inevitable return Freud’s intended brain-based 
explanations of human psychological experience or mind now that neuroimaging 
technology has advanced quite remarkably. This suggested an attempt to argue that the 
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concept mind (especially as delineated in psychoanalytic theory) has been a historical 
placeholder for brain functioning rather than a culturally significant and very different 
understanding of human selfhood than the reductionist understanding of mind often 
associated with cognitive neuroscience. Cozolino described traditional therapy theories in 
terms of their proposed underlying neural correlates, and he stated that rather than an 
original psychotherapy theory, his text was intended as an integration of the common 
factors of the most well-known therapy theories based on the understanding that all 
effective therapies foster neural integration. Passages defining mind and self, and 
depicting a relationship between mind, self, and brain, were noteworthy for their 
generally unclear (and altogether infrequent) use of the concept of mind aside from the 
assertion that Freud’s tripartite theory of mind can be thought to represent three parts of 
the human brain that have evolved over the course of human history. Although 
Cozolino’s text incorporated a wide array of psychotherapy concepts, psychoanalytic 
concepts were especially represented in discussions of self, therapy interventions, and 
indicators of successful therapy outcomes, and those concepts were often mapped on the 
brain. For example, he described the experience of the self as the extent of neural 
integration. Cozolino’s case vignettes often used descriptions of brain functioning to 
justify the efficacy of an assortment of talk therapy interventions. The vignettes I 
reviewed showed Cozolino’s use of creative role-play exercises, as well as attributing 
psychological symptoms to physiological processes rather than a combination of 
personality characteristics and psychosocial stressors. Throughout my interpretations of 
passages related to these primary content categories, I noted ways in which Cozolino’s 
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text was often reductionist and scientistic, and based on ahistorical and materialized 
claims about human mind or self. 
Rhetorical Strategies and Elements of Writing Style 
 In this section I provide examples of rhetorical strategies or devices in Cozolino’s 
(2010) text. I primarily reference the Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms (Baldick, 
2008) in my descriptions of these devices and strategies.  
 Ambiguity. Ambiguity refers to statements that may be interpreted in two or 
more distinct ways, or statements for which the meaning in general was unclear. 
Examining ambiguous statements was important for revealing how Cozolino’s rhetoric 
might have led readers to confuse or conflate separate concepts because he did not 
sufficiently differentiate them. Ambiguity in a mind-brain integration project is also 
significant because this rhetoric blurs psychology and neuroscience, thereby equating 
them through obscured sentence structure and word choice rather than clear supportive 
evidence.  
 Statements that were unclear about the directionality or relationship between 
mind and brain. In the following statements it was unclear whether Cozolino intended to 
portray mind or human volition as initiating changes in neurobiology, or if he intended to 
portray the brain as influencing or controlling human psychology. 
 “The ebb and flow of emotion over the course of therapy reflects the underlying 
 neural rhythms of growth and change” (p. 46). 
 
 In this passage it was unclear whether “neural rhythms” cause changes in emotion 
or whether emotions and neural rhythms are co-occurring phenomena. In other words, 
Cozolino did not specify the relationship between the brain and human experience.  
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 The following two passages also contained phrases that caused ambiguity about 
the relationship between mind and brain.  
 These processes of mind, which insecurely attached children often lack, reflect 
 the utilization of narratives in the development of self and self-identity. They also 
 point to a more sophisticated ability to metacognize (think about thinking), that 
 represents a high level of neurolinguistic self-regulation. (p. 208) 
 
 “The popularity of this game reflects the development of these systems as well as 
 a way to exercise voluntary control over impulses” (p. 130). 
 
 In these passages, the phrases “point to,” “represents,” and “reflects” were 
seemingly used to describe a relationship between mind and brain but the specific 
relationship or order between psychological and neurobiological processes was unclear.  
 In the passages above, readers are left to either assume the correct relationship 
between mind and brain, or to simply conflate the two processes if they appear to be 
simultaneous.  
 Statements in which it was unclear whether Cozolino intended to describe an 
animal or a human. Throughout his book, Cozolino described animal experiments for 
which findings were portrayed as relevant for human psychology and neuroscience. 
However, in some passages it was unclear whether he attempted to use those experiments 
to draw a conclusion about humans.  
 Mother rats lick, nurse, and retrieve their pups when they roll out of the nest. 
 These three behaviors are easily observed and counted by willing undergraduates, 
 and correlated with behavioral and biological variables in the brains of both 
 mothers and children. (p. 217) 
 
 Here it was unclear whether “behavioral and biological variables in the brains of 
both mothers and children” was intended to refer to human mothers and children or rat 
mothers and children.  
 173 
 “Even virgin rats who are given pups to care for experience increased dendritic 
 growth and neuronal excitation. . . . Thus, just as in children, interpersonal contact 
 changes the brains of parents” (pp. 224-225).  
 
 Here it was unclear whether Cozolino intended to conclude that human children 
and parents or rat children and parents experience brain changes through interpersonal 
contact. 
 Because it was unclear whether the conclusions in those passages were intended 
to apply to animals or humans, it was unknowable whether Cozolino intended to infer, 
accurately explain, or speculate about the relevance of animal neurobiology to the 
understanding of human functioning.  
 Statements in which it was unclear whether Cozolino intended to describe 
humans or brains. These statements were noteworthy for ambiguity that might cause 
readers to conflate the concept of self or personhood with the brain.  
 Only through trial-and-error learning are early clumsy movements slowly shaped 
 into functional skills. Children and their brains intuitively know this and will 
 resist being held back or helped too much. When we attempt to help, a child’s 
 impatient protest of “Let me do it!” reflects instinctual wisdom of the importance 
 of trial and error learning in the growth of neural networks. (p. 69)  
 
 It was unclear whether “instinctual wisdom of the importance of trial and error 
learning in the growth of neural networks” was intended to imply that children possess 
instinctual wisdom about the brain’s need to have growth of neural networks, or, that 
instinctual wisdom is stored within neural networks and therefore activated by the growth 
of those networks. Further, if Cozolino’s intention was to describe instinctual wisdom of 
children, then it was unclear whether he posited that a child has innate wisdom from the 
brain about the way the brain needs to grow, or that a child has wisdom about how he or 
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she needs to grow, and therefore the growth of neural networks is simply spurred by the 
child’s subsequent actions. 
 The exploration of human consciousness is a vast new frontier for neuroscience 
 where there may always be more questions than answers. We know consciousness 
 exists; we just have no idea of how it emerges from the functioning of the brain. 
 An inherent challenge to this exploration will always be the conflict of interest 
 involved when something is studying itself with all the bias and distortion that 
 interferes with objective observation. There is no easy way around this. (p. 150) 
 
 The phrase “when something is studying itself” could imply that the brain is 
studying itself through directing humans to study it, or it might imply that humans are 
studying themselves through studying the brain.  
 Consider what we do when we assist clients in shifting their own perspective to 
 looking at a situation from another point of view, to thinking about the situation 
 once again from a more objective perspective. We are calling upon the ompfc and 
 dlpfc in different ways as we attempt to guide them to a more holistic perspective 
 of a life situation. (p. 161) 
 
 It was unclear whether therapists “guide” clients or guide the two regions of the 
brain (“ompfc and dlpfc”). 
 An exaggerated reliance on intellectual defenses, overemotionality, or a negative 
 attachment experience can become established as self-perpetuating patterns that 
 lead to social isolation and underperformance. All of these suboptimal lifestyles 
 are most likely reflected in biased patterns of neural activation, which become the 
 focus of psychotherapy. (p. 163)  
 
 It was unclear whether “suboptimal lifestyles” or “biased patterns of neural 
activation” become the focus of psychotherapy.    
 “When verbal interactions include references to sensations, feelings, behaviors, 
 and knowledge, they provide a medium through which the child’s brain is able to 
 integrate the various aspects of its experience in a coherent manner” (p. 207).  
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 In that statement it was unclear whether the phrase “various aspects of its 
experience” was meant to imply various aspects of the child’s experience or various 
aspects of the brain’s experience. 
 Like the attachment system described earlier, the development of this engagement 
 system and the fine-tuning of the vagal brake to regulate affect appear to depend 
 on the quality of attachment relationships in early childhood. This allows us to 
 internalize what we learn from experience with caretakers into moment-to-
 moment somatic regulation. (p. 234).  
 
 It is unclear whether the “development of this engagement system,” the “fine-
tuning of the vagal brake to regulate affect,” the “quality of attachment relationships,” or 
some combination of all three enables individuals to “internalize” whatever is learned 
from experience.  
 Ambiguity in the passages above was noteworthy because readers may interpret 
the focus of psychotherapy as the brain rather than the patient, and neurobiological and 
psychological concepts may be read as interchangeable. This obfuscated the purpose of 
psychotherapy, as well as the differences between theories that typically have focused on 
explaining the concept of mind and those explaining the functioning of the brain. Further, 
a lack of clarity could create suggestibility about the relationship between mind and 
brain, and detract from readers considering how the everyday understanding that a person 
is integrated mentally and physically does not translate easily into integrating distinct 
psychological and neuroscientific methods of inquiry. 
 Analogy. An analogy is a comparison between two sets of phenomena that is 
based on a logical argument (rather than a figure of speech such as metaphor that 
compares unrelated objects or concepts based on a similar quality and often in an 
illustrative fashion; see p. 206 below). Cozolino used analogy to compare various human 
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endeavors or types of relationships, often by asserting that the same neurobiological 
processes underlie both relationships. The use of neuroscience as a tool for explaining the 
interdependence of valued social institutions was noteworthy for how it overlooked 
longstanding and shared cultural traditions that those institutions embody. 
 The theory that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny refers to the concept that the 
 evolution of the species is recreated in the gestation and development of each 
 individual. To use Maclean’s terms, we pass through the reptilian and 
 paleomammalian stages before we develop into a fully human being. (p. 8) 
 
 In this passage Cozolino compared the evolution of the human species to the 
lifespan development of each individual on the basis that both processes manifest an 
incremental progression or maturing of the human brain. He implied that the phases of 
personal development are accelerated versions of the epochs in which humans gradually 
evolved from lower life forms to the dominant yet civilized species characteristic of its 
current form.  
 At the heart of the interface between neuroscience and psychotherapy is the fact 
 that human experience is mediated via two interacting processes. The first is the 
 expression of our evolutionary past via the organization, development, and 
 functioning of the nervous system. . . . The second is the contemporary shaping of 
 our neural architecture within the context of relationships. (p. 12) 
 
 In the passage above, Cozolino turned the analogy between evolution and lifespan 
development into the central component of his brain-based psychotherapy book. In the 
following passage he used analogy to compare brain and self. 
 We have equated psychological health with optimal neural network growth and 
 integration. Both the brain and the self are built in a stepwise manner by 
 experience. The nervous system is made up of millions of neurons while human 
 experience is constructed within countless moments of learning. (p. 31) 
 
 In this passage Cozolino compared the relationship between the nervous system 
and neurons to the relationship between human experience and the single moments that 
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comprise it, on the basis that the nervous system and human experience are both very 
complex and constructed from large numbers of their smaller components. Cozolino did 
not propose a specific relationship between self and brain in this passage, and the strategy 
of analogy enabled him to use a comparison between human psychological and 
neurobiological development to portray a relationship between brain and self without 
specifying how the concepts are directly related. 
 Neuroscientists already possess the perfect model for understanding 
 interdependency—the individual neuron. We know that neither the individual 
 neuron nor the single human being exist in nature. Without mutually stimulating 
 interactions, people and neurons wither and die. In neurons, this process is called 
 apoptosis, while in humans, it is called anaclitic depression. (p. 179) 
 
 Here Cozolino compared the relationship between a person and a group of people 
to the relationship between a neuron and a group of neurons on the basis that both 
relationships imply interdependency among members or parts of a larger functioning 
group or system. Because the concepts are juxtaposed, readers might infer a relationship 
between neuron functioning and psychopathology even though Cozolino did not actually 
argue that cell death leads to depression. In the following passage Cozolino used analogy 
to compare psychotherapy to other relationships. 
 Relationships are our natural habitat, while the isolated brain is an abstract 
 concept. Thus, understanding the brain requires knowledge of the person 
 embedded within a community of others. Therapists, teachers, and parents 
 intuitively grasp this profound reality just as laboratory scientists often do not. We 
 are now in a position to help research scientists know where to look as they 
 explore how the brain grows, learns, and changes throughout life. (p. 179) 
 
 This passage implied that therapists and patients, teachers and students, and 
parents and children are all comparable relationships insofar as each necessitates the 
person in the helping or leading role to understand the significance of interdependence or 
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community. The two sentences were noteworthy for how Cozolino seamlessly 
interchanged the concepts of “relationships,” “person,” and “brain” by first ascribing to 
human relationships the quality of naturalness and then criticizing the idea of an isolated 
brain instead of criticizing the idea of an isolated human. This may convey that people 
interact with the brains of other people, or that brains interact on behalf of people, or the 
passage may simply lead readers to assume synonymity or interchangeability between 
descriptions of people and descriptions of brains.  
 All of these analogies were significant because they portrayed relationships 
between humans and brains or might even have suggested direct arguments about mind 
and brain, yet the rhetorical device suggested that Cozolino linked self and brain through 
sentence structure and word choice in those passages rather than through a coherent 
philosophical argument.  
 Aporia. Aporia is an admission of doubt (in this case by an author) about the 
ability of a text to resolve a dilemma or answer a question that the text has raised. 
Examples of aporia were significant because they raised doubts about the usefulness of 
integrating mind-brain research into psychotherapy theory, or at least about the ways in 
which that research had been applied in Cozolino’s book. These were noteworthy not 
only for the implications of how Cozolino addressed possible contradictions or other 
flaws in his arguments, but also because he typically admitted little doubt about the 
importance of his efforts aside from these statements.  
 Because of the nature of neural processing, it might not be possible to ensure 
objectivity in the interpretation of brain research. Consistent with his argument that 
human psychology or experience arises from the functioning of an imperfect and biased 
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human brain, Cozolino acknowledged that this premise implies a glaring fallibility for 
any attempt to objectively interpret brain research.  
 The exploration of human consciousness is a vast new frontier for neuroscience 
 where there may always be more questions than answers. We know consciousness 
 exists; we just have no idea of how it emerges from the functioning of the brain. 
 An inherent challenge to this exploration will always be the conflict of interest 
 involved when something is studying itself with all the bias and distortion that 
 interferes with objective observation. There is no easy way around this. (p. 150) 
 
 With this passage Cozolino acknowledged that by following his own argument 
that each individual’s brain distorts his or her perceptions of reality, he must contend with 
the possibility that neuroscience research cannot be objective because it is a study of that 
organ and therefore subject to the “biases” and misperceptions that are among its defining 
qualities. Therefore it might be impossible to understand brain research in a way that is 
free of those factors. If humans cannot study the brain objectively, it becomes 
questionable why it is helpful for psychological theories and psychotherapy modalities to 
be linked to neuroscience research. Cozolino ends discussion of this issue entirely with 
the final statement “there is no easy way around this.” He did not further discuss the 
important dilemmas that necessarily follow from acknowledging that integrating 
psychological and neurological language is a questionable or possibly inadequate way of 
describing a singular unified process.  
 Denying responsibility as the author if readers interpret his book as supporting 
a reduction of mind to brain. Cozolino began his book by denying that reductionism was 
likely to result from it, yet he concluded his book with a statement claiming that he was 
blameless if such an interpretation resulted. 
 And while I dislike reductionism as much as the next person, doesn’t a tendency 
 toward reductionism say more about the thinker than the nature of natural 
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 phenomena? Our knowledge of neuroscience highlights the fact that we primates 
 have complex and imperfect brains and should remain skeptical about what we 
 think we know. In other words, primates would be wise to doubt their beliefs and 
 remain open to new ideas. (p. 357). 
 
 Here Cozolino denied responsibility for the possible impressions or conclusions 
that audiences might draw from his mind-brain integration efforts, which was noteworthy 
for a book that relied heavily on neuroanatomy or other scientific terminology. In fact, he 
seemed to blame the reader for any improper interpretations of his text. This draws on a 
particular understanding of text interpretation. Further, the example set for therapists by 
abdicating responsibility for the effects of a book that could be influential also warrants 
highlighting, as he seemed to display indifference toward the broader historical 
contexts—both professional and societal—that are likely to make a brain-based 
psychotherapy book appealing. The passage was a surprising demonstration of an 
apparent disconnection between the claims of the text and an understanding of the 
broader cultural values that would make it appealing. 
 Appealing to neuroscience but rejecting the authority of neuroscience 
“experts.” In Chapter 4 Cozolino proposed, “the question for therapists is: How 
amenable are these established structures to modification? This is a topic we will come 
back to again and again in later chapters” (p. 71). With that statement he seemed to imply 
that answering this question would be a central purpose of his text. In Chapter 11 he 
appeared to directly respond to this question, first by noting a shared interest among 
legislators, adoptive parents, and therapists in being able to identify which survivors of 
psychological trauma are likely to respond positively to psychological treatment or 
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reparative attachment efforts. However, he responded to the question by rejecting its 
premise rather than offering a neuroscientific answer.  
 Getting to the heart of the issue, the true question becomes: Who is worth seeing 
 as a client, adopting as a child, or investing public funds in for rehabilitation? In 
 my mind these are moral rather than scientific questions. I have become very 
 skeptical of “experts” who think they have found answers to any issue in 
 neuroscience. My bias is to trust in plasticity and our own ingenuity to discover 
 new solutions to these problems. (p. 210) 
 
 Cozolino’s response to this question (which he earlier had identified as an 
important issue, and which would seemingly be paramount to the entire purpose of his 
book) is surprising in that he responded by rebuffing or declining to address the issue 
altogether. Several possible implications of his response warrant discussion. First, his 
refusal to address the issue raises the possibility that neuroscience may be unable to 
determine with precision which individuals can experience a reduction in psychological 
symptoms or behavioral change. In that case this issue would be better addressed by 
psychological rather than neurological research methods, as would the understanding of a 
therapy patient’s presenting problems and progress in a psychological treatment. His 
answer therefore casts doubt on the idea that neuroscience is sufficient for the purpose of 
devising, practicing, and studying mental health treatments apart from whatever 
psychological or other relevant concepts are connected to the study of the human brain.  
 Importantly, Cozolino also avoided answering the question that he had raised 
earlier by arguing that the question is a moral rather than scientific one and therefore 
cannot be answered by neuroimaging research. While the question does indeed raise 
moral issues, he seemed to be trying to appeal to the sentiments raised by that premise 
without exploring the possibility that psychological research and treatment could admit 
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that they are inextricably linked with issues of morality. However, by sidestepping the 
issue through acknowledging the limitations of neuroscience research, readers may also 
come to believe that the issue would be inadequately addressed by the psychological 
methods that are intertwined with brain research in the book. Therefore the doubt 
Cozolino cast on neuroscience with this statement serves a twofold effect. His response 
detracts from readers’ ability to consider the ways in which psychology and 
psychotherapy research may actually be better suited to answer questions about mental 
health and individual change without neuroscience research. Moreover, his response 
discourages readers from considering ways in which they could engage in a more 
meaningful discussion about the role of morality in psychology and psychotherapy 
research (see Cushman, 1995; F. C. Richardson et al., 1999). 
 All of these examples of aporia raised questions about the extent to which human 
psychology can be correlated so closely with physiological underpinnings. It was 
noteworthy that Cozolino raised these significant issues and then backed away from 
engaging in any further discussion of them. This demonstrated that the way in which he 
managed or wrestled with the important societal implications he raised was inadequate 
and warrants further interpretation. 
 Diction. The following were examples of Cozolino’s use of diction or word 
choice. Close attention to diction revealed how Cozolino attempted to integrate fields of 
study (primarily psychology and neuroscience) by combining or juxtaposing terminology 
from these unique fields. This subtle use of language to integrate epistemologies may not 
be apparent to many readers. In other words, in many passages his choice of words 
warrants close examination because they highlight how rhetoric was used to assimilate 
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mind and brain rather than a careful survey of the nuanced scientific and philosophical 
issues that brain research raises.  
 Integrating and synthesizing epistemologies. Cozolino’s use of language was 
noteworthy for the various ways in which he synthesized neurobiological and 
psychological concepts by intertwining the terminology of separate fields of study in the 
same sentences. At times he acknowledged his integration of theories and at other times 
he seamlessly combined the vernacular or terminology from various fields without 
informing readers of the distinct fields of study or paradigms represented within single 
phrases or passages.  
 Synthesizing the purpose of psychotherapy with the effects of psychotherapy on 
the brain. These were examples of how Cozolino combined terms from distinct fields 
without informing readers that he had done this. This strategy was used to portray 
psychotherapy as a process of directly providing brain-based interventions through 
psychological or noninvasive means. For example, early in his book Cozolino defined 
“hidden layers” (p. 16) of the brain as the deepest levels of neural organization that are 
unobservable yet recognizable by the distortions and biases they project in the service of 
coherently organizing perception and behavior. Shortly therefore, he wrote,  
 “Based on observations of all levels of the client’s behavior, the therapist attempts 
 to bring the processing of the hidden layers to the client’s conscious attention”  
 (p. 35).  
 
 With the statement above, Cozolino described psychotherapy as the process of 
interpreting the hidden layers (presumably the hidden layers of the brain as he elsewhere 
discussed). In other words, instead of describing the purpose of therapy as revealing 
unconscious aspects of human experience, he described therapy as the process of 
 184 
revealing the functioning of underlying neurobiological correlates of those unconscious 
experiences. In this passage the reader was not specifically informed about the integrative 
use of language, and therefore the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious mind was 
presented as inseparable from or interchangeable with an understanding of the human 
brain.  
 The following passages were also exemplary of this mind-brain synthesis 
strategy. 
 “As therapists we intuitively work to regulate stress and integrate neural 
 networks, a process that is essentially the opposite of the dissociation observed in 
 reaction to trauma” (p. 21). 
 
 The organization of autobiographical memory that includes input from multiple 
 neural networks enhances self-awareness and increases the ability to solve 
 problems, cope with stress, and regulate affect. This integrative process is what 
 psychotherapy attempts to establish when it is absent. (p. 207) 
 
 Successful psychotherapy for anxiety, fears, and phobias has been shaped by the 
 necessity of integrating fast and slow circuits, taxon and locale systems, and affect 
 and cognition. Educating patients about panic leads to increased participation of 
 the cortex during anxiety states. (p. 258) 
 
 “On another level, the therapist serves as an external neural circuit to aid in the 
 integration of networks left disconnected during development” (p. 283). 
 
 “The safe emergency of psychotherapy activates dissociated neural networks and 
 attempts to reintegrate them in the service of decreased arousal and improved 
 functioning” (p. 284). 
 
 Psychotherapists are trained to use their social brains as a tool to connect to and 
 modify the brains of their clients. Through interpersonal neurobiological 
 processes, therapists serve as an external regulatory circuit to help reestablish the 
 optimal flow of energy and information. (p. 322) 
 
 With these passages Cozolino implied that by effectively providing mental health 
treatment, psychotherapists have unknowingly been utilizing neuroplasticity in order to 
restore or create healthy brain functioning. By portraying vocabularies typically used to 
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describe either mind or brain as interchangeable, these statements implied that mind and 
brain themselves are in fact interchangeable.  
 Reappropriating psychological terms as neurobiological concepts without 
directly informing readers of this strategy. At times Cozolino inserted psychological 
terms into descriptions of brain functioning without acknowledging the original uses of 
those concepts.  
 The statement “explicit memory is the tip of our experiential iceberg; implicit 
memory is the vast structure below the surface” (p. 77) was a good example of how 
Cozolino used a phrase with longstanding ties to the psychoanalytic metaphor for the 
unconscious (“iceberg”) in Freud’s theory of the topography of mind. Cozolino 
reappropriated the term for the purpose of mapping a psychoanalytic concept onto the 
human brain. Further, he implied that the concept had always referred to its underlying 
neurobiological substrate and that recent advances in neuroimaging are simply 
confirmation or objective proof of this claim.  
 Cozolino also referred to “the tripartite division of the brain” (p. 59), another 
reference to an early psychoanalytic concept of the three-tiered or tripartite mind 
comprised of id, ego, and superego. In the following statement, Cozolino used the 
psychoanalytic concept of enactment in a description of how the brain integrates visual 
perception with knowledge of language. 
 “While there is overlap of activation during picture naming, the nature of the 
 visual image triggers brain areas relevant to what is depicted. Thus, memory is a 
 form of internal enactment of whatever is being recalled” (p. 80).  
 
 In the statement above, Cozolino reappropriated the psychotherapy concept of 
enactment in his interpretation of a neuroimaging study in which researchers found that 
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the same part of the human brain that stored memory for the names of hand tools was the 
same part of the brain involved in the physical control over hands. In other words, 
through the misuse of a psychotherapy concept Cozolino portrayed the brain as the 
location of integration between physical and psychological aspects of human beings.  
 These examples were important because Cozolino did not inform readers of his 
synthesizing of two epistemologies, so some readers might not immediately recognize his 
efforts or their implications. In the next section I show how Cozolino acknowledged his 
integration between psychological and neuroscientific epistemologies.  
 Explaining one field of study from the perspective of another field of study. At 
times Cozolino described how one field of study (i.e., psychotherapy) could be 
interpreted by another field of study, putatively demonstrating how a single human 
phenomenon or activity may be described in equally helpful ways by separate fields of 
study (i.e., neuroscience). 
 “Remember, from the perspective of neuroscience, psychotherapists are in the 
 brain-rebuilding business” (p. 33). 
 
 “From the standpoint of neurobiology, most of Freud’s work addressed the 
 discontinuities and dissociations between networks of conscious and unconscious 
 processing. Freud focused on the role of overwhelming emotion as the cause of 
 unintegrated neural processing” (p. 33).  
 
 In the second example above, Cozolino acknowledged that he was providing a 
neurobiological interpretation of Freud’s work, and then provided an example of the 
argument using direct or matter-of-fact language, as if the argument was no longer an 
interpretation. The effect on the reader may be a blurring of epistemologies that uniquely 
embody aspects of the historical eras from which they separately emerged, or an 
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interpretation of history (especially the history of science) as linear, inevitable, and 
removable from the circumstances that gave rise to their discourses and their appeal.  
 Freud believed that a fundamental goal of therapy is to make the unconscious 
 conscious. From the perspective of rebuilding the brain, this goal can be described 
 as increasing the interconnection and integration of neural networks dedicated to 
 unconscious and conscious memory. This process makes understanding the 
 evolution, development, and functioning of the various systems of memory 
 crucial to conceptualizing and treating psychological distress and mental illnesses. 
 (p. 74) 
 
 Here Cozolino provided a neuroscience interpretation of the psychoanalytic 
concepts of conscious and unconscious mind. He then used this to argue that it is 
“crucial” for psychotherapists to understand the brain systems related to memory in order 
to understand and provide treatment for psychological conditions. It was unclear from 
this passage why knowledge of neurobiology is necessary for providing psychological 
treatment.  
 In the passages above, the importance of neuroscience as confirmatory research 
for psychological theories was taken for granted. This underlying assumption led to 
Cozolino’s use of assertions instead of arguments, since arguments are based on a 
structure of logic that builds to a plausible conclusion or understandable theory. Theorists 
and historians such as Canguilhem (1977/1988) have criticized this type of ahistorical 
understanding of science whereby current findings or paradigms are portrayed to explain 
or correct earlier theories from other fields of study.  
 Incorporating neurobiology into the definition of a psychological concept. The 
following passages suggested a rewriting of traditional psychological conceptualizations 
of mental experiences as neurobiological processes. The implication of these statements 
was that brain research serves as proof of a timeless truth, rather than brain research 
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being portrayed as a contemporary or recent revision to concepts typically under the 
domain of psychological theories.   
 “Freud’s projective hypothesis described the process by which our brains create 
 and organize the world around us. As the clarity of a situation decreases, the brain 
 naturally generates structure and projects it onto the world” (p. 34). 
 
 “Early relationships become encoded in networks of sensory, motor, and 
 emotional learning to form what dynamic therapists call inner objects” (p. 41). 
 
 “Early brain development is highlighted by periods of exuberant neural growth 
 and connectivity called sensitive periods triggered by the interaction of genes and 
 experience” (p. 70). 
 
 “Estimating reward value is a joint operation between the ompfc and the 
 amygdala (Dolan, 2007; Gottfried, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2003). Much of this 
 analysis occurs out of conscious awareness and is commonly called intuition” 
 (Cozolino, 2010, p. 127). 
 
 Cozolino suggested that certain key words in psychological discourse are 
shorthand for descriptions of the neurobiological processes from which they result. 
Although physiological processes are present in any human experience, emphasizing that 
fact shifts the primary understanding of what it means to be human or to have a 
subjective experience away from the psychological and toward the physiological. For 
example, by asserting that object relations theory has been proven by neuroscientific 
research, Cozolino created a materialist explanation for structuralism. 
 Although the combination of neuroscientific and psychological vernaculars might 
seem to legitimate psychological and psychotherapy concepts by pairing them with 
material correlates, Cozolino’s uses of these diction strategies also suggest an effort to 
validate neuroscience, since the psychological concepts are part of common parlance and 
important aspects of Western culture. Therefore, although neuroscience is already 
popular and appealing (see pp. 23-24), synthesizing neurobiological and psychological 
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concepts in the way that he has done seems to introduce a discourse centered on a 
neuroscientific understanding of self into everyday language.  
 Repetition. Cozolino used recurring words across a variety of contexts in order to 
subtly portray themes or bolster arguments. Here I provide several examples of this 
rhetorical device and the subtle implications of the varied uses of key words. 
 “Best guess.” Cozolino used this phrase to describe neuroscientific speculation 
about the brain, and to depict the brain itself as engaging in speculative thinking (see also 
Personification, pp. 209-211). 
 “Although these movements may look random, they are the brain’s best guess at 
 which movements will eventually be needed” (p. 68) 
  
 “What do we inherit, and what do we learn from experience? Our best guess is 
 that almost everything involves an interaction between the two” (p. 64). 
 
 Our understanding of the brains of individuals with ADHD is still limited. . . . The 
 best guess at this point is that individuals diagnosed with ADHD likely reflect a 
 number of subgroups with different types of brain involvement. (pp. 131-132) 
 “Our best guess is that larger and more complex brains allow for more diverse 
 responses in challenging situations and across diverse environments” (p. 214). 
 
 By using the same phrase to describe both the brain and current neuroscientific 
hypotheses about the role of brain functioning in human development, Cozolino 
portrayed a similarity between the tendencies of the brain and the tendencies of humans 
who study it.  
 “Bias.” Cozolino used this word to describe personal beliefs (including his own 
beliefs), common beliefs or tendencies among individuals, and tendencies or typical 
processing in the brain.  
 “These connections, and their bias toward the right hemisphere, are associated 
 with extremes of emotional processing” (p. 121). 
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 “The consistency of many perceptual and cognitive biases across individuals 
 reflects our shared neural organization and functioning” (p. 136).  
 
 “I have become very skeptical of ‘experts’ who think they have found answers to 
 any issue in neuroscience. My bias is to trust plasticity and our own ingenuity to 
 discover new solutions to these problems” (p. 210).  
 
 The word bias was used to imply that humans and the brain both have opinions. 
By reducing the concept of an opinion to a guess, Cozolino reaffirmed the privilege of 
objective quantitative studies. This implies that for now such guesswork is the best that 
can be done until progressive science provides conclusive proof for whatever is being 
studied (e.g., the relationship between brain function and human experience).  
 “Complexity.” Cozolino used this word to describe brain functioning that is 
capable of facilitating the multifaceted psychological processing necessary for the range 
of behaviors required for adequate functioning in modern civilization. He also used the 
word complexity to describe psychological functioning, and to generally describe 
intricate systems that emerge from their constituent parts. 
 “To accomplish the complexity required for behavior, neurons organize into 
 neural networks” (p. 14). 
 
 Psychotherapy can be thought of as a specific type of enriched environment that 
 promotes social and emotional development, neural integration, and processing 
 complexity” (p. 20). 
 
 “A basic assumption of both neuroscience and psychotherapy is that optimal 
 functioning and mental health are related to increasingly advanced levels of 
 growth, integration, and complexity” (p. 25). 
 
 “Although redundant hemispheres provide certain benefits, such as a backup 
 system in case of injury, hemispheric specialization via natural selection promotes 
 neural complexity” (p. 94). 
 
 The focus on integration exists at each level of nature’s complexity from neurons 
 to narratives to nations. As systems become more complex, it takes more 
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 sophisticated mechanisms and increasing amounts of energy to support their 
 continuing interconnection and homeostatic balance. (p. 174) 
 
 “Because increasing complexity requires greater interdependency, our brains have 
 come to exist more and more profoundly within a matrix of other brains” (p. 216). 
 
 “The very complexity of the development and functioning of the brain is also 
 what makes it such a fragile structure” (p. 321). 
 
 Cozolino’s use of the word complexity implied a connection between the 
properties of the human brain and the advancement of civilization, and equivalence 
between the goals of psychotherapy and the findings of brain research. Importantly, in 
these passages the word complexity substitutes for a delineated, logical explanation for 
how the brain creates reality, facilitates a coherent perception and interpretation of that 
reality, and correlates with the advancements of human societies. The assertion that 
mental processes are complex is not a substitute for an argument. 
 “Fragile.” Personal identity, the self, and the brain were all described as fragile. 
 “Stories connect us to others prop up our often fragile identities, and keep our 
 brains regulated” (p. 163).  
 
 “Pathological states highlight the fact that the self is a fragile construction of the 
 brain” (p. 286).  
 
 “The very complexity of the development and functioning of the brain is also 
 what makes it such a fragile structure” (p. 321).  
 
 Together these passages implied that self and brain have similar qualities, and in 
the second passage above Cozolino directly suggested that self is generated by the brain. 
By using the word fragile in a variety of contexts Cozolino substituted a comparison or a 
use of rhetoric for a coherent argument about how self emerges from the brain. Although 
brain disease and injury can certainly alter psychological experience and identity, the use 
of the word fragile in descriptions of self and brain cannot substitute for an articulate 
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explanation of how understanding typical experience as the product of brain functioning 
is scientifically accurate or a helpful paradigm for therapists and general audiences.  
 “Plasticity.” Cozolino discussed the plasticity of the human brain as the quality by 
which the brain changes or adapts in relation to the environment in which a person exists. 
He also used that word to describe the self.  
 “Neural plasticity refers to the ability of neurons to change the way they are 
 shaped and relate to one another as the brain adapts to the environment through 
 time” (pp. 56-57). 
 
 “Patients with multiple personalities are perhaps the most complex example of the 
 plasticity of self, because they generate many different subpersonalities associated 
 with different experiences and emotional states” (p. 287).  
 
 Because neural plasticity was a central concept for Cozolino’s brain-based 
psychotherapy theory, the assertion that the self also has plasticity suggested a use of 
rhetoric to either conflate self and brain or to imply that self emerges from the 
functioning of the brain.  
 “Primitive.” Cozolino used the word primitive to describe the early development 
of the brain, maladaptive psychological defense mechanisms, and traditional or relatively 
less-advanced societies.  
 Freud argued that in order to understand who and what we are, we need to 
 understand the primal unconscious elements of experience. He called this the id—
 the primitive and uncivilized life energy that we share with our reptilian and 
 mammalian ancestors. (p. 3) 
 
 “The more primitive or immature the defense mechanism, the more reality is 
 distorted and the more functional impairment occurs” (p. 34). 
 
 “Evolution has shaped the primitive areas of our visual brains to recognize and 
 react quickly to threats from possible predators” (p. 80). 
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 “Winnicott defined the early and intense focus on the baby as primary maternal 
 preoccupation, and understood it to include the mother’s absorption into and 
 attunement to the experiences with her baby’s primitive developmental state”  
 (p. 189). 
 
 Co-constructed narratives form the core of human groups, from primitive tribes to 
 modern families. The combined participation of caretakers and children in 
 narrating shared experiences organizes memories, embeds them within a social 
 context, and assists in linking feelings, actions, and others to the self. (p. 207) 
 
 Stress impairs or downgrades the functioning of the locale system, causing us to 
 fall back on the more primitive organization of taxon (amygdaloid) systems. From 
 a psychoanalytic perspective, this process may be understood as regression to 
 more primitive self states and defense mechanisms. (pp. 257-258) 
 
 “The most primitive subcortical fight-or-flight circuitry, shared with our reptilian 
 ancestors, interacts with the most highly evolved regions of the cortex” (p. 289).  
 
 The recurring use of the word primitive described a linear and hierarchical 
transition process for a brain, a psyche, and a society. How these concepts are 
interrelated, aside from Cozolino’s use of evolution to vaguely connect them all, was 
unclear. Regardless, his use of evolutionary theory to substantiate differences between 
industrialized and pre-capitalist societies overlooked the well-known controversies 
associated with the use of evolutionary theory as an explanation for differences in 
cultural and economic arrangements that overlooks the impact of global war and 
colonialism over the past several hundred years.  
 “Trial and error.” Cozolino used this recurring phrase to describe human 
learning, the effects of learning on the brain, and the history of psychotherapy during the 
20th century. 
 “Learning within neural networks occurs as a result of trial and error” (p. 16).  
 “Like other scientific discoveries, psychotherapy developed from a combination 
 of trial-and-error learning, the intuition of its founder, and plain luck” (p. 32).  
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 Only through trial-and-error learning are early clumsy movements slowly shaped 
 into functional skills. Children and their brains intuitively know this and will 
 resist being held back or helped too much. When we attempt to help, a child’s 
 impatient protest of “Let me do it!” reflects instinctual wisdom of the importance 
 of trial and error learning in the growth of neural networks. (p. 69). 
 
 The use of this phrase in these three contexts implied similarities between the 
processes of brain growth and development, childhood development, and the 
development of the important cultural institution of psychotherapy. Collectively, these 
passages scientized human development and cultural institutions such as psychotherapy.  
 “Worlds.” Cozolino used the term worlds to describe various aspects of 
psychological experience, change, and the features of self that explain and facilitate the 
potential for change.  
 “Our imaginations can simultaneously create exciting new worlds, as well as the 
 fears that prevent us from living in them” (p. 10). 
 
 “These unconscious memories organize our inner worlds when we are with others 
 and when we are alone” (p. 41). 
 
 “The cortex is experience dependent, which means that it is shaped through 
 countless interactions with our social and physical worlds. In this way we grow to 
 adapt to the particular niche into which we are born” (p. 59).  
 
 “In the middle of the second year, a growth spurt occurs in the left hemisphere 
 and an explosion in language and locomotion launches children into the broader 
 physical and social worlds” (p. 95). 
 
 “From a psychodynamic perspective, these patients seem trapped in secondary 
 process thinking, disconnected from their inner physical and emotional worlds” 
 (p. 107). 
 
 “Dorsolateral areas exhibit an initial lag and then growth spurt with the 
 development of language and the exploration of our physical and conceptual 
 worlds” (p. 122). 
 
 “In essence, both inner and outer worlds need to be balanced and adequately 
 regulated for optimal functioning” (p. 128). 
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 Cozolino used the term worlds in varying contexts in order to portray individuals 
and social phenomena as existing in separate realms or realities. This implied a 
dichotomous private and public existence, a move that reinforces the early modern value 
of innerness. Although psychological theories have traditionally been based on modern 
era philosophy and its vision of a self or subjectivity that is separate from the neutral and 
scientized material world, the language in the passages above were especially 
contradictory of mind-body integration that Cozolino seemingly used neuroscience as a 
way to overcome. In other words, the statements above suggest mind-body dualism. 
 In sum, the examples of repetition in Cozolino’s text suggested a subtle way of 
portraying important concepts or entities as related or even quite similar, either without 
formal arguments or as a way to unsuspectingly reinforce arguments he had posited. Over 
the course of a reading of his book it might be easy to overlook the covert yet persuasive 
effects of this rhetorical strategy.  
 Speculation language. Cozolino’s use of language that implied a finding or 
argument to be only potentially true was ubiquitous. He also used this rhetorical strategy 
to predict future neuroscience discoveries. At times Cozolino juxtaposed speculative 
statements with statements that suggested certainty. 
 Speculation about the fit between neuroscience findings and general 
psychological phenomena. The following statements exemplified uncertainty about mind-
brain integration.  
 “What Charcot and Freud called dissociation and hysteria could well have been 
 the result of inadequate integration and coordination among these different, 
 cohabiting brains” (p. 6). 
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 “By activating processes involved in secure attachment, empathic attunement 
 likely creates an optimal biochemical environment for neural plasticity” (p. 46).   
 
 “The emotions, images, and thoughts that emerge in conditions of low stimulation 
 (or the absence of distraction) may hold clues to the workings of our brains and 
 the aftereffects of early learning” (p. 88). 
 
 “Perhaps the left hemisphere interpreter may explain why we are all above 
 average in our own minds” (p. 103) 
 
 “The momentary bubbling up of feelings or images, which are then quickly lost, 
 may reflect one aspect of the intrusion of right hemisphere processing into left 
 hemisphere control” (p. 104). 
 
 Given that we use our internal expressions as implicit models for how we 
 understand others, it could be that what Freud called the defense mechanism of 
 projection is actually a simple byproduct of how our brains interweave our 
 automatic theories of others’ minds with understandings of ourselves. (p. 314) 
 
 Speculation about the fit between neuroscience and psychology or psychotherapy 
theories implied hope or expectation that future brain research will confirm or deny 
hypotheses about the relationship between mind and brain. Scholars (e.g., Brothers, 2001; 
Uttal, 1999) have cautioned that this rhetorical strategy in cognitive neuroscience 
literature is likely to cause audiences to mistake a faith in future scientific studies for 
actual scientific facts, thereby ignoring the flawed logic underlying many studies trying 
to ascertain neurobiological correlates for psychological concepts. In other words, this 
rhetoric is likely to cause some readers to confuse the goals of neuroscience with the 
established findings of neuroscience, which mistakenly reinforces a possibly unfounded 
synthesis between brain functioning and the concept of mind or mental states. 
 Speculation about evolution. Cozolino’s central premise was that evolutionary 
theory is an explanation for human neurobiology and therefore for psychology, 
psychotherapy, and contemporary human societies (see also Themes, pp. 213-220). 
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However, he acknowledged that some of the claims generated by evolutionary theory are 
hypothetical.  
 The portion of the visual system activated by pictures of animals is an area 
 involved with very early stages of visual processing. This may be a reflection of 
 how evolution has shaped the primitive areas of our visual brains to recognize and 
 react quickly to threats from possible predators. (Cozolino, p. 80) 
 
 “This model of laterality may have reflected an intermediate evolutionary stage 
 between having two modes of conscious awareness and our current bias toward 
 right hemisphere inhibition” (p. 109).  
 
 “It is likely that evolution has used these core visual-spatial networks to serve as 
 an infrastructure for language” (p. 143). 
 
 Spoken language is sound, which primitive fear circuitry is able to silence. 
 Perhaps those early prehumans who hung around for conversation and negotiation 
 with predators didn’t fare well enough to pass down as many genes as did those 
 who either kept quiet, fought, or ran away. (p. 278) 
 
 Cozolino’s speculation about evolutionary processes that were quite central to his 
brain-based psychotherapy theory raises a broader uncertainty about his mind-brain 
integration efforts altogether. In other words, speculative rhetoric about human evolution 
naturalized psychotherapy and psychological problems by depicting them as products of 
intrinsic physical processes and suggested that his integration project may be more of a 
precarious effort than the frequent use of scientific terminology and a steadfast attitude 
toward the subject matter might otherwise suggest. The rhetorical strategy could therefore 
serve as a way for Cozolino to circumvent criticism about his weighty claims about 
human functioning and the relationship between mind or self and brain. 
 Speculation about the history of psychotherapy. In Cozolino’s introductory 
chapter he described the purpose of his book as building on Freud’s original intention of 
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a brain-based explanation for human psychology (see General history of psychotherapy 
according to Cozolino, pp. 107-110; see History of Cozolino’s psychotherapy theory,  
pp. 113-117). However, Cozolino acknowledged some uncertainty about relevant 
historical details.  
 “Freud started out as a rebel, a neurologist curious about the mind. I suspect he 
 was frustrated with the mind-brain partisanship of medical school, and longed to 
 work with others who shared his interests” (p. 1). 
 
 In Charcot, Freud sought a teacher who was well-established, confident, and 
 unafraid of the no-man’s-land between mind and brain. One can imagine Freud’s 
 excitement as he walked the streets of Paris on his way to meet the great man, a 
 possible kindred spirit (p. 2). 
 
 “Perhaps Freud kept the Project to himself because he feared that it would be 
 relegated to the same sort of obscurity as the case of Phinneas Gage” (p. 4).  
 
 “Perhaps Freud anticipated that in the future, psychoanalysis would eventually be 
 integrated with its neurobiological substrates” (p. 5). 
 
 Cozolino’s speculations about the history of psychotherapy cast doubt on the 
purpose of his text as building upon Freud’s original intention of a brain-based 
understanding of human experience as Cozolino initially explained. Speculative rhetoric 
in these passages suggests an attempt to hedge on these historical claims, circumventing 
criticism about the use of an origin myth (claiming that psychotherapy emerged from 
neurology) to justify a merger between the two fields now that neuroimaging technology 
has advanced dramatically.  
 Speculative language alongside language implying certainty. At times statements 
that were speculative were placed alongside statements in which Cozolino’s choice of 
language denoted a significant amount of certainty.  
 The early interpersonal environment may be imprinted in the human brain by 
 shaping the child’s neural networks and establishing the biochemical set points in 
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 circuitry dedicated to memory, emotion, safety, and survival. Later, these 
 structures and processes come to serve as the infrastructure for social and 
 intellectual skills, affect regulation, and the sense of self. (p. 10) 
 
 In this passage Cozolino first speculated that early relationships have a role in 
organizing structures of the brain that have been implicated in a variety of psychological 
experiences (memory, emotion, safety, and survival) and he then asserted that these brain 
structures are related to psychological aspects of human functioning (intellectual skills, 
affect regulation, and the sense of self). Therefore he drew a conclusion based on a 
hypothetical argument. In the following passages he also used this strategy. 
 In taking a sample of general theoretical approaches to psychotherapy, we will 
 look for common elements among them, and how these elements may relate to 
 neural network development. Remember, from the perspective of neuroscience, 
 psychotherapists are in the brain-rebuilding business. (p. 33) 
 
 Here Cozolino speculated that common factors of psychotherapy theories are 
related to underlying neural integration, and then stated with certainty that therapy is a 
“brain-rebuilding” task. This rhetorical strategy implies that a strong belief in therapy as a 
brain intervention may suffice for conclusive evidence supporting that claim or 
explaining its relevance. The passage is therefore noteworthy because it shows how 
confidence in brain research and in the assumption that brain and selfhood are closely 
linked (or even interchangeable concepts) is such a powerful belief that speculating about 
the specific science that could support this claim is permissible.   
 “Earned autonomy is convincing evidence that early negative experiences can be 
 reinstated and repaired later in life. Personal growth has the ability to heal because 
 the social brain remains plastic” (p. 209). 
 
 With the phrase “convincing evidence,” Cozolino first speculated that individuals 
are able to overcome the negative effects of early experiences, yet he then stated with 
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sureness that healing is enabled by neuroplasticity. This was surprising because it would 
seem that the capacity for psychological change has been well established, in fact, 
probably more established than the neuroscience thought to underlie the types of healing 
experiences Cozolino described. This juxtaposition of speculation and certainty was 
noteworthy because it suggests unnecessary doubt about psychology amidst possibly 
unfounded certainty in the ability of neuroscience to attenuate that doubt by serving as a 
material truth about psychological concepts and the cultural values that they embody. In 
other words, by juxtaposing speculation and certainty in the passage above, Cozolino 
privileged recent scientific research (and the assumption of objectivity in that research) 
over a longstanding psychological theory (attachment theory). Because it is unclear why 
psychologists would need neuroscience to prove the relevance or accuracy of this theory, 
the passage reinforces the model of a higher-order or higher-status science confirming 
that a psychological concept or paradigm is an accurate understanding of human 
functioning.  
 Like the attachment system…the development of this engagement system and the 
 fine-tuning of the vagal brake to regulate affect appear to depend on the quality of 
 attachment relationships in early childhood. This allows us to internalize what we 
 learn from experience with caretakers into moment-to-moment somatic 
 regulation. (p. 234).  
 
 In this passage Cozolino first speculated that the development of brain structures 
that are related to affect regulation is dependent upon the quality of early relationships, 
and then he concluded with an attitude of certainty that these developmental processes 
explain how self-control of the body is facilitated by formative early relational 
experiences. This passage highlights a significant contradiction because he at once 
claimed that scientists know and do not know that brain research explains how the quality 
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of early relationships is related to later psychological functioning and stability. Similar to 
the previous examples of this rhetorical device, this passage is noteworthy because it 
shows how Cozolino assumed or relied on a strong belief amongst readers in a 
relationship between self and brain to obfuscate the lack of clear evidence for a direct 
relationship between affect, attachment, and brain functioning.  
 In sum, the examples of placing speculation language alongside language 
implying certainty were noteworthy because they exemplify a reliance on a strong 
convictions of a relationship between mind or self and brain in order to assert conclusions 
about the brain based on claims that remain unproven. 
 Predicting future discoveries. At times Cozolino suggested that continued brain 
research will eventually answer some of the difficult yet important questions about 
human mind and consciousness. 
 In the case of the imagined memory, the prefrontal area also becomes activated, 
 reflecting its role in processing the instructions, staying on task, and accessing 
 imagination. How neural networks in the prefrontal cortex know how to do this is 
 as yet unknown. (p. 80) 
 
 How does the brain achieve conscious awareness? Where is the seat of 
 consciousness? The answer to both of these questions is that we don’t yet know. 
 At this point, we must be satisfied with discovering pieces of this complex puzzle 
 of consciousness that will be assembled sometime in the future. (p. 140) 
 
 “Although this research has yet to be done with humans, the behavioral and 
 neurobiological parallels between rats and humans are striking, making rats very 
 helpful in understanding the interpersonal aspects of neurobiology” (p. 214).  
 
 “As the dialogue between psychotherapy and neuroscience continues to evolve, 
 an increasing number of scientific findings will be applied to both theory and 
 clinical practice” (p. 342). 
 
 With these statements Cozolino used speculative rhetoric to portray the discovery 
of the neurobiological locations of mind or human experience as inevitable. Cozolino’s 
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predictions for a confirmed material understanding of human psychology may generate 
excitement, yet this view is not without scientific and philosophical controversies, and 
seems to have little to do with improving the practice and profession of psychotherapy. In 
Chapter I, I discussed the widespread optimism about neuroscientific advances 
contributing to the alteration of life on a genetic and molecular level that scholars believe 
to be a firmly engrained aspects of contemporary Western selfhood (see Rose, 2007), the 
well-documented criticisms of the use of this optimism as a rhetorical strategy in 
cognitive neuroscience literature (see Brothers, 2001; Vidal, 2009), and the arguments 
against the neuroscientific efforts to localize consciousness within the brain (see Bennett 
& Hacker, 2003; Noë, 2009; Tallis, 2004). In light of those critical perspectives, the use 
of a psychotherapy text as a venue to perpetuate neuroscientific speculation should be 
brought to the attention of psychotherapists studying this material or applying it to 
clinical practice. 
 Cozolino providing personal speculations. In several passages, Cozolino (2010) 
provided personal (and therefore unconfirmed) interpretations of neuroscience research. 
 “I strongly suspect that left-right integration is an experience-dependent process” 
 (p. 109). 
 
 “In my mind, the parallels as well as the tendency for evolution to conserve such 
 mechanisms form a strong case for the theory that what Meaney and his 
 colleagues are finding in rats is at work in humans” (p. 223) 
 
 What might be happening in the brain during and after an accurate and well-timed 
 interpretation? Each interpretation that hits home is like the death of a small 
 aspect of the false self. My suspicion is that it begins with seeing past the products 
 of the left hemisphere interpreter, which disinhibits the activation of subcortical 
 circuits containing negative memories. (p. 295) 
 
 “I suspect that telling the story builds circuitry, which contributes to amygdala 
 inhibition and the dissipation of fear” (p. 307) 
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 These speculative statements demonstrated how Cozolino (2010) expressed 
personal interest or investment in neuroscience research by proposing his own 
interpretations of it. This strategy implied that with sufficient interest in the integration of 
neuroscience and psychology, one individual may impact popular beliefs about the 
relationships between brain functioning and human psychology or self. In fact, the final 
chapter of his book (“The Psychotherapist as Neuroscientist,” pp. 341-358) begins with a 
quote (see Epigraph below) by seminal neuroscience researcher Eric Kandel about this 
field of study: “Unlike other areas of science, it is still possible for an individual or small 
group to make important contributions” (p. 341). With the passages above Cozolino 
illustrated those exact efforts and he depicted an interest in neuroscience as a way for 
psychotherapists to contribute to a grander and epochal scientific endeavor. This is 
significant because the depiction of psychotherapists as brain science enthusiasts 
represents a departure from the generally understood purpose of therapy and the 
professional identity of therapists.  
 These statements are also noteworthy because they exemplify the problems with 
cognitive neuroscience that Brothers (2001) highlighted in her discussion of how authors 
are able to creatively permeate cognitive neuroscience with tenuous claims about human 
experience and the brain that are actually disguised cultural discourses, since cognitive 
neuroscience lacks a central organizing theory against which to test hypotheses (a 
defining characteristic of other scientific disciplines), the brain is extremely complicated 
and contemporary brain science is relatively new, and the vernaculars of psychology and 
brain science might be fundamentally incompatible (see also Bennett & Hacker, 2003).   
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 Epigraph. Cozolino started every chapter and each subsection of every chapter 
with an epigraph, that is, a short quote from any one of a variety of historical figures, 
scientists, authors, psychotherapists, and others. The quotes represented a wide array of 
statements on topics ranging from scientific issues to general human concerns. The 
variety and placement of the quotations suggested that they were intended to link mind-
brain research with psychotherapy and broader values or principles with which readers 
may find solace. In other words, they were used to depict brain-based explanations for 
psychotherapy and human psychology as being intuitive, natural, and highly relevant to 
nearly any endeavor to which neuroscience is applied. 
 For example, Chapter 11 (“Building the Social Brain: Shaping Attachment 
Schemas”) begins with the quote, “Experience is a biochemical intervention” by Jason 
Seidel (p. 197). To introduce Chapter 7 (“The Executive Brain”), he quoted Virginia 
Woolf, “My own brain is to me the most unaccountable of machinery—always buzzing, 
humming, soaring roaring diving, and then buried in mud. And why? What’s this passion 
for?” (p. 115). To introduce Chapter 14 (“Trauma and Neural Network Dissociation”), he 
quoted Virginia Woolf again, “The beauty of the world has two edges, one of laughter, 
one of anguish, cutting the heart asunder” (p. 262). In Chapter 12 (“The Neurobiology of 
Attachment”), to start the subsection titled “The Human Social Brain,” Cozolino quoted 
the French Renaissance philosopher Montaigne, “It is good to rub and polish our brains 
against those of others” (p. 227).  
 By providing such a large number and variety of quotes from important figures 
likely to be regarded as wise, daring, or socially impactful, Cozolino implied that there is 
a broad societal significance to each chapter and subsection, and showed that the 
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significance of neuroscience research transcends specific historical eras because it 
confirms whatever was observed or suspected about humans beings generally and the 
social arrangements humans have formed. Because the epigraphs that Cozolino selected 
were short and used without further elaboration, they seem to support especially a sense 
of universality of his efforts. In other words, epigraphs supported the argument that much 
of human culture, history, successes, and problems are explainable by the evolution of the 
brain, and that over time many great figures realized this. The quotes set a frame for his 
chapters and subsections as supporting a vast array of disciplinary efforts through the 
expansive scope and incisiveness of epigraphs that preceded each one. By placing his 
chapters and subsections alongside quotes from prominent and insightful figures, 
Cozolino might also be regarded as bold or revolutionary for tying brain research to 
psychology and therapy in such a comprehensive effort.  
 Figures of speech. The following were examples of figures of speech in 
Cozolino’s book that are disguised forms of persuasion (for further examples of 
Cozolino’s use of this rhetorical strategy, see Appendix B, pp. 325-328). 
 Apposition. Examples of apposition (that is, the use of a phrase consisting of a 
noun used to modify or describe another noun), included “attachment circuitry” (p. 211, 
p. 210, p. 184), “familiarity circuits” (p. 153), “social brain” (p. 8, p. 244), “social 
engagement system” (p. 233), “social neural networks” (p. 182), and “social synapse”  
(p. 179, p. 180, p. 195, p. 182, p. 187, p. 189, p. 196).  
 Apposition synthesized neurobiological and psychological or colloquial concepts, 
thereby identifying a typical subjective experience by emphasizing its neurobiological 
origin. These phrases easily insert neurobiological terms into common descriptions of 
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subjective experience, thereby encouraging a discourse that perpetuates a reductionist and 
mechanical vision of self through a disguised form of persuasion.  
 Metaphor. Cozolino used metaphor (that is, a comparison between two objects or 
concepts without using the words “like” or “as”). The metaphors he selected for 
describing the brain represented several recurring categories of objects or themes.  
 Human development metaphors used to describe the brain. Cozolino often 
compared the development of the brain to the physical and psychological development of 
a child.  
 “Consequently, many of our most important socioemotional learning experiences 
 are organized and controlled by reflexes, behaviors, and emotions outside of our 
 awareness and distorted by our immature brains” (p. 9). 
 
 “In contrast to the brainstem and limbic system, the cortex is immature at birth 
 and continues to develop throughout adulthood” (p. 68). 
 
 “The maturation and sculpting of so much of the cortex after birth allows for 
 highly specific environmental adaptations” (p. 72). 
 
 “During the first 2 years of life, the right hemisphere has a growth spurt” (p. 95). 
 “In contrast to the amygdala, the hippocampus is a late bloomer, continuing to 
 mature into early adulthood” (p. 231). 
 
 These metaphors paired images of human maturation with descriptions of the 
brain, implying an association between developmental stages and the growth or 
expansion of the brain during each stage. Cozolino’s use of developmental metaphors had 
the effect of humanizing the brain and naturalizing human development concepts. By 
unproblematically sharing psychological and neuroscientific discourses, these metaphors 
foster a vision of human development that is synonymous with, or reduced to brain 
development. This vision reproduces the understanding that the brain is the only entity 
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needed for the self, or as Vidal (2009) noted, the brain and the self become 
“consubstantial” (p. 7).  
 Technology metaphors. Cozolino often described the structure and function of the 
brain as a computer or other communication and information processing device. 
 “Although we usually think of the cortex as a giant hard drive capable of storing 
 huge amounts of data, another primary role of the cortex is inhibition” (p. 22). 
 
 “In order for a neuron to survive and grow, it must wire with other neurons in 
 increasingly complex interconnections” (p. 67). 
 
 “Because these neural networks are sculpted during early interactions, we emerge 
 into self-awareness preprogrammed by unconsciously organized hidden layers of 
 neural processing” (p. 72).  
 
 “Early memories stored in circuits of the amygdala and right hemisphere can 
 intrude into adult consciousness in a variety of ways” (p. 87). 
 
 “Although redundant hemispheres provide certain benefits, such as a backup 
 system in case of injury, hemispheric specialization via natural selection promotes 
 neural complexity” (p. 94). 
 
 “Genetic expression is programmed by experience” (p. 217). 
 “We have seen a great deal of evidence of the impact of early nurturance on the 
 shaping of the social brain and its emotional circuitry” (p. 227). 
 
 “In fact the human brain is criss-crossed with neural networks dedicated to 
 receiving, processing, and communicating messages across the social synapse”  
 (p. 227). 
 
 “Since the networks connecting the ompfc and the amygdala are shaped by 
 experience, our learning history of what is safe and dangerous, including our 
 attachment schema, is thought to be encoded within this system” (p. 231). 
 
 These metaphors were noteworthy because they equate the brain with 
contemporary machinery, thereby also equating the functioning of the self with the 
functioning of modern devices devised by applied science. In other words, this figure of 
speech reduces human mentation to machine processes.  
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 Building and infrastructure metaphors. Cozolino characterized the structure and 
functioning of the brain by comparing it to architectural design and infrastructure. 
 “A therapist attempts to restructure neural architecture in the service of more 
 adaptive behavior, cognition, and emotion” (p. 9).  
 
 “The neural architecture of the brain comes to embody the environment that 
 shapes it. You could also think of our neural architecture as a tangible expression 
 of our learning history” (p. 19). 
 
 The way we organize and understand ambiguous stimuli gives us clues about the 
 architecture of the hidden layers of neural processing (how our unconscious 
 organizes the world; p. 34). 
 
 “This process most likely enhances the growth of ompfc and dlpfc systems, while 
 building new brain networks to bridge the two for higher level awareness”  
 (p. 161). 
 
 “The hippocampus is constantly remodeled in response to new information”  
 (p. 310). 
 
 By describing the brain as a physical structure that manifests self and personal 
history, Cozolino portrayed psychological changes or changes in self in a highly reified 
and materialistic manner. 
 Earlier (see pp. 9-16) I discussed examples of historical research about 
neuroscientific endeavors that suggested ways in which the brain has been used in 
popular culture to depict a materialization of mind or psyche in accordance with various 
Western cultural and societal movements during the 19th and 20th centuries. The 
metaphors above suggested ways in which Cozolino replicated that trend. In the context 
of a book promoted as a psychotherapy text, these metaphors extract self (and therefore 
valuable concepts such as insight and agency) from social context and instead place self 
in a discourse of instrumentalism and materialism regardless of the appeals to visions of 
self as inherently social, or initially formed within the context of relationships, which also 
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appear in his text. This produces a basic contradiction in Cozolino’s argument that works 
against his professed ideals. 
 Personification. Personification is the attribution of human abilities to nonhuman 
objects. Cozolino used personification to depict the brain as possessing qualities or 
capable of performing tasks typically associated with human beings. 
 “A brain which is challenged comes to be more complex, active, and robust”  
 (p. 19). 
 
 Our cortex then provides us with rationalizations and beliefs about our behaviors 
 that help keep our coping strategies in place, possibly for a lifetime. These neural 
 and psychic structures can lead to either psychological and physical health, or 
 illness and disability. (p. 23) 
 
 “The very way that the brain has evolved to successfully cope with immediate 
 threat appears to have created a vulnerability to longer term psychological 
 distress: Enter psychotherapy” (p. 25).  
 
 “The neural circuitry involved with fear has a tenacious memory and can invisibly 
 influence conscious awareness for a lifetime” (p. 34). 
 
 After birth, newborns continue to move all parts of their bodies, allowing them to 
 discover their hands and feet as they pass in front of their faces. Although these 
 movements may look random, they are the brain’s best guess at which movements 
 will eventually be needed” (p. 68). 
 
 “This confabulatory and positive self-bias. . . . also reflects the brain’s basic 
 instinct to engage in explanatory behavior for things it cannot understand”  
 (pp. 103-104). 
 
 “The posterior parietal regions weave together sensory information about our 
 physical environment with networks of organized motoric actions and intentions 
 which (along with the frontal lobes) create goal-directed action plans” (p. 142). 
 
 “The brain’s ability to take our physical experience and use it metaphorically is 
 the basis of imagination” (p. 146). 
 
 “Thus, if our neurons become depressed so do we” (p. 220). 
 “So, by the time we become conscious of others, our brain has already made 
 decisions about them” (p. 244). 
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 “The amygdala can learn, throughout life, to pair any stimulus (even physical 
 affection or praise) with fear” (p. 245). 
 
 “The existence of these sophisticated social neural systems reflects the millions of 
 years of natural selection that have been refining our brain’s ability to read the 
 emotions, thoughts, and intentions of others” (p. 314). 
 
 Personification of the brain was significant because it suggests that the brain has 
its own volition independent of individuals that influences and asserts control over 
behavior and thinking. The portrayal of the brain as a source of human experience and 
functioning implies an understanding of human selfhood as extracted from sociocultural 
expectations and reduces experience to an observable location within the human body. 
Since this rhetorical device renders agency, identity, and choice as concepts that are best 
studied through a scientific study of the brain, the understanding of human selfhood 
becomes greatly dependent upon however brain research is interpreted.  
 These statements evoke an understanding of human beings that is consistent with 
an interiorized yet materialized self, similar to the challenge to the idea of a “ghost in the 
machine” posited by philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1949). This view understands the brain to 
be the source of the mind and human behavior, thereby attempting to reconcile the 
problems of mind-body dualism based on the idea that mind is a nonmaterial entity 
(comparable to a ghost) inhabiting the physical body. Personification of the brain in these 
passages therefore establishes human agency as a matter of influencing or controlling 
brain functioning to gain control over one’s life, and it implies that without recent 
neuroscientific advances it would be unknowable why humans think, behave, and interact 
with each other in the ways that they do. As Vidal (2009) summarized, even when 
neuroscientific literature states an objection to reducing mind to brain, if personification 
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is used to describe brain functions, the result is a twofold reductionism: First, a reduction 
of self to brain, and second, a reduction of psychology or social knowledge to 
neuroscientific information.   
 Prosopopoeia. Prosopopoeia is a type of personification in which human abilities 
are ascribed to a nonmaterial entity or concept such as mind or emotion rather than a 
physical object such as brain.  
 “As affect is repeatedly brought into the therapeutic relationship and successfully 
 managed, the client gradually internalizes these skills by sculpting the neural 
 structures necessary for autoregulation” (p. 21).  
 
 “Flashbacks, memories from traumatic experiences, likely reside in amygdaloid-
 driven memory networks” (p. 86). 
 
 “Language within significant relationships has shaped the brain during evolution 
 and continues to do so throughout our lives. (p. 343)  
 
 Narratives embedded within an emotionally meaningful relationship (like 
 psychotherapy) are capable of resculpting neural networks throughout life”  
 (p. 343). 
 
 “The pathways containing these traumatic memories become hyperpotentiated, 
 meaning that they are more easily triggered by less severe subsequent stressors” 
 (p. 249).  
 
 This type of personification was significant because it was used to explain how 
individual subjectivity is connected to the material or external world (which includes the 
human body itself) by depicting the brain as receiving nonmaterial experience and storing 
information or memories. Integrating the external world and private experience by 
describing the brain as a connective organ within the body assumes a split between public 
and private or social and individual realms in a way that perpetuates dualist philosophy. 
 Summary of rhetorical strategies and elements of writing style. In The 
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain, Cozolino (2010) applied a 
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variety of recurring rhetorical strategies that were noteworthy for how they fused mind 
and brain through his use of language. For example, some statements were ambiguous or 
unclear with regard to whether they were intended to refer to brains or to humans; other 
statements suggested (but did not clearly articulate) a relationship between brain 
functioning and mind or subjective experience. Further, Cozolino used analogies to imply 
specific relationships between human experience and neurobiology, yet often those 
statements also lacked any clearly delineated arguments. Cozolino’s infrequent, brief, yet 
very important statements casting serious doubt on the entire premise of his book seemed 
to be what literary experts call aporia, and the dismissive and inadequate discussions 
about those doubts seemed to annul any genuine concern he might have had with those 
problematic aspects of his book.  
 Cozolino used diction (word choice) to redefine or reappropriate psychological 
terms as neuroscientific concepts, thereby synthesizing psychology and neuroscience 
through the use of rhetoric rather than through scientific argument. This obfuscated the 
boundaries between neuroscience and psychological or psychotherapy theories instead of 
directly defining those boundaries or giving good reason why they should be combined in 
such an unproblematic way. Epigraphs (quotes preceding chapters and subsections of the 
book) were ubiquitous and suggestive of an attempt to universalize Cozolino’s 
neuroscience-psychotherapy integration and to portray brain research as providing 
evidence that confirms the legitimacy of timeless observations about humans and human 
society. Figures of speech were also frequent and they included metaphors (such as 
technological and child development metaphors for the brain), and personification of the 
structure and functioning of the brain. The figures of speech suggested reductionist and 
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scientized depictions of relationships between unique concepts or fields of study without 
adequate discussion about the implications of these discourses. In general, Cozolino’s 
book was heavy with rhetoric in a way that is noteworthy in light of the criticisms leveled 
against cognitive neuroscience literature with regards to language that could be 
obfuscating or misleading despite appearing to many readers as legitimate and truthful 
scientific evidence that mind or self is easily studied through brain science. 
Themes 
 In this section I discuss themes that emerged from recurring topics or arguments 
throughout Cozolino’s book. 
 Evolution as a central organizing principle. This appeared to be Cozolino’s 
overarching theme. He used evolution or Darwinian theory of natural selection to argue 
that the human brain is responsible for human development, psychology, self, 
psychological problems or illness, the emergence of psychotherapy as a mental health 
treatment, and physiological mechanisms of effective psychotherapy.  
 The evolution of the human brain explains the growth and advancement of 
human societies. Cozolino argued that humans organized into groups because doing so 
enhanced survival, which in turn supported the evolution of a brain capable of complex 
language and thinking abilities necessary for the advancement of societies. 
 “Using evolution as an organizing principle, we begin with the assumption that 
 our highly social brains have been shaped by natural selection because banding 
 together in groups enhances survival” (p. 177). 
 
 As social groups grew even larger, more cortical geography was needed to 
 process increasingly complicated social information. This coevolution of 
 relationships, language, and brain allowed for the development of higher levels of 
 symbolic and abstract functioning. In other words, early caretaking and intimate 
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 relationships are a fundamental building block in the evolution of the human 
 brain. (p. 178) 
 
 In these passages Cozolino argued for a co-occurring and interdependent 
relationship between the progression of the brain across the history of the human species, 
and the advancement of human societies into their vast and complex manifestations. In 
other words, he asserted a correlation between changes in the brain and changes in human 
society but he evaded phrasing that would have posited a causal relationship. This 
naturalized culture, human relationships, and social order.  
 The evolution of the human brain explains human culture. Cozolino speculated 
that a variety of human abilities, endeavors, and shared traditions result from the 
evolution of the human brain. 
 Because of the evolutionary links between motor behavior and cognition, some 
 theorists consider cognition to be a derivative of motor behavior (Wilson, 1998). 
 Support for this idea may exist in that much of our symbolic and abstract thinking 
 is organized by the visceral, sensory, and motor metaphors that permeate our 
 language. (Johnson, 1987, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 117) 
 
 According to Cozolino, the fact that some common metaphors use descriptions of 
physical abilities or sensations to illustrate abstract or nonmaterial concepts might be is 
evidence that mind or cognition emerges from bodily processes. His argument extracted 
nuances of contemporary language such as figures of speech from their social and 
historical context and depicted them as illustrative of inseparability between mind and 
body. In other words, rather than embodying a shared way of communicating and 
understanding within a culture or social group, Cozolino instead portrayed certain 
metaphors as a means by which the human brain projects some primitive knowledge 
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about how the human species was adept at physical development and survival prior to its 
advanced psychological functioning. 
 “When we think of the human cerebral cortex, we may think of the 
 accomplishments of music, art, and culture—products of cortical and especially 
 prefrontal evolution” (p. 119). 
 
 This passage suggested that higher-order thinking abilities such as planning, 
organizing, mental manipulation, and abstract thinking, which have been associated with 
the functioning of the outer layers of the human brain, explain or are necessary for the 
remarkable human developments of “music, art, and culture” and the uniquely human 
way of creating and appreciating these social practices. While it is true that humans 
require brains for devising and sharing phenomena such as music and art, Cozolino made 
an assertion about the evolution of the brain (especially the cortex that he valorized) 
instead of building a coherent argument about how brain functioning explains societal 
institutions and their significant historical purposes. This is problematic because his 
assertion ambitiously conveys a reduction of social traditions and practices to the brain 
without providing a clear understanding for why this vision of human beings is accurate. 
 Our brains allow us to fashion clothing, build houses with heating systems, and 
 create sophisticated farming techniques that allow us to expand our habitats and 
 sources of food. But does this explain why we have relationships? We know that 
 the expansion of the cortex in primates correlates with increasingly large social 
 groups. (pp. 214-215) 
 
 With this passage Cozolino argued that the brain rather than societies facilitated 
the progression of civilization toward effectively functioning and providing physical 
sustenance to multitudes of citizens. He then used that argument to compare 
technological advancements to human relationships by asserting that both phenomena are 
enabled by the way in which the human brain evolved and the human cortex expanded. 
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Although complex social groups and complex human technologies may have emerged 
together, Cozolino’s deemphasizing of human relationships or shared historical traditions 
exemplified how it is problematic or at least incomplete to apply Darwinian theory as an 
explanation for every aspect of human life. As with the passages above, his assertion 
cannot adequately substitute for a properly delineated argument.  
 The evolution of the human brain explains the emergence of self. In the 
following passage Cozolino attributed some of the defining features of self to the parietal 
lobes of the human brain, thereby using the evolution of the human brain as an 
explanation for the accuracy of the psychological theories of self that he favored. 
 The parietal lobes’ interconnections with the rest of the cortex allowed for the 
 integration of working visual memory, attentional capacities, and bodily 
 awareness necessary for these imaginal abilities. This suggests that our self-
 awareness was likely built in a stepwise manner during evolution through a series 
 of overlapping “maps”—first of the physical environment, then of self in 
 environment, and later of self as environment. Thus, the growth of imaginal 
 abilities allowed us to create an increasingly sophisticated inner topography.  
 (p. 141) 
 
 Cozolino emphasized the concept of an inner world as a necessary and defining 
feature of self. With this concept Cozolino differentiated between public and private lives 
and the need to balance personal space or tolerance for being alone with interpersonal 
involvement or emotional attunement with other people. He portrayed the balance 
between these aspects of contemporary human beings as possible because of the way that 
the brain supports those competing and complementary needs. In other words, social 
artifacts such as the concept of the self are reduced in an ahistorical and scientized 
manner to neurological products. His passage naturalizes and materializes the concept of 
an inner world or inner self, and therefore also reduces psychology to neurology. 
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 Psychoanalytic theory of mind was actually a description for how the human 
brain evolved and generates human experience. Cozolino described traditional 
psychoanalytic theory of mind as a description of the functioning of the human brain.  
 “Maclean described the human brain as a three-part system that embodies our 
 evolutionary connection to both reptiles and lower mammals” (p. 5) 
 
 “What Charcot and Freud called dissociation and hysteria could well have been 
 the result of inadequate integration and coordination among these different, 
 cohabitating brains. MacLean’s description…roughly parallels Freud’s distinction 
 of the conscious and unconscious minds” (p. 6). 
 
 Cozolino argued that Freud’s theory of a tripartite division of mind was 
unknowingly a description of the brain, which Cozolino understood to be comprised of 
three parts that produce competing needs and other aspects of human beings that Freud 
described. Earlier (see pp. 106-110) I discussed how this claim was a major premise for 
Cozolino’s mind-brain integration in the context of psychotherapy. These passages 
illustrate how a reduction of mind to brain entails a reduction of psychology to neurology 
and other neuroscientific disciplines, and Cozolino acknowledged that this broad 
disciplinary reduction was one of the purposes of his book. 
 The evolution of the human brain explains contemporary problems of self. 
Cozolino depicted a close relationship between brain and self, and he concluded that 
psychological problems are a disruption in how the brain facilitates the human experience 
of a coherent sense of self. In the following passage, he attributed many emotional and 
psychological problems to irrational thinking caused by human imagination. 
 With the expansion of the cerebral cortex and the emergence of imagination, we 
 have become capable of being anxious about situations we will never experience. 
 We can now worry about monsters living under our beds and the incineration of 
 the earth resulting from the sun’s expansion. Because our imaginal capabilities 
 218 
 have allowed for the construction of the self, we can also become anxious about 
 potential threats to our psychological survival. (p. 240) 
 
 In this passage Cozolino argued that imagination is a defining characteristic of 
selfhood and it is enabled by the complexity of the brain. This is one of the primary ways 
by which Cozolino linked brain and self, and he used that connection to describe many 
contemporary problems of self as products of imagination or irrational thinking caused by 
the brain. This was a remarkably reductionist and asocial vision of human self.  
 Psychopathology inhibits fitness or survival of the species. The following 
passage described the effects of childhood trauma using evolutionary rhetoric. 
 “When children are traumatized, abused, or neglected, they are taught that they 
 are not among the chosen. They grow to have thoughts, states of mind, emotions, 
 and immunological functions that are inconsistent with well-being, successful 
 procreation, and long-term survival” (p. 206). 
 
 Some readers might overlook the association between phrases such as “successful 
procreation” and “long-term survival” as components of Darwinian theory because 
Cozolino insufficiently outlined evolutionary theory before applying it and referencing it 
in such a sweeping and connective way throughout his book. The implication that typical 
psychological functioning and wellbeing or the absence of psychological illness supports 
evolutionary theory is a rather scientized and limiting view of psychological health and 
illness that stands counter to a view of health and illness as social constructs which are 
certainly important for many Western cultures but not at all universal across human 
societies.  
 Psychotherapy emerged because of how the brain evolved. Cozolino argued that 
the brain evolved so as to develop in accordance with a person’s environment and the 
quality of relationships and is negatively affected by the developmental limitations in the 
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immature brain. According to his theory, early childhood development is formative for 
psychological health, yet because of the plasticity that the brain retains throughout the 
lifespan, change is possible after early childhood. This implied that psychotherapy 
happens to correct or heal difficulties that arise from these characteristics of the brain.  
 Many of our most important socioemotional learning experiences are organized 
 and controlled by reflexes, behaviors, and emotions outside of our awareness and 
 distorted by our immature brains. To a great extent, psychotherapy owes its 
 existence to these artifacts of evolution and development. (p. 9) 
 
 Evolution’s legacy is a complex brain, vulnerable to a variety of factors that can 
 disrupt the growth and integration of important neural networks. The field of 
 psychotherapy has emerged because of the brain’s vulnerability to these 
 developmental and environmental risks. (p. 11)  
 
 The human brain is an amazing organ, capable of continual growth and lifelong 
 adaptation to an ever-changing array of challenges. Our understanding of how the 
 brain accomplishes this mandate increases with each new theoretical development 
 and technological advance. At the same time, we are uncovering some of natural 
 selection’s more problematic choices. If necessity is the mother of invention, then 
 evolution itself has created the necessity for psychotherapy by shaping a brain that 
 is vulnerable to a wide array of difficulties. (p. 306) 
 
 These ahistorical passages placed psychotherapy as a corrective intervention for 
natural problems caused by or manifested in the functioning of the human brain (see also 
General history of psychotherapy according to Cozolino, pp. 106-113). By explaining 
psychological difficulties as inevitable products of the brain, Cozolino implied that 
mental problems and disorders are ahistorical phenomena that would have appeared 
regardless of however else societies and cultures developed over the course of human 
history. This was a reductionist and scientized understanding of selfhood and problems of 
the self.  
 In sum, Cozolino used evolutionary theory to portray a relationship between the 
advancement of the human brain and the advancement of human societies, as well as the 
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emergence of culture and selfhood. He applied evolution as an all-encompassing theory 
that is able to link neuroscience and psychology generally, and mind and brain 
specifically, through materializing psychological problems and the curative mechanisms 
of psychotherapy. The passages above suggested that Cozolino used evolutionary theory 
to portray an ahistorical and scientistic vision of human beings, culture, and psychology.  
 Synonymity and convergence between academic disciplines, areas of study, 
and types of human relationships. Another primary theme of Cozolino’s book was the 
integration between various fields of study and human relationships. He positioned 
neuroscience research as evidence that neural functioning is the common underlying 
factor uniting disparate fields or social institutions that might otherwise be considered as 
fundamentally separate. 
 Reducing various fields of study to molecular biology. In the following passage 
Cozolino argued that molecular biology is the newest field of research that might unify a 
variety of psychological and medical disciplines by reducing the findings and practices of 
those disciplines to underlying gene expression that they each may actually be describing. 
 Research in psychoanalysis, epidemiology, developmental psychology, and 
 psychiatry have all supported what we think of as common sense: A good 
 childhood is better than a bad one; positive parental attention is important; and 
 less stress early in life is a good thing. Of course, each field explains these 
 findings from its own theoretical model and tends to see other perspectives as 
 secondary. Recent research in molecular biology offers us a groundbreaking view 
 into the underlying mechanism of the effects of early experience on genetic 
 expression, that is, how early experience triggers gene expression to guide our 
 brains onto particular adaptational trajectories. (p. 213) 
 
 With these statements Cozolino first criticized a number of fields of study for 
disregarding what he portrayed as equally valid points of other fields in regards to ideal 
qualities for childhood development. He then grouped all of those fields together and 
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argued that they are secondary to the study of how genetic predisposition and human 
experience interact to form the totality of a human being. Instead of integrating the 
epistemologies by broadening them to include an understanding of the larger cultural 
context in which they are all fighting for primacy, he reduced them all as secondary to the 
“underlying mechanisms” of gene expression researched by the field of molecular 
biology. Neuroscience, he proclaimed, is the master science. However, an assertion is not 
a solid argument. 
 Recent advances in mind-brain research suggest that psychology and neurology 
should be integrated into a single field as Freud intended. Earlier (pp. 107-110) I 
discussed how Cozolino claimed that psychology emerged from neurology because Freud 
(who first trained and practiced as a neurologist) was the founding psychoanalytic 
theorist. Cozolino identified the split between the two fields as having emerged when 
Freud gave up on his early interest in exploring a brain-based explanation for human 
cognition and psychopathology in favor of a theory of a nonmaterial mind after realizing 
that a mind-brain connection would have received little acceptance among the medical 
establishment, and would lack scientific evidence without the advances in neuroscience 
developed later in the 20th century (see General history of psychotherapy according to 
Cozolino, pp. 106-113). In those passages Cozolino asserted that the differences between 
psychology and neurology are artificial because the two fields both provide treatment for 
conditions that arise from the brain.  
 However exciting the goal of merging psychology and neurology may seem to 
some readers, the rationale underlying that vision was a historical inaccuracy about 
Freud’s intentions which, even if it was true, seems irrelevant to the tenuous argument 
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that self or mind is actually brain and therefore neurology and psychology should be 
combined even though each field serves extremely different yet significant purposes. The 
effect of advocating for an integration between the two fields was a further blurring 
between mind and brain. His advocacy for integration might just be a justification for 
how he does it.  
 Psychoanalytic theory, Buddhist philosophy, and neuroscience all reach the 
same conclusions. Cozolino asserted that Buddhist philosophy (which he identified as a 
personal longstanding interest) and psychoanalytic theory both contend that the 
perception of reality is illusory or highly subjective, even though it appears certain to 
individuals. He asserted that this area of convergence convergence is further supported by 
the findings of brain research.  
 Although controversial, the way in which the brain generates consciousness, 
 including its many distortions, may have been subject to the pressures of natural 
 selection. . . . You will soon see that the take-home message from psychoanalysis, 
 Buddhism, and neuroscience is to be a skeptical consumer of the offerings of your 
 mind. (pp. 133-134) 
 
 With this passage Cozolino posited that Buddhist philosophy and psychoanalytic 
theory share a common interpretation of the relationship between individual human life 
and the external world, and then he claimed that neuroscientific research explains and 
offers proof for why those two worldviews are both correct in valuing a skeptical outlook 
about the world. He also treats the mind as separate from the individual since it offers 
things to the “consumer.” This reinforces a view of self as an individual that has little 
control over his or her psychological experiences yet gains agency by learning that the 
findings of neuroscience confirm that reality is illusory, perceptions of truth are 
questionable, and identity is ultimately flexible. The use of neuroscience to support a 
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highly ideological view of reality presents possible philosophical contradictions between 
the alluring prospect of scientific objectivity and the assertion that a shared truth may 
ultimately be absent.  
 Using neuroscience to integrate psychotherapy theories. Earlier (pp. 121-126) I 
discussed Cozolino’s use of neuroscience to promote what is called a common factors 
approach to psychotherapy. According to this integration, therapy tends to be effective 
when several core qualities or principles are all present. Cozolino argued that each of 
these common qualities or factors represents a specific type of neural integration, that is, 
a syncing or coordination between areas of the brain required for coherent psychological 
functioning and wellbeing. With his explanation of the purpose and efficacy of 
psychotherapy, Cozolino asserted that therapy utilizes the neurobiological property of 
neuroplasticity in a way that coincides with intended psychological change. In other 
words, therapy modalities facilitate the corresponding or underlying neural integration 
processes, as confirmed by the findings of recent neuroimaging studies used in mind-
brain research. I discussed the ways in which this argument is reductionist and relies on 
neuroscience to resolve contentious debates in professional psychology about the 
standards of patient care and the best ways to assess of psychological healing.  
 Neuroscience provides psychotherapists with an explanation for how and why 
therapy is effective. The following two statements were exemplary of Cozolino’s claim 
that neuroscience shows physical correlates for what had previously been assumed to be a 
nonmaterial or nonphysical psychological or relational process. 
 Social relationships have the power to stimulate the neural plasticity required for 
 new learning. The interpersonal and emotional aspects of the therapeutic 
 relationship, referred to as a nonspecific factor in the psychotherapy outcome 
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 literature, may be the primary mechanism of therapeutic action. . . . These 
 nonspecific factors are, in fact, quite specific, as early maternal care has been 
 linked to increased neural plasticity, emotional regulation, and attachment 
 behavior. (p. 38) 
 
 What is it that allows us to become self-aware, generate explanations, and modify 
 long-standing ways of being? How do we expand conscious awareness in ways 
 that allow us to change? Obviously, something has to change in the way our 
 brains process information when we benefit from psychotherapy. (p. 140) 
 
 With these statements Cozolino positioned psychotherapy as a physiological 
restructuring that he claimed is observable through neuroimaging. He stated that 
“nonspecific factors” (p. 38) or the broad qualities necessary for successful therapy 
outcomes yet not necessarily tied to specific techniques or interventions are now 
measurable as brain changes that coincide with positive therapeutic results. In other 
words, by reducing therapeutic processes to brain functioning Cozolino believed he had 
provided a straightforward and concise explanation for an issue that has been the subject 
of much research and debate in psychotherapy. Earlier (p. 125) I discussed how this 
attempt at psychotherapy integration is simplistic, assumes that agreement is possible 
among competing psychotherapy scholars and their often-disparate approaches, and 
would furthermore require an uncritical acceptance of neuroscience as a true and unifying 
institution in psychology and psychotherapy.  
 Equating parenting and psychotherapy. Cozolino compared parenting and 
psychotherapy on the basis that each relationship alters gene expression in the same way. 
 “The idea that psychotherapy is a kind of reparenting may be more than a 
 metaphor; it may be precisely what we are attempting to accomplish at the level 
 of the epigenome” (p. 227). 
 
 Cozolino speculated that parents may influence the brains of children in a way 
that is identical to how therapists influence the brains of patients, thereby proving that 
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therapists re-parent patients. This was an example of reducing a cultural metaphor (and 
the moral discourse it represents about the origins of illness and healing) to a physical 
organ that has the capacity to recognize and respond to the qualities of ideal parents 
regardless of the unique purpose or boundaries of the relationship. In other words, 
Cozolino appealed to brain research as identifying the similar functions of valued societal 
institutions such as therapy and parenting. This exemplified how reductionism might 
overlook important cultural nuances in an effort to depict unique relationships as 
significant insofar as they use technical means to confer physiological change upon a 
person in times of growth or healing. This is also an understanding of psychotherapy as a 
process of re-parenting that infantilizes patients and draws from a romanticism 
philosophy that ideas such as innerness and authenticity, replicating an individualized 
view of self as extractable from its broader context and striving toward a knowable 
personal potential or ideal (see Sass, 1988). 
 In sum, Cozolino portrayed a convergence among various areas of study and 
concepts within those areas of study, and between types of human relationships. For 
example, he suggested that psychoanalytic theory, and theories of human development 
and psychopathology are all observations of genetic inheritance (and the environmental 
malleability of that biological predisposition). In his book he also argued that psychology 
and neurology should be reunited now that neuroimaging can evaluate the legitimacy of 
Freudian theory. Cozolino used neuroscience as the basis of psychotherapy integration, 
and he suggested that neuroscience confirms a highly subjective view of reality (he stated 
that psychoanalysis and Buddhism each value such a philosophical position). He also 
argued that psychotherapy leads to changes in patients’ brains in ways that are similar to 
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how parents support healthy neural development in children. Throughout his book, these 
efforts at disciplinary integration often suggested reductionism of unique fields of study, 
and significant aspects of human development and experience, to the same material 
explanations or origins.  
 The brain as an inexact controller of perception. According to Cozolino, the 
human brain organizes and controls perception in accordance with what it learned about 
relationships and the world during early childhood. He explained that over the course of 
human history the brain evolved to function in this way, thereby making each person’s 
experience of the world unique and based on personal biases or expectations even when 
individuals believe that they are experiencing an objective or truthful view of the world.  
 Despite the appearance of personal control and volition, the brain dictates 
individual functioning and experience of the world. Cozolino described how the brain 
evolved to exert a great deal of control over individual functioning. He also asserted that 
the brain has “hidden layers” that function outside of awareness and drive subjective 
psychological experience and functioning. In other words, he discussed the hidden layers 
of the brain as if they are the location of the unconscious mind—that is, they cannot be 
observed yet their existence can be ascertained by how they cause people to behave and 
think. 
 “Although we tend to think of our brains as processing information from the 
 environment, the vast majority of the input to the cerebral cortex comes from 
 what is already inside the brain” (p. 135). 
 “By now it is clear that our brains are in the business of constructing rather than 
 conveying reality” (p. 138). 
 
 We actually live about 500 milliseconds after the moment and our past learning 
 severely limits our free will. The illusion of free will and control have obvious 
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 survival advantages, foremost of which is the ability to be assertive and confident 
 in complex situations. (p. 313) 
 
 This projection onto the screen of our Cartesian theater is actually generated 
 within the hidden layers of our neural architecture prior to conscious awareness. 
 This leads us to assume that the world of our experience and the objective world 
 are one and the same. We also tend to believe that we have all the necessary 
 information we need to make choices. In truth, we often have little or no access to 
 the information or logic upon which we base our decisions. (p. 135) 
 
 These passages were all exemplary of Cozolino’s claim that humans are generally 
under the control of the brain while remaining under the “illusion” that they have volition 
or “free will.” In these passages Cozolino explained that an individual’s brain makes 
decisions without his or her input. For example, his claim that “the illusion of free will 
and control have obvious survival advantages, foremost of which is the ability to be 
assertive and confident in complex situations” (p. 313) implied that brains deceive 
individuals (rather than individuals deceiving themselves) in order to adapt to stressful 
situations and perform tasks well under pressure. From this premise it would seem that 
learning about the brain is a necessary step in a process of regaining a sense of control or 
self-directedness. His assertions draw from a vision of self that is consistent with the 
problems of the “ghost in the machine” (Ryle, 1949); it is an attempt to overcome the 
Cartesian illusion by materializing the mind, which requires taking for granted the 
compartmentalized view of personhood and the personification of the brain as the source 
of human beings that this materializing and localizing of self necessarily requires. This 
appears to be a form of cognitivism (which is common to many psychotherapy theories; 
see Cushman, 1995) although it is at once dressed up and justified by neuroscience. The 
implication is that we must take control over our lives by taking control over our brains. 
The implications of the use of personification in these passages is a good example of 
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Vidal’s (2009) argument that even when neuroscientific literature states an objection to 
reducing mind or self to brain, personification of the brain often implies mind-brain 
reductionism anyway—not only of mind to brain, but also a reduction of psychology to 
neuroscience. For example, since the hidden layers of the brain were suggested to be the 
source of the Freudian unconscious, the concept of the unconscious mind might be 
inferred to be a historical placeholder for a neurobiological concept rather than an 
corresponding location (or an alternative explanation) for it. As I discussed earlier (see 
Aporia, pp. 178-182), Cozolino briefly acknowledged this important issue, and then he 
responded by abdicating responsibility as the author for how readers might interpret his 
text. 
 Cozolino’s concept of hidden layers mapped unconscious experience onto the 
human brain, and this warrants some discussion. He stated that the hidden layers organize 
experience outside of individual awareness and therefore produce defenses that emerge 
spontaneously, thereby causing disorganized and immature reactions to distress, which 
then impairs psychosocial functioning. In other words, as therapists we recognize the 
workings of the hidden layers by observing how patients adapt, cope, and function, but it 
was unclear whether Cozolino intended to imply that these neural layers are hidden 
because they are unobservable by current neuroimaging techniques, or whether they are 
hidden from humans yet observed by neuroimaging. Regardless, with this concept 
Cozolino established a reason for individuals to be skeptical of what they think is reality, 
yet he also encouraged readers to trust that the functioning of the brain is the reason why 
that skepticism or uncertainty is warranted. This is a disguised ideology or moral 
discourse. Cozolino valorized an attitude of skepticism about the external material world 
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(which would seemingly suggest a loss of self-directedness or personal control), and then 
he implied that a person may regain that control over his or her life because the amount 
of freedom or agency that individuals possess may be ascertained by learning about the 
internal physical location of that control and recognizing how to influence and change it. 
in this view one way to change the hidden layers is through psychotherapy, which I 
discuss in the following subsection. 
 The therapeutic correction to the distortions of the hidden layers of neural 
processing. Cozolino explained psychotherapy as a process that corrects problems caused 
by the brain by counteracting the brain’s decisions and reorganizing is functioning. 
 Based on observations of all levels of the client’s behavior, the therapist attempts 
 to bring the processing of the hidden layers to the client’s attention. Repeated and 
 skillful attention to unconscious material via interpretations, confrontations, and 
 clarifications results in a gradually expanded awareness of unconscious processes 
 and the integration of dissociated top-down and right-left processing networks.  
 (p. 35) 
 
 Most forms of psychotherapy attempt to shine the light of conscious awareness on 
 belief perseverance and attribution biases, and undermine the conservative nature 
 of the hidden layers. Others engage in a deep exploration of the dynamic 
 unconscious, defenses, and primitive emotional states. By encouraging clients to 
 be open to new ideas, explore the connections within their hidden layers, and take 
 responsibility for positive change, we challenge them to reorganize the neural 
 networks of their hidden layers. (p. 138) 
 
 Once we wake up to how our brains work, what do we do? How can we overcome 
 or at least cope with our distortions, impulses, and unconscious drives in 
 constructive and healthy ways? Fortunately, our brains contain structures and 
 networks that allow us to counteract some of the hidden layers. (pp. 138-139) 
 
 In these passages Cozolino described therapy as a means of coping with and 
counteracting the brain. This was suggestive of cognitivism. Since he equated the 
material brain with the psychological mind, his theory is an extraordinary effort at 
reductionism. Cozolino argued that patients must remain open to new ways of thinking 
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and take responsibility for changing, and through those steps patients alter the 
functioning of their brains in ways that makes these changes permanent. This is similar to 
an early modern era understanding of madness and sanity (see Cushman, 1995; Foucault, 
1961/1988; Scull, 1975) and it fails to explain how humans are to think rationally in order 
to doubt the reality produced by the brain if it is through the brain that humans think. As I 
discussed earlier (see Aporia, pp. 178-182), Cozolino explicitly acknowledged this 
problem but refused to even address it, thereby raising doubts about the purpose and 
meaningfulness of the entire text. It hints at the disguised ideology of skepticism or doubt 
about the external material world. 
 Neurobiological functioning explains many typical human experiences. 
Cozolino provided numerous examples of neuroscientific explanations for how humans 
commonly think, act, and talk about themselves and the world.  
 For example, Cozolino described the game Simon Says, and the 
neurophysiological systems needed to participate in it, by noting, “The popularity of this 
game reflects the development of these systems as well as a way to exercise voluntary 
control over impulses” (p. 130). Cozolino linked the psychological experience 
(“popularity”) of a common children’s activity to the development stage at which they 
are able to participate in it. Of note, it was unclear how the popularity of a children’s 
game (rather than the ability of children to perform the tasks required for it) reflects 
neurophysiological development.  
 The brain’s ability to take our physical experience and use it metaphorically is the 
 basis of imagination. For example, jumping down a slide may serve as a sensory-
 motor metaphor for falling in love. The child’s experience of emerging from 
 under the covers into the light of day provides a metaphor for religious 
 enlightenment later in life. The balance provided by the vestibular system may be 
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 the model for psychological and emotional stability, and ultimately for leading a 
 more balanced life (Frick, 1982). Physical metaphors provide a contextual 
 grounding in time and space that helps us grasp our experience and may serve as 
 an infrastructure of higher cognitive processes. (Cozolino, 2010, pp. 146-147) 
 
 This passage exemplified Cozolino’s argument that cultural traditions and shared 
descriptions of them emanate from certain desires or intentions of the brain itself, which 
people happen to have in common because of the way the brain evolved over the history 
of the species. In the passage above, Cozolino asserted that the brain recognizes when 
certain meaningful human experiences (such as falling in love or having a spiritual 
awakening) produce similar feelings as certain physical sensations, and then it decides to 
compare the physical and psychological experiences using the figure of speech of 
metaphor. Because members of a society share colloquial or idiomatic expressions (and 
therefore share the moral understandings that are implicated in those cultural 
expressions), the passage naturalized those values and discourses by identifying them as 
products of the material world that are produced by the brain in order to coordinate 
bodily processes. The passage was noteworthy because it illustrates how the reduction of 
mind to brain can lead to an individualized material reduction of the social or shared 
understanding of the good. This a good example of how the use of evolutionary theory 
and neuroscience to explain social traditions seems to primarily reinforce a modern era 
understanding of the self as a detached, private, and somatic individual.  
 “Most of us have felt the firing of these familiarity circuits in an exaggerated form 
 when we unexpectedly run into a friend in an unusual place” (p. 153).  
 
 In this passage Cozolino described the feeling of familiarity or recognition of 
other people as the experience of having “felt” the neurobiological process that is 
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believed to correspond or coincide with that social experience. Cozolino rewrote an 
important yet typical human experience in terms of neurobiology. 
 “Many new mothers report an increasing need during the first year to get out into 
 the world of adults or back to work. This need may parallel a shift back to 
 previous levels of left-right hemisphere balance” (p. 190). 
 
 This brain-based explanation for why women often find themselves returning to 
work soon after childbirth was quite surprising. By depoliticizing this issue Cozolino 
entirely overlooked the broader political and economic issues related to inadequate 
workers’ rights and family services that have been associated with this issue. Further, it 
was also unclear how new mothers are removed from “the world of adults” simply 
because they have spent time with an infant. Yet it is characteristic of his overall strategy 
of naturalizing cultural phenomena by attributing them to common neurobiological 
functioning (in this case neurobiological functioning that is assumed to be gender 
specific), thereby implying that typical experiences such as these are evidence that the 
behavior is generally desirable (rather than compulsory by economic circumstances or 
cultural prescriptions), controlled by brain functioning, and somehow present across 
cultures and historical periods. This passage was important because it illustrated an 
overreach by Cozolino in his use of neuroscience to explain this particular trend as 
somehow natural, ahistorical, and apolitical.  
 To summarize, a main premise of Cozolino’s book is that the brain exerts a great 
deal of control over behavior and conscious experience, and therefore individual volition 
and agency are more illusory than they might seem. He used this foundation to describe 
how psychotherapy allows individuals to regain self-directedness by exerting influence 
over the brain’s engrained processing. This implies that without neuroscientific research, 
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humans would be unaware of whether valued beliefs about freedom and agency actually 
exist. He also reduced cultural phenomena to brain functioning, thereby removing 
customs and social norms from their broader historical traditions and shared context. I 
showed one noteworthy example of how this type of thinking led Cozolino to the 
apolitical conclusion that many women currently return to work following childbirth 
because of the natural needs of their brains, rather than economic conditions or public 
policy.  
 Integration. Cozolino described various types of integration, ranging from mind-
body integration to various examples of the integration of psychotherapy theories.  
 Mind-body integration via the brain. Cozolino frequently described the 
integration or convergence of physical and psychological aspects of human life through 
the integration of their corresponding neural correlates. 
 “A therapist attempts to restructure neural architecture in the service of more 
 adaptive behavior, cognition, and emotion” (p. 9) 
 
 “Healthy functioning requires proper development and functioning of neural 
 networks organizing conscious awareness, behavior, emotion, and sensation”  
 (p. 21). 
 
 These top-down networks provide the pathways for inhibiting reflexes and 
 bringing the body and emotions under increasing cortical control…Thus, a vital 
 aspect of the development of the cortex is inhibitory—first of reflexes, later of 
 spontaneous movements and even later of emotions and inappropriate social 
 behavior. (p. 69). 
 
 “Cells in the parietal lobes respond to hand position, eye movement, words, 
 motivational relevance, body position, and other factors relevant to the integration 
 of experience” (p. 100). 
 
 “The learning of these skills in therapy occurs in the context of emotional and 
 cognitive integration, requiring the participation of both hemispheres, reflective 
 language, feelings, sensations, and behaviors” (p. 111). 
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 These statements illustrated how Cozolino portrayed various aspects of human 
psychology and physiology as converging within the human brain in ways that allow for 
a coherent experience of objective reality and self-control over physical and emotional 
functioning. Further, he implied that because of this convergence within the brain, 
psychological and physiological aspects of experience are inextricable during typical 
functioning. This explanation of the connection between mind and body through the brain 
is similar to early modern era theory that stressed the importance of rationality over 
emotion (see Cushman, 1995; Taylor, 1989). Therefore, Cozolino’s descriptions of the 
brain as the source of cognitive and emotional coordination are indicative of an 
underlying moral discourse about standards of normativity and the best way of life. 
 The co-occurrence of neural integration and psychological integration. The 
following passages exemplified how Cozolino described psychological integration as the 
observable manifestation of neural integration. 
 A basic assumption of both neuroscience and psychotherapy is that optimal 
 functioning and mental health are related to increasingly advanced levels of 
 growth, integration, and complexity. On a neurological level, this equates to the 
 integration and communication of neural networks dedicated to emotion, 
 cognition, sensation, and behavior and a proper balance between excitation and 
 inhibition. On an experiential level, integration is the ability to live life—love and 
 work—while employing a minimum of defensiveness. (p. 25) 
 
 “Ultimately, psychological, interpersonal, and neural integration are different 
 levels and manifestations of the same process” (p. 43). 
 
 “The three nonsecure patterns of attachment research all reflect lower levels of 
 psychological and neurological integration” (p. 205). 
 
 With these statements Cozolino implied that psychological integration and neural 
integration are processes that are inseparable, because psychological integration is the 
experience that results from neural integration. These statements also suggested that both 
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types of integration described the extent of typical functioning and therefore may be used 
interchangeably. In the third statement above, psychopathology was portrayed as a 
breakdown or deficiency in the integration of both psychological and neurobiological 
realms although it is commonly described as insecure attachment (see also The definition 
and etiology of psychopathology, pp. 132-135). The use of the concept of integration to 
describe both psychological and neurological functioning was central to Cozolino’s 
theory and illustrative of the use of rhetoric to portray concepts with a possible 
relationship as closely related and even alternate descriptions of the same objective truth 
or reality.  
 Human experiences and relationships shape neurobiology and contribute to 
health and wellbeing. These passages exemplified how Cozolino described human 
experience as tangibly represented by how they impact the brain or its early development. 
 “You could also think of our neural architecture as a tangible expression of our 
 learning history” (p. 19).  
 
 “So as we show affection and kindness to our children, we may be building more 
 resilient brains, an expression of genetic variation” (p. 218). 
 
 “Perhaps caring for our children and grandchildren may be more supportive of 
 health and longevity than cholesterol medication and treadmills” (p. 226) 
 
 These statements illustrated how Cozolino depicted the brain as the 
materialization of human experience. For example, with the first statement above, he 
described a person’s learning history as “tangible” through how this history shapes the 
brain. The second and third statements above exemplified his argument that the 
experiences of family life can be useful for maximizing the genetic potential for brain 
health or other biomedical indicators of wellbeing. These types of statements suggested 
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an attempt to overcome the mind-body problem by identifying ways in which personal 
history and seemingly nonmaterial experiences manifest as observable physiological 
changes. Despite the relatively recent emergence of remarkable scientific advancements, 
the underlying focus on finding scientific (especially neuroscientific) evidence for how 
individuals are connected to a broader context (and to each other) personifies brain 
functioning and replicates mind-brain dualism instead of providing an alternative to 
Cartesian philosophy (Bennett & Hacker, 2003). In their critiques of the logic of 
cognitive neuroscience or mind-brain research, scholars (e.g., I. Gold & Stoljar, 1999; 
Noë, 2009; Tallis, 2011) have argued that the portrayal of neuroscience as a revolutionary 
endeavor that disproves dualism overlooks how an assumed relationship between mind or 
self and brain has in fact been a hallmark of Western culture for many centuries, while 
the excitement generated by neuroscientific research and technologies masks the flawed 
logic that underlies much of the research seeking to explain conscious experience in 
terms of its neural correlates. 
 Psychotherapy theory integration via neuroscience. Earlier (see pp. 121-127) I 
discussed how Cozolino portrayed neuroscience as a field of study that can transcend the 
differences between psychotherapy theories by explaining how effective psychological 
treatments all enable neural integration. I also showed (see p. 126) how his use of brain 
science to validate this common factors approach to psychotherapy assumed both an 
uncritical stance toward neuroscience, as well as a belief that competing therapy theories 
will easily surrender their differences in favor of adopting a new explanation for the 
effectiveness of therapy and the best ways to measure that efficacy.  
 237 
 Throughout Cozolino’s book, integration was a primary theme. Aside from the 
disciplinary integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy, he also used 
neuroscience to integrate psychotherapy theories on the basis of their common factors or 
shared aspects that explain the efficacy of various treatment approaches. Further, through 
these disciplinary integrations, he integrated psychological concepts with brain 
functioning, thereby linking mind and brain or mind and body. The use of neuroscience 
to resolve the Cartesian split or explain the connection between individuals and their 
broader context reinforces dualism by personifying the brain and assuming a need to find 
scientific evidence to contradict the idea of a mind-body split.  
 The progression of neuroscience. Cozolino supported a socially-minded yet 
personally applicable interpretation of neuroscience through his taken-for-granted belief 
in the inevitability of progressive achievements in science. 
 The transition from neuroscience to social neuroscience. Cozolino discussed the 
late-20th century transition within the field of neuroscience from its use of neuroimaging 
to study the neural correlates of individual behavior to its use of neuroimaging to study 
social behaviors. 
 “The notion of the brain as a social organ emerged in neuroscience during the 
 1970s as animal researchers slowly began to appreciate that neuroanatomy, 
 neurochemistry, and social relationships are inextricably woven” (p. 178). 
 
 Lessons learned during a century of dynamic psychotherapy may have important 
 neuroscientific implications. The most basic is that we are born into relationships 
 and come to our individual identity while resting upon social connectivity. 
 Another is that social interactions affect everything from our biology to our 
 intellectual abilities. Neuroscience researchers are slowly coming to the 
 realization that the scope of their scientific observation needs to expand to include 
 relationships. (pp. 178-179)  
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 In this passage Cozolino praised the field of social neuroscience and he supported 
a continued effort within neuroscience to continue its research in this direction. He also 
argued that psychotherapy theories have described a social emergence of selfhood and 
therefore those theories have unknowingly described a social brain. In this passage the 
reduction of psychology to neuroscience leads to a reduction of social selfhood as 
important insofar as its effects on biology are measured. The use of a material or physical 
location of self to explain the emergence of human communication and 
interconnectedness might be fundamentally incompatible with the idea of a social or 
relational self that it purportedly proves because this vision emphasizes a somatic 
individual self defined by a materialized inner world.  
 Individuals or groups of individuals can impact the paradigms of neuroscience 
research. In the following passage Cozolino suggested that one role for therapists, 
parents, and teachers is to advocate for interpretations of neuroscience research that focus 
on human interdependence.  
 Relationships are our natural habitat, while the isolated brain is an abstract 
 concept. Thus, understanding the brain requires knowledge of the person 
 embedded within a community of others. Therapists, teachers, and parents 
 intuitively grasp this profound reality just as laboratory scientists often do not. We 
 are now in a position to help research scientists know where to look as they 
 explore how the brain grows, learns, and changes throughout life. (p. 179) 
 
 In this passage, Cozolino suggested a role for parents, teachers, and therapists as 
advocates for directing brain research toward an understanding of how humans are 
interconnected and dependent upon each other, especially during periods of learning, 
personal growth, healing, and early development. He described parenting, education, and 
psychotherapy as tasks or roles that have resulted from personal intuition, rather than 
 239 
social institutions or shared traditions that have emerged over many centuries. This 
reduction of traditional social roles to intuition appears to justify his implication that such 
intuition is now able to initiate hard science research that will determine definitively and 
objectively what is and is not real. His claim that therapists and other nonscientists can 
now contribute to the work of higher-order scientific research might generate excitement 
that the value of non-scientific endeavors will be demonstrated by science, but it 
ultimately serves to mask the disciplinary reductionism in the passage.  
 In this passage it is also noteworthy how Cozolino switched back and forth 
between descriptions of social experiences and descriptions of the brain, thereby 
portraying brains instead of people as the entities that are either thought to be isolated or 
social. The passage builds to a conclusion that brains learn, grow, and change. The 
reduction of mind or self to brain that results from the rhetorical device of personification 
in this passage further reinforces a reduction of cultural institutions such as therapy and 
parenting to neuroscience under the guise that therapists, teachers, and parents could help 
broaden neuroscience and reverse its reductionist tendencies. Finally, it was unclear how 
exactly therapists and other nonscientists might go about participating in this progressive 
neuroscientific movement. Readers might simply be left with feelings of excitement or 
gratitude that Cozolino advocated for finding neuroscientific evidence for why teachers, 
parents, and therapists exist. Or, readers might be inspired to talk about neuroscience and 
the brain more in their daily life or careers. Regardless, the passage perpetuates an 
understanding of self as brain.  
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 Personalizing neuroscience. In some passages Cozolino discussed how his 
knowledge about neuroscience has impacted his understanding of his own thinking and 
behavior. 
 For example, in the following passage Cozolino described how he used his 
understanding of brain functioning in order to understand why people habituate to 
patterns and are unable to perform random behaviors. 
 I remember being surprised to find a table of random numbers in an appendix of 
 my college statistics textbook. . . . This finally makes sense to me based on neural 
 network organization: We are unable to engage in random actions because our 
 behaviors are guided by patterns established through previous learning to which 
 we automatically return. (p. 16) 
 
 In the above example Cozolino identified the predictability of human beings as 
the habituation of the brain to early experiences. In the following passage Cozolino 
described his insight into the origins of his struggle with dieting as an adult, and how this 
struggle resulted from what his brain had learned when he was a child.  
 I was a young boy of 5 or 6 standing in my grandmother’s kitchen and had just 
 expressed being upset about something. . . . Without saying a word she pivoted 
 around, opened the freezer, took out a large box of Neapolitan ice cream. . . . 
 There was no memory of discussing how I felt. Whatever bad feelings I may have 
 been having quickly dissolved in a haze of glucose. The similarity of this memory 
 to my experience in my adult life was striking. My hidden layers had learned a 
 pattern—feel tired, sad, stressed, or disappointed; get lots of calories; watch TV; 
 and the feelings pass. (p. 139) 
 
 In this passage Cozolino attributed his ongoing dieting failures to his 
grandmother’s use of food to soothe him during childhood. However, rather than 
presenting this interpretation as a solely psychological or behavioral cycle, he posited that 
his brain had learned a pattern that became permanent until he gained insight into the 
origins of the behaviors. In the following passage Cozolino recalled a childhood 
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experience that he identified as essential to the development of self, and he speculated 
that the parietal lobes were significant in that process. 
 As a child I had an imaginary retreat. I would close my eyes and picture the back 
 of my grandmother’s closet, always piled high with shoe boxes. Behind these 
 boxes was a hidden door just large enough for me (but not an adult) to squeeze 
 through. . . . This was a safe place for me—quiet and private—where I could 
 imagine other worlds, reflect on life, and fantasize about the future. The evolution 
 and expansion of the parietal lobes were likely essential to the emergence of this 
 kind of imaginal self. (p. 146) 
 
 In this passage Cozolino demonstrated his understanding of Winnicottian theory 
by using it to understand his own psychological development and emergence of self 
during his childhood. He then concluded that the parietal lobes of the human brain 
facilitated the development of self in the way described by psychoanalytic theory. In the 
following passage Cozolino demonstrated his brain-based understanding of a startle 
response.  
 I walked into my garage one day to look for a tool when, out of the corner of my 
 eye, I saw a small brown object near my foot. . . . I immediately jumped back, my 
 heart rate increased, my eyes widened, and I became tense, ready to act. . . . My 
 peripheral vision saw the object and my amygdala appraised it in an 
 overgeneralized fashion to be a threat. My amygdala activated a variety of 
 sympathetic responses including startle, increased respiration, and avoidance.  
 (p. 244). 
 
 While there are obviously physiological processes occurring during experiences 
such as the abrupt scare that Cozolino recalled above, he demonstrated a rather scientized 
and reductionist understanding of self and behavior.  
 By explaining personal experiences in terms of the physiology and neurobiology 
correlated with those experiences, Cozolino used the narratives above to illustrate the 
relevance of neuroscience for explaining common human behaviors and daily life. His 
statements also implied that his book was an endeavor born from his life experiences and 
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personal interests, and exemplified how he incorporated neuroscience into those personal 
interests.  
 Criticism of reductionism and other tenets of Western science. In some brief 
passages Cozolino criticized reductionism in neuroscience and the use of scientific 
approaches for solving human problems.  
 For example, in the following statement Cozolino criticized the lack of 
appreciation for how psychological wellbeing may aid in improving physical wellbeing. 
 “Perhaps caring for our children and grandchildren may be more supportive of 
 health and longevity than cholesterol medication and treadmills” (p. 226). 
 
 With that statement Cozolino leveled a fair criticism against individuality and loss 
of close familial bonds in the United States. He then supported that criticism with claims 
that spending time with family can positively impact physiological wellbeing and 
biomedical indicators of health or disease prevention. Cozolino’s argument placed 
cholesterol medicine and exercise equipment alongside time spent with family as equally 
viable healthcare options. He furthermore overlooked the paradox of viewing social 
interactions as valuable for strengthening individual health, since a concern for individual 
enhancement could undermine the priority of social good and family commitment. In 
other words, there is a worthwhile argument that spending time with family solely for the 
purpose of trying to lower one’s blood cholesterol might inadvertently subvert the sense 
of history and tradition that contribute to the sustainability of the institution of family. In 
other words, Cozolino’s argument is built on a contradiction. 
 In the following passage Cozolino criticized the scientific method for using 
individuals rather than relationships as its unit of analysis. 
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 Despite the fact that our brains are social organs, Western science studies each 
 individual as a single, isolated organism rather than one embedded within the 
 human community. This way of thinking leads us in the West to search for 
 technical and abstract answers to human problems instead of looking at day-to-
 day human interactions. Take, for example, how physicians responded to the high 
 mortality rate among children in orphanages during the last century. Assuming 
 that microorganisms were to blame, they separated children from one another and 
 ordered their handling to be kept to a minimum . . . . It was not until children were 
 held and played with by consistent caretakers and allowed to interact with one 
 another that their survival rate improved. (Blum, 2002, as cited in Cozolino 2010, 
 p. 178) 
 
 In this passage Cozolino began by asserting that humans cannot be scientifically 
studied in isolation because the human brain is a social organ (in his book he identified 
the brain as intrinsically seeking attachment relationships and social interactions, 
especially during the formative early childhood years). This was an example of using a 
philosophical claim about the nature of human selfhood as an interpretation of natural 
brain functioning. He then criticized the effects of a scientific understanding of human 
life by proving an example of children who died from lack of attention when it was 
wrongly assumed that they were dying from a contagious disease. He suggested a 
relationship between interpersonal human experience and physical wellbeing using 
evidence that children had died from lack of care rather than physical disease, which 
itself seems to be a scientized understanding of that tragedy. Cozolino was correct to 
caution about the effects of using the scientific method as a model to study human 
interrelatedness and subjective experience. However, rather than proposing a way to 
study relational selfhood that is extricated from the scientific method, he seemed to 
advocate instead for a revised science that studies the effects of social relationships on 
physical health (and elsewhere he praised the efforts of social neuroscience). Throughout 
his book, regardless of whether he was advocating for either scientists to change their 
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thinking, or therapists and general audiences to interpret neuroscience findings in a more 
progressive or contextual way to support human science theories, the option to question 
entirely the helpfulness of brain-based understandings of self was never an option.  
 In the following passage, Cozolino challenged the comparison between the brain 
and technology, asserting that the brain creates reality (often problematically) whereas 
technology functions in accordance with human demands and has no volition.   
 By now it is clear that our brains are in the business of constructing rather than 
 conveying reality. This perspective is in sharp contrast to the modern Western 
 notion of the brain as a combination camera, tape recorder, and computer. If our 
 electronic equipment really did function like our brains, we would replace them at 
 the first opportunity. (p. 138) 
 
 It was noteworthy that Cozolino decried the comparison between the brain and 
electronic equipment despite his frequent use of metaphors for the brain that suggested 
that the brain is very much like an electronic device, albeit an electronic device with a 
volition or will of its own (see Metaphor, pp. 206-209). The passage above actually 
suggested a criticism of the brain itself for causing misinterpretations, irrational beliefs, 
and distorted perceptions (see also Personification, pp. 209-211, and my discussion of the 
implications of this rhetorical strategy for the understanding of human selfhood).  
 Criticism of reducing psychological symptoms to single brain structures. In 
some passages Cozolino criticized the reduction of psychological symptoms to single 
brain regions or processes and advocated instead for an understanding that symptoms are 
caused by multiple and interacting processes in the brain.  
 Due to the interconnectivity between left-right and top-down neural networks, 
 examining integration from either the vertical or horizontal dimension alone is 
 overly simplistic. Studies of metabolic activity in specific areas of the brain in 
 pathological states reveal differences in both cortical and subcortical structures on 
 both sides of the brain. (p. 28) 
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 The common explanation from psychiatrists to parents is that their children have a 
 lag in frontal lobe development that results in a disinhibition of impulses from 
 lower in the brain and difficulties with tasks that require sustained 
 attention…while this is a good anecdotal explanation, the underlying mechanisms 
 and etiology of ADHD are likely much more complicated. Functional imaging 
 research comparing ADHD to non-ADHD subjects reveals a variety of patterns of 
 higher and lower levels of activation throughout the brain. (pp. 129-130)  
 
 These statements were noteworthy because Cozolino’s initial tone or attitude in 
these passages suggested a criticism of reductionist thinking, yet he attempted to 
overcome reductionism with only a broader view of the human brain that still suggested 
that it is the location of psychological symptoms or disorders.  
 In his portrayal of the relevance and applicability of neuroscience, Cozolino 
described neuroscience as a field that accurately studies the origins of social phenomena, 
and he portrayed non-scientists as possible contributors to this exciting endeavor. 
Cozolino demonstrated this participation by applying descriptions of neurobiology to his 
own insights about his early development, daily behaviors, and understandings of human 
nature. Further, in his descriptions of how human physicality and wellbeing are 
connected to broader social factors, he portrayed neuroscience as a field that counters the 
problems caused by Western individualism and the scientism valued in this way of life. I 
noted how materializing psychological and sociological concepts onto the brain—an 
organ residing within each individual—may in fact reinforce rather than challenge the 
social concerns he raised.  
 Summary of themes. Throughout Cozolino’s text,  major themes included the 
use of evolutionary theory as a central principle for his mind-brain and psychology-
neuroscience integration efforts, synonymity and convergence between academic 
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disciplines and human relationships, the brain as a controller of human experience and 
psychology, integration (e.g., mind-brain integration and psychotherapy integration), and 
the progression of neuroscience whereby brain research has recently become concerned 
with issues related to social psychology, and can be influenced, interpreted, and applied 
by non-scientists, and serves as a field that can actually counter the problems of Western 
individualism and scientism.  
 Cozolino’s use of evolutionary theory to explain human culture and society, and 
to reduce psychology to physiological processes, is a controversial and problematic 
premise because it individualizes and scientizes cultural and historical phenomena, 
including selfhood. His use of neuroscience to integrate fields of study is a form of 
reductionism that overlooks the social and historical significance of unique areas of 
knowledge and cultural institutions. His understanding of the brain as the controller of 
human experience challenged the existence of subjectivity and agency before he restored 
those important aspects of humans by implying that by learning about the brain humans 
can learn how to gain control over it. His integration of mind and brain either posited 
brain functioning as the source of human social interactions, or portrayed social 
interactions as valuable because of their effects on the individual brain. Both conclusions 
imply an a priori individualism rather than an a priori shared context into which 
individuals are born and develop together. Using mind-brain research to advocate for a 
more contextual rather than narrow scientific approach reinforces rather than adequately 
challenges the supremacy of science as a way of explaining human life or psychology. 
Cozolino’s efforts suggest a reduction of psychology to neuroscience.  
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Summary 
 In this chapter I presented the primary content, rhetorical strategies, and major 
themes of Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the 
Social Brain. In the next chapter I conclude my research project with a discussion of the 
content, rhetoric, and themes in Cozolino’s book in light of the historical and cultural 
circumstances from which the book emerged, and the understandings of self that a 
psychotherapy discourse based on his book might perpetuate.  
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Chapter V: Discussion 
 In this Chapter I conclude my hermeneutic research project by discussing the 
primary content, rhetorical strategies, and themes in Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The 
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain in light of the cultural and 
historical trends from which the integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy 
emerged, which I described in Chapters I and II. The purpose of this discussion is to 
identify the understanding of self that a therapy discourse based on Cozolino’s text might 
unknowingly reflect and perpetuate.  
Summary of Results Chapter 
 In Chapter IV I laid out the primary content, rhetorical strategies, and recurring 
themes in Cozolino’s (2010) book. I discussed the primary content of his text in three 
general sections: In the outline and background section of Chapter IV I summarized the 
six parts of the book and I discussed Cozolino’s understanding of the historical origins of 
psychotherapy, the place of his text within the history of psychotherapy, typical 
psychotherapy theories, and differences between his theory and other theories. Cozolino 
described his efforts as a return to Freud’s original intentions of delineating brain-
behavior relationships now that neuroimaging has advanced to a point that allows for 
describing Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of mind according to its neural correlates. I 
argued that Cozolino’s understanding of the history of psychotherapy was an origin myth 
that he used to validate a reductionist mind-brain theory using a broader reduction of 
human psychology to neurobiology. 
 In the second primary content section of Chapter IV I laid out the tenets of 
Cozolino’s psychotherapy theory (see pp. 127-164). According to Cozolino, 
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psychotherapy is an intervention that is curative to the extent that it fosters neural 
integration or proper flow and balance between brain regions. He asserted that neural 
integration is an indicator of healthy psychological functioning, and therefore all 
problems for which patients seek psychotherapy—from severe psychopathology to 
general life concerns that are not symptoms of serious mental illness—are products of 
inadequate neural integration (he acknowledged that neural bases for general life 
concerns that are not the result of mental disorders have yet to be studied using brain 
imaging). Cozolino primarily used the concepts of self and mind as ways to describe 
brain functioning. For example, he mapped a psychoanalytic (primarily Winnicottian) 
understanding of self as a product of neural development and functioning. It was unclear 
how he defined the concept of mind (which he used infrequently) and therefore his use of 
that concept was vague and confusing. His infrequent and unclear use of the concept of 
mind portrayed that hallmark psychological concept as antiquated and better understood 
as the behaviors and experiences produced by individual brain functioning. According to 
Cozolino, the extent to which psychological treatments are effective is understood to be 
reflective of the extent to which these treatments activate neural plasticity (the ability of 
the brain to change according to experience and environment) in a way that fosters neural 
integration. He seemed to imply a correlation between human volition and brain 
functioning (rather than asserting a directionality between mind and brain) but his use of 
language was often vague, as I discuss further below. In his account the brain evolved to 
be responsive to the qualities that are central in effective psychotherapies. Those qualities 
include the use of narrative or language in a secure attachment relationship based on a 
combination of supporting and challenging patients.  
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 Cozolino described a variety of indicators of successful psychotherapy that 
included symptom reduction, affect regulation, and ego strength or the use of higher-
order defenses. His primary content suggested that he attempted to integrate a wide array 
of psychotherapy theories and concepts by subsuming them all under a neurobiological 
understandings of self, illness, and healing methods.  
 Cozolino’s (2010) text was suggestive of materialist reductionism justified by a 
misunderstanding of the historical emergence and cultural relevance of psychological 
concepts. According to Cozolino, the brain controls human experience and therefore must 
be influenced or changed in order for individuals to gain agency or self-directedness. His 
brain-based psychotherapy theory assumed that the concept of personhood is comprised 
of separate mental and physical aspects, and therefore it reinforces rather than resolves 
Cartesian dualism. 
 I also discussed two case vignettes from Cozolino’s text that illustrated some of 
his recurring treatment suggestions, understandings of the origins of psychological 
difficulties, and ways in which psychotherapists foster psychological change with 
patients. In the first vignette I reviewed, Cozolino referenced his use of a Winnicottian 
developmental scheme to suggest that his patient, Sandy, needed to spend time coping 
alone and developing a safe, “internal” place to turn to in order to cope with mood 
swings. With Sandy, Cozolino also focused on behavioral changes based on a tenuous 
behavior cycle related to recurring sinus infections rather than work, family, or social 
difficulties. In the second case vignette Cozolino described his treatment for a Holocaust 
survivor suffering from trauma-related anxiety. Cozolino used a creative role-play 
intervention that portrayed the traumas of being a member of a persecuted minority 
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religious group as a set of isolated curable symptoms able to be relieved by imagining a 
different personal history. I noticed that in both cases Cozolino’s approach focused on 
teaching new and creative ways of thinking and talking about patients’ lives and 
symptoms based on brain changes. In both cases it was unclear why he avoided any 
relational or depth-oriented conceptualization or treatment approach. He justified his 
approaches with neurobiological evidence of how the brain changes in response to 
altering memories, yet was unclear how he decided upon the specific interventions that he 
implemented. Cozolino’s approaches seemed eclectic, reductionist, and decontextualized. 
 After my descriptions and interpretations of Cozolino’s (2010) primary content 
and psychotherapy case vignettes, I examined his use of rhetorical strategies, especially 
in his portrayals of relationships between brain functioning and psychological experience. 
I categorized these strategies under ambiguity (unclear statements that could be 
interpreted in two or more ways), analogy (logical comparisons concerning relationships 
between concepts or entities), aporia (statements in which Cozolino acknowledged doubt 
about a premise or purpose of his entire book), diction (word choice), epigraph (quotes 
preceding the start of each chapter and subsection), and figures of speech which included 
apposition (the use of a noun to modify another noun), metaphor (a comparison between 
concepts or entities without using the words like or as), personification (attributing 
human characteristics to nonhuman yet physical entities), and prosopopoeia 
(personification of nonmaterial concepts). Cozolino used these strategies to portray 
relationships or synonymity between brain functioning and psychological experience, and 
more generally between neuroscience and psychology. These strategies furthered a 
material reductionism of mind to brain while obfuscating historical and epistemological 
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differences between psychology and neuroscience. Later in this chapter I devote a section 
to discussing his use of these strategies and their significance at greater length (see  
p. 255). 
 Finally, I identified some of the recurring themes contained in Cozolino’s (2010) 
book. The central organizing principle of Cozolino’s text was the theory of evolution, 
which Cozolino used to explain human psychology, culture, and societies as resulting 
from how the brain developed throughout the history of the human species (see 
Cozolino’s Thesis below). I also identified as another theme Cozolino’s brain-based 
attempt to integrate various disciplines, fields of study, and human relationships. Another 
theme was Cozolino’s portrayal of the brain as a distorted and biased controller of 
individual beliefs and perceptions. Cozolino used this theme to describe how 
psychotherapy offers the potential for regaining control over the brain. I identified the 
progression of neuroscience as one of Cozolino’s major themes, which he portrayed by 
including several brain-based accounts of his personal history such as his early 
psychological development as a child, typical behaviors as an adult, insights about human 
psychology generally, and insights about the origins of his own behaviors he has tried to 
change.  
Cozolino’s Thesis 
 The central argument in Cozolino’s (2010) book is that neuroscience is the true or 
master science for revealing the origins of human culture, society, and psychological 
experience because recent advances in neuroimaging reveal (or have the potential to 
reveal) the neural structures and functions that have evolved to produce all individual and 
social phenomena. According to his thesis, psychology and psychotherapy are institutions 
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whose emergence was inevitable because of the contemporary problems and solutions 
that the brain evolved to produce and heal. Because the brain is the material source of all 
human experience, the brain is the source of personal difficulties ranging from general 
life stressors to serious mental illness. However, evolution also resulted in a brain that 
retains throughout the lifespan the ability to be influenced by relationships and other 
experiences. This confers upon individuals the potential for psychological healing and 
personal change. Since neuroscience is the master science, it confirms or validates the 
accuracy of psychoanalytic and other therapy theories that happen to share an established 
efficacy for reducing or eliminating psychological symptoms.  
Historical Support for the Thesis 
 Cozolino (2010) argued that neuroscience is the true science and the brain is the 
true source of human personhood. He supported his thesis with the argument that therapy 
theories—with their understandings of self, illness, and psychological healing—have 
been historical placeholders for neurobiological descriptions of human experience. He 
claimed that neuroscience is now showing why effective psychological treatments happen 
to be correct in their understanding of psychological functioning and methods of 
impelling psychological change. Cozolino depicted his efforts as picking up where Freud 
left off when Freud devised the tripartite theory of mind, psychological defense 
mechanisms, the use of free association and interpretation in the talking cure, and other 
aspects of psychoanalytic theory and practice.  
 According to Cozolino (2010), Freud initially aspired to create a brain-based 
mapping of behavior and human experience, yet neuroimaging technology had not yet 
been created to allow for that, and the idea was also unpalatable to his contemporaries. 
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Freud’s theory of mind (and the century of psychological and psychotherapy theories that 
followed it) was simply a metaphor that Freud was forced to adopt. This implies that 
mind can now be discussed directly in terms of neural correlates now that these factors 
are no longer a problem. Based on this premise and Freud’s training in neurology, 
Cozolino asserted that psychotherapy emerged from neurology, and now the two fields 
can merge again after a century of being wrongly separated. I argue that this is an origin 
myth (see Samelson, 1974) in which Cozolino makes an appeal on behalf of psychology 
to the higher-status profession of neurology (and neuroscience generally) to show that 
psychology is useful for advancing a brain-based understanding of self, illness, and 
healing.  
 Cozolino drew from the narrative that psychology originated from neurology in 
order to reduce psychology to neuroscience, and also to reduce the concept of mind or 
human subjectivity to the material processes of the brain. By claiming that 
psychoanalysis (and the therapy theories that followed it) was a historical placeholder 
rather than a unique field, Cozolino provided an ahistorical, scientized understanding of 
psychology and psychotherapy. His argument relocates psychotherapy from a significant 
social and cultural institution to an individualized and mechanized healing instrument for 
the physical brain. Cozolino therefore used psychotherapy as a vehicle for neuroscience 
in order to show how neuroscience is the master science by asserting that neuroscience 
confirms the validity and accuracy of how Western culture thinks and talks about the self 
and psychological illness, healing, and healing technologies or practices. The use of 
psychotherapy as a vehicle for neuroscience is what Brothers (2001) argued neuroscience 
has needed in order to transform the socially widespread discourse about the self from 
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philosophical and social concepts into a discourse based on neuroscientific terminology. 
Cozolino’s conclusions suggest that the work of psychotherapists should become one of 
promoting neuroscience through psychotherapy theory and practices. 
Rhetorical Strategies Supporting the Thesis 
 Scholars (e.g., Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Brothers, 2001, Tallis, 2004; Uttal, 2007) 
have argued that cognitive neuroscience literature frequently relies on certain words, 
sentence structure, and other grammatical strategies to imply relationships between brain 
functioning and the concept of mind or subjective conscious experience. These portray 
unresolved yet significant questions about the self as already resolved (or likely to be 
resolved with more neuroscience research). These rhetorical strategies also materialize 
psychological concepts so that they appear objective and verifiable. In my textual 
analysis of Cozolino’s (2010) book (see Chapter IV) I provided examples of rhetorical 
strategies that he used to portray relationships between mind and brain, and psychology 
and neuroscience, which warrant critical examination.  
 I began with statements that I categorized as ambiguous because they had two or 
more possible meanings as a result of the order of words in the statements. In some 
passages it was unclear whether Cozolino (2010) intended to describe people or brains. In 
other ambiguous passages Cozolino discussed mental experiences alongside descriptions 
of the brain yet it was unclear whether he intended to posit a causal relationship or simply 
a direct correspondence between neurobiological and psychological processes. His use of 
analogy to compare brain structures to social structures suggested a direct relationship 
between the individual brain and the emergence of human society, yet no specific 
scientific explanation was provided for how social order is a reflection of neural patterns. 
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This suggested that his premise of a strong relationship between psychology or 
psychotherapy and neuroscience relied upon a taken-for-granted or assumed relationship 
between brain and human personhood. Cozolino also used analogy to compare the roles 
of therapists, parents, and teachers based on the social functions of the brain that he 
implied to be similar to relationships between patient and therapist, child and parent, and 
student and teacher. This suggests that there is nothing inherently unique or special about 
psychotherapy that could not be achieved in another relationship as long as the brain is 
changed in the same way. This decontextualized and ahistorical representation of 
psychotherapy fit with his depiction of psychology and psychotherapy (and the human 
tendencies they study and problems they remedy) as inevitable products of the evolution 
of the brain rather than unique and important social institutions that emerged because of a 
confluence of historical and cultural factors. 
 Cozolino’s use of diction (word choice and sentence structure) seamlessly 
intertwined psychological concepts and neuroscientific ones, thereby reappropriating the 
former as the latter, or in some cases directly asserted that the two epistemologies were 
interchangeable. At times he employed that strategy unbeknownst to the reader, and 
therefore his rhetorical support for his thesis was often very subtle. Unsuspecting or 
inexperienced readers might easily be convinced that psychological terms were intended 
to refer to neurobiological structures and functions. This is significant because it creates a 
discourse in which psychology is absorbed into neuroscience, thereby using psychology 
to relocate shared social and cultural understandings of humans to individual 
neurophysiology. Speculative language was also present throughout Cozolino’s book. 
Many of his claims about evolution, neuroscience, and mind-brain correlates were 
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prefaced with language suggesting that the claims are hypothetical; at other times he 
offered predictions about what neuroscience might eventually discover about human 
consciousness and behavior. These predictions might seem exciting but it is unclear 
whether they are feasible. 
 The dramatic and broad quotes from important historical figures Cozolino (2010) 
placed before each chapter and subsection (epigraph) suggested that the scientized and 
reductionist understandings of human psychology that followed these quotes were in fact 
evidence supporting philosophical, religious, scientific, cultural, and literary observations 
of human beings across historical eras and epistemologies. Cozolino’s thesis implies that 
all theories of human experience (such as psychoanalysis and other therapy theories) have 
unknowingly been descriptions of brain functioning rather than moral claims about 
health, illness, and the best way of life, and therefore his use of epigraph enacted and 
thereby reinforced his claim that psychological discourse was a historical placeholder for 
a neuroscientific one. Cozolino used figures of speech such as metaphor and 
personification to reduce mind to brain and therefore reduce psychology to neuroscience. 
He used personification, for example, to portray a brain that itself thinks, believes, learns, 
and decides on behalf of individuals. The sense of agency and control that this rhetoric 
strips from people in its depiction of human beings mirrored his thesis that human 
experience is a product of brain evolution.  
 I used the literary concept of aporia to describe statements in which Cozolino 
called into question whether his text could answer some of the important questions on 
which it was allegedly premised. For example, early in his book he rejected the 
possibility that his psychotherapy-neuroscience integration would be considered 
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reductionism, and he promised a thorough treatment of the task of identifying individual 
potential for psychological change and healing. Later in his book he denied that he was 
responsible if his efforts to integrate psychotherapy and neuroscience were interpreted as 
a reduction of mind to brain. As I showed throughout the Results chapter (see Chapter 
IV), much of his book contained highly reductionist and scientized understandings of 
psychology and psychological treatment. Therefore his use of aporia to deny 
responsibility for the likely effects of his book seemed more permissive that cautionary. 
In other words, he ultimately showed that he lacked concern about the effects of a brain-
based psychotherapy on traditional psychological concepts such as mind. This disregard 
for psychology fit with his assertion that the field was a historical placeholder rather than 
an important institution whose emergence and broad societal relevance cannot be 
understood through a contemporary neuroscientific theory.  
 In another example of aporia, Cozolino putatively rejected the authority of 
neuroscientists who claim to have definitively determined how to predict an individual’s 
potential for behavior change or psychological recovery. He encouraged readers to have 
faith in the ability of the brain to change, rather than having faith or trust in 
neuroscientists themselves. Finally, in another statement he acknowledged that if one 
follows his premise that the brain largely controls what individuals believe and what 
actions they initiate, then brain research might never be usable for explaining human 
functioning since scientists and others can never be sure that the brain is not deceiving 
them in their interpretations of research findings. These examples of aporia cast doubt on 
claims that a merger between therapy and neuroscience is a useful, relevant, and 
scientifically accurate endeavor. These statements were surprising because they seemed 
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to contradict the premise of his book, and they even implied that neuroscience is 
insufficient for addressing the large issues that he raised. However, rather than addressing 
these important concerns about brain-based psychotherapy, Cozolino did not engage in 
any significant discussion about the implications of these statements. It appeared to be 
more a strategy to relax the reader and appeal to an anti-authority tendency in 
contemporary American life, rather than a serious critique of all he previously asserted. 
This promotes an uncritical, resigned way of thinking. Below I discuss this problem 
further. 
The Understanding of Self Perpetuated by the Thesis 
 The understanding of self in Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of 
Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain begins with the assertion that the brain is first 
shaped by experience early in life (especially attachment relationships) outside of an 
infant’s control, and later in life comes to exert tremendous influence over a person based 
on the patterns of neural firing that early experiences impressed into the brain. 
Throughout his book, individuals are at once portrayed as embedded within a social 
context because social contexts shape brain development, and then removed from that 
social context because Cozolino also described the brain as having innate tendencies that 
explain inherent qualities such as language, adaptability, and the potential for 
psychopathology. In other words, he attempted to explain both structuralist and 
poststructuralist social theory as reified in brain structures. Regardless, according to 
Cozolino’s theory, humans are able to gain control of their lives and their psychological 
functioning by regaining control over the brain through acting in whatever ways have 
been proven to change its functioning. This implies that individuals must learn about 
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neuroscience, or certain interpretations of neuroscience, in order to learn about how and 
why the self can change. Human agency thus becomes a quality that is not possessed by 
individuals, but instead is dependent on the pronouncements of neuroscientific expertise. 
These conflicting visions of a material human being suggest that Cozolino’s theory holds 
a vision of a perpetually uncertain self, lingering between genetic determinism and the 
brain research Cozolino positioned as necessary for rejecting it. The self is trapped 
between a sense of agency and acquiring knowledge about neuroscientific findings that 
grant that agency. Cozolino serves as an interpreter of brain science who depicts this 
science as accessible and easy to learn for lower-status professionals (psychotherapists) 
who have not studied neuroscience yet have come to believe in its relevance and 
accuracy. Therapists are made to be the model for a self that is a scientific novice who is 
dependent on scientific expertise to validate socially valued theories about human nature.  
 Above I reviewed Cozolino’s strategy of aporia (see pp. 178-182) or statements 
that call into question the entire purpose of his text. In one of those statements Cozolino 
wrote that he does not trust neuroscience experts who claim to have found any answers to 
questions about the human potential for change, which was surprising for a text based on 
neuroscience research and jargon. He claimed that he instead trusts in the ability of the 
brain to change, and in the ability of “our own ingenuity to discover new solutions” 
(Cozolino, 2010, p. 210) to those issues. His statement casts doubt on whether 
neuroscience is able to discover anything that psychological research methods, combined 
with clinical judgment and experience, had not already established. However, his 
statements assume that even if neuroscientific claims about the self are useful only to 
support what therapists and others already know, neuroscience should still be combined 
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with everyday psychological discourse because ideas about the brain are privileged as a 
way to understand the self. Even with Cozolino’s surprising rejection of neuroscience 
expertise about psychology and the self, he assumes the role of alternative neuroscience 
expert who interprets this science and mandates its use. Despite the rhetorical promise to 
liberate the self from uncritical allegiance to the authority of neuroscience, the self is still 
a scientific novice dependent upon neuroscience experts. In other words, he portrays a 
certain inevitability to the understanding that the study of the brain is the study of the 
self. The choice to forego the use of neuroscience altogether is never presented; whether 
humans have or do not have agency and self-directedness is still dependent upon whether 
Cozolino and other experts permit it.  
 Throughout my Results chapter (see Chapter IV) I argued that Cozolino’s (2010) 
neuroscientific interpretations of the self perpetuate an interiorized, socially removed, and 
inward vision of human beings that is reminiscent of much modern era philosophy. His 
claim that Winnicottian and object relations schemes best describe the self that is created 
by brain functioning is evidence of that interiorized modern self. Even when he claims 
that the brain is a social organ that is socially interdependent, and is constructed through 
narrative, by having materialized those social qualities Cozolino presents a vision of 
human beings that is individualized rather than contextualized. This is a significant 
problem with using neuroscience to solve the mind-body or mind-brain problem. 
Cozolino’s efforts show how the idea of a brain-based psychotherapy represents a literal 
perpetuation of Cartesian dualism through a physical reification of structuralism wherein 
moral discourse is concretized through the brain and disguised as scientific findings.  
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 In another example of aporia, Cozolino (2010) surprisingly noted that, since the 
brain is a biased and distorted controller of perception, yet individuals rely on it to 
interpret neuroscience research about human psychology and the self, humans might 
never obtain the objective understanding of the brain or human experience that 
neuroscience seemingly promises. This statement seemed to acknowledge a legitimate 
concern about his use of neuroscience, yet he ignores any further implications and instead 
resigns to continuing these efforts. Cozolino’s statements only further an uncritical and 
enduring belief that personhood is equivalent to brain functioning since he dismisses any 
other approach to understanding the self. In that regard, even the self as scientific novice 
becomes an illusion produced by the brain. I posit that since neuroscience is an expertise 
that might never be able to live up to its promise of providing objective answers, readers 
are left in an untenable position characterized by uncertainty about what to believe about 
themselves yet hopeful that brain science will confirm their beliefs. For therapists these 
beliefs are often represented by psychotherapy theories. Psychotherapy theories embody 
cultural and historical understandings of self, and Cozolino maps those theories onto the 
brain.  
 Cozolino keeps the reader locked in a cycle of hoping that neuroscience will 
resolve important philosophical questions about human beings. For example, he briefly 
speculated that neuroscience research will reveal the origins of human consciousness. 
Elsewhere his speculation ranged from ways in which rat brains could be models for the 
human brain, to ways in which the brain is activated during psychodynamic therapy 
interventions. His speculative approach (and his brief acknowledgement of the logical 
flaws of a brain-based understanding of human personhood and psychological 
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experiences) leaves readers indefinitely reliant upon neuroscience to answer these 
questions. Cozolino’s writing style almost invariably overlooks the concept of mind and 
instead mostly describes human experience alongside descriptions of brain functioning. 
One could argue that throughout his book Cozolino simply portrayed eliminativism (that 
is, the belief that psychological concepts such as subjectivity and consciousness are 
without neural correlates and are therefore fictions that are waiting to be replaced with 
descriptions of how brain functioning produced reality). Yet he also proposed that, with 
enough support from interpreters of neuroscience such as himself, neuroscience could be 
used to challenge eliminativism if psychological concepts are verified by mapping them 
onto the brain. In this conflicting theory the self is perpetually reliant upon interpretations 
of neuroscience research because the self is resolute in its assumed need for 
neuroscientific validation of psychological, psychotherapy, and other theories about the 
self. However, the self is also portrayed as equivalent to the brain. Cozolino offers hope 
that maybe this is not true by challenging the expertise of neuroscientists. But even if 
people find their own ways of believing that they are their brain, biological determinism 
still stands because the language of psychology and subjectivity is lost. When Cozolino 
applies his theory to psychotherapy through his case vignettes, freedom is restored in 
suddenly ambitious, overly technical, and eclectic ways. However, even after he positions 
himself as a savior of human freedom, it is not clear that he ever truly restores the 
freedom to humans that his brain-based understanding of self already stripped away. In 
other words, beneath the excitement and hopefulness that neuroscientific jargon might 
generate, there is a rather unfulfilling and depressing understanding of human beings.  
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 Cozolino never presents readers with the option to disregard neuroscience or 
brain-based understandings of therapy or the self. Therefore, sociocultural perspectives 
that coherently address these conflicts are dismissed entirely in a discourse founded on a 
materialized intrapsychic self over which patients are trying to regain control. He leaves 
no room to talk about the historical and cultural circumstances in which individuals are 
born and develop. For Cozolino there is ultimately no shared context aside from whatever 
our brains evolved to have in common, which is his definition of culture and society. In 
other words, there is little that is shared aside from the common need of personal 
enhancement and private gain. Because there is no option in his book to forego the 
conflation of psychotherapy and neuroscience, there is no way of thinking about the self 
that understands the cultural and historical crossroads from which contemporary 
neuroscience emerged and later became integrated with psychotherapy theories. His 
approach uses therapy as a tool to ensure that neuroscience retains control of the study of 
self, the outcomes of that study, and whatever commercial, biomedical, and other 
purposes that such an understanding of the self might further.  
The Potential Effects of the Thesis on the Practice of Psychotherapy and the 
Profession of Psychology 
 Above I suggested that Cozolino places therapists in the role of a model for a 
confused yet compliant self. Simply because Cozolino intermittently alludes to the idea 
of a socially-emerging selfhood embedded in a cultural context does not necessary 
translate into a truly contextual, historically- and socially-minded understanding of 
human psychology. In fact, his confusing (and generally absent) use of the concept of 
mind is a blatant disregard for psychology and instead represents a perpetuating of self as 
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brain and psychology as fiction. Although for much of the 20th century psychotherapy 
theories have perpetuated the problems of an individualized, modern era configuration of 
self, a brain-based psychotherapy theory is especially persuasive because it seems to be 
justified primarily by the excitement that is often generated by neuroscientific rhetoric 
and its taken-for-granted claims about materialism and the self. Perhaps his conflicting 
views represent an attempt at creating a wide appeal for his book. However, as I have 
suggested, his understanding of self as brain is a depiction of at least material 
reductionism, and possibly eliminativism. Psychotherapists and psychologists should 
recognize that a vision of psychological concepts as historical placeholders for 
neurobiological processes ultimately results in the expiration of psychology as a serious 
profession, academic field, or way of talking about human beings (see I. Gold & Stoljar, 
1999). The self is required to be a scientific novice about a science that might not even 
work to achieve what it is supposed to achieve. The self is at once confused about 
whether it has agency yet continues to be compliant in a fruitless attempt to address that 
and other philosophical issues. Therapists are assigned the role of modeling this confused 
yet compliant self. 
 Cozolino (2010) positions psychotherapists as advocates for neuroscience as the 
correct paradigm for understanding the self and the relationship between individual 
development and the cultural context in which personhood emerges. One way that this 
shows up is with Cozolino’s recommendation that therapists assure patients that their 
problems are common to all humans because of imperfect brain functioning that is not 
unique to individual patients. This is an example of how the incorporation of a 
neuroscientific understanding of self into therapy discourse could directly disregard 
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subjectivity and agency (and therefore detract from the ability of therapists to engage in 
any meaningful discussion of morality and responsibility). At the same time, he used 
neuroscience to explain and combine established therapy theories rather than invent a 
new one. He also described case vignettes that depict courses of psychotherapy in which 
he applied an assortment of interventions in a rather confident fashion without consistent 
theory or justification other than the portrayal of quick psychological change and easy 
malleability of the brain and self. His combination of a material self that has the potential 
for quick-changing malleability led to interventions that are instrumentalist, targeting 
specific psychological and neurophysiological goals. These interventions produced little 
insight about how or why patients’ difficulties arose. The result was an incoherent 
eclecticism rather than a clearly articulated treatment approach.  
 Cozolino often demonstrated rather playful and creative therapy activities—for 
example, having a patient imagine a different personal history in order to change the 
recurring psychological effects of painful memories that are purportedly stored in the 
brain. His approach disregards the contexts in which patients’ problems arise and therapy 
is effective. There was little rationale given for his treatment choices. In other words, the 
use of neuroscience fails to answer the questions of what therapists are doing, who they 
are doing it with, and why they are doing it. As I discussed earlier (see Chapter II), 
addressing those issues has been described as the point of integrating neuroscience and 
psychotherapy. Cozolino’s theory gives therapists permission to implement whatever 
therapy theories or techniques they desire as long as they can be justified by an appeal to 
brain functioning. This does nothing to address the moral questions raised by the debates 
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within psychology about how or whether to establish best practices in psychotherapy and 
assess their efficacy (i.e., the meanings of concepts such as cure and health).  
 In Cozolino’s psychotherapy theory, insight about the self or psychological 
development becomes insight about the brain. He even demonstrates how to rewrite 
psychological development through his brain-based accounts of his own development of 
self, as well as some of his typical behaviors. He materializes family life by describing its 
influence on brain structures as a way to create an integrated or coherent narrative about 
psychological difficulties and the ways in which psychotherapy remedies those 
difficulties through the effects that the therapy relationship and therapy discourses confer 
upon the brain. Cozolino’s rejection of neuroscientists claiming to have discovered with 
certainty answers about the potential for individual change appeals at once to the 
antiauthority sentiments that are a hallmark of the modern self, and the antiscientific 
sentiments that took hold during the 20th century and cast doubt on the applicability of 
the scientific method to the understanding of individual experience. Yet the portrayal of 
neuroscience as an alternative and progressive science that lends support to social 
selfhood, healthy individuality, and critical treatment of scientific authority could serve 
simply to reinforce the authority and appeal of a scientific study of human psychology. 
The creative variety of appeals to neuroscience is an implicit acknowledgement of the 
methodological flaws of cognitive neuroscience (that is, the effort to ascertain the neural 
correlates of psychological concepts). This exemplifies why mind-brain literature is 
vulnerable to melding cultural discourse to interpretations of brain functioning in 
whatever way an author or researcher desires. There are traditional guidelines about what 
makes a good interpretation, but they are found in the humanities, not in neuroscience. 
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 Cozolino’s (2010) ahistorical and scientized understanding of psychotherapy has 
several possible consequences for psychology and psychological treatment. It is helpful 
to recall that Cozolino concludes his book by predicting ways in which therapy will 
become more closely tied to neuroscience. For example, he predicts the use of 
neuroimaging as a routine part of psychotherapy planning and progress monitoring, and 
the use of neuroscientific terms in therapy case conceptualizations. These are lofty 
predictions. First, there are many problems with those ideas that Cozolino does not 
address. For example, if patients do not report psychological improvement even though 
brain scans suggest it (or conversely, if a brain scan fails to indicate the neural correlates 
of the psychological improvements that patients are reporting), in what ways could 
psychologists and psychotherapists expect to be held ethically and legally accountable? 
Cozolino’s prediction assumes a direct mind-brain correlation; therefore his predictions 
for the practice of psychotherapy imply that he is also predicting that neuroscience will 
thoroughly map direct mind-brain relationships. In other words, he is encouraging 
therapists to adopt a mindset of hope and expectancy that the self will be even more 
understood as a function of human neurobiology. Psychologists and psychotherapists 
should remember the work of scholars (e.g., Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Brothers, 2001; 
Noë, 2009; Tallis, 2004) who have argued that neuroscience will never solve many of the 
mysteries of human consciousness, not because of a lack of trying, but because 
positioning the study of psychological concepts as the study of those concepts’ neural 
correlates is a conceptually flawed endeavor.  
 One possible effect of Cozolino’s (2010) theory is that neuroscience could serve 
to distract psychologists and psychotherapists from efforts that are more likely to 
 269 
maintain the viability of psychotherapy as a profession. After considering arguments such 
as those of Orange (2003) about the problems with total physical reductionism in 
psychology, I have come to believe that the only way to substantiate the field of 
psychology and the practice of psychotherapy is through using the psychological methods 
already available to us (quantitative, qualitative, and sociocultural or interpretive research 
approaches), through continuing to debate in psychological rather than neuroscientific 
terms the benefits and difficulties with each of those methods, and through addressing the 
moral questions raised by psychological theories and these debates surrounding how best 
to understand them.  
 Although the incorporation of neuroscience into psychotherapy research (and now 
into psychotherapy discourse with texts such as The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy) 
could not have happened without the longstanding desire by psychology to legitimize 
itself as a true science, neuroscientific visions for psychotherapy do not only reproduce 
and further empirical research methods and the problems with using the scientific method 
to understand individuals. Cozolino’s (2010) theory also diminishes the reader’s ability to 
think critically about psychological theories and research methods because neuroscience 
is used to meld all of those approaches together, thereby denying that these moral debates 
even exist. Readers are permitted to believe not only that evidence exists for whatever 
therapy approaches they happen to believe in or utilize, but also that all psychotherapy 
theories make the same claims about the self and the best way of life—specifically, a self 
that is biomedical in its origins and concerned with neuroscience as its primary 
intellectual endeavor. This is why, although I disagree with the primacy given to 
empirical outcome studies in psychotherapy research over sociocultural or historical 
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interpretations of therapy practices, I believe it is far more dangerous to move these 
important debates entirely into a neuroscientific discourse rather than a social or 
philosophical one to avoid addressing these contentious issues altogether. Doing so 
perpetuates the problem of psychologists, psychotherapists, and psychotherapy trainees 
not having the knowledge or interest in addressing the moral issues that are often veiled 
in psychotherapy theories and practices. Neuroscientific explanations are simple, and for 
cultural reasons they are often exciting for readers as well. However, Cozolino’s (2010) 
book illustrates how this excitement unknowingly reduces psychology to neuroscience, 
and this ultimately erases issues of consciousness and subjectivity. The loss of 
psychological concepts is dehumanizing, and I find that to be more disconcerting than 
exciting.  
 One reason Cozolino is able to make a brain-based psychotherapy appear useful 
and appealing is that he positions the brain as an easy answer to the questions of how and 
why psychologists and psychotherapists became tasked with such a wide variety of 
professional duties. For example, many psychologists and psychotherapists—even within 
a single day—provide treatment for patients whose symptoms range from neurological 
disease, to chronic mental illness, to general life stressors, while alternating between 
various treatment modalities (individual, family, group). Blurring the boundaries between 
psychology and neuroscience is easy when Cozolino blurs the boundaries between 
clinical psychology and neuropsychology. There is certainly professional overlap 
between clinical psychology and clinical neuropsychology (e.g., neuropsychologists 
invariably deal with all categories of mental health diagnoses when assessing and treating 
brain disease and injury, and many clinical psychologists conduct assessment, 
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evaluations, and even treatment for disorders such as attention deficit disorder, autism, or 
dementia that are typically understood to have neurobiological correlates). However, 
readers should not be easily persuaded by undisciplined uses of concepts such memory, 
which have different meanings in clinical neuropsychology than traditional 
psychotherapy theory. This recommendation is not meant to condemn the relationship 
between psychological assessment and psychotherapy. Those endeavors are parts of the 
same field, and how they fit together is an important issue that comprises psychology’s 
unique domain over mental health research, treatment, advocacy, forensic and medical 
applications, and other interests. What is troubling, however, is the prospect that 
Cozolino’s readers might be convinced that talk therapy is simply a neurobiological 
intervention because therapists have an interest in the effects of memory on individual 
functioning and experience, and some psychologists (particularly neuropsychologists) 
study and evaluate symptoms of memory difficulties (such as sudden forgetfulness or 
longstanding disabilities with learning or retaining information).  
 With this type of conflation Cozolino exploits any possible unawareness amongst 
readers that psychology has had a longstanding interest in proving itself a legitimate 
science, and that even scientific psychology is not a natural scientific observation of the 
physical world. However, there is good evidence in Cozolino’s case vignettes that he 
intentionally used neuropsychology in this way. In one of his first case vignettes, 
Cozolino recalls conducting family therapy for the treatment of a patient with a traumatic 
brain injury. His treatment involves psychoeducation with the family about their son’s 
psychological symptoms such as irritability that resulted from the injury, and ways to 
support his recovery, in addition to community reintegration through social services.  
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 The above seems to be a reasonable approach with this patient. However, in the 
remainder of Cozolino’s case vignettes he frequently discusses various psychotherapy 
interventions in terms of their alleged effects on the brain. Mental health researchers and 
practitioners should remember that even if symptoms have some neurological 
component, psychologists are uniquely qualified to treat patients because of a deep 
understanding that those symptoms are still embedded within systems and relationships, 
and even neurological issues manifest in symptoms that are psychological and therefore 
exist because they are based on observations of persons (not observations of the brain).  
 Moreover, psychologists devised assessments for cognition, memory, attention, 
and personality prior to the early 1990s when neuroimaging was first used in 
psychotherapy research. Neuroimaging at times provides support for psychological 
findings, and it has certainly been used as evidence in legal matters. For example, 
locating brain lesions that are causing behaviors beyond individual control has helped to 
establish reduced culpability in criminal proceedings. But Cozolino’s book is not about 
that issue. It is important that readers consider the difference between something that is 
interesting and something that is necessary. The fact that some neurological disorders can 
cause involuntary physical and psychological symptoms does not translate into an 
assumption that all behaviors and experiences throughout a person’s life are also 
involuntary and spurred by the brain’s alleged control over one’s life. 
 Rather than attempting to transform psychological concepts into material objects 
for natural science inquiry, ensuring the long-term viability of professional psychology is 
likely to require political activism that empowers psychologists through measures such as 
fair reimbursements from insurance companies and expanded access to treatment 
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populations. Those measures necessarily involve issues of fairness, civic engagement, 
and shared responsibility for managing the societal impact of mental disorders. In other 
words, these measures require the type of thinking that Cozolino never mentioned in his 
book, and worse, is made more difficult by a brain-based discourse that locates the social 
within a materialized, somatic individual.  
 Regardless of Cozolino’s brief disavowal of reductionism, and regardless of his 
understanding of the brain as a social organ, his attempt to combine psychotherapy and 
neuroscience is suggestive of an a priori, individual, neural self. At the very least this 
perpetuates reductive materialism, and likely propagates eliminativism or the position 
that psychology is a historical placeholder for neuroscience. The hope that readers come 
to place on neuroscience proving the validity of psychology and psychotherapy seems to 
perpetuate the position that psychological concepts such as mind, subjectivity, and 
consciousness are merely fictions that should be done away with so that humans can 
speak about themselves in neuroscientific rather than social and philosophical terms. In 
fact, Cozolino’s portrayal of traditional psychotherapy concepts as historical placeholders 
for neurobiological theories is a good strategy for depicting human psychology as a myth. 
In his book, the absence of much use of the concepts of mind and consciousness also 
might further an eliminativist position.  
 Sociocultural theories posit that psychology and psychotherapy are inseparable 
from the Western cultural context because they are cultural and historical institutions that 
have an irreplaceable influence over the way people think and talk about the world and 
the purpose of humans within it. To extract these fields from culture and history with 
decontextualized descriptions about their origins (and scientized claims about their 
 274 
purpose) in essence furthers a society in which psychological theories and treatments at 
first perpetuate a technicized, instrumental understanding of self, and later erases the self 
altogether.  
 In sum, the effects of incorporating into psychotherapy theories a vision of 
materialized personhood (presented as a mechanized brain that controls individual 
functioning) is ultimately an erosion altogether of psychology and psychotherapy. In 
other words, Cozolino might cause therapists unknowingly to cheer for their own demise. 
This might seem to be a dire prediction. However, if one takes seriously the possible 
disregard for subjectivity and agency that neuroscientific visions of humans suggest 
(especially in the absence of coherent or sincere efforts to address psychological concepts 
such as mind), then one should seriously question whether psychology and psychotherapy 
could exist if therapists, researchers, and patients began to discuss human problems and 
solutions entirely in terms of the brain. 
The Political, Economic, and Social Arrangements Replicated by the Thesis 
 A cultural and historical interpretation of Cozolino’s (2010) psychotherapy theory 
highlights a need amongst psychologists and psychotherapists to challenge the promises 
of an uncritical integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy. His efforts warrant 
closer scrutiny than psychotherapy scholars have adequately provided. For example, 
Victoria Pitts-Taylor’s (2010) criticism of the use of the concept of brain plasticity to 
validate sociological theory (and progressive political ideas about the impact of culture 
and history on human functioning) is one example of an especially relevant criticism 
because Cozolino’s brain-based psychotherapy seems to promote an individualized, 
material understanding of the self and self-improvement. She argued that the underlying 
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ideas about citizenship and selfhood valued by biomedical selfhood are consistent with 
neoliberal economic and political arrangements that hold a vision of a priori 
individualism valued above democratic ideals and the collaborative civic engagement 
necessary to foster equity and justice. The understanding that the self is a brain that 
inevitably evolved to control human psychology and subjective experience is an 
understanding of self and human nature that is universal across time and place. This is 
incompatible with cultural sensitivity, recent philosophical theory, or relevant mental 
health practices. Cozolino’s case vignettes are good evidence of how a technicized and 
instrumentalized talk therapy purposed to target specific brain changes inherently 
dismisses psychological concepts such as subjectivity and consciousness, and therefore 
unknowingly dismisses the role of culture and context in creating a shared discourse 
about psychological illness and change.  
 I argue that universalizing human experience as a product of the brain rather than 
understanding its emergence within a social and cultural matrix threatens to unknowingly 
perpetuate conservative or status quo political arrangements. For example, in my textual 
analysis I interpreted one passage that was indicative of Cozolino’s overreach (he 
claimed that women often return to employment shortly after childbirth because the brain 
commands it). His brain-based understanding of this issue overlooked the lack of 
progress in public policy related to workers rights and general family services that has 
been associated with the issue of insufficient maternity leave in the United States. 
Reducing problems to the evolution of the brain dismisses the ways in which shared 
economic and social arrangements produce distress and difficulties amongst citizens in 
many capitalist systems. Cozolino’s application of a brain-based therapy theory directly 
 276 
threatens to diminish a reader’s ability to contextualize psychological issues and to 
recognize that inadequate democratic representation and fairness is contributing to 
patients’ difficulties.  
 Near the end of his book, while reiterating the importance of remembering that 
the brain changes in response to experience, Cozolino (2010) abruptly asserted that, “the 
neural network dissociation that often results from exposure to combat should make us 
pay closer attention to those whom we put in harm’s way” (p. 357). This is a good 
example of a statement that might appeal to therapists during a cursory reading because it 
sounds as if Cozolino is bravely questioning the institution of war. He seems to be 
subversively challenging authority and presenting a progressive social and political 
alternative to the state of perpetual war that has been a defining feature since the first 
colonists arrived in the U.S., and which has of course been quite pronounced in the 
decade between September 11, 2001 and 2010 when Cozolino’s book was published in 
its current edition. In fact, a closer examination of his statement shows that he takes no 
political stance whatsoever. It is not even clear that he is challenging the institution of 
war itself. His statement is at best meaningless, and at worst subtly reinforces the 
moderate position that perhaps combat is regrettable yet should remain a fairly common 
endeavor for the United States to engage. His statement’s most literal meaning—that 
brain science should cause people to “pay attention” to active duty soldiers but take no 
active political position regarding the institutions they represent—is a good metaphor for 
Cozolino’s broader depiction of the relationship between neuroscience and 
psychotherapy. That is, Cozolino supports questioning neuroscience, interpreting 
neuroscience in ways that support psychotherapy theories, using it to justify 
 277 
psychological healing and change, and even perhaps advocating for a more socially-
minded rather than individualized use of science—yet he never provides the option to 
disregard neuroscience entirely, develop a more robust sociocultural vision, or avoid 
altogether the integration between brain research and psychotherapy. Like the soldiers 
whose welfare he really only minimally cares about, Cozolino’s concern for the 
institution of psychotherapy is at best minimal.  
 Despite the many therapy theories that Cozolino (2010) presents as options for 
mental health practice, and despite the treatment of neuroscience as an alternative-minded 
science that could confirm important values about psychology and the self, he presents 
little choice to readers, and instead depicts a great deal of inevitability with regards to the 
merger between neuroscience and psychotherapy even in general therapy practice. His 
implications lead to statements that sound progressive but never really challenge the roots 
of social injustice and violence—namely, the complicity with the status quo, an erosion 
of civil society and community involvement, and resignation about the possibility that 
individuals may affect larger change through psychotherapy discourse. It seems more 
likely that broader social progress is not possible with a reductionist, material selfhood 
such as the vision of humans that a brain-based therapy promotes. Why would it be? 
According to Cozolino, human selfhood, culture, society, and history have been primarily 
products of the evolution of the brain. This necessarily implies that war, for example, or 
the inability of women to take time away from work following childbirth, must also be 
products of brain functioning. Yet to admittedly naturalize social ills such as war, and to 
declare it inevitable, would be quite unappealing to many readers. In other words, 
Cozolino’s vision of the brain as the self is a vision of justified helplessness. Cozolino 
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could not elaborate on what he intended to convey with his recommendation that readers 
pay attention to soldiers, since a logical conclusion following his brain-based theory 
would suggest that war itself is inevitable (or, that the inevitability of war is just as 
tenable of a position as the opposition to it). However, in order to actually question 
something like war, psychological concepts such as mind and self must be located in a 
sociocultural context—that is, in the relationships between people (such as therapist and 
patient) rather than in brain cells and circuits of individuals. The brain-based self and 
brain-based psychotherapy is an understanding of self and psychology with no cultural or 
historical frame and therefore no shared understanding of the good, other than whatever 
values and ways of living are promoted or reinforced by neurochemical or biomedical 
selfhood. The reader becomes easily manipulated, just like he or she is convinced of the 
ability to manipulate the brain functioning of patients to help them heal and change. This 
is a helpless and complacent selfhood. Not questioning the authority of neuroscience is 
good practice for not questioning other forms of authority as well.  
 Although brain-based therapies hold the hope for many therapists for advances 
such as greater reimbursements from third party payers and greater societal esteem 
through scientific accuracy in diagnosis and treatment of psychological conditions, 
scientized and reductionist texts breed the very complicity that therapists need to avoid in 
order to reclaim some authority over psychotherapy practice from interests such as 
insurance companies or government programs that therapists appeal to for 
reimbursement. In other words, brain-based psychotherapy theories could unknowingly 
have little or even detrimental effects on the efforts for which therapists seem to have 
placed many personal and professional hopes. In my hermeneutic interpretation of 
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Cozolino’s (2010) text I have shown why his use of neuroscience is likely to convince 
readers that everything in his book is true. With his statements I labeled aporia (see 
above) Cozolino then casts doubt on his entire purpose, quite suddenly nothing becomes 
true. At its worst, confusion and ambiguity result in political apathy, which ultimately 
leads to hopelessness and despair. Because Cozolino’s (2010) efforts are ahistorical, his 
book is unable to foster a way of thinking that might condemn anything about the current 
time and place in which it has emerged and gained favor. Cozolino’s vision is a neutral 
understanding of therapy and mental health. It safely avoids polarizing readers at a time 
when the United States is quite polarized politically, economically, and socially. In The 
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy, American complicity is reinforced through the use of 
psychotherapy as a venue to further remove the mind or self from context and human 
relationship. In Cozolino’s book there is a psychotherapy theory or practice that could 
appeal to nearly any therapist, as long as readers do not disagree with the use of the brain 
as a means by which to understand and integrate psychotherapies. That is why a 
hermeneutic interpretation of the context, claims and rhetoric involved in integrating 
mind and brain is especially helpful for revealing the implications of mind-brain 
reductionism for the self, and thus for society more broadly. Psychologists and 
psychotherapists should attend closely to the cultural and historical circumstances from 
which brain-based therapy theories have emerged before adopting these therapy 
practices. 
 Finally, Cozolino is a good writer, and like most good writers, his efforts 
culminate in a book that is easy to read and which seems quite appealing. Unfortunately, 
the use of psychotherapy as a vehicle for a more widespread neuroscientific discourse, 
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and one that is firmly engrained in how people talk about the self and its ills, ultimately 
seems dismissive of psychological research and psychotherapy theories because it 
unknowingly dismisses subjectivity, agency, and morality. It is therefore dismissive of a 
more coherent discussion about relationships, culture and civic engagement—in other 
words, the good. The sense of complacency that Cozolino’s efforts perpetuate could be 
more likely to harm the viability of psychotherapy than to save it. A brain-based 
psychotherapy, in addition to being scientifically and logically questionable, is simply too 
good to be true. In other words, it is too easy for solving the difficult historical and moral 
problems that psychotherapy has for some decades been facing. As psychologists and 
psychotherapists we have to try harder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 281 
References 
Abi-Rached, J. M., & Rose, N. (2010). The birth of the neuromolecular gaze. History of 
 the Human Sciences, 23, 11-36. doi: 10.1177/0952695109352407 
 
Alford, B. A., & Beck, A. T. (1997). The relation of psychotherapy integration to the 
 established systems of psychotherapy. Journal of Psychotherapy Integration, 7, 
 275-289. doi: 1053-0479/97/1200-0275 
 
Applegate, J. S., & Shapiro, J. R. (2005). Neurobiology for clinical social work: Theory 
 and practice. New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
 
Badenoch, B. (2008). Being a brain-wise therapist: A practical guide to interpersonal 
 neurobiology. New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
 
Baldick, C. (2008). Oxford dictionary of literary terms (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford 
 University Press. 
 
Barker, P. (2001). The ripples of knowledge and the boundaries of practice: The problem 
 of evidence in psychotherapy research. International Journal of Psychotherapy, 6, 
 11-23. doi: 10.1080/13569080120042171 
 
Baxter, L. R., Schwartz, J. M., Bergman, K. S., Szuba, M. P., Guze B. H., Mazziotta, J. 
C., . . . Munford, P. (1992). Caudate glucose metabolic rate changes with both 
drug and behavior therapy for obsessive-compulsive disorder. Archives of 
General Psychiatry, 49, 681-689. doi: 10.1001/ archpsyc.1992.01820090009002 
 
Beitman, B. D., & Manring, J. (2009). Theory and practice of psychotherapy integration.  
  In G. O. Gabbard (Ed.), Textbook of psychotherapeutic treatments (pp. 705-726).  
  Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric. 
 
Beitman, B. D., & Viamontes, G. I. (2006). The Neurobiology of psychotherapy. 
 Psychiatric Annals, 36(4), 214-220. Retrieved from 
 http://search.proquest.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org 
 
Bennett, M. R., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2003). Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. 
 Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
 
Bernstein, R. J. (1988). Interpretation and its discontents: The choreography of critique. 
 In S. B. Messer, L. A. Sass, & R. L. Woolfolk (Eds.), Hermeneutics and 
 psychological theory: Interpretive perspectives on personality, psychotherapy, 
 and psychopathology (pp. 87-108). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
 Press. 
 
 
 282 
Beutel, M. E., Stern, E., & Silbersweig, D. A. (2003). The emerging dialogue between 
 psychoanalysis and neuroimaging perspectives. Journal of the American 
 Psychoanalytic Association, 51, 773-801. doi: 10.1177/00030651030510030101 
 
Blumberg, H. P., Leung, H. C., Skudlarski, P., Lacadie, C. M., Fredericks, C. A., Harris, 
 B. C., . . . Peterson, B. S. (2003). A functional magnetic resonance imaging study 
 of bipolar disorder: State- and trait-related dysfunction in ventral prefrontal 
 cortices. Archives of General Psychiatry, 60, 601-609. Retrieved from 
 http://archpsyc.jamanetwork.com 
 
Boag, S. (2007). ‘Real processes’ and the explanatory status of repression and inhibition. 
 Philosophical Psychology, 20, 375-392. doi: 10.1080/09515080701361173 
 
Borck, C. (2001). Electricity as a medium of psychic life: Electrotechnological 
 adventures into psychodiagnosis in Weimar Germany. Science in Context, 14, 
 565-590. doi: 10.1017/0269889701000254 
 
Bordo, S. (1987). The flight to objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and culture. Albany:  
 State University of New York. 
 
Braun, S. A., & Cox, J. A. (2005). Managed mental health care: Intentional misdiagnosis 
 of mental disorders. Journal of Counseling and Development, 83, 425-433. 
 Retrieved from http://web.a.ebscohost.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ehost/ 
 
Brenner, H. D., Roder, V., & Tschacher, W. (2006). Editorial: The significance of 
 psychotherapy in the age of neuroscience. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32, S10-S11. 
 doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbl026 
 
Brenninkmeijer, J. (2010). Taking care of one’s brain: How manipulating the brain 
 changes people’s selves. History of the Human Sciences, 23, 107-126.  
 doi: 10.1177/0952695109352824 
 
Brody, A. L., Saxena, S., Schwartz, J. M., Stoessel, P. W., Maidment, K., Phelps, M. E., 
 & Baxter, L. R. (1998). FDG-PET predictors of response to behavioral therapy 
 and pharmacotherapy in obsessive compulsive disorder. Psychiatry Research, 84 
 (1), 1-6. Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9870412 
 
Brody, A. L., Saxena, S., Stoessel, P., Gillies, L. A., Fairbanks, L. A., Alborzian, S., . . . 
 Baxter, L. W. (2001). Regional brain metabolic changes in patients with major 
 depression treated with either Paroxetine or Interpersonal Therapy. Archives of 
 General Psychiatry, 58, 631-640. Retrieved from 
 http://www.archgenpsychiatry.com 
 
 
 
 283 
Bromberg, P. M. (1993). Shadow and substance: A relational perspective on clinical 
 process. In S. A. Mitchell & L. Aron (Eds.), Relational psychoanalysis: The 
 emergence of a tradition (pp. 379-406). New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Brooks-Harris, J. E. (2008). Integrative multitheoretical psychotherapy. Boston, MA: 
 Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Brothers, L. (2001). Mistaken identity: The mind-brain problem reconsidered. Albany: 
 State University of New York Press. 
 
Canguilhem, G. (1988). Ideology and rationality in the history of the life sciences. (A. 
 Goldhammer, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Reprinted from Idéologie et 
 rationalité dans l'histoire des sciences de la vie, 1977, Paris, France: Librairie 
 Philosophique J. Vrin).  
 
Carter, C. S., Mintun, M., Nichols, T., & Cohen, J. D. (1997). Anterior cingulate gyrus 
 dysfunction and selective attention deficits in schizophrenia: [15O]H2O PET 
 study during single-trial Stroop task performance. American Journal of 
 Psychiatry, 154(12), 1670 1675. Retrieved from 
 http://search.proquest.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ 
 
Centonze, D., Siracusano, A., Calabresi, P., & Bernardi, P. (2005). Removing pathogenic 
 memories: A neurobiology of psychotherapy. Molecular Neurobiology, 32(2), 
 123-32. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ 
 
Codrington, R. (2010). A family therapist’s look into interpersonal neurobiology and the 
 adolescent brain: An interview with Dr. Daniel Siegel. The Australian and New 
 Zealand Journal of Family Therapy, 31(3), 285-299. 
 
Cohen, J. A. (2003). Managed care and the evolving role of the clinical social worker in 
 mental  health. Social Work, 48, 34-43. doi: 0037-8046/03 
 
Cozolino, L. J. (2010). The neuroscience of psychotherapy: Healing the social brain  
 (2nd ed.). New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
 
Cromby, J. (2004). Between constructionism and neuroscience: The societal co-
 constitution of embodied subjectivity. Theory & Psychology, 14, 797-821.  
 doi: 10.1177/0959354304048107 
 
Cushman, P. (1995). Constructing the self, constructing America: A cultural history of 
 psychotherapy. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press. 
 
Cushman, P. (2002). How psychology erodes personhood. Journal of Theoretical and 
 Philosophical Psychology, 22(2), 103-113. 
 
 284 
Cushman, P. (2005). Between arrogance and a dead-end: Psychoanalysis and the 
 Heidegger-Foucault Dilemma. Cotemporary Psychoanalysis, 41(3), 399-417. 
 
Cushman, P., & Gilford, P. (1999). From emptiness to multiplicity: The self at the year 
 2000. Psychohistory Review, 27(2), 15-31.  
 
Cushman, P., & Gilford, P. (2000). Will managed care change our way of being? 
 American Psychologist, 55, 985-996. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.55.9.985 
 
Danziger, K. (1979). Social origins of modern psychology. In A. R. Buss (Ed.), 
 Psychology in  social context (pp. 27-45). New York, NY: Irvington. 
 
De Raedt, R. (2006). Does neuroscience hold promise for the further development of 
 behavior therapy? The case of emotional change after exposure in anxiety and 
 depression. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 47, 225-36. Retrieved from 
 http://web.a.ebscohost.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ehost 
 
Dumit, J. (2004). Picturing personhood: Brain scans and biomedical identity. Princeton, 
 NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Dumont, F. (2009). Rehearsals, confession, and confabulations: Psychotherapy and the 
 synaptic self. Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 39, 33-40. doi: 
 10.1007/s10879-008-9101-5. 
 
Duquette, P. (2010). Reality matters: Attachment, the real relationship, and change in 
 psychotherapy. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 64(2), 127-151. Retrieved 
 from http://web.a.ebscohost.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ehost 
 
Ecker, B., & Toomey, B. (2008). Depotentiation of symptom-producing implicit memory 
 in coherence therapy. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 21, 87-150. doi: 
 10.1080/10720530701853685 
 
Elliott, R., Watson, J. C., Goldman, R. N., & Greenberg, L. S. (2004). Learning emotion 
 focused therapy: The process-experiential approach to change. Washington, DC: 
 American Psychological Association.  
 
Etkin, A., Pittenger, C., Polan, J., & Kandel, E. R. (2005). Toward a neurobiology of 
 psychotherapy: Basic science and clinical applications. The Journal of 
 Neuropsychiatry & Clinical Neurosciences, 17(2), 145-158. Retrieved from 
 http://search.proquest.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/docview/195227347/fulltext/ 
 
 
 
 
 285 
Farrow, T. F. D., Hunter, M. D., Wilkinson, I. D., Gouneea, C., Fawbert, D., Smith, R., 
 . . . Woodruff, P. W. R. (2005). Quantifiable change in functional brain response 
 to empathic and forgivability judgments with resolution of posttraumatic stress 
 disorder. Psychiatry Research-Neuroimaging, 140, 45-53. 
 doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2005.05.012 
 
Faux, S. F. (2002). Cognitive neuroscience from a behavioral perspective: A critique of 
 chasing ghosts with Geiger counters. The Behavior Analyst, 25(2), 161-173. 
 Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2731617/ 
 
Fonagy, P. (2004). Psychotherapy meets neuroscience: A more focused future for 
 psychotherapy research. Psychiatric Bulletin, 28, 357-359.  
 doi: 10.1192/pb.28.10.357 
 
Foucault, M. (1988). Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason. 
 (R. Howard, Trans.). New York, NY: Vintage Books. (Reprinted from Histoire de 
 la folie, 1961, France: Librairie Plon). 
 
Foucault, M. (1994). The order of things: An archeology of the human sciences. New 
 York, NY: Vintage Books. (Reprinted from Les mots et les choses, 1966, France: 
 Editions Gallimard).  
 
Frewen, P. A., Dozois, D. J. A., Lanius, R. A. (2008). Neuroimaging studies of 
 psychological interventions for mood and anxiety disorders: Empirical and 
 methodological review. Clinical Psychology Review, 28, 228-246. 
 doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2007.05.002 
 
Frie, R. (2009a). Introduction: Coherence or fragmentation? Modernism, postmodernism, 
 and the search for continuity. In R. Frie & D. Orange (Eds.), Beyond 
 postmodernism: New dimensions in clinical theory and practice (pp. 1-23). New 
 York, NY: Routledge.  
 
Frie, R. (2009b). Reconfiguring psychological agency: Postmodernism, recursivity, and 
 the politics of change. In R. Frie & D. Orange (Eds.), Beyond postmodernism: 
 New dimensions in clinical theory and practice (pp. 162-182). New York, NY: 
 Routledge. 
 
Frie, R. (2011). Culture and context: From individualism to situated experience. In R. 
 Frie &  W.J. Coburn (Eds.), Persons in context: The challenge of individuality in 
 theory and practice. (pp. 3-19). New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Frie, R., & Coburn, W. J. (2011). Introduction: Experience in context. In R. Frie & W. J. 
 Coburn (Eds.), Persons in context: The challenge of individuality in theory and 
 practice. (pp. xv-xxx). New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
 286 
Fuchs, T. (2004). Neurobiology and psychotherapy: An emerging dialogue. Current 
 Opinion in Psychiatry, 17, 479-485. Retrieved from http://journals.lww.com/co-
 psychiatry/pages/default.aspx 
 
Furmark, T., Tillfors, M., Marteinsdottir, I., Fischer, H., Pissiota, A., Långström, B., & 
 Fredrikson, M. (2002). Common changes in cerebral blood flow in patients with 
 social phobia treated with citalopram or cognitive-behavioral therapy. Archives of 
 General Psychiatry, 59(5), 425-433. Retrieved from 
 http://www.archgenpsychiatry.com 
 
Furumoto, L. (1989). The new history of psychology. In I.S. Cohen (Ed.), The G. Stanley 
 Hall lecture series (vol. 9, pp. 9-34). Washington, DC: American Psychological 
 Association. 
 
Gadamer, H.-G. (1975). Truth and method (2nd ed., revised). (J. Weinsheimer & D. G. 
 Marshal, Trans.). New York, NY: Continuum. 
 
Gadamer, H.-G. (1994a). Truth in the human sciences (B.R. Wachterhauser, Trans.). In 
 B. R. Wachterhauser (Ed.), Hermeneutics and truth (pp. 25-32). Evanston, IL: 
 Northwestern University Press. (Reprinted from Gesammelte werke, Vol. 2, 1986, 
 Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr). 
 
Gadamer, H.-G. (1994b). What is truth? (B. R. Wachterhauser, Trans.). In B. R. 
 Wachterhauser (Ed.), Hermeneutics and truth (pp. 33-46). Evanston, IL: 
 Northwestern University Press. (Reprinted from Gesammelte werke, Vol. 2, 1986, 
 Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr). 
 
Gadamer, H.-G. (2004). The universality of the hermeneutical problem (D.E. Linge, 
 Trans.). In D.E. Linge (Ed.), Philosophical hermeneutics (pp. 3-17). Berkeley: 
 University of California Press. (Reprinted from Klein schriften, 1966, Tübingen, 
 Germany: J.C.B. Mohr). 
 
Garza, G., & Smith, A. F. (2009). Beyond neurobiological reductionism: Recovering the 
 intentional and expressive body. Theory and Psychology, 19, 519-544.  
 doi: 10.1177/0959354309336318 
 
Gold, I., & Stoljar, D. (1999). A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience. Brain 
 and Behavioral Sciences, 22(5), 809-869. Retrieved from 
 http://journals.ohiolink.edu.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ejc 
 
Gold, J., & Stricker, G. (2006). Introduction: An overview of psychotherapy integration. 
 In G. Stricker & J. Gold (Eds.), A casebook of psychotherapy integration  
 (pp. 3-17). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
 287 
Goldapple, K., Segal, Z., Garson, C., Lau, M., Bieling, P., Kennedy, S., & Mayberg, H. 
 (2004). Modulation of cortical limbic pathways in major depression: 
 Treatment specific effects of cognitive behavior therapy. Archives of General 
 Psychiatry, 61, 34-41. Retrieved from http://www.archgenpsychiatry.com 
 
Goldfried, M. R., Pachankis, J. E., & Bell, A. C. (2005). A history of psychotherapy 
 integration. In  J. C. Norcross & M. R. Goldfried (Eds.), Handbook of 
 psychotherapy integration (2nd ed., pp. 24-61). New York, NY: Oxford 
 University Press. 
 
Goodwin, C. J. (2008). A history of modern psychology (3rd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John 
 Wiley & Sons. 
 
Grawe, K. (2007). Neuropsychotherapy: How the neurosciences inform effective 
 psychotherapy. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Gurley, J. R., & Marcus, D. K. (2008). The effects of neuroimaging and brain disease on 
 insanity defenses. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 26, 85-97.  
 doi: 10.1002/bsl.797. 
 
Hagner, M. (2001). Cultivating the cortex in German neuroanatomy. Science in Context, 
 14, 541-563. doi: 10.1017/0269889701000242 
 
Hayes, S. C. (2004). Acceptance and commitment therapy and the new behavior 
 therapies: Mindfulness, acceptance, and relationship. In S. C. Hayes, V. M. 
 Follette, & M. M. Linehan (Eds.), Mindfulness and acceptance: Expanding the 
 cognitive-behavioral tradition (pp. 1-29). New York, NY: The Guilford Press. 
 
Hayward, R. (2001), The tortoise and the love-machine: Grey Walter and the politics of 
 electroencephalography. Science in Context, 14, 615-641.  
 doi: 10.1017/0269889701000278 
 
Hoffman, I. Z. (2009). Doublethinking our way to ‘scientific’ legitimacy: The desiccation 
 of human experience. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 57, 
 1043-1069. doi: 10.1177/0003065109343925 
 
Hollingsworth, A. (2008). Neuroscience and Spirituality: Implications of interpersonal 
 neurobiology for a spirituality of compassion. Zygon, 43(4), 837-860. 
 
Hoyt, M. F., & Combs, G. (1996). On ethics and the spiritualities of the surface: A 
 conversation with Michael White. In M. F. Hoyt (Ed.), Constructive therapies 2 
 (pp. 33-59). New York, NY: The Guilford Press. 
 
 288 
Ilardi, S. S., & Feldman, D. (2001). On mental events, disciplinary boundaries, and 
 reductionism: A reply to Plaud. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 57, 1103-1107. 
 doi: 10.1002/jclp.1074 
 
Johanson, A., Risberg, J., Tucker, D. M., & Gustafson, L. (2006). Changes in frontal lobe 
 activity with cognitive therapy for spider phobia. Applied Neuropsychology, 13, 
 34-41. doi: 10.1207/s15324826an1301_5 
Joyce, K. A. (2008). Magnetic appeal: MRI and the myth of transparency. Ithaca:  Cornell 
 University Press. 
 
Kandel, E. R. (1999). Biology and the future of psychoanalysis: a new intellectual 
 framework for psychiatry revisited. American Journal of Psychiatry, 156(4), 505-
 524. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ 
 
Kay, L. E. (2001). From logical neurons to poetic embodiments of mind: Warren S. 
 McCulloch’s project in neuroscience. Science in Context, 14, 591-614.  
 doi: 10.1017/0269889701000266 
 
Kielbasa, A. M., Pomerantz, A. M., Krohn, E. J., & Sullivan, B. F. (2004). How does 
 clients’ method of payment influence psychologists’ diagnostic decisions? Ethics 
 and Behavior, 14(2), 187-195. Retrieved from 
 http://web.b.ebscohost.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ 
 
Kirschner, S. R., & Martin, J. (2010). The sociocultural turn in psychology: A contextual 
 emergence of mind and self. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
 
Kolb, B., & Whishaw, I. Q. (2009). Fundamentals of human neuropsychology (6th ed.). 
 New York, NY: Worth. 
 
Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions (3rd ed.). Chicago, IL: University 
 of Chicago Press. 
 
Lampropoulos, G. K., Spengler, P. M., Dixon, D. N., & Nicholas, D. R. (2002). How 
 psychotherapy integration can complement the scientist-practitioner model. 
 Journal of Clinical Psychology, 58, 1227-1240. doi: 10.1002/jclp.10108 
 
Layton, L. (2009). Who’s responsible? Out mutual implication in each other’s suffering. 
 Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 19, 105-120. doi: 10.1080/10481880902779695 
 
Lazarus, A. A. (2005). Is there still a need for psychotherapy integration? Current 
 Psychology, 24(3), 149-152. Retrieved from 
 http://web.b.ebscohost.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ 
 
Leahey, T. H. (1992). The mythical revolutions of American psychology. American 
 Psychologist, 47, 308-318. doi: 0003-066x 
 289 
Lee, A., Kannan, V., & Hillis, A. E. (2006). The contribution of neuroimaging to the 
 study of language and aphasia. Neuropsychology Review, 16, 171-183.  
 doi: 10.1007/s11065-006-9014-6 
 
Legrenzi, P, & Umilta, C. (2011). Neuromania: On the limits of brain science. (F. 
 Anderson, Trans.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Liggan, D. Y., & Kay, J. (1999). Some neurobiological aspects of psychotherapy. The 
 Journal of Psychotherapy Practice and Research, 8(2), 103-114. Retrieved from 
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3330538/ 
 
Lillas, C., & Turnbull, J. (2009). Infant/child mental health, early intervention, and 
 relationship-based therapies: a Neurorelational framework for interdisciplinary 
 practice. New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
 
Linden, D. E. J. (2006). How psychotherapy changes the brain—the contribution of 
 functional neuroimaging. Molecular Psychiatry, 11, 528-538. 
 doi:10.1038/sj.mp.4001816 
 
Linden, D. E. J. (2008). Brain imaging and psychotherapy: Methodological 
 considerations and practical implications. European Archives of Psychiatry and 
 Clinical Neuroscience, 258, 71-75. doi: 10.1007/s00406-008-5023-1  
 
Linden, D. E. J., & Fallgatter, A. J. (2009). Neuroimaging in psychiatry: From bench to 
 bedside. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 3, 1-7.  
 doi: 10.3389/neuro.09.049.2009 
 
Linford, L., & Arden, J. B. (2009). Brain-based therapy and the ‘pax-medica.’ 
 Psychotherapy in Australia, 15(3), 16-23.  
 
Martin, S. D., Martin, E., Rai, S. S., Richardson, M. A., & Royall, R. (2001). Brain blood 
 flow changes in depressed patients treated with interpersonal psychotherapy or 
 venlafaxine hydrochloride: Preliminary findings. Archives of General Psychiatry, 
 58, 641-648. Retrieved from http://archgenpsychiatry.com 
 
Meichenbaum, D. (1988). What happens when the ‘brute data’ of psychological inquiry 
 are meanings: Nurturing a dialogue between hermeneutics and empiricism. In 
 S. B. Messer, L. A. Sass, & R. L. Woolfolk (Eds.). Hermeneutics and 
 psychological theory: Interpretive perspectives on personality, psychotherapy, 
 and psychopathology (pp. 116-130). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
 Press. 
 
 
 290 
Melcher, T., Falkai, P., & Gruber, O. (2008). Functional brain abnormalities in 
 psychiatric disorders: Neural mechanisms to detect and resolve cognitive conflict 
 and interference. Brain Research Reviews, 59, 96-124.  
 doi: 10.1016/j.brainresrev.2008.06.003 
 
Mitchell, S. (1988). Relational concepts in psychoanalysis: An integration. Cambridge, 
 MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Miller, S. D., Duncan, B, & Hubble, M. (1997). Escape from babble: Toward a unifying 
 language for psychotherapy practice. New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
 
Mizen, C. S. (2005). Neuroimaging and neuropsychotherapy. Psychiatry, 4, 10-13.  
 doi: 10.1383/psyt.4.5.10.65103 
 
Moreira, T., & Palladino, P. (2005). Between truth and hope: On Parkinson's disease, 
 neurotransplantation and the production of the 'self'. History of the Human 
 Sciences, 18, 55-82. doi: 10.1177/0952695105059306 
 
Nakao T, Nakagawa A, Yoshiura T, Nakatani, E., Nabeyama, M., Yoshizato, C., . . .
 Kanba, S. (2005). Brain activation of patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder 
 during neuropsychological and symptom provocation task before and after 
 symptom improvement: A functional MRI study. Biological Psychiatry; 57,  
 901-910. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2004.12.039 
 
Nakatani, E., Nakgawa, A., Ohara, Y., Goto, S., Uozumi, N., Iwakiri, M., … Yamagami, 
 T. (2003). Effects of behavior therapy on regional cerebral blood flow in 
 obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 124,  
 113-120. doi: 10.1016/S0925-4927(03)00069-6 
 
Neborsky, R. J. (2006). Brain, mind, and dyadic change processes. Journal of Clinical 
 Psychology: In session, 62, 523-538. doi: 10.1002/jclp.20246 
 
Neimeyer, R. A. (1993). An appraisal of constructivist psychotherapies. Journal of 
 Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 61, 221-234. doi: 10.1037//0022-
 006X.61.2.221 
 
Noë, A. (2009). Out of our heads: Why you are not your brain and other lessons from the 
 biology of consciousness. New York, NY: Hill and Wang. 
 
Norcross, J. C. (2005). A primer on psychotherapy integration. In J. C. Norcross & M. R. 
 Goldfried (Eds.), Handbook of psychotherapy integration (2nd ed. pp. 3-23). 
 New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
 
 291 
Norcross, J. C., & Newman, C. F. (2003). Psychotherapy integration: Setting the context. 
 In J. C. Norcross and M. R. Goldfried (Eds.), Handbook of psychotherapy 
 integration. (pp. 3-45). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Norcross, J. C., Karpiak, C. P., & Lister, K. M. (2005). What’s an integrationist? A study 
 of self- identified integrative and (occasionally) eclectic psychologists. Journal of 
 clinical psychology, 61, 1587-1594. doi: 10.1002/jclp.20203 
 
Novas, C. (2006). The political economy of hope: Patients’ organizations, science and 
 biovalue. BioSocieties, 1, 289-305. doi: 10.1017/S1745855206003024 
 
Nuttall, J. (2002). Imperatives and perspectives of psychotherapy integration. 
 International Journal of Psychotherapy, 7, 249-264.  
 doi: 10.1080/1356908021000063169 
 
O’Brien, M., & Houston, G. (2007). Integrative therapy: A practitioner’s guide (2nd ed.). 
 Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 
Orange, D. (2003). Antidotes and alternatives: Perspectival realism and the new 
 reductions. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 20, 472-486. doi: 10.1037/0736-
 9735.20.3.472 
 
Orange, D. (2009). Toward the art of the living dialogue: Between constructivism and 
 hermeneutics in psychoanalytic thinking. In R. Frie & D. Orange (Eds.), Beyond 
 postmodernism: New dimensions in clinical theory and practice. (pp. 117-142). 
 New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Ortega, F., & Vidal, F. (2007). Mapping the cerebral subject in contemporary culture. 
 RECIIS: Electronic Journal of Communication, Information & Innovation in 
 Health, 1, 255-259. doi: 10.3395/reciis.v1i2.90en 
 
Panzarino, P. J. (2000). Psychiatric training and practice under managed care. 
 Administration and Policy in Mental Health, 28(1), 51-59. Retrieved from 
 http://search.proquest.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ 
 
Paquette, V., Levesque, J., Mensour, B., Leroux J.-M., Beaudoin, G., Bourgouin, P, & 
 Beauregard, M. (2003). Change the mind and you change the brain: Effects of 
 cognitive-behavioral therapy on the neural correlates of spider phobia. 
 NeuroImage 18, 401-409. doi: 10.1016/S1053-8119(02)00030-7 
 
Pepperdine University. (2013, June 16). Faculty directory. Retrieved from 
 http://gsep.pepperdine.edu/welcome/faculty/default.htm?faculty=lou_cozolino 
 
 
 292 
Peres, J., & Nasello, A. G. (2008). Psychotherapy and neuroscience: Towards closer 
 integration. International Journal of Psychology, 43, 943-957.  
 doi: 10.1080/00207590701248487 
 
Peres, J. F. P., Newberg, A. B., Mercante, J. P., Simão, M., Albuquerque, V. E., Peres,  
 M. J., & Nasello, A. G. (2007). Cerebral blood flow changes during retrieval of 
 traumatic memories before and after psychotherapy: A SPECT Study. 
 Psychological Medicine, 37, 1481-1491. doi: 10.1017/S003329170700997X 
 
Pitts-Taylor, V. (2010). The plastic brain: Neoliberalism and the neuronal self. Health, 
 14, 635-652. doi: 10.1177/1363459309360796 
 
Portland State University. (2013, October 30). Interpersonal neurobiology certificate of 
 completion. Retrieved from http://www.pdx.edu/ceed/interpersonal-
 neurobiology-certificate-of-completion 
 
Porto, P. R., Oliveira, L., Mari, J., Volchan, E., Figueira, I., & Ventura, P. (2009). Does 
 cognitive behavioral therapy change the brain? A systematic review of 
 neuroimaging in anxiety disorders. Journal of Neuropsychiatry, 21(2), 114-125. 
 Retrieved from http://media.proquest.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ 
 
Prasko, J., Horacek, J., Zalesky, R., Kopecek, M., Novak, T., Paskova, B., … Hoschi, C. 
 (2004). The change of regional brain metabolism (18FDG PET) in panic disorder 
 during the treatment with cognitive behavioural therapy or antidepressants. 
 Neuroendocrinology Letters, 25(5), 340-348. 
 
Prochaska, J. O., & Norcross, J. C. (2003). Systems of psychotherapy: A transtheoretical 
 analysis (5th ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
 
Racine, E., Bar-Ilan, O., & Illes, J. (2005). FMRI in the public eye. Nature Reviews 
 Neuroscience, 6, 159-164. Retrieved from 
 http://web.b.ebscohost.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ 
 
Racine, E., Bar-Ilan, O., & Illes, J. (2006). Brain imaging: A decade of coverage in the 
 print media. Science Communication, 28, 122-143.  
 doi: 10.1177/1075547006291990 
 
Racine, E., Waldman, S., Rosenberg, J., & Illes, J. (2010). Contemporary neuroscience in 
 the media. Social Science & Medicine, 71, 725-733.  
 doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2010.05.017 
 
 
 
 
 293 
Ragan, C. L. (2006). Comparing apples to oranges and making a fruit salad (mixing 
 psychodynamic science and neuroscience): A review of Clay C. Whitehead’s 
 ‘neo-psychoanalysis: A paradigm for the 21st century’. Journal of The American 
 Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry, 34(4), 629-649. Retrieved 
 from http://web.b.ebscohost.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ 
 
Rajan, K. S. (2006). Biocapital: The constitution of postgenomic life. Durham, NC: Duke 
 University Press.  
 
Richardson, F. C. (2002). Current dilemmas, hermeneutics, and power. Journal of 
 Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 22(2), 114-132. 
 
Richardson, F. C. (2009). Biases against theism in psychology? Journal of Theoretical 
 and Philosophical Psychology, 29, 122-127. doi: 10.1037/a0017689 
 
Richardson, F. C., & Bishop, R. (2004). Practices, power, and cultural ideals. Journal of 
 Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24(2), 179-195. 
 
Richardson, F. C., & Christopher, J. C. (1993). Social theory as practice: Metatheoretical 
 options for social inquiry. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 
 13(2), 137 153. 
 
Richardson, F. C., Fowers, B. J., & Guignon, C. B. (1999). Re-envisioning psychology: 
 Moral dimensions of theory and practice. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Richardson, L. M., & Austad, C. S. (1991). Realities of mental health practice in 
 managed care settings. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 22, 52-
 59. doi: 0735-7028/91 
 
Robins, C. J., Schmitt III, H., & Linehan, M. M. (2004). Dialectical behavior therapy: 
 Synthesizing radical acceptance with mindfulness skills. In S. C. Hayes, V. M. 
 Follette, & M. M. Linehan (Eds.), Mindfulness and acceptance: Expanding the 
 cognitive-behavioral tradition (pp. 30-44). New York, NY: The Guilford Press. 
 
Roffman, J. L., Marci, C. D., Glick, D. M., Dougherty, D. D., & Rauch, S. L. (2005). 
 Neuroimaging and the functional neuroanatomy of psychotherapy. Psychological 
 Medicine, 35, 1385-1398. doi: 10.1017/S0033291705005064 
 
Rose, N. (2007). The politics of life itself. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
 
 
 294 
Sakai, Y., Kumano, H., Nishikawa, M., Sakano, Y., Kaiya, H., Imabayashi, E., … 
 Kuboki, T. (2006). Changes in cerebral glucose utilization in patients with panic 
 disorder treated with cognitive-behavioral therapy. Neuroimage, 33, 218-226. 
 doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.06.017 
 
Salgado, J., & Hermans, H. J. M. (2005). The return of subjectivity: From a multiplicity 
 of selves to the dialogical self. E-Journal of Applied Psychology: Clinical Section, 
 1(1), 3-13. Retrieved from http://ojs.lib.swin.edu.au/index.php/ejap 
 
Samelson, F. (1974). History, origin myth, and ideology: Comte’s “discovery” of social 
 psychology. Journal for the theory of social behaviour, 4, 217-231. 
 
Sass, L. A. (1988). Humanism, hermeneutics, and the concept of the human subject. In  
 S. B. Messer, L. A. Sass, & R. L. Woolfolk (Eds.), Hermeneutics and 
 psychological theory: Interpretive perspectives on personality, psychotherapy, 
 and psychopathology (pp. 222-271). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
 Press. 
 
Schore, A. N. (1994). Affect regulation and the origin of the self: the neurobiology of 
 emotional development. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Schore, A. N. (2001). Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain 
 development, affect regulation, and infant mental health. Infant Mental Health 
 Journal, 22, 7-66. doi: 10.1002/1097-0355(200101/04)22:1 
 
Schore, A. N. (2002). Dysregulation of the right brain: A fundamental mechanism of 
 traumatic attachment and the psychopathogenesis of posttraumatic stress disorder. 
 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 36, 9-30. doi: 10.1046/j.1440-
 1614.2002.00996.x. 
 
Schore, A. N. (2005). A neuropsychoanalytic viewpoint: Commentary on paper by 
 Steven H. Knoblauch. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 15(6), 829-854. Retrieved from 
 http://web.b.ebscohost.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ 
 
Schore, A. N. (2012). The science of the art of psychotherapy. New York, NY: W.W. 
 Norton. 
 
Schwartz, J. M., Stoessel, P. W., Baxter, L. R., Martin, K. M., & Phelps, M. E. (1996). 
 Systematic changes in cerebral glucose metabolic rate after successful behavior 
 modification treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Archives of General 
 Psychiatry, 53, 109-113. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1996.01830020023004 
 
Siegel, D. J. (1999). The developing mind: How relationships and the brain interact to 
 shape who we are. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
 
 295 
Siegel, D. J. (2001). Toward an interpersonal neurobiology of the developing mind: 
 Attachment relationships, mindsight, and neural integration. Infant Mental Health 
 Journal, 22, 67-94. 
 
Siegel, D. J. (2007). The mindful brain: reflection and attunement in the cultivation of 
 well-being. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.  
 
Siegel, D. J. (2010). Mindsight: The new science of personal transformation. New York, 
 NY: Bantam Books. 
 
Smith, H. (2003). Beyond the postmodern mind: The place of meaning in a global 
 civilization. Wheaton, IL: Theosophical. 
 
Sperling, M. B., & Sack, A. (2002). Psychodynamics and managed care: The art of the 
 impossible? American Journal of Psychotherapy, 56(3), 362-377. Retrieved from 
 http://web.a.ebscohost.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ 
 
Stigliano, A. (1989). Hermeneutical practice. Saybrook Review, 7, 47-69. 
 
Stolorow, R., & Atwood, G. (1994). The intersubjective perspective. Northvale, NJ: 
 Aronson.   
 
Stricker, G., & Gold, J. (2006). A casebook of psychotherapy integration. Washington, 
 DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
Sulik, G. A. (2009). Managing biomedical uncertainty: The technoscientific illness 
 identity. Sociology of Health & Illness, 30, 1059-1076. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
 9566.2009.01183.x 
 
Tallis, R. (2004). Why the mind is not a computer: A pocket lexicon of neuromythology. 
 Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic.  
 
Tallis, R. (2011). Aping mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the misrepresentation of 
 humanity. Durham, England: Accumen. 
 
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. Cambridge, 
 MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Toomey, B., & Ecker, B. (2007). Of neurons and knowings: Constructivism, coherence 
 psychology, and their neurodynamic substrates. Journal of Constructivist 
 Psychology, 20, 201-45. doi: 10.1080/10720530701347860. 
 
Toomey, B., & Ecker, B. (2009). Competing visions of the implications of neuroscience 
 for psychotherapy. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 22, 95-140.  
 doi: 10.1080/10720530802675748. 
 296 
Uttal, W. R. (1999). Let us keep our ontology and epistemology separate! In I. Gold & D. 
 Stoljar  (Eds.), Open peer community: A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of 
 neuroscience (pp. 852-853). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22(5), 809-869. 
 http://journals.ohiolink.edu.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ejc 
 
Uttal, W. R. (2007). The immeasurable mind: The real science of psychology. Amherst, 
 NY: Prometheus Books. 
 
Vidal, F. (2009). Brainhood, anthropological figure of modernity. History of the Human 
 Sciences, 22, 5-36. doi: 10.1177/0952695108099133 
 
Vivona, J. M. (2009). Leaping from brain to mind: A critique of mirror-neuron 
 explanations of countertransference. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
 Association, 57, 525-550. doi: 10.1177/0003065109336443 
 
Vrecko, S. (2010). Neuroscience, power, and culture: An introduction. History of the 
 Human Sciences, 23, 1-10. doi: 10.1177/0952695109354395 
 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. (2013, November 9). Norton series on interpersonal 
 neurobiology. Retrieved from http://books.wwnorton.com/books/index.aspx 
 
Wachtel, P. L. (1993). Therapeutic communication: Knowing what to say when. New 
 York, NY: The Guilford Press. 
 
Wachterhauser, B. R. (1994). Introduction: Is there truth after interpretation? In B.R. 
 Wachterhauser (Ed.), Hermeneutics and truth (pp. 1-24). Evanston, IL: 
 Northwestern University Press. 
 
Walls, G. (2004). Toward a critical global psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 
 14(5), 605-634. 
 
Walter, H., Berger, M., & Schnell, K. (2009). Neuropsychotherapy: Conceptual, 
 empirical, and  neuroethical issues. European Archives of Psychiatry: Clinical 
 Neuroscience, 259, S173-S182. doi: 10.1007/s00406-009-0058-5 
 
Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20, 
 158-177. doi: 10.1037/h0074428 
 
Watts-English, T., Fortson, B. L., Gibler, N., Hooper, S. R., & De Bellis, M. D. (2006). 
 The psychobiology of maltreatment in childhood. Journal of Social Issues, 62, 
 717-736. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.2006.00484.x. 
 
Weisberg, D. S., Keil, F. C., Goodstein, J., Rawson, E., & Gray, J. R. (2008). The 
 seductive allure of neuroscience explanations. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
 20(3), 470-477. Retrieved from http://web.a.ebscohost.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ 
 297 
 
Wilcoxon, S. A., Magnuson, S., & Norem, K. (2008). Institutional values of managed 
 mental  health care: efficiency or oppression? Journal of Multicultural Counseling 
 and Development, 36, 149-154. Retrieved from 
 http://web.a.ebscohost.com.antioch.idm.oclc.org/ 
 
Wilkinson, M. (2010). Changing minds in therapy: Emotion, attachment, trauma, and 
 neurobiology. New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
 
Woolfolk, R. L., Sass, L. A., & Messer, S. B. (1988). Introduction to hermeneutics. In  
 S. B. Messer, L. A. Sass, & R. L. Woolfolk (Eds.), Hermeneutics and 
 psychological theory: Interpretive perspectives on personality, psychotherapy, 
 and psychopathology (pp. 2-26). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 298 
Appendix A 
Further Examples of Primary Content of  
The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain (Cozolino, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 299 
 The definition or general purpose of psychotherapy.  
 Psychotherapy as a venue for neural integration. 
 “At the heart of psychotherapy is an understanding of the interwoven forces of 
 nature and nurture, what goes right and wrong in their developmental unfolding, 
 and how to reinstate healthy neural functioning” (p. 13). 
 
 Psychotherapy can be thought of as a specific type of enriched environment that 
 promotes social and emotional development, neural integration, and process 
 complexity. The way the brain changes during therapy will depend upon the 
 neural networks involved in the focus of treatment. (p. 20) 
 
 The very way that the brain has evolved to successfully cope with immediate 
 threat appears to have created a vulnerability to longer term psychological 
 distress: Enter psychotherapy. Applying this model, psychotherapy is a means of 
 creating or restoring coordination among various neural networks. (p. 25) 
 
 A basic assumption of both neuroscience and psychotherapy is that optimal 
 functioning and mental health are related to increasingly advanced levels of 
 growth, integration, and complexity. On a neurological level, this equates to the 
 integration and communication of neural networks dedicated to emotion, 
 cognition, sensation, and behavior and a proper balance between excitation and 
 inhibition. On an experiential level, integration is the ability to live life—love and 
 work—while employing a minimum of defensiveness. . . . From the perspective 
 of neuroscience, psychotherapy can be understood as a specific kind of enriched 
 environment designed to enhance the growth of neurons and the integration of 
 neural networks. The therapeutic environment is individually tailored to fit the 
 symptoms and needs of each client. I propose here that all forms of therapy, 
 regardless of theoretical orientation, will be successful to the degree to which they 
 foster appropriate neuroplasticity. (p. 25) 
 
 “Psychotherapy can serve as a means to reintegrate the patient’s disconnected 
 hemispheres through reality testing, emotional expression, and putting words to 
 feelings in the context of a caring relationship” (p. 110). 
 
 The organization of autobiographical memory that includes input from multiple 
 neural networks enhances self-awareness and increases the ability to solve 
 problems, cope with stress, and regulate affect. This integrative process is what 
 psychotherapy attempts to establish when it is absent. (p. 207) 
 
 “Given that psychotherapy is an enriched environment for social-emotional 
 learning, we can assume that the challenges we provide our clients build more 
 complex and resilient brains” (p. 330). 
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 Psychotherapy as a relationship that is similar to other relationships that 
facilitate neural integration. 
 “In psychotherapy we are tapping the same principles and processes available in 
 every relationship to connect to and heal another brain” (p. 305). 
 
 “Language within significant relationships has shaped the brain during evolution 
 and continues to do so throughout our lives. Because of this, narratives embedded 
 within an emotionally meaningful relationship (like psychotherapy) are capable of 
 resculpting neural networks throughout life” (p. 343). 
 
 General reasons why people seek psychotherapy. 
 A lack of “optimal” neural functioning is implicated in the problems for which 
people  seek treatment with psychotherapy regardless of the severity or types of problems. 
 At the heart of psychotherapy is an understanding of the interwoven forces of 
 nature and nurture, what goes right and wrong in their developmental unfolding, 
 and how to reinstate healthy neural functioning. When one or more neural 
 networks necessary for optimal functioning remain underdeveloped, 
 underregulated, or underintegrated with others, we experience the complaints and 
 symptoms for which people seek therapy. We now assume that when 
 psychotherapy results in symptom reduction or experiential change, the brain has, 
 in some way, been altered. (Kandel, 1998, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 13) 
 
 Many people, perhaps even the majority of clients in psychotherapy, do not come 
 for treatment of a major psychiatric illness. Most clients who are somewhat “less 
 ill” have so far not been included in extensive (and expensive) outcome research 
 that includes brain imaging studies. Many people seek psychotherapy simply 
 because, as they often say themselves, life has somehow gotten out of balance. 
 This may mean that their fears and worries have taken control of their lives and 
 limited their ability to function or find happiness in the world. Others find 
 themselves devoid of emotion and without empathy for others, leading them to 
 seek therapy to save their marriages and relationships with their children. Many 
 have the sense that they are not living up to their potential or get in their own way 
 when it comes to worldly success and emotional satisfaction. These clients are 
 often referred to as the ‘worried well,’ implying that they should somehow get 
 over themselves and get on with life. My sense is that this group of patients, in 
 which I would include myself, also suffer various versions of a homeostatic 
 imbalance. An exaggerated reliance on intellectual defenses, overemotionality, or 
 a negative attachment experience can become established as self-perpetuating 
 patterns that lead to social isolation and underperformance. All of these 
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 suboptimal lifestyles are most likely reflected in biased patterns of neural 
 activation, which become the focus of psychotherapy. (pp. 162-163)  
 
 The following eight problematic aspects of brain functioning…cause many people 
 to come to psychotherapy: 
 1. The suppression of language and predictive capacity under stress 
 2. Divergent hemispheric processing 
 3. The bias toward early learning 
 4. The tenacity of fear 
 5. The damaging effects of stress hormones 
 6. The speed and amount of unconscious processing 
 7. The primacy of projection 
 8. Unconscious self-deception 
 (p. 306) 
 
 Psychotherapy remedies problems that result because the human brain initially 
develops in accordance with early childhood experiences. 
 As highly adaptive social organs, our brains are just as capable of adjusting to 
 unhealthy environments and pathological caretakers as they are to good-enough 
 parents. While our brains become shaped to survive early traumatic environments, 
 many of these adaptations may impede health and well-being later in life. 
 Negative interpersonal experiences early in life are a primary source of the 
 symptoms for which people seek relief in psychotherapy. (p. 206) 
 
 Patients are often being held back in their potential to enact desired changes 
because of the way in which their brains have constructed reality. 
 At the heart of psychotherapy are two interwoven processes; the first is the way in 
 which our brains and minds construct reality, while the second is our ability to 
 modify these constructions to support mental health and well-being. In other 
 words, why are we so vulnerable to constructing distorted realities, and how can 
 we learn to counterbalance these distortions? People come to therapy because one 
 or more aspects of their lives are not how they would like them to be. Most often 
 our clients know what they should be doing differently but cannot bring 
 themselves to make changes. They come in with a feeling that something within 
 them is holding them back. The answers to their questions can usually be found in 
 the architecture of the hidden layers of neural processing—those networks within 
 the brain that construct reality, guide our experience, and shape our identity.  
 (p. 133) 
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 Psychological defenses (also described as the adaptations of neural networks) are 
no longer effective for coping. 
 “What Freud called defenses can be seen as ways in which neural networks have 
 adapted to cope with emotional stress. People seek treatment when their defense 
 mechanisms cannot adequately cope with repressed emotions, or when symptoms 
 become intolerable” (p. 34). 
 
 The definition and etiology of psychopathology. 
 Mental disorders are types of inadequate neural integration. 
 If everything we experience is represented by instantiations within neural 
 networks, then by definition, psychopathology of all kinds—from the mildest 
 neurotic symptoms to the most severe psychosis—must also be represented within 
 and among neural networks. In line with this theory, psychopathology would be a 
 reflection of suboptimal development, integration, and coordination of neural 
 networks. Patterns of dysregulation of brain activation found in disorders such as 
 depression and obsession-compulsive disorder support the theory of a brain-based 
 explanation for the symptoms of psychopathology. (p. 24) 
 
 I postulated earlier that neural network integration should correlate with mental 
 health, while dissociation or imbalance among neural networks should correlate 
 with mental illness. If this is true, we can assume that integration between the 
 right and left hemispheres is one element of optimal brain functioning. It turns out 
 that anxiety, affective disorders, psychosis, alexithymia, and psychosomatic 
 conditions have all been linked to deficits in the integration and balance among 
 the cerebral hemispheres. (pp. 105-106) 
 
 Humans have the potential to experience psychopathology because of how the 
brain evolved. 
 The neural circuitry involved in fear and anxiety, although biased toward the right 
 hemisphere, involves both hemispheres and all levels of the triune brain. The most 
 primitive subcortical fight-or-flight circuitry, shared with our reptilian ancestors, 
 interacts with the most highly evolved regions of the cortex. This results in the 
 capacity to experience anxiety about everything from an unexpected tap on the 
 shoulder to an existential crisis. (p. 239) 
 
 “The increased size of the human brain and its additional processing capacity 
 make it possible for us to worry about many more potential dangers, both real and 
 imagined” (p. 253). 
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 The continuum of normality to abnormality represents a continuum of stress 
responses. 
 Early deprivation or chronic stress increase the chances of damage to the brain, 
 deficits in memory and reality testing, and the prolonged utilization of primitive 
 defenses…With increased nurturance and support, stress hormone levels 
 decrease; physical comfort and soothing talk with caretakers helps the brain to 
 integrate experience. (p. 22) 
 
 From extreme PTSD to everyday neurosis, we all exhibit a pattern of integration 
 and dissociation reflective of our adaptational history and the health of our brains. 
 At the level of the experience of self, networks dedicated to sensation, perception, 
 and emotion seamlessly integrate into the emergence of conscious experience. 
 (Damasio, 1994; Pessoa, 2008; Fox et al., 2005, as cited in Cozolino, 2010,  
 p. 151) 
 
 For each of us there is a point at which fear crosses the line into trauma, causing 
 severe disturbances in the integration of cognitive, sensory, and emotional 
 processing. The psychological and neurobiological reactions to traumatic 
 experiences lie on a continuum of severity. As a general rule, the earlier, more 
 severe, and more prolonged the trauma, the more negative and far reaching its 
 effects (De Bellis, Baum, et al., 1999; De Bellis, Keshavan, et al., 1999). 
 Unresolved trauma may result in symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder 
 (PTSD), which reflect the physiological dysregulation and dissociation of 
 multiple neural networks. (Cozolino, 2010, p. 262) 
 
 Psychopathology resulting from nonsecure attachment experiences. 
 “A basic assumption is that loving connections and secure attachments build 
 healthy and resilient brains, while neglectful and insecure attachments can result 
 in brains vulnerable to stress, dysregulation, and illness” (p. 180). 
 
 Bowlby suggested that early interactions create attachment schemas that predict 
 subsequent reactions to others. Schemas are implicit memories that organize 
 within networks of the social brain, based on experiences of safety and danger 
 with caretakers during early sensitive periods. A secure attachment schema 
 enhances the formation of a biochemical environment in the brain conducive to 
 regulation, growth, and optimal immunological functioning. Insecure and 
 disorganized attachment schemas have the opposite effect, and correlate with 
 higher frequencies of physical and emotional illness. (p. 198) 
 
 “The three nonsecure patterns of attachment research all reflect lower levels of 
 psychological and neurological integration” (p. 205).  
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 “Secure attachments represent the optimal balance of sympathetic and 
 parasympathetic arousal, whereas their imbalance correlates with insecure 
 attachment patterns such as fight or flight and splitting” (p. 206). 
 
 “We can hypothesize that many who engage in domestic violence, child abuse, 
 and other forms of aggressive behavior may not have had the kinds of early 
 attachment relationships required to build an adequate vagal system” (p. 234). 
 
 The existence and definition of self. 
 Influenced by D.W. Winnicott, Cozolino described self as developing during 
periods in childhood marked by calmness and being alone. 
 “Creating a quiet internal world allows for private thought, self-reflection, and 
 traveling through time via episodic memory. Quiet moments can then serve as the 
 grounds for mentalization, creativity, and consolidating the self” (Winnicott, 
 1958, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 145). 
 
 Winnicott (1962) suggested that the ego and one’s sense of self consolidate during 
 the periods of quiescence when children feel safe and calm in the presence of their 
 parents. Good-enough parenting scaffolds the child, allowing him or her to go 
 ‘inside’ and rest in imagination and the experience of self (Stern, 1985, as cited in 
 Cozolino, 2010, p. 146)  
 
 Secure attachments and a sense of a safe world create the context for the 
 development of the true self, which represents those aspects of the self that 
 develop in the context of manageable (minor) impingements, support, 
 encouragement, and proper meaning by the caretaker. Respect for the autonomy 
 and separateness of the child motivates the parent to discover the child’s interests, 
 instead of imposing his or her own upon them. (p. 191) 
 
 When self-involved or pathological parents use children for their own emotional 
 needs, the child can become compulsively attuned to the parents, creating a false 
 self designed to regulate the parents’ needs. Without appropriate assistance in 
 developing his or her self-reflective capacity, such children live through reflexive 
 social behavior and never learn that they have feelings and needs of their own that 
 should be expressed and nurtured. (p. 192) 
 
 Self formed through narrative. 
 Narratives allow us to place ourselves within alternative points of view and 
 increase our understanding of the experience of ourselves and others. We can 
 escape our bodies in imagination to other possible selves, ways of being, and 
 worlds that have yet to be created. Through stories we have the opportunity to 
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 ponder ourselves in an objective way across an infinite number of contexts. In life 
 and in therapy, we can use stories to imagine our problems happening to someone 
 else or view ourselves at a distance (externalization). We can share versions of 
 possible selves and receive input from others. Finally, we can experiment with 
 new emotions, actions, and language to edit the scripts of our lives. . . . Our ability 
 to edit narratives summons us to try on new ways of being. (p. 165) 
 
 Co-constructed narratives form the core of human groups, from primitive tribes to 
 modern families. The combined participation of caretakers and children in 
 narrating shared experiences organizes memories, embeds them within a social 
 context, and assists in linking feelings, actions, and others to the self. (p. 207) 
 
 Narrative or “stories of the self” enables affect regulation. 
 “Autobiographical memory creates stories of the self capable of supporting affect 
 regulation in the present and the maintenance of homeostatic functions into the 
 future” (p. 47). 
 
 Self and imagination. 
 Narratives allow us to place ourselves within alternative points of view and 
 increase our understanding of the experience of ourselves and others. We can 
 escape our bodies in imagination to other possible selves, ways of being, and 
 worlds that have yet to be created. Through stories we have the opportunity to 
 ponder ourselves in an objective way across an infinite number of contexts.  
 (p. 171) 
 
 “Because our imaginal capabilities have allowed for the construction of the self, 
 we can also become anxious about potential threats to our psychological survival” 
 (p. 240). 
 
 The existence and definition of mind. 
 Mind is how Freud chose to describe the brain. 
 Freud, the neurologist, became all but forgotten as his psychological theories 
 moved further and further from their biological roots. He chose instead to utilize 
 the more palatable and accessible metaphors of literature and anthropology to 
 provide the primary vocabulary for psychoanalysis. Unfortunately, Freud’s shift 
 from the brain to metaphors of mind opened psychoanalysis up to all sorts of 
 criticism throughout the 20th century. Metaphors such as the Oedipal and Electra 
 complexes were seen as contrived fictions, shielding them from scientific 
 evaluation. Perhaps Freud anticipated that in the future, psychoanalysis would 
 eventually be integrated with its neurobiological substrates. (pp. 4-5) 
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 Although psychotherapy originally emerged from neurology, differences in 
 language and worldview have limited collaboration among the two fields for most 
 of the 20th century. While psychotherapists developed a rich metaphoric language 
 of mind, neurologists built a detailed database of brain behavior relationships. As 
 we approached the 21st century, neuroscience began providing us with tools to 
 explore what happens in the brain during early development, and later in 
 psychotherapy. A return to Freud’s Project of a biological psychology is finally at 
 hand. (p. 12)  
 
 The brain is what therapists have unknowingly been working with or describing 
while calling it mind. 
 “The similarity between hemispheric specialization and Freud’s notion of the 
 conscious and unconscious mind has not been lost on psychotherapists” (p. 110). 
 
 The relationship between mind and brain. 
 Mind and brain are “a unified process.” 
 How does the brain give rise to the mind? Where do the brain and mind meet, and 
 by what means do they interact with one another? These are difficult questions—
 so difficult, in fact, that the common reaction is to focus on either the mind or the 
 brain and act as if the other is irrelevant (Blass & Carmeli, 2007; Pulver, 2003). 
 The problem with this approach is the barrier it creates to understanding that the 
 human experience of brain and mind is essentially a unified process (Cobb, 1944). 
 Neurology and psychology are simultaneously pushed apart by academic and 
 intellectual politics while being drawn together by their common 
 psychobiological foundation. (Cozolino, 2010, p. 1) 
 
 Mind is “embedded” within processes of the brain. 
 Theories of psychological development by Winnicott, Freud, and others provide 
 us with models for the development of mind embedded in these more basic 
 neurobiological processes. The development of a sense of self requires periods of 
 freedom from external threat and inner turmoil. It also requires the development 
 of frontal-parietal systems responsible for inner imaginal space. (p. 196) 
 
 Mind might emerge from the brain. 
 “As our knowledge of neural networks expands, perhaps we gain a greater 
 understanding of how the mind emerges from the wetware of the brain” (p. 132). 
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 Certain states of mind might influence brain functioning. 
 The perception of control has been shown to reduce emotional arousal and stress. 
 It is likely that cognitive processes involved in prediction and control activate 
 frontal functioning and downregulate amygdala activation. In other words, 
 thinking we have some control puts us in a state of mind that prepares us to think 
 and activates prefrontal functioning, which reduces our emotionality. As a self-
 fulfilling prophecy, believing you are an efficacious person stimulates frontal 
 activation, making you a more efficacious person. (p. 169)  
 
 Phrases that suggested mind and brain are not synonymous. 
 Ancient networks have been conserved, expanded, and reorganized, while new 
 networks have emerged and combined to perform increasingly complex functions. 
 In the process, some executive functions remained with earlier evolving networks, 
 and some moved up to frontal and prefrontal regions, while still others were 
 assumed by the mind and the social group. (p. 115) 
 
 “Further, stories link individuals into families, tribes, and nations and into a group 
 mind linking each individual brain” (p. 164). 
 
 “These ways in which the brain and mind have evolved have created a wide 
 variety of threats to our emotional and physical well-being” (p. 316). 
 
 The relationship between self and brain. 
 The extent of neural integration corresponds to the extent of psychological 
integration or coherence of self. 
 Numerous processing networks combine affect, sensation, behavior, and 
 conscious awareness into an integrated, functional, and balanced whole—the 
 neural substrate for what Freud called the ego. The ego is essentially shorthand 
 for how the organization of the self comes to be expressed in dimensions such as 
 personality, affect regulation, coping styles, and self-image. (p. 27) 
 
 Consciousness and identity are complex functions constructed from the 
 contributions of multiple, primarily nonconscious, neural networks. Pathological 
 states highlight the fact that the self is a fragile construction of the brain. 
 Furthermore, there is considerable flexibility in the location, experience, and 
 organization of the self within our imagination. (p. 286) 
 
 
 
 
 308 
 Left and right hemispheres of the brain correspond to distinct aspects of self. 
 The right hemisphere is generally responsible for both appraising the safety and 
 danger of others and organizing a sense of the corporeal and emotional self 
 (Devinsky, 2000). Appraisal simply means attaching a positive or negative 
 association to a stimulus, while emotion is the conscious manifestation of this 
 appraisal process (Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990; Fox, 1991). The vast 
 majority of appraisal occurs at an unconscious level. This is why the right 
 hemisphere is more often associated with the unconscious mind, that is, what 
 guides our thoughts and behavior outside of our awareness. (Cozolino, 2010,  
 p. 97) 
 
 Gazzaniga (1989) later developed the concept of the left hemisphere interpreter 
 that synthesizes available information and generates a coherent narrative for the 
 conscious social self. The strategy of filling in gaps in experience and memory, 
 and making a guess at an explanation, parallels confabulatory processes seen in 
 patients with psychosis, dementia, and other forms of brain damage. 
 Confabulation appears to be a reflexive function of the left hemisphere interpreter 
 as it attempts to make sense of nonsense, organize experience, and present the self 
 in the best possible light. This phenomenon is likely related to Freudian defense 
 mechanisms that distort reality in order to reduce anxiety. (Cozolino, 2010,   
 p. 103) 
 
 The parietal lobes of the brain contribute significantly to the experience of self. 
 It seems that the parietal lobes developed a parallel capacity for constructing and 
 navigating a map of internal, imaginal space. . . . The parietal lobes’ 
 interconnections with the rest of the cortex allowed for the integration of working 
 visual memory, attentional capacities, and bodily awareness necessary for these 
 imaginal abilities. This suggests that our self-awareness was likely built in a 
 stepwise manner during evolution through a series of overlapping ‘maps’—first of 
 the physical environment, then of self in environment, and later of self as 
 environment. Thus, the growth of imaginal abilities allowed us to create an 
 increasingly sophisticated inner topography. (p. 141) 
 
 “Damage to the parietal lobes disrupts the experience of location, self 
 organization, and identity—in other words, who and where we are” (p. 142). 
 
 “These findings point to the fact that the parietal lobes are far more than sensory 
 motor association areas, but are involved in the deployment of attention, 
 understanding the environment, and constructing the experience of self” (p. 143). 
 
 There is also evidence to suggest that the parietal lobes participate in the creation 
 of internal representations of the actions of others within us (Shmuelof & Zohary, 
 2006). In other words, we internalize others by creating representations of them in 
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 our imaginations. This allows us to both learn from others and carry them with us 
 when they are absent. These inner objects, as described in psychoanalysis, likely 
 serve as the infrastructure of the construction and maintenance of our experience 
 of self (Macrae et al., 2004; Tanji & Hoshi, 2001, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, 
  p. 143). 
 
 Some sort of frontal-parietal network appears to be essential to our experience of 
 self. Neural fibers connecting the middle portions of these two areas appear to 
 serve a general integrative function of linking right and left hemispheres, limbic 
 and cortical structures, as well as anterior and posterior regions of the cortex (Lou 
 et al., 2004, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 144) 
 
 The frontal-parietal network may be primarily responsible for the construction of 
 the experience of self (Lou, Nowak, & Kajer, 2005). A properly functioning 
 frontal-parietal network allows for the successful negotiation of our moment-to-
 moment survival and the ability to turn our attention to inner experience. . . . 
 Without the ability to reflect on and sometimes cancel reflexive motor and 
 emotional responses, there is little freedom. (Cozolino, 2010, p. 145) 
 
 We believe that early caretaking builds and shapes the cortex and its relationships 
 with the limbic system, which supports emotional regulation, imagination, and 
 coping skills. To this we now must add the development of the parietal lobes in 
 the construction of internal space. (p. 146) 
 
 Winnicott’s concept of true self describes neural integration and healthy 
psychological  development. 
 Winnicott (1962) suggested that the ego and one’s sense of self consolidate during 
 the periods of quiescence when children feel safe and calm in the presence of their 
 parents. Good-enough parenting scaffolds the child, allowing him or her to go 
 “inside” and rest in imagination and the experience of self (Stern, 1985). This 
 may serve as an important mechanism of the transmission of neural organization 
 from parent to child. It is rare to find a child who is able to be still and centered 
 and feel safe in the presence of chaotic adults. We believe that early caretaking 
 builds and shapes the cortex and its relationships with the limbic system, which 
 supports emotional regulation, imagination, and coping skills. To this we now 
 must add the development of the parietal lobes in the construction of internal 
 space. (Cozolino, 2010, p. 146) 
 
 The true self reflects our ability to tolerate negative feelings and integrate them 
 into conscious awareness and to seek out what feels right for us in our activities, 
 ourselves, and our relationships with others. Winnicott’s true self is obviously one 
 in which neural network development has been maximized, affect is well 
 regulated, and emotions and cognition are well integrated. The true self reflects an 
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 open and ongoing dialogue among the heart, the mind, and the body. (Cozolino, 
 2010, p. 191) 
 
 Self and contemporary problems of the self both result from how the brain 
evolved to allow for imagination. 
 With the expansion of the cerebral cortex and the emergence of imagination, we 
 have become capable of being anxious about situations we will never experience. 
 We can now worry about monsters living under our beds and the incineration of 
 the earth resulting from the sun’s expansion. Because our imaginal capabilities 
 have allowed for the construction of the self, we can also become anxious about 
 potential threats to our psychological survival. Psychotherapists deal with a wide 
 variety of anxiety disorders based in the fear of social death. The expectation of 
 rejection by another can result in social withdrawal; the fear of forgetting one’s 
 lines in a play can result in stage fright. Systems of physical survival have been 
 conserved in the evolution of consciousness and the ego, to be triggered when 
 threats to these abstract constructions are activated. (p. 240) 
 
 The ways in which the brain interprets social interactions contributes to a sense 
of self. 
 The internal emotional associations linked to mirror circuitry are activated via 
 outwardly expressed gestures, postures, tone, and other pragmatic aspects of 
 communication. Thus, our internal emotional state—generated via automatic 
 mirroring processes—can become our intuitive “theory” of the internal state of 
 the other. These structures are at the core of our ability to develop intimate 
 relationships, be attuned to one another, and aid our children in shaping a healthy 
 and balanced sense of self. (p. 189) 
 
 Neural integration enables self to be experienced as embodied. 
 “An organized sense of the body in space and the embodied self form in 
 subcortical and cortical networks involving the thalamus, cerebellum, and parietal 
 cortex” (p. 95).  
 
 “The right hemisphere is generally responsible for both appraising the safety and 
 danger of others and organizing a sense of the corporeal and emotional self” 
 (Devinsky, 2000, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 97). 
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 Language and narrative foster neural integration, thereby enabling a coherent 
experience of self. 
 Putting feelings into words and constructing narratives about our experiences are 
 integral to emotional regulation, the interweaving of neural networks of emotion 
 and cognition, and the experience of a coherent sense of self. Perhaps most 
 important, a lack of language can separate us from the healing effects of positive 
 connections with others. The loss of the ability to construct narratives is 
 especially problematic in situations where individuals are forced into silence by 
 their abusers, or after enduring the “unspeakable horrors” of torture, war, or the 
 death of friends and family. (p. 306) 
 
 Self-reflection facilitates neural integration. 
 “The relationship between coherence and reflective self-functioning is powerful, 
 and that the ability to reflect on the self plays an important role in the integration 
 of multiple processing networks of memory, affect regulation, and organization” 
 (p. 208). 
 
 Narratives foster neural integration which enables affect regulation. 
 Autobiographical memory creates stories of the self capable of supporting affect 
 regulation in the present and the maintenance of homeostatic functions into the 
 future. Memory, in this form, may maximize neural network integration as it 
 organizes vast amounts of information across multiple processing tracks. Thus, 
 language is an important tool in both neurological and psychological 
 development. (p. 47) 
 
 The relationship between self, mind, and brain. 
 Exemplary of his self-mind-brain integration was Cozolino’s depiction of the 
relationship between the right hemisphere of the brain, the “unconscious” mind, and 
physical and emotional aspects of self. 
 The right hemisphere is generally responsible for both appraising the safety and 
 danger of others and organizing a sense of the corporeal and emotional self 
 (Devinsky, 2000). Appraisal simply means attaching a positive or negative 
 association to a stimulus, while emotion is the conscious manifestation of this 
 appraisal process (Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990; Fox, 1991). The vast 
 majority of appraisal occurs at an unconscious level. This is why the right 
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  hemisphere is more often associated with the unconscious mind, that is, what 
 guides our thoughts and behavior outside of our awareness. (Cozolino, 2010,  
 p. 97) 
 
 Neurobiological mechanisms of effective psychotherapy. 
 The ability to alter gene expression. 
 This gets us back to the old nature-nurture debate and the question: What do we 
 inherit, and what do we learn from experience? Our best guess is that almost 
 everything involves an interaction between the two. While we inherit a template 
 of genetic material (genotype), what gets expressed (phenotype) is guided by 
 noncoded genetic information that is experience dependent. . . . So while template 
 genetics may guide the early formation of the brain during gestation, the 
 regulation of gene expression directs its long-term development in reaction to 
 ongoing adaptation to the social and physical worlds. . . . As therapists, we 
 attempt to reprogram these neural systems via a supportive relationship and the 
 techniques we bring to bear during treatment. In other words, we are using 
 epigenetics to change the brain in ways that enhance mental and physical well-
 being. (pp. 64-65) 
 
 Neural plasticity. 
 The growth and connectivity of neurons is the basic mechanism of all learning 
 and adaptation. Learning can be reflected in neural changes in a number of ways, 
 including changes in the connectivity between existing neurons, the expansion of 
 existing neurons, and the growth of new neurons. All of these changes are 
 expressions of plasticity, or the ability of the nervous system to change in 
 response to experience. (p. 17) 
 
 Neural integration. 
 From the perspective of neuroscience, psychotherapy can be understood as a 
 specific kind of enriched environment designed to enhance the growth of neurons 
 and the integration of neural networks. The therapeutic environment is 
 individually tailored to fit the symptoms and needs of each client. I propose here 
 that all forms of therapy, regardless of theoretical orientation, will be successful to 
 the degree to which they foster appropriate neuroplasticity. (p. 25) 
 
 “Whether it is called symptom relief, differentiation, ego strength, or awareness, 
 all forms of therapy are targeting dissociated neural networks for integration”  
 (p. 46). 
 
 I postulated earlier that neural network integration should correlate with mental 
 health, while dissociation or imbalance among neural networks should correlate 
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 with mental illness. If this is true, we can assume that integration between the 
 right and left hemispheres is one elements of optimal brain functioning. It turns 
 out that anxiety, affective disorders, psychosis, alexithymia, and psychosomatic 
 conditions have all been linked to deficits in the integration and balance among 
 the cerebral hemispheres. (p. 106)  
 
 Although the executive areas of the brain are traditionally thought of as being 
 responsible for our rational abilities, they actually combine sensory, motor, 
 memory, and emotional information to shape ideas, plans, and actions. This 
 broader view of executive functioning has been guided, in part, by an increasing 
 appreciation of the contribution of emotion and intuition in decision making 
 (Damasio, 1994). Because so much of brain functioning is unconscious, 
 nonverbal, and hidden from conscious observation, the executive brain is also 
 strongly influenced by nonconscious processes. Psychotherapy calls on the 
 executive brain to update and reorganize the relationship among the conscious 
 and unconscious networks they oversee in the service of mental and physical 
 health. (Cozolino, 2010, p. 116) 
 
 New learning alters the effects of memories on psychological functioning or 
subjective experience. 
 This mosaic of firing patterns, the networks’ instantiation, will determine which 
 set of output neurons fire. . . . Instantiations are sculpted by experience and 
 encode all of our abilities, emotions, and experiences into one or more forms of 
 memory. It is the consistency of these firing patterns that results in organized 
 patterns of behavior and experience. Once these neural patterns are established, 
 new learning modifies the relationship of neurons within these networks. (p. 16) 
 
 “The process of psychotherapy is totally dependent upon memory. From what we 
 know of clients’ past and current lives, to their ability to bring the lessons of 
 therapy into practice, everything depends on their ability to learn and remember” 
 (p. 73).  
 
 Given that memory is encoded among neurons and within neural networks, the 
 malleability of memory is an observable manifestation of the plasticity of these 
 neural systems. . . . But from the perspective of psychotherapy, this plasticity 
 provides an avenue to the alteration of destructive memories. Revisiting and 
 evaluating childhood experiences from an adult perspective often leads to 
 rewriting history in a creative and positive way. The introduction of new 
 information or scenarios to past experiences can alter the nature of memories and 
 modify affective reactions. (p. 89) 
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 Psychological mechanisms that enable neurobiological mechanisms of effective 
therapy to occur. 
 Four broad conditions common to successful therapies. 
 From the perspective of neuroscience, psychotherapy can be understood as a 
 specific kind of enriched environment designed to enhance the growth of neurons 
 and the integration of neural networks. The therapeutic environment is 
 individually tailored to fit the symptoms and needs of each client. I propose here 
 that all forms of therapy, regardless of theoretical orientation, will be successful to 
 the degree to which they foster appropriate neuroplasticity. Further, I also propose 
 that neural plasticity, growth, and integration in psychotherapy are enhanced by:  
 1. The establishment of a safe and trusting relationship  
 2. Mild to moderate levels of stress  
 3. Activating both emotion and cognition  
 4. The co-construction of new personal narratives.  
 (pp. 24-25) 
 
 Language and narrative. 
 “Narratives co-constructed with therapists provide a new template for thoughts, 
 behaviors, and ongoing integration” (pp. 26-27). 
 
 “In editing our narratives, we change the organization and nature of our memories 
 and, hence, reorganize our brains. This is a central endeavor in many forms of 
 psychotherapy” (p. 92). 
 
 “The integrative properties of language may be unequaled by any other function 
 of the brain. Creating and recalling a story requires the convergence of 
 multisensory emotional, temporal, and memory capabilities that bridge all vectors 
 of neural networks” (p. 102). 
 
 “A primary tool across all models of therapy is editing and expanding the self-
 narrative of the left hemisphere to include the silent wisdom of the right” (p. 110). 
 
 Narratives allow us to place ourselves within alternative points of view and 
 increase our understanding of the experience of ourselves and others. We can 
 escape our bodies in imagination to other possible selves, ways of being, and 
 worlds that have yet to be created. Through stories we have the opportunity to 
 ponder ourselves in an objective way across an infinite number of contexts. In life 
 and in therapy, we can use stories to imagine our problems happening to someone 
 else or view ourselves at a distance (externalization). We can share versions of 
 possible selves and receive input from others. Finally, we can experiment with 
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 new emotions, actions, and language to edit the scripts of our lives. . . . Our ability 
 to edit narratives summons us to try on new ways of being. (p. 165)  
 
 Much of therapy consists of uncovering and exploring reflexive social language 
 and internal dialogue, both of which reflect unconscious aspects of the self. In this 
 process we develop the language of self-reflection, learning that we are not only 
 our social reflexes plus the voices that haunt us but are also the one that can 
 observe, listen, and judge what we hear these voices say. As the language of self-
 awareness is expanded and reinforced, we learn we are capable of evaluating and 
 choosing whether to follow the expectations of others and the mandates of our 
 childhoods. The language of self-reflection…most likely reflects a higher level of 
 integration. In this language, cognition is blended with affect so that there can be 
 feelings about thoughts and thoughts about feelings. At a very deep level, this 
 language leads us to meditation, where we learn to quiet our thoughts and move 
 beyond words. (p. 171) 
 
 Create a nurturing and supportive therapeutic relationship that facilitates secure 
attachment. 
 Our brains are capable of continual adaptation in both positive and negative 
 directions and…successful psychotherapy, one that establishes a nurturing 
 relationship, may well be capable of triggering genetic expression in ways that 
 can decrease stress, improve learning, and establish a bridge to new and healthier 
 relationships. (p. 223)  
 
 As in early development, the repeated exposure to stress in the supportive 
 interpersonal context of psychotherapy results in the ability to tolerate increasing 
 levels of arousal. This process reflects the building and integration of cortical 
 circuits and their increasing ability to inhibit and regulate subcortical activation. 
 Affect regulation, especially the modulation and inhibition of anxiety and fear, 
 allows for continued cortical processing in the face of strong emotions, allowing 
 for ongoing cognitive flexibility, learning, and neural integration. In this process 
 the therapist plays essentially the same role as a parent, providing and modeling 
 the regulatory functions of the social brain. (p. 21) 
 
 Networks of our complex social brains include brain regions, neural systems, and 
 regulatory networks. . . . These are the same circuits that therapists attempt to 
 influence in reshaping the brain in ways which lead to more positive adaptation 
 later in life. The idea that psychotherapy is a kind of reparenting may be more 
 than a metaphor; it may be precisely what we are attempting to accomplish at the 
 level of the epigenome. This research establishes attention, care, and nurturance 
 as a way to influence the very structure of our brain and places psychotherapy at 
 the heart of biological interventions. (p. 227).  
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 An appropriate amount of stress helps patients learn to regulate their own affect. 
 Mild to moderate stress (MMS) activates neural growth hormones. . . . Thus, 
 MMS may be utilized to enlist naturally occurring neurobiological processes in 
 the service of new learning. Although we use the term stress in animal research, 
 humans also demonstrate arousal in the form of curiosity, enthusiasm, and 
 pleasure. Humans can also be motivated to learn new skills and take on new 
 challenges to relieve discomfort and stress. These motivational states have all 
 been recognized for their role in successful outcomes from psychotherapy. (p. 20) 
 
 As in early development, the repeated exposure to stress in the supportive 
 interpersonal context of psychotherapy results in the ability to tolerate increasing 
 levels of arousal. This process reflects the building and integration of cortical 
 circuits and their increasing ability to inhibit and regulate subcortical activation. 
 Affect regulation, especially the modulation and inhibition of anxiety and fear, 
 allows for continued cortical processing in the face of strong emotions, allowing 
 for ongoing cognitive flexibility, learning, and neural integration. In this process 
 the therapist plays essentially the same role as a parent, providing and modeling 
 the regulatory functions of the social brain. (p. 21) 
 
 “Assistance with experiencing increasing levels of positive and negative affect is 
 a vital component of both parenting and psychotherapy” (p. 23). 
 
 How therapists should provide psychotherapy. 
 Common interventions across established psychotherapy models that stimulate 
neuroplasticity. 
 Although psychotherapists do not generally think in “neuroscientific” terms, 
 stimulating neuroplasticity and neural integration is essentially what we do. We 
 provide information to clients about our understanding of their difficulties in the 
 form of psychoeducation, interpretations, or reality testing. We encourage clients 
 to engage in behaviors, express feelings, and become conscious of aspects of 
 themselves of which they may be unaware. We dare them to take risks. We guide 
 them back and forth between thoughts and feelings, trying to help them establish 
 new connections between the two. We help clients alter their descriptions of 
 themselves and the world, incorporating new awareness and encouraging better 
 decision making. With successful treatment, the methods being used are 
 internalized so that clients can gain independence from therapy and we do this all 
 in the context of a warm, supportive, committed, and consistent relationship. 
 These same factors are at play across psychodynamic, systems, and cognitive-
 behavioral approaches to treatment. (p. 26) 
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 Psychotherapists are applied neuroscientists who create individually tailored 
 enriched learning environments designed to enhance brain functioning and mental 
 health. We are skilled at teaching clients to become aware of unconscious 
 processing, take ownership of their projections, and risk anxiety in the service of 
 emotional maturation (Holtforth et al., 2005). In our work, illusions, distortions, 
 and defenses are exposed, explored, and tested or modified with understandings 
 closer to reality. Implicit memory—in the form of attachment schemas, 
 transference, and superego—are made conscious and explained as expressions of 
 early experiences. We use a combination of empathy, affect, stories, and 
 behavioral experiments to promote neural network growth and integration. 
 (Cozolino, 2010, p. 341) 
 
 Consider how the brain distorts thinking and listen for what is not being talked 
about. 
 Another way of describing therapy from the perspective of laterality is that we 
 teach clients a method by which they can learn to attend to and translate right 
 hemisphere processing into left hemisphere language. We teach them about the 
 limitations and distortions of their own conscious beliefs presented by their left 
 hemisphere interpreter. . . . This is why reality testing is so important for 
 treatment success. It is the therapist’s job to hear what is not said, resonate with 
 what the client is unable to consciously experience, and communicate it back to 
 him or her in a way that will allow it to become integrated. This human process 
 serves hemispheric integration. (p. 111) 
 
 Attribute psychological symptoms to the brain or body in order to depathologize 
them and to engender a sense of control for patients. 
 On a practical level, adding a neuroscientific perspective to our clinical thinking 
 allows us to talk with clients about the shortcomings of our brains instead of the 
 problems with theirs. The truth appears to be that many human struggles, from 
 phobias to obesity, are consequences of brain evolution and not deficiencies of 
 character. Identifying problems that we hold in common and developing methods 
 to circumvent or correct them is a solid foundation upon which to base a 
 therapeutic alliance. (p. 356) 
 
 Identify the congruence between a patient’s cognition and affect. 
 When patients come to therapy, the left hemisphere interpreter tells its story. But 
 something is usually wrong: the story does not fully account for what is 
 happening in their lives. The narratives that organize their identities inadequately 
 account for their experiences, feelings, and behaviors. The right hemisphere also 
 speaks via facial expressions, body language, emotions, and attitudes. Thus, we 
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 listen to both stories for the congruence between the verbal narrative, and 
 nonverbal and emotional communication. In this process, we analyze the 
 integration and coherence of left-right and top-down neural networks. A primary 
 tool across all models of therapy is editing and expanding the self-narrative of the 
 left hemisphere to include the silent wisdom of the right. (p. 110) 
 
 Using narratives in a way that puts feelings into words and engenders emotional 
regulation and a sense of control. 
 Consider what we do when we assist clients in shifting from their own perspective 
 to looking at a situation from another point of view, to thinking about the situation 
 once again from a more objective perspective. We are calling upon the ompfc and 
 dlpfc in different ways as we attempt to guide them to a more holistic perspective 
 of a life situation. (p. 161) 
 
 Putting feelings into words (affect labeling) has long served a positive function 
 for many individuals suffering from stress or trauma. . . . The narrative, which 
 simultaneously activates an array of networks, enhances metabolic activity and 
 neural balance. The perception of control has been shown to reduce emotional 
 arousal and stress. It is likely that cognitive processes involved in prediction and 
 control activate frontal functioning and downregulate amygdala activation.  
 (pp. 168-169) 
 
 Therapy attempts to create this metacognitive vantage point from which the 
 shifting states of mind that emerge during day-to-day life can be thought about. 
 This is accomplished by interweaving the narratives of client and therapist and 
 hopefully leading them in a more healthful direction. You begin by making clients 
 aware of one or more of the narrative arcs of their life story and then help them 
 understand that change is possible and offering alternative story lines. As the 
 editing process proceeds, new narrative arcs emerge, as do possibilities to 
 experiment with new ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. (p. 171) 
 
 Make interpretations, analyze projection, and discuss whatever is dissociated or 
not being talked about. 
 “It is the therapist’s job to hear what is not said, resonate with what the client is 
 unable to consciously experience, and communicate it back to him or her in a way 
 that will allow it to become integrated” (p. 111). 
 
 Therapists employ the projective hypothesis to explore the architecture of their 
 clients’ unconscious. . . . Most forms of psychotherapy attempt to shine the light 
 of conscious awareness on belief perseverance and attribution biases, and 
 undermine the conservative nature of the hidden layers. Others engage in a deep 
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 exploration of the dynamic unconscious, defenses, and primitive emotional states. 
 By encouraging clients to be open to new ideas, explore the connections within 
 their hidden layers, and take responsibility for positive change, we challenge them 
 to reorganize the neural networks of their hidden layers. (p. 138) 
 
 In making an interpretation, the therapist points out an unconscious aspect of the 
 patient’s experience, such as a defense he or she is using to avoid negative 
 feelings. . . . When an interpretation is accurate and delivered in an appropriate 
 and well-timed manner, a number of things occur. The client generally becomes 
 quiet; there may be a change in facial expressions, posture, and tone of voice. 
 Very often the client will begin to fully experience the emotions against which he 
 or she was defending. (pp. 294-295) 
 
 “In therapy, we teach our clients to ask themselves if the pot is calling the kettle 
 black: that is, are their thoughts and feelings about others autobiographical?”  
 (p. 315). 
 
 How therapists should provide psychotherapy. 
 Common interventions across established psychotherapy models that stimulate 
neuroplasticity. 
 Although psychotherapists do not generally think in ‘neuroscientific’ terms, 
 stimulating neuroplasticity and neural integration is essentially what we do. We 
 provide information to clients about our understanding of their difficulties in the 
 form of psychoeducation, interpretations, or reality testing. We encourage clients 
 to engage in behaviors, express feelings, and become conscious of aspects of 
 themselves of which they may be unaware. We dare them to take risks. We guide 
 them back and forth between thoughts and feelings, trying to help them establish 
 new connections between the two. We help clients alter their descriptions of 
 themselves and the world, incorporating new awareness and encouraging better 
 decision making. With successful treatment, the methods being used are 
 internalized so that clients can gain independence from therapy and we do this all 
 in the context of a warm, supportive, committed, and consistent relationship. 
 These same factors are at play across psychodynamic, systems, and cognitive-
 behavioral approaches to treatment. The broad context in which these processes 
 can successfully occur is one of increasing levels of affect tolerance and 
 regulation and the development of integrative narratives that emerge from the 
 client-therapist relationship. In the context of empathic attunement within a safe 
 and structured environment, clients are encouraged to tolerate the anxiety of 
 feared experiences, memories, and thoughts. In this process, neural networks that 
 are normally inhibited become activated and available for inclusion into conscious 
 processing (Siegel, 1995, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 26) 
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 Psychotherapists are applied neuroscientists who create individually tailored 
 enriched learning environments designed to enhance brain functioning and mental 
 health. We are skilled at teaching clients to become aware of unconscious 
 processing, take ownership of their projections, and risk anxiety in the service of 
 emotional maturation. . . . In our work, illusions, distortions, and defenses are 
 exposed, explored, and tested or modified with understandings closer to reality. 
 Implicit memory—in the form of attachment schemas, transference, and 
 superego—are made conscious and explained as expressions of early experiences. 
 We use a combination of empathy, affect, stories, and behavioral experiments to 
 promote neural network growth and integration. (p. 341) 
 
 Consider how the brain distorts thinking and listen for what is not being talked 
about. 
 Another way of describing therapy from the perspective of laterality is that we 
 teach clients a method by which they can learn to attend to and translate right 
 hemisphere processing into left hemisphere language. We teach them about the 
 limitations and distortions of their own conscious beliefs presented by their left 
 hemisphere interpreter. . . . This is why reality testing is so important for 
 treatment success. It is the therapist’s job to hear what is not said, resonate with 
 what the client is unable to consciously experience, and communicate it back to 
 him or her in a way that will allow it to become integrated. This human process 
 serves hemispheric integration. (p. 111) 
 
 Attribute psychological symptoms to the brain or body in order to depathologize 
them and to engender a sense of control for patients. 
 On a practical level, adding a neuroscientific perspective to our clinical thinking 
 allows us to talk with clients about the shortcomings of our brains instead of the 
 problems with theirs. The truth appears to be that many human struggles, from 
 phobias to obesity, are consequences of brain evolution and not deficiencies of 
 character. Identifying problems that we hold in common and developing methods 
 to circumvent or correct them is a solid foundation upon which to base a 
 therapeutic alliance. (p. 356) 
 
 Think about the congruence between a patient’s cognition and affect. 
 When patients come to therapy, the left hemisphere interpreter tells its story. But 
 something is usually wrong: the story does not fully account for what is 
 happening in their lives. The narratives that organize their identities inadequately 
 account for their experiences, feelings, and behaviors. The right hemisphere also 
 speaks via facial expressions, body language, emotions, and attitudes. Thus, we 
 listen to both stories for the congruence between the verbal narrative, and 
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 nonverbal and emotional communication. In this process, we analyze the 
 integration and coherence of left-right and top-down neural networks. A primary 
 tool across all models of therapy is editing and expanding the self-narrative of the 
 left hemisphere to include the silent wisdom of the right. (p. 110) 
 
 Using narratives in way that puts feelings into words and engenders emotional 
regulation and a sense of control. 
 Consider what we do when we assist clients in shifting from their own perspective 
 to looking at a situation from another point of view, to thinking about the situation 
 once again from a more objective perspective. We are calling upon the ompfc and 
 dlpfc in different ways as we attempt to guide them to a more holistic perspective 
 of a life situation. (p. 161) 
 
 Putting feelings into words (affect labeling) has long served a positive function 
 for many individuals suffering from stress or trauma…The narrative, which 
 simultaneously activates an array of networks, enhances metabolic activity and 
 neural balance. The perception of control has been shown to reduce emotional 
 arousal and stress. It is likely that cognitive processes involved in prediction and 
 control activate frontal functioning and downregulate amygdala activation.  
 (p. 169) 
 
 Therapy attempts to create this metacognitive vantage point from which the 
 shifting states of mind that emerge during day-to-day life can be thought about. 
 This is accomplished by interweaving the narratives of client and therapist and 
 hopefully leading them in a more healthful direction. You begin by making clients 
 aware of one or more of the narrative arcs of their life story and then help them 
 understand that change is possible and offering alternative story lines. As the 
 editing process proceeds, new narrative arcs emerge, as do possibilities to 
 experiment with new ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. (p. 171) 
 
 Make interpretations, analyze projection, and discuss whatever is dissociated or 
not being talked about. 
 “It is the therapist’s job to hear what is not said, resonate with what the client is 
 unable to consciously experience, and communicate it back to him or her in a way 
 that will allow it to become integrated” (p. 111). 
 
 Therapists employ the projective hypothesis to explore the architecture of their 
 clients’ unconscious. . . . Most forms of psychotherapy attempt to shine the light 
 of conscious awareness on belief perseverance and attribution biases, and 
 undermine the conservative nature of the hidden layers. Others engage in a deep 
 exploration of the dynamic unconscious, defenses, and primitive emotional states. 
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 By encouraging clients to be open to new ideas, explore the connections within 
 their hidden layers, and take responsibility for positive change, we challenge them 
 to reorganize the neural networks of their hidden layers. (p. 138) 
 
 In making an interpretation, the therapist points out an unconscious aspect of the 
 patient’s experience, such as a defense he or she is using to avoid negative 
 feelings. . . . When an interpretation is accurate and delivered in an appropriate 
 and well-timed manner, a number of things occur. The client generally becomes 
 quiet; there may be a change in facial expressions, posture, and tone of voice. 
 Very often the client will begin to fully experience the emotions against which he 
 or she was defending. (p. 294) 
 
 “In therapy, we teach our clients to ask themselves if the pot is calling the kettle 
 black: that is, are their thoughts and feelings about others autobiographical?”  
 (p. 315). 
 
 Indicators of successful psychotherapy outcomes. 
 Neural integration. 
 Psychotherapy can be thought of as a specific type of enriched environment that 
 promotes social and emotional development, neural integration, and process 
 complexity. The way the brain changes during therapy will depend upon the 
 neural networks involved in the focus of treatment. (p. 20) 
 
 “I propose here that all forms of therapy, regardless of theoretical orientation, will 
 be successful to the degree to which they foster appropriate neuroplasticity”  
 (p. 25). 
 
 Less dissociation or greater integration. 
 Dissociation is a common result of the high levels of stress associated with 
 traumatic experiences. Characterized by a disconnection among thoughts, 
 behaviors, sensations, and emotions, dissociation demonstrates that the 
 coordination and integration of these functions is an active neurobiological 
 process. Because all of these functions are seamlessly and unconsciously 
 interwoven during normal states of awareness, it is easy to overlook the fact that 
 their integration is a central component of mental health. (p. 21) 
 
 Symptom reduction. 
 There is a recognition that the evocation of emotion coupled with conscious 
 awareness is most likely to result in symptom reduction and personal growth. 
 Whether it is called symptom relief, differentiation, ego strength, or awareness, all 
 forms of therapy are targeting dissociated neural networks for integration. (p. 46)  
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 Traumatic experiences result in a variety of well-understood physiological and 
 psychological reactions to threat, which cause a number of predictable symptoms 
 to emerge. These symptoms tend to gradually diminish after the resolution of the 
 traumatic situation, as we gather support from others, and repeatedly talk through 
 the experience. These conditions allow us to regain both neurobiological 
 homeostasis and a sense of emotional control. (pp. 262-263) 
 
 Affect regulation. 
 Increased integration results in tolerating and experiencing thoughts and emotions 
 previously inhibited, dissociated, or defended against. Affect regulation may be 
 the most important result of the psychotherapeutic process across orientations, 
 because it allows for a reconnection with the naturally occurring salubrious 
 experiences in life. (p. 47) 
 
 Secure attachment. 
 “Throughout our lives, but especially during childhood, relationships with others 
 regulate our stress and fear. A secure attachment indicates that we have learned to 
 successfully utilize our relationships with others to quell our fears and modulate 
 our arousal” (p. 233). 
 
 Ego strength and higher-order defenses. 
 Ego strength, or our ability to navigate reality with a minimum of defensiveness, 
 reflects the integration of neural networks of emotion and thought, and the 
 development of mature defenses. The more primitive or immature the defense 
 mechanism, the more reality is distorted and the more functional impairment 
 occurs. . . . Mature defenses, like sublimation or humor, allow us to assuage 
 strong feelings, keep in contact with others, and remain attuned to a shared social 
 reality. (p. 34)  
 
 “Secure attachment and ego strength are correlated with our ability to hear 
 feedback, accept our own limitations, and use less reality-distorting defenses—
 humor instead of repression and sublimation instead of denial” (p. 316). 
 
 Self-reflective language. 
 “When clients shift to the language of self-reflection, the changes in their tone, 
 manner, and mood are palpable. I imagine at this moment that clients have the 
 clearest perspective on their thoughts, behaviors, and feelings” (p. 173). 
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 Earned autonomy and avoiding pathological caretaking of others. 
 “Earned autonomy is convincing evidence that early negative experiences can be 
 reinstated and repaired later in life. Personal growth has the ability to heal because 
 the social brain remains plastic” (p. 209). 
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Appendix B 
Further Examples of Rhetorical Strategies in  
The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain (Cozolino, 2010) 
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 Human development metaphors used to describe the brain. 
 “At the same time, middle portions of the prefrontal cortex are maturing and 
 integrating with subcortical structures to establish the basic structures of 
 emotional regulation and attachment” (p. 95). 
 
 “The corpus callosum begins to develop at the end of the first year, is 
 significantly developed by age 4, and continues to mature past the age of 10”  
 (p. 95).  
 
 “At birth, the human brain is dependent on caretakers for its survival and growth” 
 (p. 216). 
 
 Technology Metaphors. 
 “The right hemisphere is heavily wired to the limbic system” (p. 97). 
 
 “Through countless adaptational challenges and the process of natural selection, 
 we find ourselves with staggeringly intricate and sophisticated brains:  Ferraris—
 not fords” (p. 115). 
 
 “The control of the vast majority of our bodily and mental functions is on 
 automatic pilot” (p. 115). 
 
 “This carryover of past learning into the present where it may be irrelevant or 
 destructive is certainly one of the contemporary human brain’s design flaws”  
 (p. 136). 
 
 “It seems that the parietal lobes developed a parallel capacity for constructing and 
 navigating a map of internal, imaginal space” (p. 141). 
 
 “High levels of cortisol, dopamine, and bottom-up inhibition from the amygdala 
 can all take the prefrontal cortex ‘off-line’ during stress” (p. 157). 
 
 “Much of neural integration takes place in the association areas of the frontal, 
 temporal, and parietal lobes, which serve to coordinate, regulate, and direct 
 multiple neural circuits. They are our conscious switchboard operators” (p. 164). 
 
 “Now she was sharing the content of her internal dialogue, likely programmed 
 early in life” (p. 173). 
 
 “The right-hemisphere-biased circuits of the social brain come online at birth”  
 (p. 182). 
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 “Genes first serve to organize the brain and trigger sensitive periods, while 
 experience orchestrates genetic transcription in the ongoing adaptive shaping of 
 neural systems, so that experience becomes the actual hardware of our brains”  
 (p. 216). 
 
 “Environmental programming is a term used to describe this orchestration of 
 epigenetic factors” (p. 217). 
 
 “Although we are genetically programmed to become anxious about things like 
 snakes or abandonment, fear can be learned by pairing any thought, feeling, or 
 sensation with a noxious stimulus” (p. 245). 
 
 “NE activation makes us become vigilant, scan for danger, and maintain a posture 
 of tense readiness. It also heightens our memory for danger, creating a sort of 
 ‘print now’ command for amygdala memory circuits” (p. 249). 
 
 “On the other hand, evolution has also provided us with caretakers who allow us 
 to link into their developed cortex until our own is ready” (p. 253). 
 
 “We mature into self-awareness having been programmed by early experience 
 with sensory and emotional assumptions that we accept as truth” (p. 309). 
 
 Building and infrastructure metaphors. 
 “Mirror neurons may bridge the gap between sender and receiver, helping us 
 understand one another” (p. 188). 
 
 “Keep in mind that, just as in rats, these systems are also built by the attachments 
 they come to control. Thus, our learning history comes to be reflected in the 
 architecture of our neural systems” (p. 228). 
 
 “The caretaking and resonance behaviors made possible by the cingulate also 
 provide an important component of the neural infrastructure for social cooperation 
 and empathy” (p. 229). 
 
 “The insula begins life on the lateral surfaces of the brain, only to become hidden 
 by the rapid expansion of the frontal and temporal lobes” (p. 229). 
 
 “The hippocampus is constantly remodeled to keep abreast of current 
 environmental changes” (p. 254). 
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 Personification. 
 “Although most neural processing requires the contribution of both hemispheres, 
 there are situations when the hemispheres not only think differently but also 
 compete with one another” (p. 93). 
 
 “Overall, the left side of the brain appears to be in charge of the successful 
 navigation of the social world” (p. 98). 
 
 “This allows each human brain to be a unique blending of nature and nurture as it 
 builds its structures through interactions and molding itself to its environment”  
 (p. 216). 
 
 “In essence, rats who receive more maternal attention have brains that are more 
 robust, resilient, and nurturing of others” (p. 218). 
 
 “In interpersonal situations, our amygdala reflexively and unconsciously 
 appraises others in the context of our past experiences” (p. 244). 
